Case Commentary - State Of Madhya Pradesh V. Chironji Lal & Ors. (1980)
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CASE COMMENTARY: STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH V.
CHIRONJI LAL & ORS. (1980)
Adrija Laskar, Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad
INTRODUCTION
The case State of Madhya Pradesh v. Chironji Lal & Ors. 1 concerns the state's vicarious liability (sovereign functions). In Vicarious Liability, an individual is accountable for his or her wrongful acts, but not for the actions of others. However, in some cases, vicarious liability, or the liability of one person for the act of another, may arise. For A to be held liable for the act committed by B, there must be some kind of relationship joining A and B, and the unlawful act must be connected in some way to that relationship. “Vicarious liability” for wrongdoing arises from the relationship between Master and Servant, the principal and the agent, the company and the director, and Company and partner. Vicarious liability is founded on the principles of ‘respondent superior' (i. e. , responsibility must be that of the preferable) and 'Qui Facit per alium facit per se' (i. e.
, he who behaves through others is regarded in law to be acting himself). In a similar case of Padmalochan Panda v. State of Orissa2, the Orissa Military Police used a lathi charge on a mob gathered in front of the District Court to convey their demands. It was claimed that police officers attacked members of the mob without any orders from the Magistrate or other police authorities, injuring the plaintiff. He filed a complaint against the State for his injuries. The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, but on appeal, the High Court acknowledged that police officers engaged in misconduct in the execution of their duties without authorization and that this did not exempt the unlawful act from the competence of
1 State of Madhya Pradesh v. Chironji Lal, AIR 1981 MP 65
2 Padmalochan Panda v. State of Orissa, 1971 SCC Online Ori 223
delegated sovereign function, it was further held that any harm suffered by the plaintiff were caused by the exercise of sovereign duties. FACTS OF THE CASE
1. The plaintiff-respondent No. 1 Chironji Lal filed the suit that gave rise to this appeal to
collect Rs. 600/- in damages caused by police to a loudspeaker, amplifier, mic, and other accessories belonging to him and leased to Sunder Lal, defendant-respondent No. 2.
2. On December 27, 1959, a student protest was held near the Motor Stand in Morena.
The police released a lathi charge on the mass. The aforementioned loudspeaker system was installed in a rickshaw.
3. Although the speakers were in Jiwangi Gang, Sikhawari Block, Morena at the time of
the lathi charge, away from the location of the lathi charge, the Police Constables wilfully damaged the aforementioned, set-in order to cause damage to the plaintiff. As a result, Rs. 600/- was assessed as damages for the harm caused by the defendant State's officials. ISSUES RAISED
1. Whether the state government is exempt from the obligation complained of, according
to sections 30 of the Police Act of 1861 and 144 of the C.R.P.C. of 1898?
2. Whether the state liable for the actions of a public servant?
JUDGEMENT
1. This is the defendant's appeal against the judgment and decree of 24-12-1968 issued by
the Third Additional District Judge, Morena, in which the trial Court's judgment and decree dated 20-10-1965 was affirmed.
2. The defendant-appellant State disputed the plaintiff's claim, arguing that the State
cannot be held accountable for the loss even if caused by the aforementioned acts complained of by the plaintiff.
3. The trial Court granted the action for Rs. 377/- and dismissed the remainder of the
plaintiff's claim. The defendant, who was dissatisfied with the judgment and decree, filed an appeal, which was dismissed by the impugned judgment and decree. As a result, the second appeal.
4. In this appeal, Shri B. P. Singhal, learned Additional Government Advocate for the
appellant State contended that the State Government is immune from the liability complained of under the Police Act, 1861, Section 30 regarding the regulation of processions and Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, regarding maintenance of law and order, including the right to quell the riot. Shri Motilal Gupta, experienced counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, argued in favor of the impugned judgment and decree, claiming that the current case is an instance of exceeding authority conferred by the law. As a result, the State is liable in this case. Shri Gupta further contended that the State is liable for unlawful or legally unjustified acts committed by its employees while on the job and does not enjoy the immunity contemplated by the Kasturilal v. State of U. P.
