Balancing Judicial Independence And Accountability In India - Comparative Perspectives And Constitutional Reforms

Author: LawSphereX

Category: Constitutional & Human Rights

Published: 2026-08-23T18:24:17.361841+00:00

Updated: 2026-08-26T17:11:55.968+00:00

BALANCING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND

ACCOUNTABILITY IN INDIA: COMPARATIVE

PERSPECTIVES AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

Janak Sejpal, SVKM's Pravin Gandhi College of Law

ABSTRACT

Judicial independence and accountability are necessary twin pillars of constitutional democracies. The judiciary in India has been bestowed with vast autonomy to afford insulation of the institution vis-a-vis other organs of the state for the protection of the rule of law and rights of the citizenry. However, independence without accountability promotes inefficiency, opacity, and arbitrariness on the contrary. Excessive accountability inhibits judicial impartiality and gutsiness. As an intermediate institution, the development of the judiciary in India—especially the collegium systemcome with strengths and weaknesses in the judicial architecture.

While our Constitution makers while drafting the Constitution have borrowed from multiple jurisdictions and later tailored it according to Indian needs and experiences, we can once again attempt to follow the same practice so as to repair the cracks which are harming our institutions ever since. Taking cues from Indian experience and international comparisons from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, this paper offers proposals like transparent appointments, structured oversight of misconduct, and a strengthened internal ethics framework for the balance of independence and accountability. Only through rebalancing will India be able to succeed in having judicial integrity without sacrificing judicial freedom. In our endeavour to achieve so, we must shed our prejudices and look outwards for inspiration. This paper is a reflection of the same.

Introduction The judiciary is very important to the process of constitutional governance, as it represents the final authority in interpreting the Constitution and the guardian of the rights of the individual. An independent judiciary gives confidence in the fact that judges should be allowed to do their jobs without interference from the executive, the legislature, or from any other pressures outside the courtroom. Judicial responsibility ensures that the judges are responsible for their behaviour and decisions, thus achieving the confidence of the public. India saw the course of judicial independence closely tied up with historical events, such as the Emergency (1975-1977), that revealed vulnerabilities in judicial autonomy.

But with time and increased power of the judiciary, accountability questions started rising, mainly on these three issues: appointments, transparency, and allegations of misconduct. The Collegium was at the forefront of such a debate that put the issue of appointments firmly in the hands of the judiciary but operated in the most untransparent manner. Impeachment, the strongest disciplining tool against judges, is also cumbersome and infrequently used. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the necessities of balancing judicial independence with accountability. Drawing from the Indian constitutional framework, landmark cases, and comparative models of other democracies, the analysis argues that there exists a necessity to address the opacity and inefficiency of the judiciary without diluting its autonomy.

Conclusions of Recommendations for reforms uniquely suited for the Indian socio-political landscape also form the last sections of this paper. Judicial Independence in India: Legal Framework and Challenges I. Constitutional Provisions to Safeguard Judicial Independence

The Constitution of India provides several provisions for the safeguarding of judicial independence: ● Appointment and Removal of Judges (Articles 124 and 217): In this article, the President appoints the judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, after consulting with the judiciary, which then lessens the dominance of the executive over appointments.

● Tenure Security : Judges in the Supreme Court can retire when they attain an age of 65 years, and those in the High Courts, when they attain the age of 62 years. Removal is possible only through impeachment for "proven misbehaviour or incapacity," and this gives protection from arbitrary removal. ● Judicial Salaries and Benefits : Article 125 ensures that the pay of judges cannot be altered by the executive and is charged to the Consolidated Fund of India. ● Separation of Powers (Article 50): This Directive Principle prompts the State to separate the Judiciary with the Executive thus cutting away potential interference in judicial functions. These constitutional guarantees reflect the intent of the framers to create a judiciary insulated against outer pressures while at the same time ensuring impartial adjudication. II. Evolution of Judicial Independence Through Landmark Cases

