Bridging The Gap - Exploring Patent Pooling And Collaboration Mechanisms In The Indian Economy

Author: LawSphereX

Category: Intellectual Property

Published: 2026-08-23T18:35:19.054752+00:00

Updated: 2026-08-26T17:11:46.225+00:00

BRIDGING THE GAP: EXPLORING PATENT POOLING

AND COLLABORATION MECHANISMS IN THE INDIAN

ECONOMY

Nidhi N Anand, PES University

ABSTRACT

The expanding scope of intellectual property rights in upstream biomedical research has resulted in a "tragedy of the anticommons," according to Heller and Eisenberg's 1998 paper1. This has created difficulties for users who need access to several proprietary inputs to make a single usable product. The basic idea behind the anticommons thesis is that no one can utilise anything when too many individuals possess fragments of it. Private ownership often generates wealth. Underutilization of resources in an anticommons is the result of excessive ownership, on the other hand2. The cost of biomedical innovation rose and the rate of downstream innovation slowed down as they noticed that each upstream patent allowed its owner to erect another tollbooth on the path to product creation.

Through patent cooperation, one may reduce transaction costs, foster efficiency and innovation, prevent expensive patent infringement lawsuits, and overcome patent thicket issues. Additionally, if there are pressing matters of great public concern, patent cooperation is frequently employed as a result of regulatory involvement. The rising cost of biomedical innovation has become a critical challenge, with the rate of downstream innovation slowing significantly. This slowdown is often attributed to the presence of upstream patents that act as tollbooths along the pathway to product development. Each patent owner gains the right to control access to essential knowledge or technologies, which can create bottlenecks for innovators trying to develop new biomedical products.

As companies or researchers encounter multiple patents during the development process, they often face difficulties in negotiating access, leading to higher transaction costs and delays in innovation. This fragmented landscape, commonly referred to as a "patent thicket," can discourage potential investments and hinder the commercialization of breakthrough technologies. Two examples are the availability of medications and global warming. 1 M. Heller and R. Eisenberg, “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research,” Science, Vol. 280, No. 5364, 1998, pp. 698-701 2https://scholarship. law. columbia. edu/cgi/viewcontent. cgi? article=2779&context=faculty_scholarship#:~:text=' T he%20anticommons%20thesis%20is%20simple,all%20across%20the%20global%20economy.

Collaborating on patents, nevertheless, may give rise to problems with competition law. The paper begins with an introduction on patent pools, along with discussing the concepts of SEPs and FRAND rates as patents collaboration requires a thorough understanding of the same. The paper further discusses other systems that are similar to that of patent pools and their uses. The paper then discusses the relation between patent pools and competition laws and the possible advantages and disadvantages collaboration and patent pools have. The last section of the paper analyses the scene of patent pooling and SEPs in India and concludes by discussing the scope of patent pooling in India and the possible outcomes for the same.

INTRODUCTION:

Models allowing intellectual property rights holders to collaborate in order to promote innovation are becoming more and more popular worldwide. Such collaboration in the field of patent law is a reaction to worries over the system's flaws, particularly those brought on by patent thickets or patent stalemate, of which the biotechnology industry is one example. A variety of additional strategies exist for patent co-operation; however patent pools are one example. Carl Shapiro defines patent thickets as "A complex network of interlocking intellectual property rights that a business needs to navigate to effectively market novel technologies. 3” Conversely, there are certain businesses in which producing a single product requires a multitude of patent-protected technology.

One of the best examples is cell phones, which require access to a number of different technologies, including CPUs, batteries, antennae, Wi-Fi standards, LCD screens, and more. Integrated circuits, memory chips, light emitting diodes, and other computational tools that rely on semiconductors are examples of analogous situations. Codecs for music or video are another example. In these industries, innovation becomes particularly complex and expensive due to the need to integrate multiple patented components into one cohesive product. A prime example of this is the smartphone industry. Manufacturing a smartphone requires incorporating numerous technologies, each protected by its own patents, such as central processing units (CPUs), batteries, antennae, Wi- Fi standards, operating systems, and liquid crystal displays (LCDs).

