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Balancing Power And Responsibility - India's Nuclear Tightrope Walk

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BALANCING POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY - INDIA'S

NUCLEAR TIGHTROPE WALK

Ankush Saxena, University of Petroleum and Energy Studies

ABSTRACT

Since the very inception of nuclear weapons there has been a race of developing and obtaining the nuclear technology among various nations. The unprecedented growth of nuclear weapons has had a deep impact on international relation and in general the cooperation of nations. Post Hiroshima-Nagasaki the countries even though they have been investing heavily into developing the nuclear technology somewhere down the line everyone feels the need to regulate and streamline the same. Accordingly, various efforts and attempts have been made at the international and regional level by the UN and various other organisations including IAEA, DAE and AERB. Reginal mechanisms have also grown for regulating the nuclear weapon and in insuring the sustainable and responsible use of the same.

This paper is an attempt to investigate the international regulations of nuclear weapon, the making, storage, and use of the same. This paper also talks and evaluates India's stance and position in the nuclear sector including the APSARA, and the CIRUS reactor. Drawing upon international legal frameworks such as Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Nuclear Tests Ban Treaty (CTBT) along with other regulations such as the Limited Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (LTBT), Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). It would also talk about the institutional control and regulation through International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) etc. Keywords: Nuclear, Nuclear test, India, Atomic Energy, U. S. , U. S. S. R.

1. INTRODUCTION:

Prior to the existence of the nuclear energy, India relied heavily on other sources of energy like coal, oil, biomass, and other fossil fuels to fulfil its power requirements. Most of the energy generated for India was primarily through coal which it continues to persist till date, after that comes the other renewable energies like solar, wind and others which were unable to fully compensate for the shortfall of the energy requirements in the country. Hypothetically, even if the entire barren uncultivable land in India is used up for setting solar plants (which, clearly, is not possible), it would still fall way short of the target. The potential of wind energy would run short as well.

The only way out then is a rapid scale-up of nuclear energy, however, to achieve this we also need to keep in mind the fear of nuclear power like uranium mining with its destructive toxic fuels, reactor safety, nuclear waste, and nuclear proliferation. But also accepting the fact that nuclear power could provide a dependable supply of electricity which is crucial for meeting India’s energy needs today. This would help keep the environment cleaner and healthier. 1 India after gaining independence, has pursued nuclear technology to support its economic development and meet its energy demands, and has used nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, such as generating electricity through nuclear power plants and developing nuclear medicine, while also seeking to reinforce its national security against potential threats from other countries.

However, this pursuit has been juxtaposed with India's inclination towards global disarmament, creating a notable contradiction in its stance, akin to an ‘elephant in the room’ for Indian policymakers. In 1968, when the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)2 was signed to limit the escalation of nuclear arms race and the technology related to it, India was encouraged to join as a non-nuclearweapon state (NNWS). Since the early age one of the main concerns for India in nuclear energy has been to work towards a nuclear-weapon-free-world (NWFW) in a view that it has the minimal threat to the mankind recognising its dangers till the time they are not banned or completely eradicated.

3 However, India refrained from signing, seeking a clear roadmap for worldwide nuclear disarmament which in terms was not provided by the others, its decision underscored India's nuanced approach to nuclear policy, reflecting its commitment to both national security imperatives and broader disarmament goals. The conflicting desire for nuclear

1 Kakodkar, 2023f

2 Pastinen & Tampere Peace Research Institute, n.d.

3 “India’s Nuclear Capability, Her Security Concerns and the Recent Tests on JSTOR,” n.d.

weapons by India became more pronounced as certain countries like America, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, already possessed nuclear arsenals, out of which a few posed potential threats to India's security. This prompted India to conduct nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998,4 asserting its nuclear capabilities on the global stage. Notably, India's decision to proceed with these tests was made independently, unbound by the constraints of the NPT, which it had opted not to join. These nuclear tests sparked international scrutiny and condemnation, leading to India being labelled as a paradox in nuclear policy by foreign policy experts. Despite this, India managed to navigate through this paradox and demonstrate its capacity to be a responsible nuclear power in the future.

