A Critical Study Of The Parliament’s Power To Legislate On State Subjects
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Category: General Law
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A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE PARLIAMENT’S POWER TO
LEGISLATE ON STATE SUBJECTS
Kashish Vaishnavi, Symbiosis International University
ABSTRACT
This research paper explores the complex and dynamic field of legislative jurisdiction under federal systems, with a particular emphasis on the Parliament's power to enact legislation on matters falling under the jurisdiction of state governments. The allocation of legislative powers between central and state authorities is a fundamental aspect of constitutional governance within the framework of federalism. This study aims to investigate the degree to which the Parliament, in its sovereign position, can infringe onto matters that fall under the jurisdiction of individual states, and the potential consequences of such infringements on the intricate power dynamics inherent in federal systems.
This comprehensive evaluation entails a scrutiny of pertinent legal laws, significant judicial rulings, and constitutional concepts that regulate the allocation of legislative powers within the particular framework of India, but also holding broader significance for federal systems globally. This study explores the historical progression of the doctrine of legislative competence and its impact on the dynamics of center-state interactions throughout different periods. In addition, this paper examines the socio-political implications of legislative overreach by the Parliament into areas that fall under the jurisdiction of individual states. These implications encompass possible confrontations, administrative intricacies, and the gradual reduction of states' autonomy.
This study also examines the function of judicial review in the interpretation and protection of the federal structure by examining the legality of legislation pertaining to matters under state jurisdiction. The study underscores the need of preserving the intricate balance between central and state governments within a federal system, placing emphasis on the necessity for distinct delineation of legislative powers, efficient means for resolving disputes, and the value of collaborative federalism. This analysis provides valuable perspectives on the difficulties encountered by federal systems in preserving this balance amidst changing social, economic, and political circumstances. In summary, this research paper makes a valuable contribution to the current academic discussion on federalism.
It offers a thorough examination of the Parliament's authority to enact legislation pertaining to matters within the jurisdiction of the states. Moreover, it adopts a critical standpoint that emphasises the importance of constitutional caution and collaborative
governance within federal systems. This statement illuminates the dynamic character of federalism and emphasises the importance of maintaining a balanced relationship between central and state governments, while upholding the fundamental ideals of federalism.
CHAPTER – 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1)
BACKGROUND:
Federalism demands a careful balance of central and local power and responsibility. A strong central government and independent state administrations with legislative power are balanced by the constitution. Government depends on legislative power. This allocation depends on whether the Indian Parliament can legislate outside state jurisdiction. The report, "An Analytical Examination of the Parliament's Legislative Authority over State Matters," examines federal legislative power. The complexity of this authority, its impact on federal power allocation, and judicial scrutiny are examined in this paper. Analysis will centre on India, a federal democratic republic with a Constitution that supports federalism and gives Parliament wide legislative power. Parliamentary scrutiny of state concerns is not new to India.
Numerous federal systems worldwide struggle to define central legislative authority and divide power between federal and central legislative bodies. Although centred on India, the research has worldwide federalism implications. Federalism must accommodate diverse areas and populations under Democratic rule. Success requires delicate authority distribution and reciprocal recognition of each governance level's jurisdiction. Central legislatures interfering with state issues challenges federalism, constitutionalism, and partnership. This study examines Parliament's state-level legislation authority's historical, legal, and practical effects. This study examines landmark legal cases, constitutional provisions, and court interpretations affecting Indian legislative authority.
This study suggests federal dynamics encroachments may produce tension, administrative issues, and state sovereignty loss. The judiciary's role in upholding the federal system and balancing the central and state governments is also examined. This study underlines the need to reconsider federalism's constitutional objectives and adapt them to modern problems in a time of rapid social, economic, and political change. Given this complicated framework, legislative power must fluctuate with a country's needs and goals. This study addresses Parliament's state-issue legislative jurisdiction for federalism scholarship. This
paper examines the complex relationship between central and state governments to emphasise the need for constitutional care and federal principles in a changing political climate.
