Case Comment - Anamol Bhandari (Minor) Vs Delhi Technological University
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CASE COMMENT: ANAMOL BHANDARI (MINOR) VS
DELHI TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY Mananika Deb, BA LLB, National Law University and Judicial Academy, Assam
ABSTRACT
This case comment analyses the Delhi High Court’s decision in Anamol Bhandari (Minor) v. Delhi Technological University, a landmark judgment addressing the unequal academic relaxation extended to persons with disabilities (PwDs) vis-à-vis Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST) candidates. The case raised crucial constitutional questions under Article 14, particularly on whether a 5% relaxation for PwDs, compared to 10% for SC/ST candidates, violated the guarantee of substantive equality. The Court held that the differential treatment failed to meet the test of reasonable classification and reaffirmed the principle of horizontal reservation, emphasizing that PwDs cannot be treated as a competing vertical category. The judgment also clarified that institutional policies are not immune from judicial review when they infringe constitutional rights.
Drawing on statutory mandates from the 1995 “Disabilities Act and international commitments under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities” (UNCRPD), the Court relied on empirical data to highlight the systemic educational disadvantage faced by PwDs. While the judgment secured relief for the petitioner, it stopped short of mandating broader structural reform across educational institutions. This comment situates the judgment within India’s evolving disability rights jurisprudence and critiques its limitations in achieving systemic change. It argues that the decision, though significant, underscores the need for stronger executive and legislative action to ensure that constitutional and statutory guarantees for PwDs are effectively realised across the country.
INTRODUCTION
The Indian constitutional framework, while strongly rooted in the ideals of equality and nondiscrimination, has historically struggled to translate its promises into reality for marginalized groups, especially “persons with disabilities (PwDs). ” While “the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016” has sought to undo years of institutional neglect, its implementation has been plagued by apathy and selective interpretation. The case of Anamol Bhandari (Minor) v. Delhi Technological University, delivered by the Delhi High Court stands as a landmark judgement in the evolution of Indian disability rights jurisprudence. 1 It addresses a central question but one that had time and again been overlooked: Can a public institution provide lesser academic relaxation to disabled candidates than to candidates from Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST)?
While the judgment was decided “in the context of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995,” it remains significant in light of the shift to a rights-based approach under “the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. ” This case comment aims to critically analyse the case from a legal and socio-political standpoint, focusing on the systemic biases PwDs face in accessing higher education. The judgement holds considerable significance in the context of India’s attempt to move from formal to substantive equality, particularly in education, a right rooted in Article 15, 21 and 21A of the Constitution and global mandates like “the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), to which India is a signatory.
” FACTS OF THE CASE The petitioner, Anamol Bhandari, was a student with 50% physical disability caused by a medical condition called Moya-moya disease, which led to right side hemiparesis. He passed his CBSE Class XII examinations in 2012 with 52. 66% in English Core, Computer Science, Physics, Chemistry, and Mathematics (PCM), and qualified in the All India Engineering Entrance Examination (AIEEE). He then applied for admission into Delhi Technological University (DTU) in the B. Tech. (Computer Science) program. DTU had set a minimum eligibility of 60% in Class XII for general candidates. However, it relaxed this criterion by 10% for SC/ST candidates, bringing their minimum down to 50%. For
1 Anamol Bhandari v. Delhi Technological University, (2012) 4 DRJ 583 (Del).
PwDs like the petitioner, only a 5% relaxation was provided, setting the eligibility at 55%. The petitioner’s 52.66%, although meeting the SC/ST relaxed threshold, fell short of the threshold for PwDs. Feeling discriminated against, the petitioner filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court under Article 226, contending that the unequal relaxation violated his constitutional right. LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVED The case raised the following legal questions:
1. Whether the differential relaxation in eligibility criteria (10% for SC/ST, 5% for PwDs)
violated the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution.
2. Whether this disparity in treatment amounted to hostile discrimination against persons with
disabilities, particularly in light of horizontal versus vertical reservations.
3. Whether policy decisions made by academic institutions are immune from judicial review
when they involve issues of constitutional rights.