Over time, India adapted its policies to align with shifts in the global nuclear landscape, enacting legal frameworks and participating in treaties and conventions to enhance its control over the nuclear sector. The author sets the stage for a comprehensive exploration of India's nuclear policy, highlighting the complexities and contradictions inherent in its approach, while also acknowledging its efforts to evolve and adapt within the international nuclear order.

2. EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT

2.1. 1974: Developing a Peaceful Nuclear Program

As India gained independence, it establishes an energy commission named as the Atomic Energy Commission on 10th August 1948, objective of which was to organise, research the atomic science, produce electricity from the atomic energy, to train atomic scientists in the country, to promote nuclear research in the commissions own laboratories in India headed by Homi Jahangir Bhabha, this Commission was created by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE)5 for the research and development of peaceful uses of Atomic Energy established on 3 August 1954 headed by the then Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. During this India gives out a huge funding for the enhancement of nuclear science and starts developing furthermore.

The early nuclear policy of India was the peaceful use of nuclear energy, universal nuclear disarmaments to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and to protect South Asia from external influence to enhance Indian security. In the very beginning India does the peaceful advancement of only nuclear technology in the year 1955 by creating a light water reactor in

4 Press Statement by Dr. Anil Kakodkar and Dr. R. Chidambaram on Pokhran-II Tests, n.d.

5About DAE | Department of Atomic Energy | India, n.d.

the year 1956 named as APSARA6 commissioned by Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) which was a great achievement as it was not only India’s but Asia’s first nuclear reactor. The next in line was the heavy water reactor which was later established in the year 1960 named as CIRUS. 7 In the year 1957 India becomes a part of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) motive of which was to control the peaceful usage of nuclear technologies. India also signs the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in the year 1963 which banned the outer space and underwater nuclear tests. Now there were a few events in the 1960s which led India to rethink about their plan regarding the nuclear weapons, the first one being the 1962 war with China after which China conducts a nuclear test at Lop Nor on 16th October 1964.

8 Both USA and USSR failed to provide nuclear guarantee to India, plus the death of the then Prime minster Jawaharlal Nehru made it difficult for India to make up its mind for nuclear weapons. In the year 1964, PM Lal Bahadur Shastri, gave 6 months to the Indian scientists to develop a nuclear weapon, and during the time the 1965 India-Pak war reinforced this necessity of developing weapons in India and by the time of 1965 most of the major countries throughout the world had already acquired nuclear weapons[USA(1945), USSR(1949), UK(1952), France(1960), China(1964)].

The NPT was signed on 1st July 1968 as soon as it was signed, India was against it as it was splitting the world into 2 parts the first one being the Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) which were the countries that tested before 1967 and could keep their weapons and the other was Non-Nuclear Weapons State (NNWS) that could not possess or develop nuclear weapons.

2.2. 1974-1998: The Slow Path Toward Weaponization

During this time PM Indira Gandhi decided to carry out a nuclear test on 18th May 1974 under the codename ‘Smiling Buddha’. India undertook its first nuclear test at Pokhran, Rajasthan. India described this test as a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) which states that no one was harmed during the process of the testing of the nuclear weapon. The consequences of this test were that India used U.S. and Canadian reactors to produce fissile material, that is why USA and Canada removed all nuclear ties and assistance from India. This test led to the formation

6 Research Reactors in BARC:Bhabha Atomic Research Centre(BARC), Department of Atomic

Energy,Government of India, n.d.