5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I have concluded that the appeal
deserves to be allowed.
6. In this case, the findings given by both the Courts below concurrently are that the lathi
charge was made by the Police on the procession when it became unruly. At that time, the loud-speaker set was fitted on a rickshaw and was employed for leading the procession. When there was a lathi charge, the occupant of the rickshaw took it hurriedly on the road leading to Jiwaji Ganj, Morena. The loud-speaker set was damaged on account of the lathi charge.
7. In Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co, v. Secretary of State3, the basic
principle regarding the liability of the State was stated thus: "There is a great and clear distinction between acts done in the exercise of what are usually termed sovereign powers and acts done in the conduct of undertakings that might be carried on by private individuals without
3 Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Secretary of State, 1861-5 Bom HCR App 1
having such powers delegated to them. Having thus enunciated the basic principles; Peacock C. J. stated another proposition as flowing from it. "Where an act is done, or a contract is entered into, in the exercise of powers usually called sovereign powers, by which we mean powers which cannot be lawfully exorcised except by sovereign, or private individual delegated by a sovereign to exercise them, no action will lie." In Secretary of State for India in Council v. Shreegobinda Chaudhuri, Rankin C. J.4 explains the aforesaid dictum observed as -"Where an act was done in the course of the exercise of powers which could not be lawfully exercised save by the sovereign power, no action in tort lay against the Secretary of State for India in Council upon the principle of respondent superior."
8. Now, the function of the State to regulate processions is delegated to the Police by
Section 30 of the Police Act, 1861, and the function to maintain law and order including quelling riots is delegated to the authorities specified by, Section 144 Cr. P. C. (sic) is undisputedly the Police. These functions cannot be performed by private individuals. They are the powers exercisable by the State or its delegates only and by their very nature, these functions are to be regarded as 'sovereign functions of the State.
9. As in the present case, in the case of Stale v. Dattamal (supra), liability was sought to
be imposed on the State on the ground that the firing was more than the need. It was held that the State will not be liable for tortious acts of the servants or in respect of consequences ensuing therefrom because the immunity of the state extends to such a situation. "Where the driver of a jeep, owned and maintained by the State of Rajasthan for the official use of the Collector of a district, drove it rashly and negligently, while bringing it back from the workshop after repairs and knocked down a pedestrian and fatally injured him. Held that the State can be made vicariously liable for the tortious act, like any other employer. Viewed from first principles there can be no difficulty in holding that the State should be as much liable for tort in respect of a tortious act committed by 4 Secretary of State for India in Council v. Shreegobinda Chaudhuri, Rankin C. J.
, ILR 59 Cal 1289: AIR (932 Cal 834) its servant within the scope of his employment but wholly dissociated from the exercise of sovereign power, as any other employees. " 10. Accordingly, if the liability sought to be enforced arises from nongovernmental or nonsovereign functions, The state may be liable, but if the liability complained of flows from tortious acts done or functions discharged in the exercise of sovereign powers, the immunity attaches. The ratio of Roop Lal v. Union of India is to the same effect, although State was held liable due to the nature of the acts complained of in that case.
11. The ratio of State of M. P. v. Premabai is applicable only to those cases, which belong
to the category to which the State of Rajasthan's (supra) applies. As such, reliance thereon is not available in this case.
12. It was further contended by Shri Motilal Gupta that the State will be liable where acts
done or purported to be done under the Municipal law may be termed as unlawful and/or legally unwarranted. In this respect reliance was placed on the Secretary of State of India in Council v. Kamachee Rave Sahaba5; Eshugbayi v. Govt, of Nigeria6. The attempt of Shri Motilal Gupta in reality is to persuade this Court to carve out an exception to the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Kasturilal's case (supra). No exception can be carved out by this Court affecting the generality of the dictum laid down in Kasturilal's case (supra). That apart, there appears to be no antithesis or inconsistency between the ratio of the State of Rajasthan's case (supra), the fields in which they operate being different.
