Algorithmic Astrology - When Traditional Practices Meet Modern Discrimination Law

Author: LawSphereX

Category: General Law

Published: 2026-08-23T17:47:01.758551+00:00

Updated: 2026-08-26T17:12:20.553+00:00

ALGORITHMIC ASTROLOGY: WHEN TRADITIONAL

PRACTICES MEET MODERN DISCRIMINATION LAW

Ridhima Goel, LLB, O.P. Jindal Global University

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the growth of algorithmic astrology in India, where digital platforms use artificial intelligence to replace religious predictions when it is initialized by caste, religion, gender and other inputs mix. These services all claim to offer a mechanical version of traditional processes. However, the algorithms that are hardwired, often perpetuate systemic biases, leaving room to discuss deeply troubling human rights issues under foundational anti-discrimination and constitutional principles in India. This paper questions whether these platforms are acting as indirect discrimination despite operating as religious platforms. Using a doctrinal legal methodology, I examine Articles 14, 15, 19 and 25 of the Constitution of India, past case law decisions like Navtej Singh Johar, Puttaswamy, and Sabarimala judgments.

I finally examine statutory frameworks including, the Information Technology Act, Consumer Protection Act, and the caste based anti-discriminatory legal frameworks and makes the case for equivalent law in the digital context. The paper draws comparative insights from the the UK, EU and the US to formulate an approach with respectfully greed test for algorithmic indirect discrimination and recommendations for legal reform through algorithmic auditing, an increased regulatory presence, and a new AI Ethics Commission. Finally, the paper shows that recognition of equality in the Constitution must evolve to meet the digital reproduction of the oppressive caste and religious systems, where advancements in technology do not come at the expense of social justice.

I. Introduction: Algorithmic Religious Practices and the Equality Dilemma

In modern India, the collision between ancient traditions and emerging digital technologies has created new legal opportunities. One new opportunity is algorithmic astrology—an occurrence where religiously and culturally significant predictions are made through artificial intelligence on digital platforms. These platforms frequently request inputs such as date of birth, gender, religion, and caste—inputs that build the basis for social hierarchies that are deeply part of the domestic space in India. 1 On the one hand, these digital services are claiming to automate traditional practices but increasingly are interrogated for incorporating systemic biases in violation of constitutional guarantees of equality-seeking and non-discrimination.

The legal question, therefore, is whether these algorithmic practices—though framed as religious or cultural—constitute indirect discrimination within India's legal framework. 2 In this paper, the primary legal issue is whether algorithmic astrology platforms are a form of indirect discrimination and the constitutional or statutory remedies that may be available. This is an urgent issue because the platforms, though seemingly private actors, may actually perform a quasi-public role by having an influence over making cognitive decisions such as employment; whom one would marry; or a person's social reputation. This paper utilizes a doctrinal legal research methodology. The paper is grounded in judicial case law, statutory interpretation, and comparative constitutional analysis.

From a doctrinal perspective all that is included is doctrinal analysis and nothing else is empirically or sociologically included. 3 II. Algorithmic Discrimination under the Indian Constitution

The Indian constitutional system is anchored in a meaningful commitment to substantive equality, grounded most clearly in Articles 14 and 15.4 Article 14 provides for no discrimination before the law and for equal protection of the laws. Indian courts have interpreted Article 14 as not a mere formal guarantee, but as a fluid doctrine prohibiting arbitrary action either by the legislature or executive (E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555).5 Importantly, where digital platforms utilize algorithms to formulate predictions or provide

1 Shreya Sinha & Suraj Beri, Algorithms, Discrimination and the Indian Constitution: A Framework for

Understanding Digital Bias, 15(2) INDIAN J.L. & TECH. 59 (2022). 2 Vidushi Marda, Artificial Intelligence Policy in India: A Framework for Ethical and Inclusive AI, CARNEGIE INDIA (Oct. 4, 2018), https://carnegieindia.org/2018/10/04/artificial-intelligence-policy-in-india-pub-77338.

3 Gautam Bhatia, The Transformative Constitution: A Radical Biography in Nine Acts 25–32 (2019).

4 India Const. arts. 14–15.

5 E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 555 (India).

recommendations by employing caste of religion, even if it is done in the name of culture, it is likely unconstitutional and in breach of Article 14, if these classifications fall short of unreasonableness and have no intelligible differentia. 6 The Supreme Court in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018)7 highlighted that equality also deals with indirect discrimination, where otherwise neutral rules disproportionately burden particular groups. The algorithms implemented by astrology platforms may not discriminate in ways that are apparent; however, it is possible for these designs, which distinguish the consequences of low compatibility or low desirability on the basis of caste or religion, to lead to results that indulge a disparate impact.