7 Research Reactors in BARC:Bhabha Atomic Research Centre(BARC), Department of Atomic

Energy,Government of India, n.d.-b

8 IRIS Newsletter: Fall 1996 Issue: Last Nuclear Weapons Test?, n.d.

of a group known as the London Suppliers Group which was later known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) that aimed to control the export of nuclear materials to those countries which already do not have the nuclear materials and want to acquire the same. India remained committed to the nuclear disarmaments India supported plans for nuclear weapons conventions similar to the Biological Weapon Convention (BWC) 1972 and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 1993, both of which was signed by India however, India refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (hereinafter referred as CTBT) 1996, not because it stated that the new countries cannot have a nuclear test but because it did not stop the P5 nations (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. ) to use nuclear weapons.

With the decline of USSR India loss trading and political support, India was still facing the international sanctions. India was out of NSG membership so now India can also not acquire any nuclear facilities from any other country. US-EU-Japan and the US-China front was against India. This was the time in India decided that it should have its second nuclear test done, so India tested 5 nuclear devices under PM Vajpayee on 11th May (3 tests) and 13th May (2 tests)

1998. This test was codenamed as ‘Operation Shakti’ and often called as Pokhran-II.

2.3. 1998-2009: India as an Emerging Nuclear Power

After both the nuclear tests India became an established nuclear country because of which India was required to maintain nuclear doctrine so India's national security Advisory Board released the state’s draft nuclear doctrine on 17th August 1999. On the basis which India's nuclear doctrine was made public on 4th January 2003. This nuclear doctrine states 8 doctrine rules stated as:

1. Credible minimum deterrent: India will be acquiring the nuclear power to such an extent

that will minimum the use of nuclear weapons by the other countries as much as possible.

2. No first use: India will not be using the nuclear weapons at first, it will use the weapon

on to revert the nuclear attacks of the other countries.

3. Retaliation attack to inflict unacceptable damage: the retaliation attack which India

would do to revert the nuclear attacks of other countries will be of an unacceptable damage.

4. Authorised by civilians’ political leadership: If India wants to have a nuclear attack on

other country needs to get it authorised by civilians’ political leadership that is usually the Prime Minister.

5. No nuclear attack on non-nuclear state.

6. Retaliating with nuclear weapons in case of biological or chemical weapon attack.

7. Strict control on export of nuclear materials.

8. Commitment to the goal of nuclear weapon free world9.

Along with the nuclear doctrine the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) was also established by the Cabinet Committee on Security on 4th January 2003, consists of an Executive Council and a Political Council. The Prime Minister presides over the Political Council. 10 It is the only authority that has the power to approve the use of nuclear weapons. The National Security Advisor also serves as the chair of the Executive Council. It carries out the Political Council's directions and contributes to the Nuclear Command Authority's decision-making process. India was seen as a responsible nuclear power, after the Pokhran-II test India proved its significance in South-Asia region, U. S. accepted significance, followed by improve relations between the 2 powers. Later in July 2005 U. S.

-India civilian nuclear corporation was announced in which India agreed to separate its civil and military unclear facilities and to have all its civil nuclear facilities placed under IAEA safeguards. This agreement gave India de facto nuclear recognition throughout the world, in August 2007, both governments released the ‘U. S. -India Civil Nuclear Agreement’ also known as the 123 agreement which would make it easier for the two countries to trade nuclear technology and materials. The deal supports India's ambition to become nuclear self-sufficient while enhancing their strategic alliance in the energy industry. This deal benefits both countries in terms of technology and economy. The IAEA approved the safeguards agreement with India and in September 2008, the NSG granted India a waiver to import nuclear material and technology which they were refrained in doing back in

1974. In October 2008 U.S. ended the sanctions on nuclear trade that dated from 1974 nuclear

9India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine | Arms Control Association, n.d.

10 The Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Perationalization of India’s Nuclear Doctrine, n.d.

test.11

2.4. 2008-Present: India as an Established Nuclear Power

In 2008, India received a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), permitting it to obtain civilian nuclear technology and fuel, even though it hadn't signed the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This waiver paved the way for collaborations with countries such as the US, France, and Russia, thereby enhancing India's capability in nuclear power generation. Allegedly, India is in the process of updating its nuclear arsenal, with purported efforts towards the development of thermonuclear weapons and the establishment of a credible nuclear triad encompassing land, air, and sea-based delivery systems. 12 India's military nuclear program operates under a veil of secrecy, posing difficulties in accurately assessing its extent and capabilities. Notably, India refrained from conducting any nuclear tests since 1998, showcasing a commitment to international non-proliferation efforts.

