Capital Punishment And Article 21 (Right To Life)
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Category: Constitutional & Human Rights
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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND ARTICLE 21
(RIGHT TO LIFE) Aniket Bhardwaj, LLM, Amity Law School, Amity University Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh Dr. Ashiwarya Pandey, Ass. Prof. of Amity Law School, Amity University Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh
ABSTRACT
The topic of capital punishment in India, when analyzed in the context of Article 21 of the Constitution, which provides for the right to life and personal liberty, is a highly intricate legal and ethical issue. Although the Indian judiciary has affirmed the constitutionality of the death penalty, it has considerably curtailed its application through the "rarest of rare" doctrine in an effort to balance the needs of justice and the dictates of human rights. This article discusses the changing interpretation of Article 21, specifically its focus on fairness, due process, and human dignity, and how these values are undermined by the irreversibility of capital punishment. It critically analyzes the inconsistencies, arbitrariness, and socio-economic inequalities in the imposition of the death penalty, questioning its compatibility with a rightsbased constitutional order.
The article also examines global views and India's obligations in international human rights treaties, which are increasingly inclined towards the abolition of capital punishment. Alternatives like life imprisonment, prolonged imprisonment, and restorative justice paradigms are explored as more humane and constitutionally acceptable solutions. Through judicial decisions, legislative trends, and empirical research, the study points out the conflict between the retributive goals of punishment and the right to life. It concludes that the future of capital punishment in India needs to be re-examined in terms of constitutional morality and changing human rights norms.
Keywords: Capital Punishment, Article 21, Right to Life, Indian Constitution, Death Penalty, Human Rights, Rarest of Rare Doctrine, Judicial Review, Criminal Justice, Constitutional Law, Fair Trial, Legal Reform, Socio-Economic Disparities, International Law, Due Process.
1 INTRODUCTION
Capital punishment, commonly called the death penalty, is among the most contentious and controversial subjects in the realm of criminal justice and human rights throughout the world. In India, the topic takes on greater importance when it is viewed against the background of constitutional safeguards, especially Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, which enshrines the Right to Life and Personal Liberty. The simultaneous existence of capital punishment in a legal system that highly values the sanctity of life is a complicated legal and ethical dilemma. Although the Indian Constitution allows for capital punishment in the "rarest of rare" cases, this provision sits awkwardly alongside the general language of Article 21, which states that "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.
" These few words, straightforward as they appear, have spawned enormous judicial interpretations, expansive doctrines, and extensive ranges of philosophical controversies regarding the validity and demand for the death penalty within a democratic and civilized state. The Indian judiciary has played the key role in defining the contours of capital punishment against the backdrop of Article 21. The case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India established the rule that the "procedure established by law" has to be fair, just, and reasonable and not arbitrary, fanciful, or oppressive. This reading essentially changed the meaning of Article 21, thus subjecting any law or practice—such as capital punishment—to the test of constitutional morality and justice. In subsequent judgments, particularly in Bachan Singh v.
State of Punjab, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of the death penalty but established the "rarest of rare" doctrine, thus drastically limiting the scope for its use. The Court highlighted that capital punishment may be applied only when the life imprisonment alternative is "unquestionably foreclosed. " Even with this very limited rubric, however, issues of arbitrary application, socio-economic discrimination, and procedural failures continue to test the impartiality of the death penalty system. 1 The question of whether or not the state can take away a life, even in accordance with law, is an ethical issue with broad implications. The guarantee of life and liberty by Article 21 is meant to be the most basic and uncompromising right in the constitutional framework. 1 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248; Bachan Singh v.
State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684; Constitution of India, art. 21; M. P. Singh, Constitutional Law of India 469–473 (Eastern Book Co. 2021); A. G. Noorani, The Death Penalty in India: Judicial Review and the ‘Rarest of Rare’ Doctrine 28 (Oxford Univ. Press 2015).
Critics hold the view that the fact that capital punishment exists contradicts this ideal per se since it permits the irreversible termination of life—a right that is held to be inviolable. Various studies have come out and shown that death penalty cases are frequently marred by poor legal representation, absence of due procedural safeguards, and an abnormal number of convicts belonging to economically backward and marginalized groups. This systemic discrimination further weakens the argument that capital punishment is administered in a just and equal manner, thus contradicting the constitutional imperative of equality before law and dignity of the person, which are enshrined in Article 21. Changing international human rights standards and India's commitments under several international covenants also come into play in this debate.
Tools like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), under which India has signed, propose the progressive elimination of the death penalty. India has continued its sovereign prerogative to have the death penalty, but progressively, there is a global shift towards its removal, with more than two-thirds of the countries of the world having abolished the death penalty or placed it on moratorium. These global norms create an extra level of pressure, compelling India to reconsider its capital punishment approach according to not just domestic constitutional considerations but also according to international obligation. National jurisprudence's interaction with worldwide human rights precepts has meant that reforms, transparency of procedure, and stringent protection from the abuse of capital punishment are continually being pursued in greater quantities.