1.2) CONCEPTUALIZING FEDERALISM :
Federalism is a government system with a central authority and subordinate states or provinces. Federalism balances centralised, national governance with regional autonomy. Collective sovereignty, distributed decision-making, and a divided legal system allow diverse areas or nations to abide by a common political framework. Federal regimes vary in architecture, emphasising central power or state rights. Federalism is a government concept. Federal nations use this system for governance, legislative authority, and conflict resolution. Federalism's flexibility allows it to meet each nation's sociopolitical needs.
1.3) INDIAN FEDERAL STRUCTURE :
Indian federalism is complex and splits authority between the central government and states. Quasi-federal India has federal and unitary qualities to meet its diversity. The 1950 Indian Constitution introduced federalism. The Seventh Schedule helps Parliament and state legislatures divide power. This schedule includes the Union, State, and Concurrent Lists. The Union List includes central government concerns, the State List state government issues, and the Concurrent List issues both levels can control. Parliamentary legislation sometimes makes the central government supreme in conflicts. The complex federal structure encourages cooperative federalism, allowing the central and state governments to collaborate on India's many and fast changing governance concerns.
1.4) RESEARCH PROBLEM:
The central focus of this study pertains to the constitutional and practical ramifications associated with the Parliament's jurisdiction to enact legislation on matters typically under the purview of state governments within a federal system. This study specifically examines the influence of exercising this power on the intricate equilibrium of federalism, state autonomy, and cooperative governance in India.
1.5) RESEARCH OBJECTIVE:
This study examines India's federal structure. The main goal of this study is to examine the
constitutional structure that divides legislative functions between the federal Parliament and state legislatures. This study will trace these regulations from pre-independence to the present. This study also examines how key legal decisions and judicial doctrines have interpreted and protected the federal system. This study critically examines the effects of legislative encroachments into state administration sectors. The social, political, and administrative effects of such encroachments are examined. This study also critically evaluates cooperative federalism and its ability to resolve legislative jurisdiction overlap issues. This is done by examining several cooperative governance models and learning from them. The study compares federal systems worldwide to highlight lessons from other countries.
This study concludes by assessing India's federal system's challenges in light of shifting societal dynamics. It also suggests redistributing legislative jurisdiction to address these concerns while upholding federalism. This study adds to the corpus of information on federalism and offers policymakers and stakeholders involved in India's federal system valuable insights.
1.6) LITERATURE REVIEW:
“FEDERALISM IN THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION” by A. K. Ghosal1 The publication offers a thorough examination of the intricate power dynamics between the central government and states, incorporating a historical lens and addressing present-day complexities. The author adeptly explores the constitutional provisions, judicial interpretations, and political factors that influence the formation of Indian federalism. The book elucidates the intricacies of this system in a manner that is both lucid and captivating, underscoring its significance within the context of a heterogeneous and expansive country such as India. This publication is highly recommended for scholars, policymakers, and individuals seeking a comprehensive grasp of the complexities surrounding federal governance inside the largest democratic nation globally. •
“CENTRE-STATE GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN THE INDIAN FEDERAL
SYSTEM” by Alice Jacob2
1 GHOSAL, A. K. “FEDERALISM IN THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION.” The Indian Journal of Political
Science, vol. 14, no. 4, 1953, pp. 317–32.
2 Jacob, Alice. “CENTRE-STATE GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN THE INDIAN FEDERAL SYSTEM.”
Journal of the Indian Law Institute, vol. 10, no. 4, 1968, pp. 583–636.