Judicial independence in India has undergone numerous developments through the years largely due to landmark judgments by the Supreme Court. Every case has defined, expanded, and refined the judiciary's autonomy, particularly on matters related to appointments, separation of powers, and checks on executive authority. Here is a deeper analysis on the most influential cases in this regard: 1. A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950) - Judiciary's Early Show of Deference to Legislature This is an early case showing the judiciary's initial deference toward the legislature in matters of constitutional interpretation. In A. K. Gopalan, the petitioner challenged the detention by Preventive Detention Act, 1950 against him alleging that it violated Articles 19 and 21 of the fundamental rights.

The Supreme Court, with a restrictive reading, stated that Article 21, relating to protection of life and personal liberty, was a standalone Article different from other fundamental rights, and procedural laws enacted by Parliament would be sustained unless they violated statutory procedure. The Court construed the constitution literally and was reluctant to question the power of the executive or the legislature, which also reflected lesser

judicial independence at the time. This case was later reversed in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), which is considered a landmark shift towards an interventionist judiciary. 2. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967) - Assertion of Judicial Power Over Parliament In Golaknath, the Supreme Court gave a landmark ruling in that Parliament could not amend Part III of the Constitution which are the Fundamental Rights. It was a judgement that posed very severe restraints on the power of the legislature and strengthened judicial autonomy. Significance: The Court declared that fundamental rights were non-derogable. Any constitutional amendment that altered it, was declared void by them. This judgement made the judiciary the supreme interpreter and protector of the Constitution, thereby enhancing its independence vis-à-vis Parliament.

Owing to this, it was considered very controversial and ultimately led to the enmity between the judiciary and the executive that passed the 24th Constitutional Amendment (1971) whereby it enabled the Parliament to amend any section of the Constitution including the fundamental rights. 3. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)- Basic Structure Doctrine The historic case before us represents the bedrock of judicial independence in India. The case against Kesavananda Bharati posed questions about constitutional validity over a series of amendments aimed at curtailment of property rights and extension of powers of the state. A 13-judge bench delivered a split 7:6 verdict ruling Parliament had the power to amend the Constitution but could not do away with the "basic structure" of the Constitution.

It laid down the Doctrine of Basic Structure which led the Supreme Court to declare that judicial independence is one of the basic features of the Constitution, which could not be transferred or diluted by Parliament. This judgement ensured that the judiciary would stand as a check on the overreaching legislative authority with an arbitrary amendment to the Constitution. Owing to this ruling, the relationship between the executive and the judiciary did not improve, but deteriorated into an acrimonious one for the Indian judicial history. 4. Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) - Crisis and Judicial Resilience The most potent attack on the judiciary occurred in 1975-77, during the Emergency.

There was a direct threat to its independence when the Allahabad High Court cancelled the election of Indira Gandhi based on electoral malpractice. In this regard, Parliament passed a constitutional amendment to place the election of the Prime Minister beyond judicial review. When the matter reached the Supreme Court, it accepted some of the amendments but struck down some others. This once again underscored the fundamental importance of judicial review as a part of the basic structure. The judgement, however, also reflected the vulnerability of the Court at periods of political turbulence. The later period was one of the darkest phases that judicial independence had to face. During this period, Emergency saw the judges being pressed to subscribe to executive decisions. A judgement most notorious was ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla.

It showed how badly the judiciary had failed as the Supreme Court ruled that even the right of fundamental rights could be suspended during an emergency. 5. S. P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) - First Judges Case: This case was about the Judiciary's Limited Role in Appointments. It was about whether the judiciary should have a role in judicial appointments or to what extent it should be involved. The Supreme Court held that primacy of the executive must be accepted in matters of judicial appointments and that the role of the judiciary is merely consultative. The judgement diluted the judicial influence on selection and laid the process open to interference by the executive. Due to this, the judgement has been widely criticised for impairing the independence of the judiciary because it granted the executive too much influence in matters of selecting judges. 6.

Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (1993)-Second Judges Case: Collegium System Emerge The most significant judgement of the Supreme Court was where it overruled the First Judges Case and established the collegium system, which gave the judiciary supremacy in the appointive process. Here, the Court held that the term "consultation" under articles 124 and

217 implied concurrence, thereby preventing the executive from overriding judicial

recommendations. It introduced the Collegium System of appointment. It was the collegium that took the powers to recruit and transfer judges into their hands. This constituted the high echelons of judges. The structure of the collegium was such that it consisted exclusively of top

3 judges of the Supreme Court based on seniority who in turn appointed other members of the

bar leading to exclusivity. The judgement obviously meant that political appointments could not be handed over to judges. However, the flip side to this is that appointments were made solely on the discretion of the 3 judges, the whole process remained opaque and sometimes arbitrary too. Thus, it has also brought concern about the lack of transparency and accountability. 7. In re Presidential Reference (1998) - Third Judges Case: This case reached the court due to some clarifications sought by the President under article 143 of the Constitution of India regarding the Collegium System. This reference was to clarify the functioning of the collegium system. The Supreme Court held that the collegium would consist of the Chief Justice of India and four senior-most judges, and all decisions would be taken by consensus.

Thus, the collegium as formulated by the Second Judges case was expanded from 3 member to being a 5 member body. Moreover it introduced a laid down procedure for appointment and hence some amount of arbitrariness was weeded out. Appointments became standardised after the collegium system; judicial authority that was to decide over appointments remained the same with equal intensity. However, attacks and criticism about obscurity and lack of accountability in collegium increased. 8. NJAC Case in 2015 Reiteration of Judicial Supremacy Over Appointments The NJAC case, also known as the Fourth Judges Case, proved to be a landmark in the progress of judicial independence. The 99th Constitutional Amendment Act attempted to replace collegium with the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC), which was composed of both the executive and judicial department.

The Supreme Court in a 4:1 ratio struck it down as an amendment by declaring that NJAC would undermine judicial independence and violate the basic structure doctrine. This judgement thus reaffirmed the autonomy of the judiciary over appointments but has started debates regarding the lack of transparency that characterises the collegium system. An attempt was made to restructure the opaque system and to let executive have a voice over the table. However, it was thwarted by Lordships as they saw it as creeping into the judicial system. This was much criticised as this judgement not only struck down a process but a commission whose need was validated by the

Parliament thereby undermining the supremacy and legitimacy of the Parliament. These led to critics calling it “ tyranny of the unelected “. Dynamic and Evolving Concept. Hence, it has developed over time, travelling from a passive interpreter of laws as in A.K. Gopalan to an active custodian of the Constitution in the Kesavananda Bharati. However, collegium - though it enhances independence also raises issues of accountability and transparency of its own sort. Every one of these cases discussed here represents one step in the evolutionary journey undertaken by the judiciary in navigating through various political challenges and asserting its role in protecting democracy. This provides a detailed examination of some of the most important judicial decisions that have defined the concept of judicial independence in India.

III. Problems Against Judicial Independence

Although the Indian Constitution does possess constitutional safeguards, some problems seem to stand against judicial independence: ● Executive Interference Although the collegium system reduces executive interference, delay in appointments shows the reluctance of the executive to clear recommendations fast. ● Bias and Nepotism: Critics argue that a collegium system facilitates nepotism and fails to put norms into practice for objective selection in favor of meritbased appointments. ● Judicial Overreach: The courts are entering into policy matters-related issues, such as issues of environmental regulations and governance. This raises criticism against judicial activism that might invite backlash from the other two branches. ● Media Pressure and Public Opinion: Media coverage and public opinion, predominant in many of the high-profile cases, indirectly influences judicial outcomes.