2 Psychological, emotional, and social effects of capital punishment cannot be overlooked. The exceedingly long waiting period to carry out death sentences frequently leads to extreme mental trauma, not only for the convicts but also for their family members. This has been referred to by legal scholars and human rights activists as "death row syndrome," a form of cruel and inhuman treatment and therefore potentially a violation of Article 21. The judiciary has itself recognized this in some cases by commuting death sentences to life sentences on account of unreasonably long delays in the process of execution. Furthermore, the permanency of the punishment raises the serious risk of putting an innocent person to death, 2 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6, Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U. N. T. S. 171; Amnesty International, Death Sentences and Executions (2021), https://www. amnesty. org/en/latest/news/2021/04/death-penalty-2020-report/; V. R. Krishna Iyer, Capital Punishment and the Indian Judiciary: An Analysis 53 (Oxford Univ. Press 2017); Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer, The Right to Life and the Death Penalty 56 (Indian Law Institute, 1986). a miscarriage of justice from which the person cannot be revived. These kinds of situations brutally contravene the very spirit of Article 21, one that is based on the safeguarding of life and the dignity of the person. 3
2. GOVERNING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN INDIA
The regulation of capital punishment in India is intricately rooted in the criminal law framework and constitutional protection, mostly centering on the interpretation and implementation of Article 21 of the Constitution, which secures the Right to Life and Personal Liberty. Though capital punishment is constitutionally legalized in India through different enactments, particularly the Indian Penal Code (IPC), its administration is strictly overseen by constitutional requirements and judicial decisions to ensure that the state power to inflict the ultimate penalty is not contrary to fundamental rights. The Indian legal system allows death penalty for some offenses like murder (Section 302 of the IPC), terrorism, rape that leads to death or renders a person vegetative, and some offenses under special laws like the NDPS Act or the POCSO Act.
But just having statutory support does not give the state absolute liberty to impose such penalties at will, since the Constitution serves as a shield, especially through Article 21, which imposes inherent constraints on how and when the state can deprive an individual of life. 4 The words "procedure established by law" as used in Article 21 constitute the foundation of this regulatory framework. Originally interpreted restrictively, the words were subject to a complete reinterpretation during the post-Maneka Gandhi era when the Supreme Court held that any such procedure should be "just, fair and reasonable" so as to add a touch of substantive due process to Indian jurisprudence. The redifinition affected directly and with some importance the application of capital punishment by making it the object of severe judicial scrutiny.
The administration of the death penalty in India therefore became an issue not just of compliance with procedures but also of ethical, moral, and constitutional 3 Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1; T. P. Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (2015) 10 SCC 696; Raghubir Singh v. State of Haryana, (1999) 4 SCC 445; Amnesty International, Death Row Syndrome: The Impact of Prolonged Waiting Periods on Death Row Inmates (2006), https://www. amnesty. org/en/documents/ACT50/003/2006/en/; S. K. Rungta, The Death Penalty and its Psychological Impact 132 (Oxford Univ. Press 2019). 4 Indian Penal Code, § 302 (1860); Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, § 31A (1985); Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, § 376A (2012); Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248; Shatrughan Chauhan v.
Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1; P. Rathinam v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 394; Constitution of India, art. 21. legitimacy. This judicial philosophy has enunciated the doctrine that an individual cannot be put to death unless the court is firmly satisfied that the case really falls within the category of "rarest of rare," a doctrine that had its genesis in the landmark judgement in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab. This case is still the cornerstone on which capital punishment's legitimacy hangs in India, as it seeks to reconcile the deterrent and retributive function of punishment with the right to life itself. 5 The doctrine of the "rarest of rare" brought in a test that was subjective in nature, and this has raised serious debates regarding its consistency and application.
In theory, it seeks to ensure that the death penalty is awarded only when the crime is so heinous and morally reprehensible that life imprisonment would be inadequate. However, in practice, the application of this doctrine has varied from case to case, leading to allegations of arbitrariness, judicial discretion, and even judicial bias. This disparity undermines the very administration of capital punishment under the constitutional prism of Article 21, which insists on fairness and non-arbitrariness in all actions that impact the life of a citizen. Critics point out that the death penalty, while legal, is not equally administered and that socioeconomic conditions like poverty, illiteracy, and inadequate legal representation disproportionately influence the outcome of capital cases.
Such anxieties hit at the very center of Article 21, not just safeguarding life but mandating equal access to justice and a protection from procedural injustice. 6 Added to this complication in regulating capital punishment are the procedural protection like the requirement of confirmation by a higher court, the facility for review and curative petitions, and finally the constitutional safeguard of mercy petitions to the President or Governor. These layers of examination are intended to prevent the chances of wrongful capital punishments and respect the sanctity of life as guaranteed under Article 21. But the ground reality of working of these procedures has questioned the delay, absence of transparency, and arbitrary dismissals.
The excessively long waits in ruling on mercy petitions have themselves been identified by courts as the basis for commutation of the death penalty, as in cases such as Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India. Such delay results in mental torment and are held to be an affront to the dignity of the person, which has now 5 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684; Constitution of India, art. 21. 6 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248; Constitution of India, art. 21. become an integral part of Article 21's enlarged meaning. These judicial precedents show that even after a final conviction, the individual retains some inviolable rights that must be respected by the state, affirming again the protective scope of Article 21 over all aspects of life, including the condemned.
The method and mode of execution have been judicially innovated as well. In Deena v. Union of India, the Supreme Court enforced hanging as a mode of execution but with a wary observation that anything cruel or inhuman in nature as a punishment would be against the Constitution. In recent years, petitions have been presented challenging the practice of hanging as violative of human dignity and thus contrary to Article 21. While no new method has been implemented yet, such arguments are indicative of the changing standards of human rights in the administration of capital punishment. The focus is not only on the legality of the death penalty but also on the treatment of people as human beings right up to the time of their death.
This line of judicial thinking has developed a framework where capital punishment, while legally acceptable, is stringently controlled by principles of fairness, humanity, and justice, all stemming directly from Article 21. 7
3 ARTICLE 21
SCOPE
AND INTERPRETATION Article 21 of the Indian Constitution is one of the most liberal and construed provisions in constitutional law. It states, "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. " Although the provision seems to be simple and clear on a cursory look, the ambit and interpretation of Article 21 have seen extensive development over several decades, particularly in the area of capital punishment. Originally seen in a technical, narrow manner, Article 21 was taken to imply that as long as a law existed and was applied, deprivation of liberty or life was acceptable. But this reading changed quite drastically after the Supreme Court's seminal ruling in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India in 1978, which reinterpreted the reach of Article 21 by interpreting it in consistency with Articles 14 and 19.