4. Whether denying equal academic relaxation to disabled persons defeated the purpose “of the
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act,
1995 (hereinafter referred to as the” “Disabilities Act”).2 The 1995 Act has since been repealed
and replaced “by the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, which came into” effect on 19 April 2017. 3 JUDGEMENT The Delhi High Court, in a Bench comprising Acting Chief Justice A. K. Sikri and Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, ruled in favour of the petitioner. The Court conducted a detailed analysis of the admission policy of Delhi Technological University (DTU), which granted only a 5% relaxation in the eligibility criteria to Persons with Disabilities (PwDs), as opposed to a 10% relaxation for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST) candidates in order to address the central issue, which was whether this differential treatment amounted to discrimination. The Court observed that this disparity in treatment in the policy did not stand the test of equality 2 Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, No.
1, Acts of Parliament, 1995 (India). under Article 14. 4 Justice Sikri emphasized that persons with disabilities constitute a historically marginalised group that faces structural disadvantages in accessing education. Citing socioeconomic data and government policy documents, including “the National Policy for Persons with Disabilities (2006), the” Court noted that literacy levels and school enrolment among PwDs are significantly lower than even those of SC/ST communities. 5 This substantive disadvantage, the Court held, necessitates stronger affirmative action, not weaker. Importantly, the Court highlighted that reservations for persons with disabilities are a form of horizontal reservation, which cuts across all vertical categories like General, SC, ST, and OBC.
Against such a backdrop, the disabled are not a competing vertical category but rather a class that should receive equal treatment across all social strata. Therefore, a disabled person from the General category should not receive lesser benefits than a disabled person from the SC/ST category, especially when it comes to ensuring equal access to opportunities. In addressing the argument by DTU that their relaxation norms were based on “policy decisions,” the Court held that such decisions, while generally respected, are not immune to judicial review, especially when they result in discrimination or arbitrariness. It was noted that DTU had failed to provide any rational justification for setting a lower relaxation percentage for PwDs. The policy was simply justified on the ground that it mirrored the practices of a few other universities, which the Court found insufficient.
Justice Sikri also referenced earlier precedent, most notably A. I. Confederation of Blind v. Union of India (2002), where the Supreme Court endorsed the idea that relaxation benefits given to SC/ST candidates in educational qualifications should be extended to visually impaired persons as well. 6 That decision had ultimately led to changes in University Grants Commission norms. The High Court drew a direct analogy, stating that the rationale in Confederation of Blind applied equally here, especially since the relaxation policies at issue served similar constitutional goals, namely, substantive equality and meaningful access to education. Taking all this into account, the Court directed DTU to treat PwDs on par with SC/ST candidates by extending a 10% relaxation in minimum eligibility criteria for admission.
This change brought down the minimum required marks for PwDs from 55% to 50%, thereby rendering the petitioner eligible for consideration. The petition was thus allowed, and DTU was instructed to consider
4 INDIA CONST. art. 14
5 Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment, Government of India, National Policy for Persons with
Disabilities (2006), https://depwd.gov.in/policy/national-policy/
6 A.I. Confederation of Blind v. Union of India (2002) 10 SCC 192
Anamol Bhandari for admission to the B.Tech. course, with no order as to costs.
CASE
ANALYSIS
Equality, Not Uniformity At the heart of the judgment lies the Court’s embrace of substantive equality, which demands more than identical treatment for all. Article 14’s guarantee is not merely violated when similarly situated persons are treated differently, but also when differently situated persons are treated the same, with no regard for the structural disadvantage they face. The Court rightly recognised that formal equality is insufficient, especially in contexts shaped by historical oppression and systemic marginalisation. This recognition aligns with a Rawlsian conception of justice, where equitable outcomes, not merely equal rules, are the benchmark for fairness.
The Court’s willingness to differentiate between sameness and fairness elevates the judgment as one rooted in transformative constitutionalismone that does not treat the law as a neutral instrument, but as a tool for advancing social justice. In doing so, the Court rightly underscored the need to go beyond mechanical application of rules in favour of a contextual, justice-oriented approach. Horizontal Reservation and the False Parity The case brought to light a deeper structural issue concerning how reservations are understood and implemented in India. The confusion between vertical (caste-based) and horizontal (disabilitybased) reservations is at the root of DTU’s flawed policy.
While Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe quotas are vertical, based on systemic social exclusion and historical discrimination, horizontal reservations, like those for persons with disabilities, cut across all caste and community categories. Their aim is to ensure that individuals within every vertical category, including General, SC, ST, and OBC, receive equitable access when they belong to an additional marginalised group. However, DTU’s policy treated persons with disabilities as a standalone category deserving less consideration. By granting them only a 5% relaxation in marks as opposed to 10% for SC/ST candidates, the university created a false parity that undermined the principle of horizontal reservation. This treatment defeated the core objective of inclusive education and equity in opportunity.