These individual elements must work in harmony to deliver a fully functional product to consumers, and the inability to access just one essential component can disrupt the entire production process. This scenario is not limited to smartphones but extends to other high-tech industries. The semiconductor 3 Shapiro, Carl, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting (March 2001). https://ssrn. com/abstract=273550

industry, for example, faces similar complexities. Integrated circuits, memory chips, microprocessors, and light-emitting diodes (LEDs) all rely heavily on patented semiconductor technology. These components are crucial to powering electronic devices, ranging from computers and smart appliances to automobiles and industrial machinery. In this case, businesses frequently get licences for portions of the finished product that are protected by patents. Two categories of rules significantly affect the competitiveness of the present market: patent laws and competition laws. The two legal provisions appear to contradict each other in theory since patent laws give the holder of a patent a sizable monopoly in commerce related to the patented products, while competition regulation aims to foster market competition.

Monopoly is produced and defended by one body of legislation, while its prohibition is sought by the other. There is a need to maintain equilibrium between patent rights and competition laws so that there is adequate deterrence for misuse of patent rights' dominant position while the advantages are preserved when used in a pro-competitive manner. There is mutual reliance when businesses find themselves in a position where they must bargain with other businesses— and maybe rivals—in order to get technology or patents. To make smartphones, Samsung requires licences from Apple and Motorola. Cross-licensing is the result of the other firms' need for licences as well; but, if one company has a larger portfolio of patents, it may require payment to complete the transaction. A prisoner's dilemma exists. Everyone is motivated to own the largest portfolio of patents4.

The expense of employing sophisticated technology is increased by patent thickets, which also boost motivation to obtain marginal patents. A certain body of work examined the impact of patent thickets, including a measure of patent thickets and approaches to resolve hold-up issues inside them. Specifically, it addressed the question of whether patent licencing serves as a viable solution for the hold-up issue. The prohibition of a dominant position has never been found under competition laws, with the exception of situations involving abuse of such status. While possessing a patent confers a dominant position, this does not in and of itself violate competition rules; nonetheless, patent holders who abuse this position do breach competition regulations.

"A patent pool is a collaboration between two or more patent holders wherein they pool their patents in return for 4 Are ‘Patent Thickets’ Smothering Innovation? Yale Insights, https://insights. som. yale. edu/insights/are-patentthickets-smothering-innovation (last visited Nov. 5, 2023).

a licence to use them5. Through price fixing or territorial exclusivity, competitors in the same relevant market may share markets as a result of patent pooling. In addition to facilitating rival collaboration in the form of price fixing and the sharing of proprietary information in an anticompetitive manner, patent pooling enhances market supply by solving the complementary patents issue. Furthermore, the exaggerated costs of patent pooling discussions may result in the exclusion of companies with a small number of patents, and large corporations may form a cartel to prevent new competitors from becoming market participants. Indian law has not before addressed the relationship between competition laws and patent laws.

ANALYSIS:

1. Patent Pools and other similar systems:

1.1 PATENT POOLS:

“A patent pool is an arrangement by which two or more patent owners put their patents together and receive in return a licence to use them. ” Some pools only allow cross-licensing among their members, whereas many pools licence their patents in bulk to other companies6. Patent pooling, according to the USPTO, is an agreement between two or more patent holders to allow or licence one or more of their patents to third parties or to each other7. A licence arrangement between two or more patent owners to licence one or more of their inventions to third parties or to each other is known as a patent pool. While licensees are undoubtedly practising entities, censors in a pool may include both practising and non-practicing entities. A lot of the time, patent pools are linked to sophisticated technologies that need supplementary patents to ensure effective technological solutions.

Patent pools typically include established technology. Furthermore, pools are often the foundation for industry standards that give businesses the tools they need to create services and products that work together. In that instance, they are more related to underdeveloped technology8. Patent rights are combined and shared among several patent holders in a patent pool. After that, both members and non-member licensees can access the pooled patents, and the pool usually distributes a percentage of the licensing fees it receives 5 Floyd. L. Vaughan, the United States Patent System: Legal and Economic Conflicts in American Patent History, Norman, Oklahoma 1st ed. , 1956, p. 39-40.