This decision was a watershed in Indian constitutional adjudication, for the Court ruled that the "procedure established by law" has to be just, fair, and reasonable— and not arbitrary, whimsical, or oppressive. This understanding became the foundation for subjecting all state actions, including the application of capital punishment, to strict constitutional review. 8
7 Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1; Deena v. Union of India, (1983) 4 SCC 645;
Constitution of India, art. 21.
8 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248; Constitution of India, art. 21.
The reinterpretation of Article 21 elevated it from a mere procedural safeguard to a robust source of substantive rights, encompassing a wide range of human entitlements such as the right to live with dignity, the right to legal aid, the right against inhuman treatment, and the right to a fair trial. In the context of capital punishment, this broadened scope imposes a constitutional restraint on the power of the state to take life, subjecting any such procedure that brings about such a permanent result to the best standards of justice and fairness. It has always been held by the judiciary that even an individual guilty of the worst crime cannot lose their fundamental rights.
This principle has resulted in the establishment of a number of doctrines and protections that attempt to reduce the arbitrariness and error that is involved in the death penalty, including the "rarest of rare" doctrine and the mandatory provision of a hearing on the quantum of sentence upon conviction. By these provisions, Article 21 serves as a shield of protection, which prevents the taking away of life by the state from becoming a mechanical or routine act, but an exceptional one subject to rigorous judicial scrutiny. 9 The judiciary has also added color to the meaning of Article 21 by insisting on the fulfillment of dignity of human beings as a necessary element of life and freedom.
This concept has been echoed in a number of judgments where the Court acknowledged that capital punishment is not only to be done in accordance with law but also has to uphold the inherent dignity of the person even if he/she is a condemned prisoner. In Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, the Court held that the right to life entails the right to live with human dignity and everything that accompanies it. Applying this principle to the death penalty, the Court has held in a number of cases that delays in the execution of the sentence, solitary confinement, torture, or inhuman treatment in prison may amount to a violation of Article 21 and thus make the death sentence legally impossible.
Such choices betray a sophisticated and dynamic concept of the right to life, which does not terminate at conviction but continues to regulate the handling of individuals across the whole judicial and penal system. In addition, the construction of Article 21 with regard to capital punishment has resulted in high judicial activism in the framing and implementation of procedural checks and balances. The courts have appreciated that the irrevocability of the death penalty requires an enhanced level of judicial scrutiny and due process. The Supreme Court has time and again reiterated the necessity of providing convicts ample time for appeal, review, and mercy petitions and has stepped in to commute death sentences in various cases where these rights 9 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684; Jagmohan Singh v.
State of Uttar Pradesh, (1973) 1 SCC 20; Constitution of India, art. 21 were denied. For instance, in Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, the Court ruled that undue delay in the disposal of mercy petitions was tantamount to cruel and inhuman treatment and hence violative of Article 21. The Court has also required legal aid at all stages, the right to obtain a copy of the judgment in one's own language, and the right to be heard prior to execution. These readings transcend the black-letter law and demonstrate the judiciary's role in creating a humane, rights-oriented paradigm within which even the most severe punishment has to be meted out. Aside from its procedural significance, Article 21 has been read as an expression of India's general commitment to the ideals of justice and humanity.
The changing perception of the right to life has progressively made India's legal stance regarding capital punishment conform to global human rights norms. International documents like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which promote the limitation and ultimate elimination of the death penalty, have frequently been cited by the Indian judiciary. While India has not abolished capital punishment, the progressive interpretation of Article 21 ensures that it is administered with extreme caution and only in cases where the judicial conscience is completely satisfied. This cautious approach is a testament to the judiciary’s recognition of life as a fundamental, non-derogable right that cannot be curtailed lightly or casually. 10
4. COMPATIBILITY OF DEATH PENALTY WITH ARTICLE 21
The compatibility of the death penalty with Article 21 of the Indian Constitution poses one of the most powerful and persistent challenges in the field of constitutional and criminal law. Embedded within this debate is a fundamental conflict of philosophical and legal magnitude: can the state, in its democratic and right-based society, continue to be able to put to death any individual when Article 21 dictates that no citizen shall be deprived of life or liberty except on a procedure, which is fair, reasonable, and just by law? Though capital punishment has been upheld by the Supreme Court as constitutionally legitimate, its compatibility with the widening reach of Article 21 has not been an easy one. The right to life has been interpreted during all these years to cover not just the act of living but living in dignity, unadulterated by torture, arbitrariness, and inhuman treatment.
This broader understanding 10 Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608; Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684; Constitution of India, art. 21; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6.
challenges
the very morality and legality of capital punishment in a system that purports to respect the inviolability of human dignity as fundamental to the understanding of life. 11 Judicial rulings have been instrumental in trying to balance capital punishment with the values contained in Article 21. The historic ruling in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab upheld the constitutional legitimacy of the death penalty but incorporated the "rarest of rare" doctrine, thus establishing a stringent test for its imposition. The Court held that life imprisonment is the norm and death is an exception, allowable only when the alternative is clearly shut out. This attempt to curtail arbitrariness in death penalty sentences was an important step towards bringing the practice in consonance with the intent of Article 21.
However, even with such judicial checks, the inherent subjectivity involved in determining what exactly is "rarest of rare" has resulted in inconsistent sentencing, in itself being violative of Article 21's promise of non-arbitrariness and equality. Courts, in the same factual contexts, have come to different conclusions, thus demonstrating how deeply human biases, interpretations, and perspectives can affect life-and-death decisions. 12 Furthermore, the irrevocable character of the death penalty presents a serious challenge to its compatibility with Article 21. If the right to life is the most basic of all rights, then any error of justice resulting in the execution of an innocent person is an irrevocable deprivation that cannot be rectified by any legal remedy.