The Court’s intervention clarified that equitable treatment requires parity in relaxation norms, and that failure to ensure this undermines the constitutional promise of equality. The judgment thus reaffirmed that meaningful equality lies not in identical concessions, but in equitable adjustments that account for different dimensions of disadvantage.
Statutory and International Mandate The judgment is firmly anchored in the legal framework “of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995,” particularly Sections 26 and
39.78 These provisions mandate inclusive education and require the State to reserve seats in higher
educational institutions for persons with disabilities. The statutory obligation is further reinforced by India's international commitments, most notably “the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), ratified by India in 2007. ” Article 24 of the UNCRPD obliges “States Parties to ensure that persons with disabilities”can access general tertiary education without discrimination. 9 DTU's inability to justify its arbitrary relaxation policy reveals not only a legal lapse but also an institutional disregard for both domestic and international mandates. The case highlights how bureaucratic inertia and lack of sensitivity towards disability issues continue to obstruct the realisation of statutory and treaty-based rights.
The Court's emphasis on these instruments underscores the growing importance of harmonising domestic policies with global human rights standards, especially in the context of marginalised communities. Importance of Empirical Data What sets this judgment apart is the Court’s effective use of empirical data to substantiate its reasoning. Drawing from authoritative sources like the World Bank Report, NSSO data, and the 2001 Census, the Court underlined the grave educational disparities faced by persons with disabilities. The data pointed to a literacy rate of just 48% among PwDs, with disabled children being 5. 5 times more likely to be out of school compared to their non-disabled peers. The situation was even more dire for girls with disabilities, with dropout rates exceeding 70% in some categories.
By embedding this evidence into its legal reasoning, the Court added moral weight to its findings and expanded the interpretive horizon of Article 14. The judgment exemplifies how courts can adopt a data-driven approach to constitutional adjudication, especially when interpreting social justice statutes. Such an approach does not merely anchor judgments in 7 Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, § 26, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1995 (India). 8 Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, § 39, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1995 (India). 9 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 24, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U. N. T. S. 3 (entered into force May 3, 2008).
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principles but ensures they respond to the lived realities of marginalised communities. Policy Implications and Gaps Despite its strong constitutional footing, the judgment stops short of introducing binding structural reform. While it provides relief to the petitioner and establishes a precedent, it does not invalidate DTU’s discriminatory policy outright, nor does it mandate a uniform standard for all institutions. The Court refrains from issuing any directive to the “University Grants Commission (UGC)”or “the Ministry of Human Resource Development (HRD) to” review or standardise relaxation policies across educational bodies. This omission leaves a significant gap. Without enforceable national guidelines, similar disparities may persist in other institutions, forcing individuals to seek redress through expensive and time consuming litigation.
The judgment’s silence on systemic reform reveals the limitations of individual-centric remedies in securing structural equality. To institutionalise change, judicial activism must be accompanied by executive responsiveness and legislative clarity, which is something that remains missing in the broader disability rights discourse in India. A Note on Timing and Locus DTU argued that the petitioner had prior knowledge of the eligibility criteria and should have raised objections earlier. The Court rightly rejected this contention, asserting that violations of constitutional rights cannot be waived by delay. This reaffirmation is vital, particularly in a legal culture where procedural technicalities are often weaponised to silence substantive claims.
In a country where injustice is frequently normalised as ‘policy,’ this principle restores hope in the Constitution’s transformative potential. The Court’s stance strengthens the position that constitutional claims must always be open to judicial review, regardless of when they are raised. By doing so, it protects the integrity of rights-based litigation and prevents institutions from using procedural pretexts to sidestep accountability. Critical Reflections While the judgment marks a significant step forward in disability rights jurisprudence, it is not without shortcomings. One could argue that the Court adopted a relatively conservative stance in terms of the remedy it granted. Rather than simply instructing DTU to revise its policy for this particular case, the Court could have gone further.
It could have declared the existing relaxation norms ultra vires the Disabilities Act, ordered an audit of relaxation policies in all technical institutions, or directed the formulation of a National Equal Relaxation Code for PwDs. Nonetheless, even within the limits of constitutional adjudication, the decision delivers substantive justice. It dismantles false equivalences, reaffirms the legitimacy of horizontal reservation, and sets a precedent for future litigation. The Court’s acknowledgment of the multidimensional disadvantages faced by persons with disabilities, especially in education, signals a judicial willingness to interpret equality in its fullest sense.