Such results would sit squarely in the fluid equality jurisprudence outlined in Navtej, further buttressed by the Supreme Court's endorsement of privacy and autonomy in K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)8. In Puttaswamy, the Court held that when an agency gathers information about individuals and seeks to deduct values from it, or to profile them let alone in an automated way, their actions are to be judged by the constitutional guarantees of dignity and autonomy. 9 Religious freedom as contained in Article 25 does permit individuals and groups to practice their religion freely. 10 However, the freedom of religion is not absolute, and is limited by public order, morality, and health, as well as other Fundamental Rights. In Indian Young Lawyers Association v.

State of Kerala (2018) 10 SCC 68911, the Supreme Court allowed women to enter the Sabarimala temple and ruled that religious practices must be judged against the standard of constitutional morality. 12 If caste-based exclusions are incorporated into algorithmic astrology as religious orthodoxy, they are not impervious to scrutiny. Freedom of religion cannot be a defence for structural exclusion, or technological discrimination. Commercial speech is relevant in Article 19(1)(a) too, especially because astrology platforms are engaged in advertising or publishing predictions. In Tata Press Ltd. v. MTNL (1995)13, the Court recognized commercial speech as free speech. However, as the Supreme Court held in

6 Id.

7 Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 S.C.C. 1 (India).

8 K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 S.C.C. 1 (India).

9 Id.

10 India Const. art. 25.

11 Indian Young Lawyers Ass’n v. State of Kerala, (2018) 10 S.C.C. 689 (India).

12 Id.

13 Tata Press Ltd. v. Mahanagar Tel. Nigam Ltd., (1995) 5 S.C.C. 139 (India).

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015)14, the right is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2) if it expands on dangerous or discriminatory content. Hence, algorithm-derived outputs, whether framed as religious or cultural speech, must still conform to constitutional guarantees against discrimination and the right to dignity. III. Legislative Framework and Algorithmic Accountability

Statutory frameworks contribute to constitutional principles and provide additional mechanisms for relief. The Information Technology Act, 2000 is a core enabling statute for the regulation of digital intermediaries. Section 79 provides conditional immunity for the intermediary, but safe harbour immunity is forfeited if due diligence requirements are left unfulfilled. 15 The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 state that platforms must not host content that discriminates or promotes enmity. 16 If, as stated above, algorithmic astrology platforms generate outputs that devalue, exclude, and humiliates users implicated by identity variables, the platforms breach due diligence obligations and will no longer be afforded immunity as intermediaries.

The Consumer Protection Act, 2019 can further apply in instances where astrology platforms are operating as online service providers. In instance, Section 2(47) defines any discriminatory service as an "unfair trade practice. "17 Section 2(6) provides consumers a right to be free from discriminatory or exploitive practices. 18 In scenarios involving algorithmic design which embeds caste-based profiling it follows that the platform could be liable to provide deficient or misleading service. Though earlier anti-discrimination statues, such as the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, were not intended for digital contexts, they are capable of extending to algorithmic practices where caste-based exclusion or humiliation are replicated offline. 19 The Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v.

Appa Balu Ingale, (1995)20 has repeatedly been willing to interpret the sections

14 Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 S.C.C. 1 (India).

15 Information Technology Act, No. 21 of 2000, § 79, Acts of Parliament, 2000 (India).

16 Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, Gazette of India, Part II, Sec. 3(i).

17 Consumer Protection Act, No. 35 of 2019, § 2(47), Acts of Parliament, 2019 (India).

18 Id. § 2(6).

19 Protection of Civil Rights Act, No. 22 of 1955, § 7; Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, No. 33 of 1989.

20 State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale, (1995) Supp. (4) S.C.C. 469 (India).

of these statues broadly in order to understand their scope and make attempt to remove direct or systemic caste-based inequities.

IV. Comparative Constitutional Perspectives

International law models offer useful examples for Indian legal reform. The UK Equality Act of 2010 provides an example of a statutory prohibition on indirect discrimination by public and private actors21, with courts holding algorithmic bias in employment and service delivery to be a form of indirect discrimination covered by the Act (R (on the application of Bridges) v. Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2020]22. The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and Article 22 in particular, provides individuals the right not to be subject to automated decision-making solely (although unpredictably) based on processing from algorithms, with a push towards transparency and contestability of the algorithmic output. 23 The United States, while the private sector is not as tightly regulated, begins to recognize trauma associated with using algorithms to replicate public functions.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged due process concerns arising from algorithmic risk assessment in sentencing in State v. Loomis,24 and although the Supreme Court found due process was not denied on the facts and permitted the practice, the use of algorithms to assist in public functions is worthy of opposition, and potentially for building reasonable limitations on the quasi-public nature of the platforms. In this respect, India could draw on such jurisprudence for incipient recognition that platforms are quasi-public actors and subject to some form of constitutional standard. V. Legal Doctrine and Enforcement Architecture

Framing indirect algorithmic discrimination in a legal context is important for clarity and enforcement. An appropriate legal test would be measuring (a) whether the algorithm is facially neutral, (b) whether it disproportionately disadvantages a protected category, and (c) whether the disadvantage is justifiable on the basis of a legitimate goal carried out with proportionate means.25 Once a prima facie showing is made, the burden should shift to the platform to show

21 Equality Act 2010, c. 15, § 19 (U.K.).

22 R (Bridges) v. Chief Constable of S. Wales Police, [2020] EWCA (Civ) 1058 (U.K.).

23 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 22, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.