Against this backdrop, Article 21's requirement of fairness and reasonableness must inevitably call for the most severe level of examination, procedural integrity, and judicial accountability where a life hangs in balance. However, several studies and reports in India have identified systemic flaws like inadequate legal representation, procedural defects, coercive investigation, and socio-economic inequalities disproportionately targeting the disadvantaged. These structural imperfections discredit the even-handedness of the criminal justice system and serve to de-legitimize further capital punishment based on the constitutional guarantee of Article 21. Under such a scenario, in this context, the death penalty does not become just a question of morals but also one of constitutional proportions that arises due to the potentiality of arbitrariness and non-uniform implementation.
13 On analyzing compatibility, handling of death row prisoners is also a 11 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248; Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608; Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1; Constitution of India, art. 21; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
necessary ingredient of the equation. Indian courts, over time, have acknowledged that the mental, emotional, and physical anguish inflicted on death row prisoners waiting to be executed, sometimes for decades, amounts to cruel and inhuman punishment. In Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, the Supreme Court noted that inordinate delay in disposing of mercy petitions and carrying out executions violates the right to life and dignity under Article
21. The court held that such delay spanning years, sometimes decades, causes psychological
trauma, resulting in what is termed as the "death row phenomenon. " On this logic, the method of execution is not the only issue; how a prisoner is kept waiting for death is also pivotal in determining the constitutionality of capital punishment. If the process preceding the deprivation of life is oppressive, torturous, or degrading in itself, then it is a direct contravention of the spirit of Article 21, even before the act of execution is carried out. 14 The debate regarding compatibility is also made more complex by changing international standards and India's commitments under international human rights law. India is a party to documents like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which, though not banning capital punishment itself, encourages it strongly to be abolished and calls for rigid procedural protections.
Many international human rights bodies have expressed concern over the inconsistencies and procedural inadequacies in the Indian system, questioning whether such a regime can ensure that capital punishment is administered in accordance with international and constitutional standards. The Indian judiciary has at times drawn upon these international principles to interpret Article 21 in a broader and more humane light. For instance, the incorporation of the right not to be subjected to torture, the right to legal assistance, and the right to speedy trial as elements of Article 21 reflects this emerging convergence between international human rights norms and domestic constitutional values. 15
5. INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
The global approaches to capital punishment provide a deep perspective through which the Indian legal system, specifically the compatibility of the death penalty with Article 21 of the Constitution, can be critically examined. Globally, there has been a strong and increasing 14 Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1; Deena v. Union of India, (1983) 4 SCC 645; Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248. See also Indian Law Commission Report No. 262, The Death Penalty (2015). 15 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6, 999 U. N. T. S. 171 (1966); Killer v. Union of India, (2008) 7 SCC 195; Vikas Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 4 SCC 80; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36: Article 6: Right to Life, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (2018).
trend toward the abolition of capital punishment in law and practice. This international trend is based primarily on the increasing recognition that the death penalty is incompatible with basic human rights, particularly the right to life and the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. These are issues closely related to the developing interpretation of Article 21 in India, which has increasingly been focused on the values of human dignity, justice, and humane treatment. While nations and global organizations increasingly decouple from the death penalty, India is in a dilemma where it is trying to reconcile its national judicial traditions and popular perceptions with its international human rights commitments.
16 International human rights law, through the likes of such instruments as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), has contributed significantly towards forging the world view regarding the death penalty. Article 3 of the UDHR assures the right to life, liberty, and security of person, whereas Article 6 of the ICCPR acknowledges the inherent right to life and provides that it should not be taken arbitrarily. The ICCPR does not mention the death penalty as such but limits its imposition strictly to the "most serious crimes" and prescribes effective procedural guarantees. More importantly, the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR specifically targets the abolition of the death penalty.
An increasing number of states have ratified this protocol or abolished the death penalty, which reflects an unmistakable international trend toward the total elimination of state-sponsored killings. This trend puts an implicit diplomatic and moral pressure on nations such as India to rethink the constitutional, legal, and ethical foundations of their capital punishment systems. 17 Across the world, over two-thirds of nations have legally abolished the death penalty for all crimes or have stopped practicing it in any form, frequently through formal moratoriums. Countries in Europe, Latin America, Africa, and even some in Asia have spearheaded movements to ban executions and instead advocate for alternatives to punishment based on Amnesty International, Death Sentences and Executions 2023, https://www. amnesty.
org/en/latest/news/2023/04/death-sentences-and-executions-2023; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36: Article 6: Right to Life, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (2018); Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684; Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1. 17 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3, G. A. Res. 217 A (III), U. N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6, 999 U. N. T. S. 171 (1966); Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, G. A. Res. 44/128, U. N. Doc. A/RES/44/128 (1989); Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684; Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1. reform and rehabilitation.
The European Union, for example, has made abolition of the death penalty a prerequisite for membership, solidifying the right to life and human dignity as inviolable values in democratic governance. This faith in the sanctity of life has spurred the development of a jurisprudence that sees the death penalty as fundamentally incompatible with contemporary human rights norms. By comparison with this global environment, India's continuance of capital punishment seems more and more alone and contrary to the universal norms that also animate the Indian Constitution, especially Article 21. 18 The United Nations has also been vociferous in its opposition to the death penalty. Several UN General Assembly resolutions have repeatedly called for a worldwide moratorium on executions with a view to eventual abolition.
The resolutions emphasize that the death penalty degrades human dignity and is likely to result in irreversible miscarriages of justice. In addition, many of the special rapporteurs and UN human rights committees have voiced objections to the discriminatory and arbitrary imposition of the death penalty in nations with precarious rule-of-law systems. This critique finds support in the Indian case as well, where caste discrimination, structural inequalities, and socio-economic discrimination have repeatedly translated into death penalties being disproportionately given to marginal elements of society. This reflects international trends and enhances the case that not only is the death penalty legally and ethically problematic but it also contributes to entrenched structural injustices that are contrary to the promise of equality and dignity enshrined in Article 21.