The scholarly article titled "An Examination of Centre-State Governmental Relations within the Indian Federal System" offers a thorough examination of the complex dynamics that govern the federal system of India. The literature study provides a critical analysis of the role played by cooperative federalism, judicial interventions, and political pressures in developing intergovernmental interactions. This study provides significant observations regarding the dynamic characteristics of federalism in India, elucidating its merits and demerits. This publication is an essential resource for academics and policymakers who are interested in gaining a more comprehensive grasp of India's federal governance arrangement •
“WORKING THE METAPHOR: THE CONTRASTING USE OF "PITH AND
SUBSTANCE" IN INDIAN AND AUSTRALIAN LAW” by Tony Blackshield3 Tony Blackshield's journal, "Working the Metaphor: The Contrasting Use of 'Pith and Substance' in Indian and Australian Law," is a thought-provoking exploration of how the legal concept of "pith and substance" is applied differently in the legal systems of India and Australia. Blackshield's work meticulously dissects the historical and jurisprudential roots of this concept, highlighting the nuances and complexities of its interpretation and application in the two countries. The literature review underscores Blackshield's expertise and provides a valuable resource for legal scholars and practitioners seeking insights into the comparative analysis of legal principles and their practical implications in federal systems. • “POSITION OF THE STATES UNDER THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION” by S. A. H Haqqi4 S. A. H.
Haqqi's journal, "Position of the States Under the Indian Constitution," offers a
comprehensive examination of the role and status of states within the Indian constitutional framework. Haqqi's scholarly work meticulously dissects the constitutional provisions, historical evolution, and contemporary dynamics that define the relationship between the central government and the individual states in India. With a keen focus on legal and political aspects, this literature review underscores Haqqi's expertise in the subject matter, making it an
3 Blackshield, Tony. “WORKING THE METAPHOR: THE CONTRASTING USE OF ‘PITH AND SUBSTANCE’
IN INDIAN AND AUSTRALIAN LAW.” Journal of the Indian Law Institute, vol. 50, no. 4, 2008, pp. 518–68.
4 Haqqi, S. A. H. “POSITION OF THE STATES UNDER THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION.” The Indian Journal of
Political Science, vol. 22, no. 1/2, 1961, pp. 43–52
essential resource for scholars, policymakers, and anyone seeking an in-depth understanding of the intricate interplay of powers and responsibilities. • “THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA by Shukla” V. N. (Vijaya Narain)5 V. N. Shukla's seminal work, "The Constitution of India," stands as a foundational text in the
realm of Indian constitutional law. This comprehensive and meticulously crafted treatise delves deep into the intricacies of the Indian Constitution. Shukla, with profound legal insight, explores its historical roots, drafting process, and constitutional provisions. His work is an indispensable resource for scholars, legal practitioners, and policymakers alike, providing unparalleled clarity on the complexities of India's constitutional framework. With its enduring relevance and authoritative analysis, this book continues to be a cornerstone in the study of Indian constitutionalism, shaping the discourse on the nation's legal and political landscape.
CHAPTER – 2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND FRAMEWORK
2.1) DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS (Article 245-255) :
Indian Constitution Articles 245–255 govern Parliament and State Legislatures' legislative functions. The Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution divides legislative authorities into the Union List, State List, and Concurrent List, which includes the above articles. “Key provisions are briefly described: • Article 245 provision allows the Indian Parliament to pass laws that apply nationwide or to specific regions. In contrast, the State Legislature can pass state-specific laws. • Article 246 of the Indian Constitution defines Parliament and State Legislature legislation range and competence. It divides legislative matters into the Union List, State List, and Concurrent List. The Union List only includes Parliament-legislated items. The State List only covers issues that state legislatures can legislate. Both Parliament and State Legislatures have Concurrent List jurisdiction.
In disagreements,
5 SHARAN, P. “CONSTITUTION OF INDIA AND JUDICIAL REVIEW.” The Indian Journal of Political Science,
vol. 39, no. 4, 1978, pp. 526–37.
Parliamentary legislation prevails. • Article 247 of the constitution grants Parliament the power to establish new courts. Parliament can establish more courts to enforce Union List legislation. • Article 248 gives Parliament the authority to enact legislation for matters outside the Union List, State List, or Concurrent List. Some call these powers residuary. • According to Article 249 of the constitution, Parliament can pass laws on State List matters if it is in the best interest of the nation. • Article 250 of the Constitution gives Parliament the power to pass State List legislation in emergencies. In an emergency, Parliament can pass State List laws under this article. • Inconsistency between Parliament and State Legislature statutes is addressed under Article 251 of the Indian Constitution.