Despite this, India actively engages in global non-proliferation initiatives while advocating for reforms aimed at achieving universal adherence. However, the program encounters various challenges, including limitations in uranium resources, concerns regarding safety protocols, and opposition from the public in certain regions. 13 These challenges necessitate careful navigation to ensure the program's sustainability and alignment with national and international objectives. India recently accepted as member of one of the 4 major export control regimes. It was admitted as a member into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR) in 2016, Wassenaar agreement and Australia group in 2018, India wanted to become member of NSG, but China does not support India’s entry into the NSG without signing the NPT.

Currently India has put total of 22 reactors under IAEA safeguards and according to 2023 SIPRI Yearbook, India includes 164 warheads14, and currently India maintains its official commitment to no first use of nuclear weapons.

3 The Legal Landscape of International & Domestic Frameworks.

3.1. Non-proliferation treaty (NPT) - The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear

weapons which became effective on March 5, 1970, is the primary and the only international

11 U.S. - India: Civil Nuclear Cooperation, n.d

12 Laxman, 2023

13 India’s Nuclear Power Capacity, n.d

14 Home, 2024

agreement mandating the implementation of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Treaty of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was believed to be one of the most important international agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament when the nuclear age began and played a major role in the success of cause of peace. It also serves as a fundamental pillar in the global communities’ efforts to mitigate the dangers associated with nuclear weapons. However, it not only extends to multilateral arms but also holds a considerable political significance. It has become intertwined with the concept of ‘détente’, which income passes not only a reduction in international tensions but also the normalises the relation among the major powers and fostering of mutual understanding and corporation throughout the world.

It is not an overstatement to suggest that the nuclear proliferation treaty plays a crucial role in safeguarding international community from the threat of nuclear warfare. Indeed, it remains the most effective tool available for advancing this shared interest amongst the countries. The treaty was opened for signature in 1968 and came into force in the year 1969. 191 States have signed this treaty except India, Israel, Pakistan, South Sudan, and North Korea (signed in

1985 but withdrew later in the year 2003 it announced that it will no longer be bound to this

treaty). The main aim of this treaty is to prevent the polymerization of nuclear weapons amongst the 191 member states, which are categorised either as the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) which includes US, Russia, China, France and United Kingdom, or the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) which were the countries who did not possess the nuclear power. While NNWS commit to refraining from developing or acquiring nuclear weapons. The treaties main objectives are referred to as “pillars” which includes the promoting disarmament among all States and facilitating access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. It is the most extensive compliance of any arms control agreement commerce although South Sudan, India, Israel, and Pakistan have not joined.

The treaty was extended indefinitely to 1995, which mandates a review conference every 5 years to evaluate the progress and the potential enhancement in its implication. Last NPT review conference was held in the year 2020 at the United Nations headquarters in New York15. Reason for India to reject the NPT was that this treaty distinguished the world into two parts- ‘the nuclear haves’ and ‘the nuclear have-nots’ (those who possessed nuclear weapons before 1968), only the former were allowed to have nuclear weapons, while the latter are prohibited. India argues that this perpetuates an unequal

15 Timeline of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) | Arms Control Association, n.d.

global order and hinders its right to develop nuclear capabilities for deterrence and security. which India could not tolerate, having chosen instead to develop its nuclear capabilities independently. This choice has led to India's exclusion from certain aspects of the global nonproliferation regime, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). India's nuclear weapons program has raised concerns about nuclear proliferation and regional stability, particularly regarding its relationship with neighbouring Pakistan and both the countries possessed nuclear power. The nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan, both non-NPT states, presents a challenge to global non-proliferation efforts. Although India supports the goal of total and universal nuclear disarmament, it doesn't think the NPT as it stands is the best course of action.