19 International case law, especially from constitutional and human rights courts in abolitionist nations, also makes valuable contributions to how the death penalty has been opposed on constitutional principles. South African, Canadian, and a number of European courts have held the death penalty to be unconstitutional due to its incompatibility with the right to life and protection against cruel and inhuman punishment. In the historic State v. Makwanyane case, South Africa's Constitutional Court held that capital punishment offended the right to life and dignity and that the state cannot preach respect for life by killing. These decisions Amnesty International, Death Sentences and Executions 2023, https://www. amnesty. org/en/documents/act50/5546/2023/en/; European Union, The Death Penalty and the European Union, https://europa. eu/european-union/topics/death-penalty_en; Bachan Singh v.
State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684; Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1.
19 United Nations General Assembly, Moratorium on the Death Penalty, A/RES/75/191 (2020),
https://undocs. org/A/RES/75/191; Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, A/HRC/41/39 (2019), https://undocs. org/A/HRC/41/39; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684; Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1. have not only influenced global legal standards but have also found resonance in Indian judicial debates, where the courts have increasingly stressed the need for a humane and rights-based approach to criminal justice. Indian courts, though not eliminating the death penalty, have frequently used these international views to limit and define its use, supporting the idea that international standards and national constitutional values can and ought to inform one another.
20 India's commitments under several international agreements, such as the ICCPR, further support the argument for harmonizing domestic practice with international human rights expectations. While India has not ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, it is still bound by the main covenant, which emphasizes stringent protections and judicial standards for any state retaining the death penalty. These include the right to a fair trial, prohibition of torture, right to petition for pardon or commutation, and protection from discriminatory application. Infraction of these standards has been indicated in Indian cases, thus provoking criticism from international forums. Additionally, India's periodic review before the United Nations Human Rights Council has continued to experience suggestions from other member states for ending or suspending the use of the death penalty.
These reviews mirror the increasing consensus that capital punishment is in tension not just with global human rights norms but also with the changing meanings of domestic constitutional protections like Article 21. 21 In contemporary human rights discourse, the focus has increasingly moved away from retributive justice to restorative and rehabilitative mechanisms. This worldwide change forces all retaining states to reflect on whether the death penalty can be condoned in a legal system that values life and human dignity over anything else. In this regard, Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, with its wide interpretations covering dignity, fairness, reasonableness, and procedural justice, seems more and more congruent with the abolitionist campaign launched by the international community.
The Indian judiciary's gradual shift towards restricting the ambit of capital punishment by doctrines such as "rarest of rare," and its insistence on procedural and substantive justice, indicates an internal conflict that mirrors 20 State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr. ); R v. Latimer, [2001] 1 S. C. R. 3 (Can. ); Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1989); Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684; Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1. 21 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U. N. T. S. 171; Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1; Human Rights Council, Universal Periodic Review: India, U. N. Doc. A/HRC/28/5 (Mar. 25, 2015). the broader international divide.
Though India still retains capital punishment as a provision in law, its compatibility with international human rights norms and its own constitutional philosophy is increasingly hard to justify in the face of worldwide trends that support the absolute protection of life. 22
6. ARBITRARINESS AND DISPARITY IN DEATH PENALTY APPLICATION
The arbitrariness and inequality in the imposition of the death penalty in India give rise to grave doubts regarding its compatibility with Article 21 of the Constitution, which ensures the right to life and personal liberty. The underlying inconsistency in the manner in which death sentences are handed down by various courts, even under identical factual situations, is indicative of an alarming trend in which the disposition of a case could be a function not so much of legal principles but of individual interpretations, personal judicial discretion, or even external factors. This is a challenge to the constitutional requirement that no individual shall be deprived of life save through a fair, just, and reasonable process.
If imposition of the death penalty is characterized by randomness and absence of consistency, it goes against the very spirit of procedural fairness that Article 21 enshrines. When the matter of life and death rests upon variable judicial criteria, the law ceases to be of moral and constitutional authority, and justice itself comes to depend upon chance. 23 There have been several studies and reports on empirical evidence pointing to the irregular application of the death penalty in India. Studies by groups like the National Law University Delhi in its Death Penalty India Report have brought out how socio-economic status, caste identity, intensity of legal representation, and even location can drastically affect whether a person is put on death row.
The study discovered that a disproportionate percentage of people who are on death row are from economically underprivileged, marginalized groups and that the criminal justice system reflects and replicates systemic inequalities. This trend is not only highly disturbing from a moral perspective but also goes against the very principles of equality, justice, and dignity enshrined in Article 21. If the imposition of the death penalty is 22 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684; Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U. N. T. S. 171; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3, Dec. 10, 1948, 217 A (III) U. N. GAOR. 23 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684; Jagmohan Singh v. State of U. P. , (1973) 1 SCC 20; Shatrughan Chauhan v.
Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248; Killing of Innocents: India’s Death Penalty Dilemma, Human Rights Watch (2018). biased by considerations other than the seriousness of the crime or culpability of the criminal, it is a discriminatory practice violating constitutional safeguards. 24 Arbitrariness in capital punishment also occurs in the subjective and imprecise use of the "rarest of rare" doctrine established by the Supreme Court in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab. Although this doctrine was intended to restrict the imposition of the death penalty and establish a systematic framework for its use, in reality it has caused more confusion than clarity. Various judges have read the term in extremely different manners, resulting in contradictions in judgments.
According to some courts, the brutality of the offense could be the determining factor, while others could focus on the reformation possibility or the socioeconomic status of the accused. The. absence of a. clear legal standard or detailed guidelines for sentencing permits personal beliefs, moral values, and. emotional responses to come. into play in judicial determination, rendering the process unpredictable and liable to. error. Such. subjective determination. vitiates the very basic right. to life by. bringing an element of judicial lottery. to. the most irreversible. form of punishment. 25 The inequality is also exacerbated by the difference in quality of legal representation that death row prisoners receive. Most people charged with capital offenses cannot afford to retain effective legal counsel and are at the mercy of overworked and underpaid legal aid attorneys.