• Under Article 252 of the Constitution, Parliament can pass legislation for multiple states if it wins agreement from the concerned states and approval from other states. • Article 253 authorises laws for foreign agreements. • Article 254 of the Indian Constitution resolves conflicts between Parliament and State Legislatures. This concerns discrepancies between Union and State legislative activities on Concurrent List topics. • Article 255 covers referral and prior sanction processes. Concept or previous sanction requirements in the legislative process should be considered procedural rather than affecting the legality or effectiveness of the passed legislation”. These articles explain India's constitutional framework for legislative functions and the balance of power between Parliament and state governments.
2.2) THE SEVENTH SCHEDULE:
The Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution divides legislative power between Parliament and state governments into three lists. Union, State, and Concurrent Lists, respectively. The
Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution is summarised below: The Parliament of India has exclusive legislative competence over the Union List, often known as List I. The federal government has exclusive power over these issues. Defence, international affairs, atomic energy, and finance are among the Union List topics. List II, the State List, lists all areas that Indian state legislatures can legislate on. Only state governments have control over these topics. The State List covers law enforcement, public healthcare, agriculture, and municipal governance. List III, the Concurrent List, states that Parliament and State Legislatures share legislative ability to approve laws. The central law prevails in disputes between the central and a state over the same issue. This section covers criminal law, marriage and divorce, education, and bankruptcy and insolvency.
The Seventh Schedule's legislative power allotment is crucial to India's federal structure. This divides jurisdiction between the national and state governments. Concurrent jurisdiction helps maintain a balance of authorities and promote uniformity in certain areas. Articles 246–255 of the Constitution explain how these legislative rights are exercised and what happens when Parliament and State Legislatures pass conflicting laws.
2.3) RESIDUARY POWERS:
Article 248 of the Indian Constitution covers residuary powers. Article 248 and the 1st Schedule of the Constitution outline Parliament's remaining legislative powers. Article 248 of the Indian Constitution grants Parliament sole legislative competence over matters not in the Concurrent List or State List. If an issue is not specifically listed and does not come under state government jurisdiction, it is considered to be within Parliament's residual powers. The central government's residuary authorities must prevent legislative gaps and cover areas not specifically delegated to the states or subject to concurrent authority under national law. To maintain the nation's federal framework, the Indian Constitution divides powers between the national and state governments. The residual powers of Parliament are limited to matters not explicitly listed in the Union, State, or Concurrent Lists.
Articles 249, 250, and 253 of the Constitution outline the conditions under which Parliament can pass laws on issues that may
fall under state governments or the Concurrent List. In the case of CESC Ltd. v. Union Of India (2004)6 the Indian Supreme Court evaluated Article 248 and Entry 97 Union List residuary powers. The court upheld the central government's authority to legislate on topics not covered by the three lists (Union, State, and Concurrent) and highlighted the federal system's necessity for residuary powers. It confirmed the central government's control over uncounted subjects. Federal systems define residuary powers differently, and case law in this area may be specific to the country's constitution and legal framework. Legal scholars and practitioners can comprehend how federal jurisdictions exercise residuary powers using such examples.
2.4) AMENDMENT PROCEDURE (Article 368) :
Article 368 grants the ability to change the Indian Constitution. The paper outlines Constitutional amendment procedures and jurisdiction. Article 368 also describes how to modify the constitution. Multiple clauses of Article 368 describe Constitutional amendment. A simple majority of Parliamentarians in each chamber can modify certain provisions of the Constitution. The amendments do not require a supermajority or state legislature approval. Changes to state names or boundaries are examples of such amendments. Adjustments to the federal framework of the Constitution, including changes to the allocation of legislative authority between the central and state governments and to constitutional provisions that directly affect the states, are necessary. Many constraints limit India's constitutional amending power.
