Case Note - Shankari Prasad V Union Of India (AIR 1951 SC 458)
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Category: General Law
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CASE NOTE: SHANKARI PRASAD V UNION OF INDIA (AIR
1951 SC 458)
Mahima.A.Menon, B.A. LL.B., O.P Jindal Global University
ABSTRACT
An important turning point in India’s Constitutional history was the Shankari Prasad v Union of India case, which dealt with striking a balance between the sanctity of fundamental rights and legislative authority. The Supreme Court’s ruling, which gave Parliament broad authority to change the Constitution, including fundamental rights, under Article 368, is examined in this case note. This case note charts the development of Constitutional law from Shankari Prasad’s legislative supremacy to the Basic Structure Doctrine- an established judicial doctrine in Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala. It challenged the judiciary’s broad yet nebulous power to invalidate amendments on this theory, which has generated discussion about federalism and judicial overreach.
The case note’s analysis of these seminal rulings highlights the continuous conflict between the several institutions of government as well as the necessity for a well balanced framework that upholds constitutional integrity, encourages democratic accountability, and tackles structural problems like corruption and power abuse. This exploration aims to illuminate the complex interplay of legislative and judicial powers in safeguarding India’s constitutional ethos.
Legal Issues: • Whether the First Amendment,1951, by the Parliament is unconstitutional? • Whether the Parliament has the authority to amend the Fundamental Rights? • Whether the term ‘law’ as used in Article 13(2) of the Indian Constitution includes laws to amend the Constitution? Rules: Article 13: Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights. Article 368: Power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure thereof. Analysis: The case of Shankari Prasad v. Union of India marks one of the earliest and pivotal judicial battles in India’s Constitutional history, particularly concerning the balance between parliamentary authority and the safeguarding of fundamental rights. Although later judgements most notably Kesavananda Bharati v.
State of Kerala1 overruled it, Shankari’s Prasad’s immediate influence and the legal principles it established remain a focal point for scrutiny and debate. Following India’s independence, the First Constitutional Amendment of 1951 aimed to legitimise agrarian reforms by introducing Article 31A and 31B. These reforms were imperative to combat the rampant poverty and inequality in states like Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh, where large landholdings and feudal structures hindered socio-economic development. The goal of the amendment was to curb the power of zamindars and redistribute property to advance India’s progress. However, the zamindars argued that the amendment violated their fundamental rights. The case brought to light a critical question about Parliament's authority to amend the Constitution.
The Supreme Court, given the task of having to balance the provisions under Article 3682 and Article 13(2)3 was set to determine whether constitutional amendments 1Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru & Ors. V. State of Kerala & Anr, AIR 1973 SC 1461
2 The Constitution of India 1950, art 368.
3 The Constitution of India 1950, art 13(2).
were subject to the same constraints as regular laws. Article 3684 was primarily intended to outline the procedure for constitutional amendments, not to grant the Parliament broader legislative powers. However, the judges did not thoroughly dissect this Article, leaving some ambiguity. Ultimately the Court allowed the Parliament to wield unchecked powers under Article 368, holding that it could amend any provision of the Constitution including those pertaining to fundamental rights. Thus, greatly increasing the legislative branch’s authority. 5 However, Justice Shastri remarked that "Article 368 is not proper and has certain gaps. ” The ‘gaps’ mentioned refer to the absence of precise restrictions or recommendations on the scope of the Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution, especially in relation to Fundamental rights.
6 Despite acknowledging these flaws, the Court paradoxically endowed the Parliament with significant authority to amend fundamental rights, without imposing any judicial oversight. The principle of harmonious construction is typically employed to resolve conflicts between constitutional provisions, but the judges’ treatment of Article 13(2)7 was rather superficial. This Article, which protects fundamental rights, warranted a more thorough examination. Including amendments to the Constitution within the phrase "the state shall not make any law" would have expanded its application. 8 Instead, the court restricted the application of Article 13(2)9 to ordinary legislative acts, thereby excluding constitutional amendments. In my opinion, this represents critical oversight rather than a proper application of harmonious construction.
The Court concluded that the Parliament has the authority to amend the Constitution, including fundamental rights. While the Constitution must remain flexible and adaptable to changing circumstances, it should not extend so far as to permit changes based on the whims of various political administrations. This ruling is daunting because it effectively grants the legislature nearly unchecked powers, undermining the fundamental nature of these rights. Such a precedent could lead to a scenario where fundamental rights are gradually eroded, potentially
4 The Constitution of India 1950, art 368.
5 Shankari Prasad v Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458
6 Sohil Khera, ‘Articles – Manupatra’ (articles.manupatra.com28 June 2022)
accessed 2 September 2024.