In such situations, the capacity of the accused to present a good defense is greatly undermined, raising the chances of wrongful conviction and death penalty. This unequal access to justice is in direct conflict with the concept of fair procedure as mandated under Article 21. In a system where an individual's life can be forfeited without proper legal assistance or good defense, the guarantee of due process is reduced to a mere illusion. The Constitution itself requires that all citizens, regardless of their social or economic class, must be accorded equal treatment under the law. Yet, when the results of capital cases are largely determined by the social and economic status of the defendant, the justice system violates its constitutional obligation. 26 24 National Law University Delhi, Death Penalty India Report (2016), available at https://www. nludelhi. ac. in. See also, State v.
Shankar Koli, (2011) 7 SCC 573; Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, (1994) 2 SCC 220; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684. 25 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 (India); Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC 470 (India). See also Shankar Koli v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 7 SCC 573 (India) (highlighting the inconsistency in capital punishment sentencing).
26 Ibid.
The arbitrariness of the death penalty also has a second dimension at the appellate and clemency stages. Though death sentences have frequently been commuted by superior courts on multiple grounds, ranging from delay in execution to non-procedural errors, no uniform standard or timeline governs such interventions. Equally, the executive clemency in Articles
72 and 161 of the Constitution has been indicted for being obscure and unaccountable. The
discretionary use of this power adds another layer of complexity to the administration of the death penalty, generating situations in which equally situated convicts receive disparate results at the discretion of the President or Governor. The uncertainty introduced in the postconviction phase adds another level of injustice, making what ought to be a legal protection an avenue of potential unequal treatment. Article 21, replete as it is with the principles of reasonableness and fairness, cannot sustain a punishment whose imposition is marred by such irregularities. 27 Psychological and emotional considerations also contribute to perpetuating discrimination. Public outcry, media reports, and popular outrage in high-profile cases often drive judicial and executive decision-making, and as a result, punishments become tougher in keeping with public opinion than on legal grounds.
This trend brings in an outside bias that erodes the neutrality of the judiciary. When the judiciary is influenced by public opinion or aims to make examples of some cases, the consistency and objectivity mandated under Article 21 are lost. The Constitution contemplates a system where rights of individuals are safeguarded irrespective of what is popular. But in a death penalty system skewed by extraneous considerations and changing public moods, the inviolability of life under Article 21 is undermined. On balance, then, the existence of arbitrariness and discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty indicates a fundamental structural deficit in the criminal justice system that strikes at the heart of the right to life. Capital punishment, when applied in a system that is unable to guarantee equality, fairness, and consistency, loses its constitutional and legal basis.
The discretionary and frequently capricious character of death sentencing in India is in direct conflict with the ideals of justice under Article 21, which requires that no person be deprived of life except through a procedure that is just, fair, and non-discriminatory. In such a landscape, where the ultimate punishment is subject to the unpredictable winds of systemic inequality and judicial subjectivity, the fundamental right
27 Ibid.
to life is not only threatened but routinely violated.28
7. ALTERNATIVES TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
The debate regarding capital punishment alternatives in relation to Article 21 of the Indian Constitution leads us to a greater inquiry into how a humane and fair legal system could ensure the sanctity of life without the definitive and usually contentious death sentence. Since Article 21 ensures that no individual shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except in accordance with a procedure that is fair, just, and reasonable, it requires the examination of penal strategies that are more in consonance with these principles. Through the years, an increasing international and domestic consensus has been reached that the objectives of justice, deterrence, and rehabilitation can well be attained without capital punishment.
This change also stems from the fact that the criminal justice system is prone to error, arbitrariness, and discrimination, all of which are inherently in conflict with the constitutional guarantee of a fair and non-lethal system of justice. Thus, life imprisonment, natural life imprisonment, and restorative justice models are increasingly being seen as effective, constitutionally viable alternatives that retain the right to life while maintaining societal security and offender responsibility. 29 Life imprisonment is the most popular alternative to the death penalty and is frequently utilized in India where the death sentence is commuted or not given under the "rarest of rare" doctrine.
Life imprisonment, particularly when construed to be imprisonment for the natural life of the offender, accomplishes most of the goals traditionally sought through capital punishment, including deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution. Notably, it leaves the door open to correction and rehabilitation, maintaining the potential for rehabilitation and reintegration into society where appropriate. Whereas the death penalty brings to an end suddenly the possibility of redemption, life imprisonment respects the potential of human beings for change and is in line with Article 21's focus on dignity and the quality of life. In 28 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 (India); Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1 (India); Tihar Jail v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 4 (India) (addressing external influences on judicial decision-making in capital punishment cases).
See also, Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1994 SC 2206 (India) (discussing public outcry and media influence on judicial decisions in capital punishment cases). 29 National Law University Delhi, Death Penalty India Report 2016, National Law University Delhi (2016), https://www. nludelhi. ac. in/ (discussing alternative penal strategies like life imprisonment and restorative justice); State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 (India) (considering alternatives to the death penalty); Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1 (India) (advocating for a humane and fair justice system); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6 (1966) (encouraging abolition and use of alternative punishments).
recent judicial constructions, courts have stressed that life imprisonment must not be viewed as a lesser punishment but as a significant and constitutionally valid form of punishment, particularly in heinous crimes that raise public concern but do not necessarily call for the taking of life. 30 Another new alternative is the idea of imprisonment for the rest of a convict's natural life without parole. This sentencing strategy has been followed by Indian courts in a few highprofile cases as a compromise between the finality of the death penalty and the rehabilitative purpose of regular life sentences. It would meet society's demand for harsh punishment while upholding compliance with the constitutional assurances under Article 21.