Regardless of its position on the NPT, India's dedication to non-proliferation and its stellar record outside the treaty draw strong international alliances, indicating its responsible approach.

3.2. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)- The main aim of CTBT is a multilateral treaty

that bans all nuclear explosions, whether for military or peaceful purposes, in all environments. It was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1996 and comprises a preamble, 17 articles, two annexes, and a Protocol with two annexes16. The treaty will enter into force 180 days after it has been ratified by all 44 states listed in Annex 2 of the treaty, which are states that possessed nuclear reactors or research reactors at the time of its adoption. The CTBT also includes measures to redress a situation that contravenes its provisions, procedures for on-site inspections, and confidence-building measures.

17 The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) headquartered in Vienna, is an international organization established by the States Signatories to the Treaty on 19 November 1996 to achieve the object and purpose of the Treaty, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with the Treaty, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among Member States. Between 1945 and 1996, the world witnessed more than 2,000 nuclear tests, with the United States conducting 1,032 and the Soviet Union conducting 715, Britain carried out 45 tests, France 210, and China

45. Notably, for the treaty to enter into force, it must be signed and ratified by 44 specific

nuclear technology holder countries, eight of which have yet to ratify the agreement: China,

16 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), n.d.

17 Ibid.

Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and the United States, according to the UN. 18 Concerns regarding the environmental and health repercussions of these tests prompted global efforts to restrict them. The Limited Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 1963 was a response to these concerns, prohibiting nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater while permitting underground tests. Similarly, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 1974 aimed to curtail underground nuclear weapons tests and establish a nuclear threshold, though it did not achieve a comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing, but did the CTBT stop nuclear testing? Since the CTBT, 10 nuclear tests have taken place. India conducted two in 1998, Pakistan also two in 1993, and North Korea conducted tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, 2016 (twice) and in 2017 according to the United Nations.

The United States last tested in 1992, China and France in 1996 and the Soviet Union in 1990. Russia, which inherited most of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, has never conducted a nuclear test. 19 India, Pakistan, South Sudan, Bhutan, Mauritius, Saudi Arabia, South Sudan, Syria, Tonga, and North Korea still have not signed. China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Nepal, Russia, The United States and a few more have not yet ratified the pact. India’s stance on not getting itself implied with the CTBT was that India was in the favour of a complete nuclear disarmament, its principled opposition drew from its emphasis on universal and complete nuclear disarmament in a time bound manner. CTBT does not address complete disarmament and is a bit bias towards the NWS. UNSC permanent members have a little marginal utility in testing further. They have already conducted nuclear tests and possess nuclear weapons.

For India, CTBT would only act as a hindrance for conducting nuclear test and developing their technology.

3.3. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)- Established on 29th July 1957, India

became its part in the year 1957 itself. It is an autonomous international organisation that promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy, a wide range of tactics and procedures are included in the nuclear non-proliferation regime with the goal of reducing the risk that nuclear materials could be misused for purposes other than peaceful ones. In addition to multiple unilateral and multilateral activities, it consists of a few international and regional treaties, export controls, security guarantees, physical safeguards, countermeasures against non-state actors, and attempts to monitor and discourage the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. Even while each element may focus on a different part of the proliferation danger,

18 Desk (2023)

19 Ibid

when combined, they all strive to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Among these tactics, international verification carried out under the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards stands out as essential to the regime's efficacy. It inspects and verifies measures to prevent their diversion for weapon purposes. Furthermore, the IAEA extends technical support and proficiency to its member nations across diverse domains of nuclear science and technology, including safety, security, and applications in sectors such as health and agriculture. By advocating for international standards and guidelines, the agency contributes significantly to encouraging nuclear safety and security on a global scale, thereby reducing associated risks.