Judicial Accountability: Mechanisms, Limitations and Controversies As already outlined, an opaque functioning of the institution violated the very sanctity of democracy. To deal with this, we must ensure to create structures which will not only strengthen the judiciary but also make it accountable. Judicial accountability calls for the judges to be properly ethical in their conduct and decisions transparently such that all their actions are questioned. Where judicial independence means non-influence by any other party in the act of the judges, accountability is what ensures the judges operate within the limits of the legal principles and public confidence. Yet experience in India has shown that it has not been easy to strike a balance between independence and accountability.

It discusses the mechanisms of accountability that currently exist, case laws that have tested these principles, structural limitations, and controversies that continue. I.

Judicial Accountability Mechanisms in India Judicial accountability is enforced in India through a number of formal as well as informal mechanisms:

1. Impeachment of Judges under Articles 124(4) and 217(1)(b)

Procedure: Article 124(4) and Article 217(1)(b) of the Constitution of India states that the judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court can be impeached for proven misconduct or incapacity. The process begins with a motion in this respect brought by as many as 100 members of Lok Sabha or 50 members of Rajya Sabha. Then a committee of judges investigates the allegation, and if misconduct is proven, then Parliament votes on it. Removal requires a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament. For example, case Justice V. Ramaswami, 1993 was one of the starker examples of how weak the impeachment system was. Political parties withheld their votes even when there was proof of active financial improprieties during his tenure as Chief Justice of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, and the motion for impeachment was defeated in the Lok Sabha.

However, the very process of Impeachment is cumbersome and politically fraught, making it nearly impossible to remove a sitting judge. Given the complex and multi-layered

process no judge has been impeached successfully since independence, which reflects the inefficacy of this mechanism.

2. Judicial Conduct and Oversight Bodies :

The judiciary has developed an in-house procedure to deal with complaints of misconduct. Senior judges investigate allegations against their peers and action can range from informal reprimands to forced retirement. In the case of Justice Soumitra Sen (2011), the Rajya Sabha initiated the process of impeachment proceedings against the judge on charges of misappropriation of funds, but before such a process could be finalised, he resigned. The case established the reality that judicial morality often prefers an internal solution to the issue of misconduct rather than being hauled out in public.

3. Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill:

This bill was intended to advance formal mechanisms of judicial accountability as it would enforce a code of conduct for judges and institute a Judicial Oversight Committee. Since it eventually lapsed without becoming a law, the judiciary opposed it claiming that it was an infringement on their judicial independence.

4. Contempt of Court as an Accountability Tool

Contempt Jurisdiction : The judiciary in its regard employs this jurisdiction for upholding such order of its and its authority to be maintained. There are two heads through which it gets classified: A.

Civil Contempt : The disobeying of the orders of court were done knowingly or in a wilful manner. B.

Criminal Contempt : This involves inciting disrespect against the court and judicial proceedings. Example : Arundhati Roy v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2002) – In the case, Roy had been sentenced for criminal contempt arising out of critical remarks against the judiciary. It had raised enough questions whether the powers to contempt stifle legitimate criticism and stifle accountability. Critics often argue that bulk contempt powers sometimes

essentially act as blanket immunity from public accountability. Criminal contempt has also been perceived as a means whereby the judiciary might put a blanket shroud over its dissenting decision and/or critical jurists. Similarly, In Prashant Bhushan v. Supreme Court of India (2020), the Court convicted Bhushan of contempt for tweeting against the judiciary. The whole controversy was whether contempt powers were abused to silence criticism and cower the judiciary from accountability. In response to demands for greater transparency, the Supreme Court established a voluntary practice of asset disclosure. The Supreme Court Judges and High Court Judges declare their assets on a public platform, though the practice is not mandated by law.

Since asset disclosure is not based on statutory provisions, it forms an incomplete mechanism for accountability as discrepancies cannot bring culpability upon judges. II.