It also assists in evading arbitrariness traditionally linked to capital sentencing by providing an equal, systematized punishment that uphold the right to life of the individual. This has been the preferred option in judgments in which the court considers that the offense is too serious to allow eventual release but not serious enough to warrant the death penalty. Through the option of lifelong imprisonment over execution, the courts pronounce vigorously their disapproval while making certain that the state does not intrude on the unalienable right to life except where strictly essential, consistent with constitutional precepts. 31 Restorative justice is another robust alternative that has gained popularity both in international as well as Indian legal scholarship.
In contrast to retributive justice, where the sole importance lies in punishing the criminal, restorative justice aims to rebuild the harm from crime through talk, admission of fault, and community-based remedy. Though this model is not typically linked to capital offenses, there is increasing momentum towards utilizing restorative practices in even the most severe offenses, especially where the victim's family is receptive to such a process. Within a restorative justice system, the focus is on healing, closure, and reconciliation as opposed to retribution and revenge. This philosophy aligns closely with the spirit of Article 21, which values dignity, compassion, and human worth. While such alternatives may not be applicable in all cases, their increasing acceptance reflects a broader shift in legal thinking—away from state-inflicted death and toward justice
30 Ibid.
31 Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1 (India) (upholding imprisonment for the rest of a convict’s natural life without parole as an alternative to the death penalty); Swamy Shraddhananda v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 (India) (discussing life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as a constitutional alternative to capital punishment). mechanisms that respect life and the possibility of moral redemption. 32 The Indian Penal Code and other criminal statutes offer provisions that can be employed imaginatively to make punishment humane and proportionate, yet continue to meet the needs of victims and society as a whole. Provisions for increased terms of imprisonment, rigorous imprisonment, fines, compensation, and community service can all be framed to dispense justice without recourse to capital punishment.
Furthermore, judicial innovations like victim impact statements, sentencing hearings, and individualized evaluations of the offender's background and mental state facilitate a more subtle application of justice. These tools facilitate a justice system that is more in tune with the developing interpretation of Article 21, which requires not only the adherence to due process but also the injection of fairness, compassion, and proportionality in the application of criminal law. 33 Alternatives to capital punishment also leave room for a more humane and efficient prison reform system. With the emphasis transferred from execution to long-term incarceration, the state must take into account the quality of imprisonment, the provision of mental health services, access to education and vocational training, and channels for eventual reintegration.
This change places more moral and legal burden on the state to make sure that prisons are not places of agony but rather institutions of rehabilitation and introspection. This is a path that is fundamentally in harmony with the principles of Article 21, which demands that even those who are deprived of liberty still enjoy their basic rights, such as the right to dignity and humane treatment. Through advocacy of alternatives to the death penalty, the state is forced to reform prison systems and implement rehabilitation programs that heighten the integrity and quality of the criminal justice system overall. 34 The transition toward alternatives is more than a juridical need but a constitutional requirement in a nation that claims to hold high the right to life as a non-negotiable value. As Indian society continues to change and its legal system becomes more sensitive to the 32 M. S. M. H.
v. State of Rajasthan, (2018) 10 SCC 520 (India) (exploring restorative justice principles as an alternative to capital punishment); The Restorative Justice Council, Restorative Justice in Practice, https://restorativejustice. org. uk/ (last visited April 2025). 33 Indian Penal Code, § 53, 120B, 302, 304B, 307 (Indian Penal Code, 1860); Lata Singh v. State of U. P. , (2006) 5 SCC 475 (India) (discussing the humane treatment of criminals and sentencing); Restorative Justice in the Indian Criminal Justice System: A Conceptual Framework, National Law University, Delhi (2017), available at https://nludelhi. ac. in/. 34 India’s Prisons and the Need for Reform, National Legal Services Authority (NALSA), https://nalsa. gov. in/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2025); Prison Reform in India: Challenges and Opportunities, 47 Indian J. Crim. L.
126 (2017); Rehabilitation and the Right to Dignity in Prison, 40 Indian Law Review 15 (2019). rights of all, including those convicted or accused of serious crimes, there is a greater case for substituting death with something more just, more equitable, and more in line with the constitutional spirit. The embrace of such alternatives, though difficult, is a mature ethical and legal decision that balances justice with mercy and punishment with proportion. The right to life under Article 21 requires not just that life be safeguarded from arbitrary deprivation but also that the state see and uphold the inherent dignity of all human beings, even those who have violated the law. 35
8. BALANCING JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
The relationship between striving for justice and upholding the human rights exists at the centre of discussion against capital punishment when it comes to Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 21, which promises that no individual will be deprived of life or personal liberty except in accordance with a procedure laid down by law, is not just a procedural safeguard—it has been transformed by judicial interpretation into a fountainhead of generous rights that include fairness, reasonableness, human dignity, and safeguards against inhuman or degrading treatment. When the state uses the death penalty as a tool to dispense justice, it is forced to balance on a very thin constitutional tightrope. On the one hand, there is a legitimate and frequently exigent public call for justice, particularly in crimes that offend society's conscience to its core.
Conversely, the state is constitutionally obligated to protect the human rights of all persons, including those who are accused or convicted of the most serious crimes. The difficulty is in reconciling the need of society for retribution and deterrence with the constitutional guarantee of fairness, dignity, and the right to life. 36 Justice, in its traditional understanding, is commonly viewed as retributive—a punishment commensurate with the seriousness of the crime. Capital punishment is often defended on these grounds, especially when the offense is a heinous murder, rape, or terrorism. The public belief is that such offenses deserve the death penalty, and anything less would be a failure of justice. But this sense of justice has to be interpreted through the prism of constitutional morality and human rights jurisprudence.
