Challenges To The Places Of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991

Author: LawSphereX

Category: General Law

Published: 2026-08-23T18:46:29.163Z

Updated: 2026-08-30T07:05:47.334Z

CHALLENGES

TO THE PLACES OF WORSHIP (SPECIAL PROVISIONS) ACT, 1991 Rahi P. Gaurihar, LL.M., ILS Law College, Pune

CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

India, often celebrated as the world's largest democracy, prides itself on its diverse cultural tapestry and rich tapestry of religious traditions. This mosaic of beliefs and practices has been both a source of strength and, at times, a challenge to national unity. Amidst this religious diversity, the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, emerged as a legislative attempt to address a complex and sensitive issue – the preservation of religious harmony and the protection of places of worship. The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 is a landmark piece of legislation in the Indian context that aims to address complex issues surrounding places of worship.

Enacted against a backdrop of historical and community tension, this law sought to freeze the status quo of religious structures as they existed in 1947, preventing any alterations, remodelling, or construction at these sites. The law was introduced by the Congress government under Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao at a time when the Ram temple movement was at its peak. According to an Indian Express report, the Babri Masjid was still standing at the time, but communal tensions were raging over LK Advani's rath yatra, his arrest and the shooting of karsevaks in Uttar Pradesh. Presenting the bill in Parliament, the then Home Minister SB Chavan said that these measures were necessary in view of the religious disputes over the reconstruction of places of worship, which tend to affect the social atmosphere.

He mentioned that the adoption of this law will effectively prevent any new controversies from arising according to the official document. The act was enacted to freeze the character of any religious place as it existed on 14th August 1947. According to this any worship place which belongs to one religion or which belongs to one deity of any particular religion cannot be converted into another. Thus, this act ensures to maintain the religious character. 1 1 Luv Virmani, Is The Places of Worship Act, 1991 constitutional, Bar & Bench (15/07/2023), available at - https://www. barandbench.

com/columns/is-the-places-of-worship-special-provisions-act-1991- The title of the act describes it as “An Act to prohibit conversion of any place of worship and to provide for the maintenance of the religious character of any place of worship as it existed on the 15th day of August 1947, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. ” 2However, the path of this act was not without problems. One significant obstacle lies in the different interpretations and implementations of the law, leading to contentious disputes rooted in different views of historical events and site ownership. Rather than serving as a seamless solution to religious disagreements, the law has at times become a point of contention, with parties expressing differing views on its impact on religious rights and freedoms.

The blanket ban on legal proceedings imposed by the law – regardless of the history of any mosque, temple, gurudwara, church or any other place of public religious worship – has prompted a number of complaints from people whose places of worship have been forcibly demolished or occupied before 15 August 1947. 3 These challenges underscore the need for a nuanced and adaptive legal framework that is able to navigate the complexities of religious diversity while upholding the principles of justice and equality. As discussions continue on possible amendments or revisions to the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, the Act remains central to the ongoing dialogue on striking a delicate balance between religious rights and the preservation of historical heritage in India.

This research paper examines the Places of Worship Act, 1991, a unique legislative effort by the Government of India to protect religious harmony and the sanctity of places of worship. The law was passed after a turbulent period marked by religious conflict and struck a delicate balance between historical claims, religious rights and the need to maintain social peace. This research paper also examines the complexities surrounding the constitutionality of the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 by examining the historical background, legal framework, and the multifaceted debates and perspectives that have arisen since its enactment. Through a comprehensive analysis, this paper tries to explain the constitutional#:~:text=The%20grievance%20is%20based%20on,at%20Kashi%20Vishwanath%2C%20Varanasi) .

2 Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991

3 Dhananjay Mahapatra, Can’t use Places of Worship Act for blanket stay on suits

Supreme court (12/07/23), Times of India, available at - https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/cant-use-places-of-worship-act-forblanket-stay-on-suits-supreme-court/articleshow/101678311.cms?from=mdr last seen on – 29/11/23 complexity of this law and its impact on the broader principles of the Indian Constitution such as secularism, religious freedom and social justice.

1.2 Significance of the study

The study of issues related to the constitutionality of the Places of Worship Act, 1991 is significant as it touches on various aspects of constitutional law, secularism, historical justice and social harmony in the Indian context. It also has implications for legal reform and public policy decisions.