7 Supra note 3, art 13(2).
8 Sohil Khera, ‘Articles – Manupatra’ (articles.manupatra.com28 June 2022)
accessed 2 September 2024.
9 The Constitution of India 1950, art 13(2).
paving the way for authoritarian governance. If Part III of the Constitution is subjected to Article 36810, it diminishes the significance of fundamental rights, equating them with ordinary laws. Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Shankari Prasad may have been motivated by the urgent need for socio-economic reforms, it nonetheless marked a troubling expansion of Parliament’s power at the expense of fundamental rights. The Court’s narrow interpretation of Article 13(2)11 and its broad reading of Article 36812 left fundamental rights vulnerable to amendment and manipulation. While subsequent decisions have rectified some of the extremities of this ruling, Shankari Prasad remains a significant case, not only for its immediate legal implications but also for the cautionary lessons it provides about the balance between legislative authority and Constitutional protection.
13 Conclusion: Subsequent verdicts have redefined and narrowed down the boundaries of the Parliament’s vast dominion to amend the Constitution, building upon the precedent set by Shankari Prasad v Union of India, which granted the Parliament extensive powers in this regard. This expansive view of Parliamentary Sovereignty was upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of Sajjan Singh v State of Rajasthan14. However, a shift in judicial approach emerged in Golak Nath v State of Punjab15, where the Court placed significant limitation on Parliament’s powers, holding that fundamental rights could not be amended, signalling a need for greater constitutional protection. The true watershed came in Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala16(hereinafter Kesavananda Bharati), where the Court introduced the concept of Basic Structure Doctrine.
It held that though the Parliament retains the right to amend the Constitution, it cannot alter or destroy its core framework. This was then solidified in subsequent cases like Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj 10The Constitution of India 1950, art 368.
11 The Constitution of India 1950, art 13(2).
12The Constitution of India 1950, art 368.
13 Sohil Khera, ‘Articles – Manupatra’ (articles.manupatra.com28 June 2022)
accessed 2 September 2024.
14 Sajjan Singh v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 845
15 Golak Nath v State of Punjab, 1967 SCR(2) 762
16 Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru & Ors. V. State of Kerala & Anr, AIR 1973 SC 1461
Narain17 and Minerva Mills v Union of India18, where the judiciary struck down the amendments that attempted to infringe upon essential constitutional principles which ran through the entirety of the Constitution. With an overview of all these judgements, it is discernible that there has been a movement from excessive legislative power in Shankari Prasad to judicial review that goes beyond acceptable limits in Kesavananda Bharati with the establishment of basic structure doctrine. Although the Shankari Prasad ruling greatly increased legislative power by giving Parliament unrestricted power to modify the Constitution, including the basic rights without judicial scrutiny, Kesavananda Bharati which placed emphasis on Basic Structure Doctrine curtailed this dominance.
This doctrine, while designed to limit Parliament’s power it also brought up new difficulties by granting the judiciary expansive authority to strike down amendments that they believed violated the ‘basic structure’ of the Constitution. However, the significant question here is ‘what exactly falls under the ambit of ‘basic structure? ’. In fact, judges evaluate whether the basic structure is violated on a case-by-case basis. The non-existence of an exhaustive formulation places a powerful weapon in the hands of the judiciary that enables it to not only review certain legislative and executive actions, but also to do so without an established criterion. The undefined and fluid category of basic structure means that the scope of the doctrine may gradually increase, as it has done so over the past few decades to include judicial review beyond all acceptable limits.
Furthermore, separation of powers, essentially federalism, is the foundation of our Constitution. The judgement in Shankari Prasad undermined the separation of powers, as the judiciary was no longer able to review constitutional amendments, even if they affected the core principles of the Constitution. In contrast the Kesavananda Bharati case swung the pendulum back in favour of judicial supremacy by allowing the judiciary to determine what constitutes the "basic structure" of the Constitution granting the courts almost unlimited power to strike down any constitutional amendment that they deemed to violate this undefined doctrine. Thus, as a whole, moving from Shankari Prasad to Kesavananda Bharati, the judgements negatively impacted federalism with one organ having more power and overreach
17 Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 1590
18 Minerva Mills v Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789
above the other organs. This ongoing tension between basic structure and federalism demands the need for a solution that not only brings structure and clarity but also successfully addresses the ingrained problems of power abuse and corruption. It is important to design a system that upholds democracy’s core values while encouraging accountability and justice, and not just add multiple layers of oversight or make stricter rules. Ensuring that individuals in positions of authority are held to the highest standards of transparency and honesty is vital. Until we get there, the system will continue to be open to abuse with the public’s trust at jeopardy.