Judicial Accountability Limitations Even with these structures, judicial accountability is still only restricted to a certain extent due to many structural issues:

1. Failure of Impeachment Procedure :

Just like in the Ramaswami case, it was clear that impeachment procedure works upon political cases. It becomes almost impossible to remove a judge unless there is political consensus. This becomes an uphill task as it requires a two-thirds majority in Parliament.

2. Lesser Transparency of Collegium System :

The collegium system of judicial appointments has been criticised to be opaque and, in certain cases, lacking public scrutiny altogether. While the process is meant to grant immunity from interference of the executive, issues of favouritism and lack of representation crop up through lack of institutional accountability. In the case of Justice Akil Kureshi, the collegium's reasons for rejecting some candidates have been taken to be problematic by virtue of lack of transparency and accountability.

3. Internal Investigations and Their Disadvantages :

The internal procedure of dealing with judicial malpractice is always criticised to be

non-transparent and discretionary in nature. These processes are without public scrutiny, and results are rarely published. Loss of public trust also stems from this.

4. No Suitable System for Review of Performance :

Indian judges are not rated on their performance for the post. Thus, it would be impossible to measure the effectiveness and quality of performance by judges or determine areas that might require improvement.

5. Immunity of Judges from Prosecution :

Judges are held beyond the reach of prosecution for wrongs committed judicially and in the exercise of judicial powers. It raised the question of not being held accountable for various harmful decisions/orders.

III. Controversies Over Judicial Accountability

● Clash with executive : Perhaps the biggest controversy over judicial accountability is the clash with judicial independence. The judiciary has more often than not resisted external oversight mechanisms that might compromise its very autonomy. Case Example: The NJAC case of 2015 ( refer NJAC section above) was a case in which the Supreme Court struck down the National Judicial Appointments Commission, arguing that it threatened judicial independence by entrusting the appointment of judges to the executive. This judgement reaffirmed judicial independence while underlining the need for accountability reforms within the judiciary itself. ● Judicial Appointments And Nepotism Allegation : In the collegium system, lack of transparency has given rise to allegations of nepotism and favouritism.

In several instances, questions were raised as to whether selection judges were related or part of the political parties.

Case Example: For instance, controversy over the appointment of Justice Dipak Misra as the Chief Justice of India went on to question the opacity of the collegium system; even as the judiciary came out with its side of the story, the fact that this process of selection was not transparent raises a question about accountability. IV. Proposed Reforms and the Future Course

A number of reforms have been proposed in order to overcome the deficiencies and

controversies surrounding judicial accountability: ● An independent statutory council not connected either with the judiciary or the executive to oversee complaints against judges. This would ensure that any inquiry is not prejudiced. ● Codes of judicial conduct: There should be a statutory code of conduct for judges. Such a code shall clearly outline what is expected from the judges in terms of conduct or behaviour so that accountability is increased and public confidence is developed. ● Mechanism for Performance Evaluation of Judges: Regular appraisals could be made about the performance of judges and intervene into efficiency and accountability to make judges competent and responsive. ● Contempt Powers Reform: Review of the Contempt of Courts Act so that the powers of contempt can be curbed would strengthen free speech and make way for legitimate criticism of judicial decisions.

V. Conclusion

Although judicial accountability mechanisms exist in India, structural problems plaguing it have defeated the purpose of such mechanisms operating effectively. Putting aside the structural problem, a lack of transparency and political branch interference would be consistent with the failure of this approach. The next steps for the judiciary should take an independence without sacrifice approach; institutional reforms, which include setting up judicial oversight and rewriting the collegium, must do so. It is this delicate balance between

the two principles that ensures public confidence in the judiciary should be maintained and rule of law not violated. Comparative Perspectives: Lessons from Other Jurisdictions Judicial independence and accountability are conflicting issues for most democracies around the world. Lessons for India can be learned from other countries in the development of a transparent appointment process, a structured oversight body, and functional accountability mechanisms. This section looks at the judicial framework of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada and discusses how these approaches can be relevant for Indian reforms. But each of these presents a form of unique insight into how systems balance judicial autonomy and accountability within the boundaries of fairness, transparency, and trust in the system. I. United States: Life Tenure with Strong Accountability Mechanisms