1.3 Research Question

1. Does this Legislation bar judicial review, which is the basic feature of the Constitution

of India?

2. Is the cut-off date mentioned in section 3 of the Act Arbitrary and irrational?

3. How does this Act abridge the right to equality of indigenous communities of India?

1.4 Review of Literature

1. Book- “Flight of Deities and Rebirth of Temples Episodes from Indian History”

By Meenakshi Jain The book details the unfortunate history of India in which a majority of Hindu Temples which were thousand years old were destroyed by Islamic invaders. The author in this book has given illustrations of Hindu Temples whose religious character was changed while India was ruled by the various rulers. It also mentions the present date Gyanvapi Temple Case whose legal status and outcome remains a subject to judicial proceedings and interpretations of the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991.4

2 Article- “Unmasking the Places of Worship Act, 1991

An Unconstitutional

4 “Flight of Deities and Rebirth of Temples Episodes from Indian History” By Meenakshi Jain

Legacy and the Depths of Historical Injustice” By Himanshu Ranjan5 This piece examines the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991. It dissects the Act's parliamentary debates, highlighting concerns over its undemocratic introduction and potential constitutional conflicts. The author speaks that the act has been designed to maintain religious status quo since 1947, the Act has faced criticism for its implications. The analysis delves into its impact on Indic faiths and its potential violation of Fundamental Rights of the Indian Citizens.

3. Parliamentary debate- Parliamentary debate on PLACES OF WORSHIP

(SPECIAL PROVISIONS) Bill 6 During the discussion of bill in parliament few Members of Parliament has strongly oppose the bill. Shri Ashok Anandrao Deshmukh of Parbhani questioned why the bill focused only on 1947 and suggested that it should also consider the position of the 10th century when Islam arrived in India. He highlighted India's unique cultural heritage and argued that temples have historically contributed to the country's unity. Another member Shri Shreesh Chandra Dikshit expressed concern that the bill could create division among Hindus and accused it of being a form of minority appeasement rather than promoting secularism. He believed that the bill could lead to a critical situation and questioned its impact on Hindu sentiments.

4. Gyanvapi Mosque Dispute

The Gyanvapi Mosque dispute challenges the application and interpretation of the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act 1991. This act seeks to preserve the religious status of places of worship as it was on 15 August 1947. Some argue that the Act should not apply if a religious building was built by demolishing an already existing temple. 5 Himanshu Ranjan, Unmasking the Places of Worship Act, 1991: An Unconstitutional Legacy and the Depths of Historical Injustice (26/08/23), available at - https://lawbeat.in/columns/unmasking-places-worship-act- 1991- unconstitutional-legacy-and-depths-historical-injustice, last seen on - 29/11/23

6 Parliamentary debate on PLACES OF WORSHIP (SPECIAL PROVISIONS) Bill, Lok Sabha (09/09/1991 &

10/09/1991)

1.5 Research Objective

1. To examine the complexities surrounding the Places of Worship Act, 1991.

2. To investigate the constitutional challenges arising out of this Act.

3. To study the impact of this Act on various communities of India.

4. To find out the agreeable solution to maintain the sanctity of Places of Worship of all

communities in India. 7

1.6 Scope

and Limitations: This paper examines the provisions of the Places of Worship Act, 1991. It analyses the Act in the context of Indian Constitution particularly focusing on fundamental rights, freedom of religion and secularism. The scope of the study can be multidisciplinary, incorporating legal, historical, sociological and political dimensions to provide a comprehensive understanding of the challenges and implications of the Places of Worship Act, 1991 in India.

1.7 Research Methodology

Doctrinal research methodology is used in this paper to examine the complexities surrounding the Places of Worship Act, 1991. The primary sources of information used are the statutes and legislations and the secondary sources of information used are journal articles, thesis, and working papers. This paper studies the Provisions of the Places of Worship Act, 1991. It also mentions how the provisions of this act violate certain constitutional provisions. To analyse and to explore how certain religious communities are affected because of this act. To delve into the cases where even after the clear shreds of evidence, due to the statutory bar which is created by this Act, the people are unable to approach the courts.