6 Vaughan (1956: 41) includes cross-licensing agreements as a subgroup of patent pools, while Shapiro (2001: 127) 7 Manas Bhulchandani, Akshay Khanna, Patent Pooling in Indian Scenario, 4(2) International Journal of Law 15,

15 2018

8 https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/competition-policy/en/docs/patent_pools_report.pdf

to each member according to the worth of each patent. One way to share intellectual property rights among many patent holders is through a joint venture, which can be modelled after a patent pool9. Patent pools are generally created in these situations to address "patent thicket" issues, also known as "anticommons" issues, in which an excessive number of patents and the challenges associated with securing licences for these patents result in a disruption of innovation10. There are several types of patent pools. A licencing pool, sometimes referred to as an "offensive" pool, is the most common kind of patent pool. These pools often share two characteristics in common. One such licencing pool is the one for the MPEG LA patents11.

Initially, licencing pools establish a distinct business outside from the patent holders in the pool, which proactively pursues the licencing of members' inventions to external parties, frequently on a single, portfolio basis12. The argument that complements—two things that are often more valuable when combined—can be combined to create superior goods, which is a prominent justification of patent pools. When complementary patents are pooled, licensees may then use all of the patents in their product rather than creating silos where each manufacturer just incorporates its own special characteristics. Customers may, for instance, buy toasters that include both of these patented features. If all of the patents do the same thing—that is, if each one is a replacement—manufacturers would usually use one of the options, but not more.

In such a case, cross-licensing of the patents creates additional issues and might lead to price correction13. Essentially, a company in need of resources for production can licence two other patent-holding firms together rather than individually. Different types of patents, including competitive, complimentary, and essential or non-essential patents, may be involved in patent pooling. Two patents are considered substitutes if they address distinct technologies and do not conflict with one another. If a subsequent invention in the same field may be used without hindrance due to its dependence on a different subject matter not covered by the previous patent, then it is considered non-blocking. Technology covered by these patents can be used in conjunction with one another without interfering with it14. Two patents are complementary from a legal 9 Robert P.

Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools, in Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property, Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society, 123, 129 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds. , 2001)

10 Michael A Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, "Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in

Biomedical Research" Science May 1 1998, 698

11 MPEG LA, https://www.mpegla.com [https://perma.cc/GN8E-WF8P]

12 Steven C. Carlson, Note, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REGUL. 359, 368 (1999)

13 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931)

14 Secretariat WIPO, Patent Pools and Antitrust-A Comparative Analysis, WIPO, (Feb 2, 2020),

standpoint if they both restrict each other. Usually, one might refer to these patents as ones that infringe upon each other. Since no technical element could possibly be commercialised unilaterally without the technological complements covered by the patent rights of several enterprises, cumulative invention results in mutually blocking patent rights. Due to this, obtaining the intended effects without breaking any laws requires patent licensing. Understanding the distinction between complements and substitutes is helpful in understanding the basic benefits and costs associated with cross-licensing.

For example, research shows that patent pools increase welfare when the corresponding patents are perfect complements, meaning they are useless unless used in tandem, and decrease welfare when the included patents are perfect substitutes, meaning one invention is just as good as the other but no one needs both. One patent may infringe another due to one-way blocking another one, though the initial one might not always be broken by the second. Members of the patent pool can access pooled patents; in the case of open pools, non-members can sign normal licensing contracts.

1.2 SEP’s and FRAND

In the contemporary economy, formal industrial norms are essential. They make it possible for various technology goods, programmes, and services offered by various businesses to work together seamlessly. Cell phone and other linked device wireless communications is one example of official industry standards. As 5G rolled out and the number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices increased, standardised technology has become an increasingly more ubiquitous part of daily life. Although standardisation has advantages, there are drawbacks to it as well. Jorge Contras opines that access to proprietary technology included in the standard is one such danger that cannot be circumvented15.