The U. S. federal judiciary enjoys wide-ranging autonomy via the grant of life tenure to federal judges under Article III of the U. S. Constitution. This removes any political pressure that would impact the ability of the judiciary to pronounce fair judgments without fear of removal. Life tenure for judges during "good behaviour" means theoretically that "during good behaviour," they can take their independent decisions even in highly politically sensitive cases. On the other hand, the United States has accountability mechanisms better than many others, like India: ● Impeachment Process : The US judges can be removed by impeachment by the Congress based on any malconduct or for incompetence or an abuse of their powers. Impeachment is initiated in the House of Representatives and a Senate trial is held. It requires a two-thirds majority for conviction and the removal of the judge.

US Judge G. Thomas Porteous was impeached by the Senate in 2010 for bribery and corruption. This is an indication that this process applies only where necessary and effectively works in ensuring accountability within the judiciary. The US is successful in the impeachment of judges compared to India, where this rarely occurs and is always

a politically demanding task. In this way, judges who misbehave get punished. It can be said that there is judicial review and accountability because opinions in the courts are public records, open to scrutiny from the legal community, the media, and the general public. ● Code of Judicial Conduct : Judges are regulated by an ethics code, which governs their conduct both in as well as out of the court. There may be disciplinary action through reprimand, suspension, and compulsory retirement. The following lessons are drawn for India: - India should make its process of impeachment more practical and effective by lowering the political threshold to be removed. Transparency must be embraced through mechanisms of enforcing the mandatory code of conduct, as adopted by the United States, for instance.

United Kingdom: Transparency through the Judicial Appointments Commission The judiciary in the United Kingdom is supported by conventions and legal safeguards that maintain judicial independence, although the framework is that of transparency and accountability. In this aspect, courts thus play a key role in law interpretation and ensuring that there is a limit within which the government has to act, as per the law. ● Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) : The JAC is established under the Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, while supervising appointments to judge. This independent commission is ensured on the basis of merit, as the whole rigorous process follows transparency. It consists of members from judiciary and civil society who make up the JAC, thus providing diversity in representation and decision-making.

The posts are advertised openly, and the applicants are interviewed and vetted by independent panels that limit the space of nepotism. ● Mechanisms of Accountability : There is an honest code of conduct towards judges, and any breach of such a code is investigated by the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office (JCIO). Judicial behaviour

complaints are considered serious, and the JCIO can suggest removal or disciplinary action. The very existence of an oversight body with strict powers helps to curb corruption and impropriety in the system. It ensures a medium of accountability where estranged complainants can file their complaints which in turn makes the system accountable. ● Judicial Review Powers are limited : Although the judiciary in the UK is independent, its ability to strike down laws passed by the parliament is not exactly at its will, thus incorporating parliamentary sovereignty. However, still it can ensure accountability of the government by bringing judicial scrutiny to the executive's action through administrative law. Canada: Judicial Accountability Through the Canadian Judicial Council In Canada, Constitutional independence is balanced with effective accountability measures.

The most important related body for guaranteeing the conduct of judges observed under high standards is the Canadian Judicial Council (CJC). It oversees the appointments process for the Judiciary much similar to what the NJAC had envisaged. Public consultations, and recommendations by independent committees are made before appointment of judicial officers to the Supreme Court of Canada and other federal courts. This precludes executive interference in the process. Since, the overall process is carried out by involving the public at large, it brings transparency in the procedure and hence removes arbitrariness. This institution ensures that its appointments are both merit-based and also public-friendly, hence increasing public confidence. Apart from the appointment, The CJC also investigates complaints against federally appointed judges.