Through its verification endeavours, such as conducting inspections to ensure adherence to treaties like the NPT, the IAEA actively works to prevent nuclear proliferation. Additionally, it aids member states in leveraging nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, encompassing various fields such as power generation, medicine, industry, and agriculture. Lastly, the agency plays a vital role in cancer control efforts by facilitating radiation therapy and offering training and resources for the utilization of nuclear techniques in both diagnosis and treatment, thus showcasing its dedication to advancing nuclear technology and promoting global health initiatives. 20

3.4. Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB)- The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board

(AERB) was established on November 15, 1983, under the authority granted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1962 by the President of India, though it works under the AEC, it is still considered as an individual body. AERB operates independently, While the AEC sets highlevel policies regarding atomic energy, it convenes infrequently and doesn't directly manage the day-to-day operations of entities like the AERB, AERB's decisions are not influenced or meddled with by the AEC or any other atomic energy bodies. Therefore, the AERB functions autonomously, establishing safety standards and ensuring their implementation in nuclear facilities under its jurisdiction. Its scope includes the regulatory and safety obligations delineated in the Environment Protection Act of 1986 and the Atomic Energy Act of 1962.

With its main office in Mumbai, AERB is the main regulatory agency in charge of all nuclear safetyrelated problems in India. The regulatory body in charge of nuclear, radiation, and industrial safety in India creates extensive safety regulations that are specific to each industry that falls under its purview. The

20 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY et al. (2022)

complete lifecycle of nuclear facilities and radiation plants, including siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation, and decommissioning, is covered by these policies, which include strict safety norms, guidelines, and standards. The authority performs extensive safety reviews and assessments to guarantee compliance with mandated regulatory standards, including those outlined by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), prior to giving consents for any facility-related activity. It also sets acceptability limits for public and worker radiation exposure as well as for radioactive material emissions into the environment. The authority establishes training program curricula and thoroughly reviews emergency contingency plans for nuclear and radiation sites, coupled with guidelines for licensing and requirements for employees working in these establishments.

Its mandate includes supporting research and development initiatives in safety-related sectors as well as maintaining close communication with statutory organizations both domestically and internationally on safety problems which includes some of the enforcement actions taken against nuclear power plants like Narora Fire Incident 1993, Leak from a steam line in MAPS-2 & Delamination of the Inner Containment Dome at Kaiga-2 during Construction etc21. The authority ensures responsibility and openness in the management of nuclear hazards by swiftly notifying the public of any nuclear mishaps that occur within Indian nuclear sites, in accordance with the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010. Several legislative acts and regulations in India provide the legal framework and authorization for ensuring compliance with the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB).

These include the • Atomic Energy Act, 1962 & its subsequent amendments in 2015. • Environmental Protection Act, 1986. • Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act of 2010. And the few regulations enacted by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) is: • The Atomic Energy Mines Minerals Prescribed Substance Rules, 1984. • The Atomic Energy Safe Disposal of Radioactive Waste Rules, 1987.

21 AERB, n.d.

The Atomic Energy Factories Rule, 1996. • The Atomic Energy Radiation Protection Rules, 2004. • The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Rules, 2011.22

3.5. Department of Atomic Energy (DAE)- The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was

formed under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister through a Presidential Order dated 3rd August 1954, with the chairman being Homi Jehangir Bhabha, and its apex body being the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The Department of Atomic Energy comprises 6 research centres, 5 public sector undertakings, 2 boards Board of Research in Nuclear Sciences (BRNS) and National Board for Higher Mathematics (NBHM) for promoting and funding extramural research in nuclear and allied fields and mathematics. DAE is at the forefront of research and development, leveraged by a strong synergy between R&D and technology development in several core disciplines of national and international importance. DAE continued to develop and deploy spin-off technologies for societal applications like advanced seed and crop varieties, food preservation, clean water, urban waste management, etc.

23 Few of the main functions of the DAE are:

1. Powering India's Progress: The DAE oversees the discovery, identification, and processing

of uranium deposits and atomic minerals as well as the development of nuclear power technologies.