The majority of standard-setting organisations' (SSOs') intellectual property rights rules mandate that, in order to reduce such risks, patent holders pledge to licence any patents that prove to be crucial under FRAND terms. SEPs are the term for these types of self-declared patents16. The SSO will often exclude a patent holder's invention from the applicable standard if they choose not to adhere to FRAND. In light of this, the FRAND promise represents a voluntarily made decision by the patent holder to limit the scope of its statutory patent award in exchange for the standard's inclusion. This promise is unchangeable and enforceable against other parties, including manufacturers of devices that 15 Jorge Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard Setting and Antitrust Through a Historical Lens, 80 ANTITRUST L. J. 39 (2015)

16 Ibid

adhere to the standard17. A patent that describes an innovation that has to be employed in order to adhere to a standard is known as a Standard Essential Patent (SEP). Patent-protected technology are commonly mentioned in standards. Intellectual property protection is essential to both economic expansion and international competitiveness. It significantly affects a nation's capacity to advance stability and security. Reasonable, non-discriminatory, and fair is what FRAND stands for. In order to achieve FRAND, the interests of technology suppliers and consumers must be properly balanced. The interests of both parties—the patent licensor and the licensee—should thus be taken into account during the negotiating process.

It is not desirable for the FRAND value to be so high that it renders the implementer's company unsustainable, hence making it difficult or impossible for the technology provider to reinvest in research and development to produce new technical innovations. Many variables influence FRAND rates. The value of the standardisation technology to the final product, for instance, the behaviour of parties, and the amount of a fair cumulative royalty rate that the patent holder is entitled to. The FRAND commitment is required as a technology's incorporation in a standard gives the SEP-holder substantial "after the fact" negotiation power over possible licensees. After a standard is enacted, businesses who wish to produce products that adhere to the standard are forced to utilise the technology protected by the SEPs.

When alternative technologies are standardised, those that are not chosen for the standard are eliminated as prospective rivals18. Patent holders are free to opt not to submit their technology to the standardisation process if they do not want to be bound by the FRAND promise. The broad implementation of the standard would deprive the patent holder of the advantage of more possible licensees, but the patent holder may still pursue higher, non-FRAND fees or choose not to licence its patented technology at all. Patent holders are free to opt not to submit their technology to the standardisation process if they do not want to be bound by the FRAND promise. The broad implementation of the standard would deprive the patent holder of the advantage of more possible licensees, but the patent holder may still pursue higher, non-FRAND fees or choose not to licence its patented technology at all.

2. Patent Pools and their impact on the economy:

One of the main objectives of the novel idea of patent pooling in India is to make healthcare

17 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012)

18 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 317 (3d Cir. 2007)

19 Supra Note 6

more affordable. The creation of compilations for several patents held by multiple countries has been one of the main objectives of patent pooling, with the aim of quickening development and making it easier for people in lower socioeconomic groups in developing countries to get pharmaceuticals19. With protection against lawsuits alleging patent infringement, a patent pool may yield financial gains for its members in the form of reduced costs and increased production efficiency. When it comes to effectively resolving legal problems involving patent interference, a patent pool is another option. A court battle over patent infringement involving patents related to the invention of the sewing machine that lasted until 1856 between Baker, Grover, Singer, and Wheeler & Wilson led to the formation of the first patent pool.

A sewing machine that worked was made possible in 1856 by the combination of nine complementary patents held by separate owners. Orlando B. Potter, an advocate, suggested to all of the aforementioned parties that they collaborate instead of pursuing costly legal battles to resolve their differences by granting permission to use each other's technologies19. Creating a single company that can licence all of a patent holder's innovations may also help patent owners licence their inventions more efficiently. By pooling, patent owners may effectively meet the need of various licensees for secure access to a large number of patents. If there was no pool, this kind of demand would require a lot of expensive discussions between different licensees and patent owners.