7 Gyanvapi Mosque Dispute - https://www.scobserver.in/cases/gyanvapi-mosque-dispute/

1.8 Chapterization

Chapter 1:

INTRODUCTION

This chapter talks about India being the largest democracy in the world. There are various religions in India and as a challenge to national unity amidst this religious diversity, the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 was enacted which freezes the religious character of the worship places of any religion as it was on 15th August, 1947. It gives a brief idea about when and under what circumstances the act was enacted. It also talks about the challenges faced by the act when it was enacted. It also talks about the complex issues surrounding the act in present-day. Chapter 2: STATUTORY BAR AGAINST JUDICIAL REVIEW This chapter firstly gives the brief idea about what is the act all about. It further discusses the complex issues surrounding the places of worship act, 1991.

It talks about various petitions challenging the validity of this act on the different grounds, statutory bar against judicial review being one of such ground. It further explains all about judicial review and how and which provisions of the act bars judicial review thus infringing the rights of practicing and propagating religion u/a 25-28 of Constitution of India of the indigenous communities of India Chapter 3: VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA This chapter talks about equality. It first explains the concept of equality. Article 14 of the Constitution of India guarantees the right to equality and emphasizes that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.

It further talks about the provisions of the act which are violative of equality because it keeps Lord Rama at a higher footing than the other gods under the Hindu religion. This chapter also discusses the cases where the validity of the act has been challenged. Chapter 4: IRRATIONALITY AND ARBITRARY NATURE OF THE CUT-OFF DATE This chapter talks about the irrationality and the arbitrary nature of the cut-off date as mentioned in the act. It mentions the date mentioned in the act and why is it arbitrary and irrational. It discusses the parliamentary debates while passing of the act, thus supporting why the date is arbitrary and irrational. Chapter 5:

CONCLUSION

This chapter discusses that it is a fact that the act is surrounded by the complex issues. Provisions of the act affect secularism and equality; it perpetuates historical injustices and impedes religious freedom. It further discusses the need of amendment in the act in such a way that it brings balance between respecting religious sentiments, promoting secular principles and protecting individual rights.

CHAPTER 2: STATUTORY BAR AGAINST JUDICIAL REVIEW

2.1 Brief Introduction

The law was introduced by the Congress government under Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao at a time when the Ram temple movement was at its peak. During that time the Babri Masjid was still standing at the time, but communal tensions were raging over LK Advani's rath yatra, his arrest and the shooting of kar sevaks in Uttar Pradesh. Presenting the bill in Parliament, the then Home Minister SB Chavan said that these measures were necessary in view of the religious disputes over the reconstruction of places of worship, which tend to affect the social atmosphere. He mentioned that the adoption of this law will effectively prevent any new controversies from arising according to the official document. The act was enacted to freeze the character of any religious place as it existed on 14th August

1947. According to this any worship place which belongs to one religion or which belongs

to one deity of any particular religion cannot be converted into another. Thus, this act ensures to maintain the religious character. The blanket ban on legal proceedings imposed by the law – regardless of the history of any mosque, temple, gurudwara, church or any other place of public religious worship – has prompted several complaints from people whose places of worship have been forcibly demolished or occupied before 15 August 1947. Many petitions have been filed in the Supreme Court of India claiming that the Act violates various Articles of the Constitution of India.

The petitioners in these cases include Anil Kabotra (retired army officer), Ashwini Upadhyay (lawyer), Swami Jeetendranand Saraswati (religious leader), Devkinandan Thakurji (religious leader), Kumari Krishna Priya (daughter of Kashi Naresh Vibhuti Narayan Singh and current titular head of the erstwhile of the Kashi royal family) and Subramanian Swamy (former Rajya Sabha MP), among others. 8 Some petitions also challenges the act on the ground that no consultation of the indic communities, who would be most affected by this bill was taken. Some petitions also point out the undemocratic manner in which the bill was introduced. They say for a legislation that shuts the doors of justice to affected communities and parties, it was ‘debated’ only on three dates i. e. , 23. 08. 1991, 09. 09. 1991 and 10. 09. 1991 and the Bill was passed on the last of the said dates. The debate of 23. 08.