2. Research and Development: It conducts and supports fundamental research in nuclear

energy and allied scientific domains. This includes collaborations with universities and academic institutions, backing research projects relevant to DAE's objectives, and fostering international partnerships for advanced research.

3. Regulation of Nuclear and Radiation Facilities: The DAE is responsible for regulating

various nuclear and radiation facilities and activities across India. The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), operating under the DAE, ensures the safe utilization of nuclear

22 Raghav (n.d.)

23 About DAE | Department of Atomic Energy | India, n.d.-c

energy.

4. Non-Power Applications of Atomic Energy: Apart from power generation, the DAE

focuses on advancing technologies related to fast reactors, fusion, accelerators, lasers, electronics, instrumentation, materials science, and biological sciences. It also conducts research and development for peaceful applications of atomic energy, encompassing activities like nuclear fuel fabrication, heavy water production, nuclear plant construction, fuel reprocessing, and waste management.24

4. LEGAL CHALLENGES:

After becoming a nuclear a nuclear country, India faces some of the very rigorous legal challenges and risks, one of the primary challenges is to uphold and maintain the Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD)25, aimed at the strategy to prevent any nuclear use and at the same time it also must wander off the threats particularly from Pakistan and China. India not only faced the challenges domestically but also internationally. Some of the key considerations are follows: International Non-proliferation Treaty- India’s nuclear status may conflict with international non-proliferation regimes such as the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. India is not a signatory to the NPT, which could lead to diplomatic tensions with countries that support the treaty26.

• Nuclear Arms Race: India’s nuclear capabilities may trigger a regional arms race, given that China and Pakistan are two of India's neighbours and both possess nuclear weapons, India's nuclear capability might start a regional arms race. Conflict risk may rise because of heightened regional tensions. • Risks to the Environment and Human Health: Testing nuclear weapons and producing nuclear energy can have serious effects on the environment and human health, including radiation exposure, contaminating water and land, and raising the possibility of mishaps

24 Ibid

25 India - Striking Asymmetries: Nuclear Transitions in Southern Asia, 2022

26 NTI, 2023

or nuclear disasters. When it comes to its nuclear initiatives, India must put environmental preservation and safety first. • Diplomatic ties: Given India's nuclear weapons, ties with nations that oppose nuclear proliferation or have differing geopolitical objectives may be strained. To keep the region stable and prevent isolation, it is imperative that these relationships be managed well. • Arms Control and Disarmament: Given its nuclear arsenal, India must take part in international initiatives aimed at disarmament and control of armaments. To lessen the possibility of nuclear war and proliferation, this may entail talks, accords, and actions to foster confidence with other nuclear-armed nations.

• Nuclear Security: It is essential to keep nuclear materials and installations secure to avoid any potential negative effects from it being harmed, save it from theft, sabotaged, or unapproved use. To protect its nuclear assets, India needs to put strong security measures in place, which might be difficult given the possibility of both external and internal threats. • International Sanctions: Because of its nuclear operations, India may be subject to sanctions from other nations or international bodies. Trade, technology transfer, or diplomatic ties may be the focus of these penalties, which could have negative effects on the economy and politics. • Opposition from Within: Concerns regarding the redirection of resources from social and economic development priorities are the main source of potential domestic opposition to India's nuclear policies.

Politicians must exercise extreme caution in striking a balance between socioeconomic demands and national security objectives. As a nuclear-armed country, India faces a variety of legal, diplomatic, security, and socioeconomic difficulties. To effectively tackle these obstacles, a dedication to guaranteeing the non-military application of nuclear technology, international collaboration, and strategic planning are necessary.

5. SUGGESTIONS:

The author proposes India to continue to prioritize the non-military applications of nuclear technology and strengthen its commitment to international collaboration by investing in research and development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, such as power generation, medicine, industry, and agriculture not only it will help India to meet its energy demand but also support its economic goals. For example, nuclear medicine can be used for cancer diagnosis and treatment, while nuclear techniques can be used to improve crop yields and food safety.