24 State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 763 (Wis. 2016).

25 Tarunabh Khaitan, A Theory of Discrimination Law 56–58 (Oxford Univ. Press 2015).

justification. The structure is reminiscent of the proportionality doctrine in constitutional law, as applied in Modern Dental College and Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016)

7 SCC 353.26

State action doctrine, although underdeveloped in Indian jurisprudence would need to be revisited in this case. In cases where the private actor is acting in situations formerly governed by the state, and when the relationship has a significant public element27—e.g. marriage (see Mohd. Ahmed v. State of Gujarat (1975) 3 SCC 13), employment (see Manohar v. Ravindra (1999) 9 SCC 449 and Service Board v. Manubhai (1999) 9 SCC 454), education (see Ramesh Chander v. Haryana State (1995) 2 SCC 786 citing the applicability of the Right to Education Act on a private entity). The Supreme Court decision in Zee Telefilms v. Union of India, (2005)

4 SCC 649, determined that constitutional safeguards may apply to private entities when

performing public functions.28 Algorithms that facilitate astrology may be accountable to constitutional standards where they are otherwise impacting public decision-making. VI. Remedies and the Way Forward

Legal remedies must address the multifaceted characteristics of diffracted algorithmic discrimination. Civil remedies can take the form of tort actions for negligent algorithm design or contractual remedies for failure to provide services that are non-discriminatory. The use of complaints raised under the Consumer Protection Act29 is another means of identification that could be used effectively in local consumer forums. Constitutional remedies include writ petitions under Articles 32 and 226, especially where the petition entrepreneur or persons agree on public interest. Public Interest Litigations (PIL) can be raised as a chariot to tackle interests of the biased in algorithmic community arts. Courts can invoke writs of mandamus to viably compel government regulators to engage with platforms which design algorithms and allow practices without audit.

30 Criminal law would be invoked where outputs generated by astrology platforms incite enmity or act to insult communities or groups defined by characters such as community outline by

26 Modern Dental Coll. & Rsch. Ctr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 7 S.C.C. 353 (India).

27 Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 2 S.C.C. 556 (India).

28 Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India, (2005) 4 S.C.C. 649 (India).

29 Consumer Protection Act, No. 35 of 2019, §§ 2(6), 2(47).

30 India Const. arts. 32, 226.

invoking provisions like Sections 153A and 505 of the IPC of laws. Further, there is an opportunity where outputs demean or exclude, with reference to comparable confirmation, marginalized groups complaining as in public humiliations, under the SC/ST Atrocities Act.31 VII. Law Reform: Towards a Regulatory and Doctrinal Future

There is an urgent need for law reform. We must take immediate action to amend the Information Technology Act to ensure appropriate measures for algorithmic transparency, fairness, and accountability. It may also be worth pursuing an AI and Algorithm Regulation Act, which is common when legislation is unclear, in order to fill a doctrinal gap. Consumer protection laws must be redefined to consider automated and digital discrimination. Courts may play an important role in the algorithmic auditing process by creating judicial precedents and setting benchmarks on algorithmic audit e. g. , the style and tone of the Vishaka guidelines on workplace sexual harassment. 32 Furthermore, we need a new regulatory body – an AI Ethics Commission – to be established and tasked with the reviewing and certifying of algorithms in sensitive areas such as religion, caste and matchmaking.

The Commission must have the ability to issue binding directions and penalties, in order to enforce legal norms in a proactive manner rather than reactively. 33 Conclusion: Digital Equality and the Constitutional Horizon In this article, I have argued that algorithmic astrology platforms, while dressed up in culture and religion, often reproduce and automate traditional types of discrimination violating constitutional norms. Through a unique analysis of Indian constitutional law, statutory law, and comparative jurisprudence, I have provided a new doctrinal approach to account for algorithmic indirect discrimination. The development of equality rights in India must evolve to examine digital practices, especially those that present as authoritative instances of religion. The law must be amended to ensure tradition is not manipulated to algorithmically entrench inequality.

By doing so, Indian constitutionalism can insert itself into the era of the digital by re-affirming dignity, non-discrimination and technological justice.

31 Indian Penal Code, 1860, §§ 153A, 505.

32 Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 S.C.C. 241 (India).

33 Julie E. Cohen, Between Truth and Power: The Legal Constructions of Informational Capitalism 189–95 (Oxford Univ. Press 2019).