1991 clearly captures the fact that the period of seven days’ 8 Luv Virmani, Is The Places of Worship Act, 1991 constitutional, Bar & Bench (15/07/2023), available at - https://www. barandbench. com/columns/is-the-places-of-worship-special-provisions-act-1991constitutional#:~:text=The%20grievance%20is%20based%20on,at%20Kashi%20Vishwanath%2C%20Varanasi notice was not given to members of Lok Sabha before the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Bill dated 22. 08. 1991 was introduced. 9

2.2 Judicial Review and Places of Worship Act, 1991

Broadly, the various grounds of challenge to the Act raised in the petitions, one of which is judicial review: Judicial Review’ is the power of courts to pronounce upon the constitutionality of legislative acts which fall within their normal jurisdiction to enforce and the power to refuse to enforce such as they find to be unconstitutional and hence void. 10 "Judicial Review," said Khanna, J. , in the “fundamental Rights case,”11 “has thus become an integral part of our Constitutional System and power has been vested in the High Courts and the Supreme Court to decide about the constitutional validity of the provisions of statutes.

If the provisions of the statutes are found to be violative of any of the articles of the Constitution which is the touchstone for the validity of all laws the Supreme Court and the High Courts are empowered to strike down the said provisions” Judicial review is the insertion of judicial restraint into the legislative and executive branches of government. The term originates in the theory of limited government and the theory of two laws – ordinary and supreme (i. e. , the Constitution). From the very assumption that there is a supreme law, which is the basis and source of other legislative bodies in state administration bodies, it follows that every act of regular legislative bodies that contradicts the provisions of the supreme law must be invalid. must be somebody who has the power to declare such legislative acts invalid.

12 The doctrine of judicial review was for the first time propounded by the Supreme Court of America in the historical case of Marbury v. Madison13. In India, there is an express provision for judicial review in the Indian constitution and in that sense, it is on a firmer footing than in America. In State of Madras v. V. G. Row14, Patanjali Sastri, C. J. , observed: “Our Constitution contains express provisions for judicial review of

9 Himanshu Ranjan, Unmasking the Places of Worship Act, 1991

An Unconstitutional Legacy And The Depths Of Historical Injustice, LawBeat (26/08/2023), available at - https://lawbeat.in/columns/unmaskingplaces- worship-act-1991-unconstitutional-legacy-and-depths-historical-injustice

10 E.S. Crown – Essay on the Judicial Review in Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. VIII, p. 457

11 Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461

12 Basu’s Commentaries on Constitution of India

13 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803, Supreme Court of United States)

14 State of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196

legislation as to its constitutionality, unlike in America, where the Supreme Court has assumed extensive powers to review legislative enactments under the auspices of a broadly interpreted ‘due process’ clause process in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. If, therefore, the courts of this country are faced with such an important and none-too-easy task, it is not out of any desire to bow to the legislative authority and crusading spirit, but to discharge of the duty which the Constitution clearly imposes upon them. This is especially true as regards the fundamental rights as to which the Court has been assigned the role of sentinel on the qui vive”. But even in the absence of a judicial review provision, the courts could invalidate a law that contradicts any constitutional provision, since such a power of judicial review arises from the very nature of constitutional law. In A. K.

Gopalan v. State of Madras15, Kania, C. J. , pointed out that the framers of our Constitution inserted specific provisions in Article 13 only with great caution. He observed: "In India, it is the Constitution which is supreme and that a statutory law to be valid must be in full compliance with the constitutional requirements and it is for the judiciary to decide whether any law is constitutional or not. " In Binoy Viswam v. Union of India16 Supreme Court held – the Supreme Court or Supreme Court in the exercise of its power of judicial review can declare a law passed by Parliament or State Legislature to be invalid only on two grounds: (i) It is not within the jurisdiction of the Legislature which the law adopted, and/or (ii) Contravenes any of the fundamental rights mentioned in Part III of the Constitution or any other right/provision of the Constitution.