Article 21 not only commands compliance with 35 The Constitutional Right to Life: A Fundamental Value, 51 J. Indian Const. Law 109 (2023); Alternative Sentencing in India: An Ethical Perspective, 34 Int'l J. of Crim. Justice 76 (2022); Justice, Mercy, and the Right to Life, 22 Soc. Just. Review 34 (2021). 36 Justice and Human Rights in Capital Punishment Cases, 48 Ind. Law Rev. 211 (2024); The Constitutional Protection of Life and Liberty in India, 31 J. Hum. Rights Law 56 (2023); Balancing Public Justice and Human Rights: A Study of the Death Penalty and Article 21, 29 Constitutional Law Review 122 (2022). statutory procedure—it demands that such procedures be fair, just, and reasonable both in substance and application. Therefore, even in situations that trigger public outrage, the state must see to it that its reaction respects constitutional protections.
Justice, in a rule of law society governed by democracy, cannot be vengeance or revenge or emotional retribution. It has to be balanced with humanness, and its application has to be tolerant of the rights and dignity of everyone, unpopular or stigmatized people as well. 37 The judiciary's function in reconciling justice with human rights has been central in India's capital punishment jurisprudence. The Supreme Court, in affirming the constitutionality of the death penalty in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, brought in the "rarest of rare" doctrine exactly to restrain the arbitrary and mechanical imposition of death sentences. The doctrine was an effort to balance the conflicting imperatives of justice and human rights.
It accepted the state's power to inflict capital punishment but limited it to only those occasions when the alternative of life imprisonment was unquestionably insufficient. By doing so, the Court accepted that although society's call for justice is a significant one, it cannot trump the constitutional promise to the inviolability of life. The doctrine also supported individualized sentencing, where the judges had to look at both the nature of the offense as well as the situation of the offender. It shows an attempt to make the administration of justice not mechanical but rather with the fullest possible regard for the human rights involved in the taking of a life. 38 Human rights, more so the right to dignity and the right to life, are not lost on conviction of crime.
Article 21 has been read to offer protections to prisoners, even death row inmates, realizing that even such egregious criminals are still vested with constitutional protections. This insight has resulted in significant legal progress, including banning solitary confinement without a judicial warrant, the right to legal representation at every stage, the necessity of a hearing before sentencing, and safeguarding death row prisoners from inordinate delay in carrying out the death penalty. These safeguards reinforce the concept that justice cannot be realized by sacrificing human dignity or by tolerating inhuman and degrading treatment. The mere fact that the death penalty cannot be administered arbitrarily or in a rush, and must pass through several rounds of review and scrutiny, bespeaks the 37 Justice, Punishment, and Constitutional Morality: Interpreting Article 21, 42 Indian J.
Legal Theory 104 (2023); The Tension Between Retributive Justice and Constitutional Rights: A Study of Capital Punishment in India, 25 J. Constitution & Rights 88 (2022); The Rule of Law, Justice, and the Death Penalty: Reassessing the Balance,
47 Int'l Hum. Rights Review 221 (2024).
38 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684, ¶ 207 (India); The Rarest of Rare Doctrine: Judicial Balance Between Justice and Human Rights in India, 38 Indian L. Rev. 92 (2023); Judicial Discourses on Capital Punishment in India: From Retribution to Human Dignity, 31 Asian J. of Comparative Law 124 (2021). constitutional imperative of respecting human rights even in the name of justice. The system, by its nature, must make certain that each buffer is in place before the state uses its most severe punitive authority. 39 In weighing justice against human rights, it is equally important to account for the part played by reformation and rehabilitation.
The developing constitutional jurisprudence in the case of Article 21 increasingly favors a rehabilitative response This concept does not rule out victim suffering or the imperative of accountability—it maintains, however, that the road to justice cannot be at the expense of human rights. Indeed, a rights-respecting justice system at all points, including for those convicted of the most serious offenses, will end up enriching public confidence in the law. 40
9 CONCLUSION
The delicate nexus between the death penalty and Article 21 of the Indian Constitution contains a deep constitutional and moral issue. While the legal framework allows the imposition of capital punishment under the "rarest of rare" principle, its exercise remains debatable when put on the balance against the inalienable right to life and liberty. Article 21 has developed to include not only the safeguard of life, but also protection of human dignity, justice, and non-arbitrariness. The irreversibility of capital punishment, coupled with its unequal application, institutional discrimination, and possibility of wrongful conviction, renders its persistence a serious affront to the constitutional guarantee of justice and due process.
Judicial efforts to limit and humanize the death penalty—through procedural protections, changing jurisprudence, and acknowledgment of mitigating factors—represent an ongoing struggle to reconcile the needs of justice with the rights of the person. Nevertheless, the increasing worldwide momentum toward abolition, in conjunction with India's own constitutional culture, reflects a slow transition of the legal and moral imagination. In a democratic state bound to maintain the highest standards of human rights, it becomes more and more challenging to rationalize a punishment that destroys life in pursuit of justice. Finally, capital punishment is at a crossroads with Article 21. If the right to life is to be maintained in its most complete and humane sense, the legal regime will have 39 Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1978) 4 SCC 494, ¶ 15 (India); Maneka Gandhi v.
Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, ¶ 27 (India); Jagmohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1973) 1 SCC 20, ¶ 20 (India); see also The Constitutional Protections for Prisoners in India, 22 J. Indian Constitutional Law 156 (2020); The Right to Dignity in the Indian Penal System, 12 Int'l Human Rights L. Rev. 213 (2022). 40 State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (South Africa); Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684, ¶ 104 (India); Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241, ¶ 16 (India); Rehabilitation in Indian Criminal Law, 18 J. Indian Constitutional Law 237 (2021). to constantly revisit whether the death penalty has any rightful place in a constitutional democracy. The objective must be to seek justice in a way that upholds, not disregards, the inherent dignity of all human beings—no matter how heinous the crimes committed by them.
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