Parliament can change most Constitutional provisions, but it cannot change the "basic structure" or fundamental qualities. The Supreme Court of India protects the Constitution's core values of democracy, the rule of law, federalism, and secularism from regular changes. Parliament can change Article 368 after its amendment. However, any change to Article 368 that affects Constitutional amendment requires a majority vote from at least half of the state legislatures.
6 CESC Ltd. v. Union Of India (2004) 1992 AIR 573.
In summary, Article 368 of the Indian Constitution governs Constitutional modification procedures and authority. Amendments that require a simple majority, special majority, or state legislature ratification are distinguished. Additionally, it recognises that the Constitution's "basic structure," or core, is unchangeable. Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)7is a landmark case which has a great constitutional significance in Indian law. Parliament cannot change the Constitution's essential foundation, according to the Supreme Court. Instead of listing all the key framework elements, the court listed democracy, the rule of law, federalism, secularism, and judicial autonomy. The "basic structure doctrine," a constitutional premise imposed by the judicial ruling, limits legislative amendment powers. The Supreme Court restated the fundamental structure idea in Minerva Mills Ltd.
v. Union of India (1980)8 and stated that the power to modify the Constitution does not include the power to remove its fundamental framework. The court stressed that judicial review is crucial to the fundamental framework, protecting the Constitution's essence. Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975)9, talks not about amendments but it highlighted Parliament's constitutional amendment limits. The 39th Amendment was declared unconstitutional due to its restriction on judicial review after the legal struggle. In the case of Waman Rao v. Union of India (1981)10 the Supreme Court upheld the 42nd Amendment Act, which added Article 31-C to the Constitution to protect land reform laws from judicial review. Despite Article 31-C, the court clarified that infringing on the Constitution's core structure is illegal. S. R. Bommai v.
Union of India (1994)11, though not a constitutional amendment precedent, upheld the federal nature of the Indian Constitution and stressed the importance of protecting its federal framework.
7 Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) AIR 1973 SC 1461
8 Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980) 1981 SCR (1) 206
9 Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) 1975 AIR 1590
10 Waman Rao v. Union of India (1981) 1981 2 SCR 1
11 S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 1994 SCC (3) 1
These judicial decisions establish the constitutional principle that Parliament can amend the Constitution under Article 368, but it cannot change or abolish its basic structure. Legal interpretation modifies the fundamental framework's precise definition throughout time. This notion protects key Indian Constitutional ideas from frequent modifications
CHAPTER – 3
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
3.1) THE DOCTRINE OF PITH AND SUBSTANCE:
The legal principle known as the Doctrine of Pith and Substance is employed to ascertain the genuine character or essence of a law and to ascertain if it is within the legislative jurisdiction of the entity that promulgated it. The aforementioned idea holds special significance within federal systems characterised by the division of legislative functions among distinct levels of government, as exemplified by countries like India and Canada. The following are notable legal cases that exemplify the practical implementation of the Doctrine of Pith and Substance: In the case of R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala v. The Union of India (1957)12, the court examined the legal issues at hand. The matter at hand pertained to the determination of whether the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887, fell within the purview of the state government or the central government.
The Act was modified to incorporate "betting and gambling" as areas of focus. The application of the Doctrine of Pith and Substance by the Supreme Court of India resulted in the determination that the legislation in question was primarily intended to address the issue of gambling, an area falling within the purview of the state's authority. Consequently, the statute was deemed to be legally sound within the jurisdiction of the state's legislative authority. The case of State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara (1951)13 is a significant legal matter that warrants examination. The subject matter of this lawsuit pertained to the Bombay Prohibition Act of 1949, a legislative measure that imposed restrictions on the sale and possession of alcoholic beverages. The matter at hand pertained to the potential infringement of the central
12 R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala v. The Union of India (1957), 1957 AIR 628
13 State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara (1951) 1951 SCR 682
government's authority to regulate intoxicating liquors as outlined in the central Excise Act. The primary focus of the statute was analysed by the Supreme Court, which determined that its principal objective was the ban of spirits, a matter falling under the competence of the state. As a result, it affirmed the legal soundness of the statute within the purview of the state's legislative authority. In the case of Union of India v. H. S. Dhillon (1972)14, the court examined the legal matters at hand. The present legal matter pertained to the legitimacy of the Gold Control Act of 1968, a legislative measure designed to govern the possession, trade, and utilisation of gold. The matter at hand pertained to the potential infringement of the state's authority to enact legislation pertaining to trade and commerce as outlined in the Constitution.