A pool enables agreements to be carried out through a single entity that can provide access to the required collection of patents, hence reducing transactions and their associated expenses. In addition to encouraging R&D investment, pooling may enable patent owners to obtain the full value of their patent contribution. One reason for a producer to invest in patent production is the knowledge that they may exploit a combination of patents and their complements through pooling. Although it's not always the case, the protection provided by patent pooling is more likely to be advantageous commercially. In the marketplace, collusive activity may result from the licensee's exemption from patent infringement. A patent pool that mandates that patent holders provide licensees with future invention legal protection might be detrimental to the degree of innovation in technical R&D.

In a patent pool like this, there are no financial incentives for businesses to spend money on R&D for future patents because discovering patentable ideas doesn't provide them an edge over competitors who are also pool members. Anticompetitive effects resulting from unreasonable 19 Indrani Barujari, Facilitating Access, or Monopoly: Patent Pools at the Interface of Patent and Competition Regimes, 14 Journal of Intellectual Property Rights 347, 345 (2010).

restrictions in a patent pool may not be associated with the patents inside the pool itself. Participants in the patent pool of inventions that compete with one another are seen as horizontal players given that the patented technologies are employed to accomplish the same ends. The degree to which the pool places licencing restrictions on competing technologies will determine how likely it is that such horizontal firms with conflicting technologies would have less market competitiveness. The anti-competitiveness of Patent Pools: Competing patent pools may distort the market's natural flow of competition. Patents that may be substituted for one another or that compete with one another for licensees that are pooled together reduce the negotiating power of the licensees and require them to agree to the terms set out by the pool for licencing such competing technologies.

Should the pool cease to exist, licensees would have the ability to hold individual negotiations with patent owners and get a licence for one of the patents on favourable terms, in line with the market's competitive nature. Such patent pooling-induced elimination of competition might have enormous economic ramifications, depending on the level of competition in the relevant industry at the moment20. Patent pools may encourage horizontal competitors to collude. A group of patent owners can virtually combine horizontally, and they can also decide on the patents' licencing fees together. In a competitive market, this kind of conduct leads to the restoration of monopoly pricing as it is incompatible with competitive activity21. Through their dominance over a technical sector in the absence of a benchmark body, patent pools also assist patent holders in creating de facto standards.

A single private standard of technology may be established by patent holders combining their patents through judicial settlement. The patent pool would lessen rivalry between rival patent holders who, in the absence of the pooling system, would have been vying for recognition by a standard-establishing organisation. Patent pools might result in anticompetitive collusion among competitors (a patent pool may be viewed as a cartel); licencing clauses may restrict patent holders' rights and thereby violate applicable antitrust statutes; or the formation of patent pools may distort competition if pro-competitive aspects do not outweigh the (potential) limitations on competition. 20 Mrinal Kumar, The Study on India Patent Pooling and Competition Laws Interface, 2(1), December 2022 21 Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools, and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 Yale Journal on Regulation 359, 388 (1999)

3. The scope of patent pooling in India:

A process patent regime existed in India prior to 2005, which was exploited by industries like

biopharmaceuticals to create a sizable and robust generics market. Indian firms saw no hindrance from the presence of anticommons since they were just producing bio-generics and not new goods, for which they had several process patents22. The idea of patent pooling is relatively new in developing nations like India, where it has mostly been explored as a potential remedy for the issue of access to reasonably priced healthcare. The fact that the pharmaceutical industry generally shows little interest in developing nations due to the small market, it is acknowledged that many diseases affecting the impoverished require new medications, and none are on the horizon24. In India, patent pooling is a relatively new notion. The Indian Patent Act of 1970 does not facilitate or prohibit the establishment of patent pools.

Patent pools might result in anti-competitive collusion among competitors (a patent pool may be viewed as a cartel); licencing clauses may restrict patent holders' rights and thereby violate applicable antitrust statutes; or the formation of patent pools may distort competition if pro-competitive aspects do not outweigh the (potential) limitations on competition23. Despite its potential to negatively impact market competition, the Competition Commission of India has designated patent pooling as a limited trade activity. The government's ability to create patents under Section 102 of the Patents Act of 1970 pool24. There is a provision in the present regulations relating to anti-competitive consequences regarding agreements pertaining to patent pooling under the Patents Act of 1970 and the Competition Act of 2002.