13. In view of the above discussion, this case is within the dictum of Kasturilal's case
(supra). The learned Judges of the Courts below have acted illegally in deciding it on the basis of the ratio of the State of Rajasthan's case (supra). Accordingly, even on the facts found by the Courts below, the State is immune from the liability sought to be enforced by the plaintiff.
14. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned judgment and
decree are set aside. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, I direct the
5 Secretary of State of India in Council v. Kamachee Rave Sahaba, AIR 931 PC 248
6 Eshugbayi v. Govt, of Nigeria, AIR 1937 PC 31 LNIND 1936 PC 63
parties to bear their own costs throughout.
CRITICAL
ANALYSIS
The appeal court's decision is a solid decision based on the law put down by the Apex Court, on the privilege obtained by the state when executing the sovereign powers held by the state to preserve peace and order. If the state's immunity is not safeguarded, it will be challenging for law enforcement authorities to maintain peace and order in the face of tortious responsibility. The role of the State to control processions is transferred to the Police by Section 30 of the Police Act, 18617, and the responsibility to preserve peace and order, including quelling riots, is delegated to the authority designated by Section 144 C. R. P. C. of 19738 which is unquestionably the Police. These duties cannot be done by private people. They are exclusively executable by the State or its delegates, and by definition, these functions are to be considered "sovereign functions of the State.
" In Stale v. Dattamal9, accountability was sought to be inflicted on the State because the shooting was excessive. It was determined that the State is not accountable for the tortious conduct of its servants or the repercussions that result from them since the State's immunity applies to such a circumstance. There is no contradiction between the ratios of the State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Vidhyawati and Kasturi Lal10. This is evident from the State of Rajasthan's (already mentioned) ratio, namely. "When the driver of a vehicle possessed and managed by the State of Rajasthan for the official use of the Collector of Districts drove it rashly and recklessly while returning from the workshop after repairs, he hit and killed a pedestrian. The State, like any other employer, can be held vicariously accountable for the tortious act.
From a first-principles standpoint, the State should be held just as accountable for tort as any other worker for tortious conduct performed by its servant within the limits of his service but entirely disconnected from the sovereign's exercise of authority. "
7 Police Act, 1861§ 30
8 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 § 144
9 Stale v. Dattamal, AIR 1967 Madh Pra 246
10 State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Vidhyawati and Kasturi Lal, AIR 1965 SC 1039
As a result, if the liability sought to be enforced originates from non-governmental or nonsovereign activities, the State may be accountable; nevertheless, if the liability complained of arises from tortious actions committed or functions performed in the exercise of sovereign powers, immunity applies. The decision in Roop Lal vs. Union of India11 is similar, however, the State was held accountable because of the nature of the conduct complained of in that instance. The ratio of State of M. P. v. Premabai12 applies solely to instances that fall within the scope of the State of Rajasthan’s Case. As a result, reliance on it is not possible in this case. The action was rejected because controlling processions and ensuring peace and order are the state's sovereign responsibilities.
CASE COMMENT In my opinion, it is obvious that this case acknowledges a substantial distinction between actions done by State officials that are related to the implication of sovereign power given to public servants and actions committed by public workers that are not related to the transfer of any sovereign powers. If a public servant commits a tortious act that provides rise to claims for harm, the question to ask is whether the tortious act was committed in the release of statutory functions that are relevant to, and based entirely on, the envoy of the sovereign powers of government to a public servant. According to me, if the response is yes, the claim for damages for loss incurred by such tortious activities will not be barred.
On the other contrary, if the tortious act was performed by a public official in the performance of responsibilities delegated to him without the delegation of any dominion, a claim for damages would be permissible. In this kind of circumstance, the action of the public worker committed during the employment is an action of a servant who could have been engaged by a private person for the same reason. This distinction, although obvious and unambiguous in law, is commonly overlooked when debating the State's accountability for tortious conduct.
11 Roop Lal vs. Union of India, AIR 1972 J and K 22
12 State of M. P. v. Premabai, 1979 Jab LJ 521
(AIR 1979 Madh Pra 85)