The application of the Doctrine of Pith and Substance by the Supreme Court led to the determination that the primary purpose of the statute in question was the regulation of gold as a valuable resource, rather than the regulation of trade and commerce, an area falling within the purview of the central government's authority. Consequently, the legality of the law was upheld. The case of Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) however also served to underline the significance of the Doctrine of Pith and Substance in the interpretation of the allocation of legislative powers between the central government and state governments in India. These examples serve as illustrations of how courts employ the Doctrine of Pith and Substance to ascertain the genuine nature and principal objective of legislative measures.
The objective is to ascertain the categorization of law based on its prevailing subject matter and its alignment with the legislative jurisdiction of the relevant governing body, be it the central government or a state government within a federal framework.
3.2) IMPLICATION OF LEGISLATIVE OVERREACH AND CHALLENGES TO
FEDERAL BALANCE:
The Indian Constitution took effect on January 26, 1950, marking a milestone for a society that values equality, fairness, liberty, and brotherhood. The preamble values of the Constitution
14 Union of India v. H. S. Dhillon (1972) 1972 SCR (2) 33
must be upheld by all subcontinental governments. All national ideal-based arrangements reflect the Constitution's justice. The Constitution's authors recognised the necessity to balance government power and obligations by state population. Recently, India's federal system and institutions have been most threatened.
1. Encroachments on state autonomy in state topics undermine federal balance.
2. Article 370 repeal was one of several politically heated choices made without state legislature
or stakeholder engagement in recent years.
3. By included "agriculture" in the state list, Parliament imposed a law on the states in the three
problematic farm bills. The New Education Policy 2020 may weaken the federal government.
4. BSF expanded to Assam, West Bengal, and Punjab without government approval.
5. States might buy testing kits, vaccinate residents, implement the 2005 Disaster Management
Act, and lock down the country without warning to manage COVID-19. To escape criticism, the unprepared Second Wave administration called health a "State subject".
CHAPTER – 4
4.1) ANALYSIS:
Constitutional federation of Indian states. Indian Constitution divides legislative and executive power between central government and Union, State, and Concurrent states. Federalism requires power-sharing. Federal states are supposed to divide federal and state governments. Legislative powers are governed by the Constitution's fundamental rights and other articles, as well as the Union and State legislatures' division of legislative jurisdiction (as outlined in the 3 lists). Parliament can legislate on State List issues in certain cases. Article 249 allows parliament to pass a law on a state list issue if the Rajya Sabha passes a resolution with 2/3rd majority of present and eligible voters declaring national relevance. Article 250 of the Constitution lets Parliament pass state list laws.
Except for pre-proclamation measures, parliamentary legislation must expire six months after the proclamation and article 252 states that two or more state legislatures can agree to let parliament regulate state matters.
Apart from that, the Parliament can pass laws countrywide to implement any treaty, international agreement, or convention India has signed under Article-253 of the Indian Constitution. However, if a state's constitutional system fails, the president may allow the parliament to exercise its duties under Article-356. Parliamentary bills passed after the president's departure were invalid after six months. Currently, the Union Parliament has more legislative power than the States. States are somewhat dependent on the federal government since they lack exclusive jurisdiction over Constitutionally authorised topics. Historical factors led India's founders to centralise the union. The central authority needs strong powers to suppress separatist groups to maintain order in a varied society. The Supreme Court of India ruled in M. Karunanidhi v.