Any of the following limitations on a licence to produce or use a patented object are prohibited by Section 140 of the Indian Patent Act: - to mandate that the buyer, lessee, or licensee obtain the product from the vendor, lessor, licensor, or his nominees; to forbid him from obtaining the product from any source; to restrict his ability to obtain the product from any source; or to forbid him from obtaining any product other than the patented product or a product manufactured using the 22 Lalitha N, Biopharmaceutical patents: Emerging issues for biogeneric industry in India, paper presented at for the 3rd International Conference organized by the European Policy for Intellectual Property, 3-4 October 2008. 24 Satyanrayana K, Srivastava S, Poverty, health and intellectual property rights with special reference to India, Indian Journal of Medical Research, 126 (4) (2007) 390-406.

23 The Patents Act, 1970, § 84, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1949

24 The Patents Act, 1970, § 102, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1949

patented process from any source other than the vendor, lessor, licensor, or his nominees; - to limit or forbid the buyer, lease, or licensee from using a product other than the patented article or an article other than that produced using the patented method that is not provided by the vendor, lessor, licensor, or his designee; - to give exclusive grant back, banning challenges to patent validity, and forbidding forced package licencing are some examples of measures that might be taken to limit or forbid the buyer, lessee, or licensee from using any technique other than the patented process. Consequently, the Indian Patent Act imposes limitations on anti-competitive conduct, making the Competition Act, 2002 inapplicable.

With the purpose of limiting anti competitive agreements that might seriously harm Indian markets, the recently enacted Competition Act, 2002 aims to promote market competition. According to one interpretation, this means that the CCI may take a more lenient stance on patent pooling practises, which can boost production and distribution efficiency, provided that anti-competitive practises like price-fixing, tying agreements, and package licencing are avoided in the pool25. It is not necessary to conduct an anti-competitive examination of patent pools because they have the potential to yield significant economic advantages. That being said, deliberate anti-competitive actions by entities disguising themselves as patent price fixing of goods unrelated to the patents being pooled, for example, should not be considered illegal.

Limiting the scope of a licence, leading to the distribution of the market among patent licence holders, does not in and of itself constitute anti competitive behaviour. The above statement is supported by the argument that since licensees would not have been in a competitive position in the absence of such a patent licence, such limitations would not have reduced any competition that would have otherwise happened26.

CONCLUSION:

It may turn out that the school of thought holding that the exception specified in Section 3(5) 25 Indrani Barpujari, Facilitating Access, or Monopoly: Patent Pools at the Interface of Patent and Competition Regimes, 14 Journal of Intellectual Property Rights 347, 345 (2010) 26 Roger B. Andewelt, Analysis of Patent Polls under the Antitrust Laws, 53(3) Antitrust Law Journal 611, 611 (1984).

of the Competition Act, 2002 is unqualified for agreements pertaining to intellectual property is incorrect. A significant link must exist between the intention of preventing IP infringement and the limitations imposed on a third party by an IP owner, such as a patentee. Therefore, in addition to the Controller of Patents, patent pools should also fall under the legal purview of the Competition Commission of India. Additionally, patent holders who engage in anti competitive behaviour within a pool ought to be subject to the provisions of the Competition Act, 2002. Another consideration is "jurisdiction. " Section 3(5) of the Competition Act has jurisdiction over IPRs issued under Indian law. In case the patents are granted in compliance with foreign legislation, a patent pool will face issues.

The experts recommend using Sections 3(1) and 3(4) of the Competition Act, 2002 to calculate the AAEC in this particular case. However, considering that the Competition Act, 2002 aims to promote healthy competition and restrict only anti-competitive conduct, patent pooling is seen to be encouraged, and restrictive rules are intended to be freely implemented in India. On the other hand, there are notably no guidelines on intellectual property law that govern the application and performance of the Competition Act of 2002.