This investment will demonstrate India's commitment to utilizing nuclear technology for the betterment of society and no other country will be able to point a finger at India, India should enhance its international partnership by nurturing partnership with other countries and international organisations, which may include sharing knowledge and best practices in nuclear safety and security, alongside participating in joint research and development, this diplomatic engagement and collaborative efforts may contribute to strengthen India’s diplomatic ties with other nations, this could help India deal with diplomatic issues about its nuclear program and make the global nuclear situation friendlier and more open throughout the world, India can participate in international cooperation in talks and projects related to disarmament and arms control.

To lessen the risks connected with nuclear weapons and advance international non-proliferation efforts, this may entail taking part in multilateral forums and negotiations. In line with international non-proliferation standards and safeguards, cooperation might pave the way for nuclear commerce and cooperation, giving India access to nuclear materials, technology, and knowledge. India should be prioritising and ensuring the regulatory transparency and compliance with international nuclear safety standards, by working closely with the IAEA, NCS, AERB, DAE and other nuclear related agencies along with upholding the highest safety and security measures.

6. CONCLUSION:

In conclusion, India’s nuclear program has been a complex and an intricate issue, with significant strategic, geopolitical, and scientific implications. India sought to harness nuclear technology for peaceful purposes while also recognizing the imperative of safeguarding its sovereignty and security interests but also has posed several legal challenges and risks,

including concerns related to nuclear safety, security, and non-proliferation, the acquisition of nuclear weapons marked a significant milestone, prompting India to navigate a delicate balance between its goals for global disarmament and the necessities of regional security dynamics. However, India has also pursued various non-military applications of nuclear technology, demonstrating its commitment to utilizing nuclear technology for peaceful and beneficial purposes.

The development of robust legal frameworks and regulatory mechanisms underscores India's dedication to ensuring the safe and secure utilization of nuclear energy while upholding its international obligations by adopting several legal frameworks and regulations to regulate the development and use of atomic energy, including the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, its amendments, The Environmental Protection Act, 1986, and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act of 2010. India should continue to prioritize the non-military applications of nuclear technology and strengthen its commitment to international collaboration to address the challenges and risks associated with its nuclear program.

By doing so, India can contribute to global efforts aimed at promoting the peaceful use of nuclear technology and enhancing nuclear safety and security and by doing so India can also reinforce its position as a responsible nuclear power while contributing to a safer and more secure world. In essence, the trajectory of India's nuclear journey underscores the imperative of balancing national interests with global responsibilities, navigating complex geopolitical terrain with prudence and foresight, and leveraging nuclear capabilities to advance peace, security, and sustainable development on both regional and international fronts.

REFERENCES

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https://www.ctbto.org/our-mission/the-treaty [17] Ibid. [18] Desk, E. (2023, October 7). Russia may pull out of CTBT: How the treaty tried — and failed — to stop nuclear testing. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/nuclear-test-ban-treaty-ctbt- 8971599/ [19] Ibid [20] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Madsen, M. A., Gaspar, M., Kenn, R., & Office of Public Information and Communication (OPIC). (2022). IAIAEEA BULLA

BULLEETITINN. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/cancercareforall.pdf [21] AERB.

(n.d.). Frequently asked questions (pp. 2–8). https://www.aerb.gov.in/images/PDF/f1.pdf [22] Raghav, M. (n.d.). Get Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) Certification | AERB Certificate Registration - MetaCorp. Metacorp

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Private Limited. https://www.metacorp.in/atomic-energy-regulatory-board-aerb-certification [23] About DAE | Department of Atomic Energy | India. (n.d.-c). https://dae.gov.in//about-dae/ [24] Ibid [25] India - Striking asymmetries: Nuclear transitions in Southern Asia. (2022, July 18). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/07/18/india-pub-87397 [26] NTI. (2023, December 6). Nuclear disarmament India. The Nuclear Threat Initiative. https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/india-nuclear-disarmament/