Union of India15 that a Central Act on the Concurrent list will supersede a State Act if their provisions directly conflict. Indian Union v. S. R. Bommai involved the misuse of Article 356 of the Indian Constitution, where the Supreme Court enacted Article 356 to limit state government dissolution to rare cases when the legislature loses confidence in them. On January 10, public interest case of Ramalingam v. India & Another16 challenged the Dam Safety Act, 2021. On December 14, the Gazette issued the controversial Dam Safety Act. Petitioner claims Parliament cannot legislate. The petition declares the challenged Act "void ab initio" for flagrantly violating Indian Constitution Articles 14, 19, and 21. The petition claims the impugned Act violates Entry 17 of List-II of the Constitution's 7th Schedule. State legislatures regulate "water, water supplies, agriculture, and canals.
" After evaluating the four factors, the State claimed sole sovereignty over dams, embankments, and other water storage units, as well as its works, land, and structures, including land rights. Parliament can't limit Entry 56 to state dams and embankments.
4.2) COOPERATIVE FEDRALISM AS A SOLUTION:
Latin "foedus" meaning "agreement" or "treaty," from which "federalism" comes. Federalism is unique in its centralization and decentralisation. Federalism is needed since India has several states with different cultures. The Indian federal government, states, and municipalities benefit from cooperative federalism. Indian cooperative federalism promotes a balanced system where
15 M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India 1979 SCR (3) 254
16 Ramalingam v. India & Another 1985 SCR (2) 951
the federal government and its constituents cooperate. All levels of government must work on social, political, economic, and civic issues. Federalism is old in India but new in the West. The subcontinent's heterogeneity made the national government avoid local politics. The 1773 Regulating Act established cooperative federalism in India. Crown of England monitored but provided East India Company government power. To encourage cooperation, the Constitution's authors divided crucial functions between the federal and state governments. However, they trust Parliament and the Supreme Court
CHAPTER – 5
5.1) CONCLUSION:
Parliament's powers on state matters revolves around is delicate and dynamic in federal governance. Political compromises, constitutional requirements, judicial oversight, and national needs govern it. Balance a strong central government and empowered states for a healthy federal system and people. A healthy, effective democracy requires centre-state discussion and cooperation. Parliament's tight regulation of state interests affects democracy. Constitution specifies parliament and state government authority and responsibilities, according to this analysis. In many federal systems, state governments handle state issues while parliament handles concurrent or union list issues. Amendments to the Constitution Sometimes Parliament changes the constitution to alter state affairs. Revised laws require a special majority and sometimes affected states' assent.
A centre-state power balance exists. Parliament's state jurisdiction depends on political dynamics and centre- and state-level parties. Parliament relies on political talks and alliances. Judicial review limits parliament's power. Courts can overturn parliament-breaking center-state laws. Many nations advocate cooperative federalism, where the central and states solve problems cooperatively. Government is balanced and coordinated by Parliament and state governments. Political, social, and economic developments affect parliament-state authority. Addressing these concerns requires constitutional dexterity.
5.2) RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR SUSTAINING FEDERAL
BALANCE:
States and the federal share authority in India. Many aspects determine Indian federalism's success. Unity in Diversity Religious, linguistic, cultural, and historical distinctions exist in
India. India's federal structure gives state governments authority, preserving diversity. Each state can adjust laws for residents. The nation's rich culture has survived. Decentralising authority in Indian federalism promotes democracy and citizen involvement. State governments are closer and better at public demands. India's federal structure fosters good governance by letting states oversee economic and social growth. The Indian constitution safeguards federalism. Constitutionally, federal and state governments must cooperate for national promotion. Constitutional checks and balances prevent factions from gaining power.
REFERENCES:
https://blog.ipleaders.in/distribution-legislative-powers-union-states/ • https://legalaffairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/Concurrent%20Power%20of%20Legislati on%20under%20List%20III%20of%20the%20Indian%20Constitution.pdf • https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seventh_Schedule_to_the_Constitution_of_India • https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/pdf1/Part11.pdf