Like the aforementioned EU Guidelines on Technology Transfer Agreements and the FTC–DOJ Guidelines on IP Licencing, the European Commission (EC), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in the United States regularly release studies, reports, and guidelines that represent their interpretation of pertinent statute and their likely methodology to various types of agreements and forms of conduct. Official instructions on their approach are few, despite the Competition Commission of India's commitment to conducting studies and market research on a variety of market segments.

Lack of sufficient regulations pertaining to patent pooling could seriously harm market competition in India by allowing horizontal players to engage in anticompetitive behaviour under the pretence of patent pooling agreements, or it could reduce the financial gains that come from such agreements. The ambiguity in the relationship with competition law must thus be addressed by providing clear guidelines for patent pooling. The successful production and distribution of pharmaceutical products, which the nation's lowest socioeconomic classes may readily acquire, depend on patent pooling, which needs to be handled freely.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. M. Heller and

R.

Eisenberg, “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research,” Science, Vol. 280, No. 5364, 1998, pp. 698-701

2. https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2779&context=faculty_

scholarship#:~:text='The%20anticommons%20thesis%20is%20simple,all%20across%20 t he%20global%20economy

3. Shapiro, Carl, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-

Setting (March 2001). https://ssrn.com/abstract=273550

4. Are

‘Patent Thickets’ Smothering Innovation? Yale Insights, https://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/are-patent-thickets-smothering-innovation (last visited Nov. 5, 2023).

5. Floyd. L. Vaughan, the United States Patent System: Legal and Economic Conflicts in

American Patent History, Norman, Oklahoma 1st ed., 1956, p. 39-40.

6. Vaughan (1956: 41) includes cross-licensing agreements as a subgroup of patent pools,

while Shapiro (2001: 127)

7. Manas Bhulchandani, Akshay Khanna, Patent Pooling in Indian Scenario, 4(2)

International Journal of Law 15, 15 2018

8. https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/competitionpolicy/en/docs/patent_pools_report.p

df

9. Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent

Pools, in Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property, Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society, 123, 129 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001)

10. Michael A Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, "Can Patents Deter Innovation? The

Anticommons in Biomedical Research" Science May 1 1998, 698

11. MPEG LA, https://www.mpegla.com [https://perma.cc/GN8E-WF8P]

12. Steven C. Carlson, Note, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON

REGUL. 359, 368 (1999)

13. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931)

14. Secretariat WIPO, Patent Pools and Antitrust-A Comparative Analysis, WIPO, (Feb 2,

2020)

15. Jorge Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard

Setting and Antitrust Through a Historical Lens, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 39 (2015)

16. Ibid

17. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012)

18. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 317 (3d Cir. 2007)

19. Supra Note 6

20. Indrani Barujari, Facilitating Access, or Monopoly: Patent Pools at the Interface of Patent

and Competition Regimes, 14 Journal of Intellectual Property Rights 347, 345 (2010).

21. Mrinal Kumar, The Study on India Patent Pooling and Competition Laws Interface, 2(1),

December 2022

22. Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools, and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 Yale Journal on Regulation

359, 388 (1999)

23. Lalitha N, Biopharmaceutical patents: Emerging issues for biogeneric industry in India,

paper presented at for the 3rd International Conference organized by the European Policy for Intellectual Property, 3-4 October 2008.

24. Satyanrayana K, Srivastava S, Poverty, health and intellectual property rights with special

reference to India, Indian Journal of Medical Research, 126 (4) (2007) 390-406.

25. The Patents Act, 1970, § 84, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1949

26. The Patents Act, 1970, § 102, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1949

27. Indrani Barpujari, Facilitating Access, or Monopoly: Patent Pools at the Interface of Patent

and Competition Regimes, 14 Journal of Intellectual Property Rights 347, 345 (2010)

28. Roger B. Andewelt, Analysis of Patent Polls under the Antitrust Laws, 53(3) Antitrust Law

Journal 611, 611 (1984).