If a judge is found guilty of misconduct, the Council can recommend dismissal to Parliament. Work by the CJC is publicly available, and judicial complaints are dealt with in an open way. Example: Justice Robin Camp recently had public criticism given for inappropriate comments made during one of the trials he presided over, and the CJC recommended him to be removed. It has proved as an efficient check to accountability, and judicial decorum is important. Performance review and continuing education Moreover, Judges in Canada are appraised periodically and are required to undertake

continuing legal education where they must keep abreast of developments in the law. Lessons for India

1. Setting up an Appointments Commission :

On the lines of various Commonwealth Countries, India should also consider to set up an independent commission consisting of members of judiciary, executive, legislature and civil society to make it a truly diverse and kaleidoscopic body for appointment and transfer of judges. This will ensure that the appointments made by it are taking into consideration interests of even marginalised and under represented. The Appointment Commission should also be mandated ( and not only endeavour ) to lay down a rigid process of how judges are appointed and transferred. A Memorandum of Procedure laid down in this regard will establish a framework and any deviation from it, will be observed by the public at large. Since the major part of criticism in this regard is the opacity of the functioning of the collegium, the AC should ensure that each and every file be made transparent and open.

The AC should thrive to make itself immune from any undue interference but at the same time open to criticism. The Commission should be a Constitutional body on the lines of Election Commission so as to put it on a higher pedestal than other statutories and non-statutory bodies. A Judicial Appointments Commission with public input shall make appointments to the judiciary transparent and free from political influence.

2. Code of Conduct :

In the eyes of common citizens, Judges hold high value and command immense respect owing to their position. However, trust in an institution may be lost by time due to the actions and behaviours of the individuals. To ensure that the public continues to repose faith in the institution, Judges should be guided and motivated by a Code of Conduct. To maintain the sanctity of this code, it should be backed by Statutes and necessary provisions. While there already exists a Code for judges emanating from the National Judicial Conferences, it remains a model and hence can not be strictly enforced.

3. Body to oversee performance and lack of it :

The current system, as governed by the NJAC decision, puts the onus on reviewing judges on

the collegium system. However, since members of collegium are judges themselves, the whole system can be castigated as biassed and opaque losing trust. Hence, an independent body of former judges along with legal luminaries on the lines of Canadian model should be formed to oversee various aspects of Judiciary and make its recommendations to the Appointment Commission. This will insulate the judiciary from outside attacks while at the same time ensure that judges maintain decorum and follow the law themselves. The functioning of the body should also be made open so as to usher transparency. This will also ensure that well performing judges are rewarded through promotions while under performing judges are punished.

4. Functional Impeachment process :

The current impeachment process is too lengthy and cumbersome. This has made it an effective tool. Corrupt officers should have the fear of being reprimanded for their corruption. However, given the current system, a judge once appointed remains a judge till his appointment. This calls for significant Constitutional and Institutional reforms like bringing the threshold down for initiation of impeachment process for a judge. Reforms should be undertaken on the lines of the United States which has an effective impeachment procedure. Conclusion An Independent Judiciary means independence from executive and legislature, independence from private forces and public trolls, independence from it’s own internal biases and external prejudices. However, what an independent judiciary does not envisage is independence from accountability.

Given the high pedestal on which it stands, the judiciary owes the constitution more than just duty but a duty which is not mired by allegations and impropriety. Constitution makers have dreamt of a nation where justice is delivered and guided by the fundamentals of the Constitution. Judicial independence balanced with accountability forms a trinity of legitimacy in the judiciary and public trust. Indian judiciary has gone a long way in bringing autonomy into its fold, but some impunity goes against the credibility of that very autonomy. The comparative insights from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada really and truly show that transparent appointments, structured oversight, and effective misconduct investigations are very much in order.

Above all else though, reforming internal accountability mechanisms and establishing an independent appointments commission is what will really

necessitate a vibrant and competent judiciary within the country. An attempt has to be made and it has to be supported by all sections of stakeholders to truly fulfil the dreams of our founding fathers.

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