There is no third ground for invalidating any legislation. A law cannot be invalidated on the ground that the Legislature did not provide for India, the Supreme Court held that Binoy applied his opinion, or it was actuated by some improper motive or it was arbitrary or unreasonable. In Shayara Bano v. Union of India 17and some other cases which followed State of M. P. v. Mcdowell & Co. 18, in which Mcdowell was interpreted as an absolute bar to

15 A. K. Gopalan v. Sate of Madras, AIR 1951 SC 27

16 Binoy Viswam v. Union of India, AIR 2017 SC 2967

17 Shayara Bano v. Union of India, AIR 2017 SC 4609

18 State of M.P. v. Mcdowell & Co., AIR 1996 SC 1627

the use of arbitrariness as an instrument to subvert the constitution, which is not good law because Mcdowell struck down legislation under Article 14 was decided per incurred. But while the basis of judicial review of legislative acts is much more secure under our Constitution, its options are much more limited than in the US. the vague and general phraseology of the American Constitution and the rigid method of amending it. Thus, under the power of judicial review, the nation's highest court can test all pre-constitutional and postconstitutional or future laws and declare them unconstitutional if they conflict with any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution.

In Kesavananda Bharati's case19, it was held that “judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution of India” and therefore “cannot be impaired or destroyed by constitutional amendment under Article 368 of the Constitution”. Again, in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India20, the Supreme Court held that the power of judicial review of legislative measures, as vested in the High Court under Article 226 and the Supreme Court under Article 32, is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be removed or cannot be ruled out even by a constitutional amendment. No judicial review in political matters- In political matters, judicial review is only warranted if the policy is arbitrary, unjust, or violates fundamental rights. Courts must be reluctant to engage in an evaluation of state policy, which must be given reasonable time to assert itself.

If a policy turns out to be unwise, oppressive, or mindless, voters are quick to point out the government's folly. No judicial review by statutory tribunal- An order made by the State Government under Section 18 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act is not subject to judicial review under the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010. The Tribunal cannot exercise powers of judicial review similar to that of the High Court exercising constitutional jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

19 Kesavnanda Bharati v, State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461

20 L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 1125

Thus, one of the main grounds for questioning the constitutionality of this legislation is that it legitimizes the historical forcible occupation of places of worship. Section 4(2) of the Act puts a statutory bar against statutory review21. The law thus forces the indigenous communities of Bharat to live with the atrocities committed against them by protecting the historical wrongs committed by the Mughals and the British, among other invaders. Thus, it abridges the right to religion U/A 25 – 28 of the Constitution of India of Hindus, Jains, Buddhists and Sikhs in specific as they have originated from Bharat. It prohibits people from approaching the courts to reclaim their places of worship that have been violently disturbed, thus depriving citizens of their fundamental right to access justice.

Parliament was not to decide the religious character of all places of worship by passing a blanket law, regardless of the facts of each place. The law assigned a false religious character to a number of places by simply denying the judicial remedy of any person to claim otherwise. 22

2.3 Conclusion

The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act 1991 limits judicial review of certain disputes relating to places of worship in India. Enacted in response to historical events, the Act seeks to preserve the status quo of Places of Worship as it existed in 1947. It effectively prevents judicial review by declaring that no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding relating to any dispute involving a place of worship. The goal of this limitation on judicial review is to ensure the finality of the settlement and prevent protracted litigation that could potentially lead to community tension. In conclusion, the Places of Worship Act 1991 creates a legal framework that aims to preserve the religious character of certain places of worship while limiting the scope of judicial intervention in these matters.

While the law seeks to promote harmony and stability in society, it raises questions about the balance between legal remedies and the need to address evolving societal concerns over time.

21 S. 4, The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991

22 Ibid. 9,

CHAPTER 3: VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

3.1 Introduction

This constitutional provision embodies the principle of equality and emphasizes that the government must treat all individuals, citizens and groups equally, without any unfair discrimination. It ensures that every person is entitled to equal legal rights and protection regardless of factors such as caste, religion, sex, race or place of birth. The concept of equality under Article 14 has been interpreted by the judiciary to include both the right to equal treatment and the right not to be subject to arbitrary and discriminatory state action. Courts have ruled that state action must not be arbitrary, unjust or unreasonable and must be conducted on a rational and non-discriminatory basis. Article 14 essentially serves as the cornerstone of India's constitutional framework, embodying the commitment to justice, equity and protection of individual rights.

It plays a key role in ensuring that the state acts in a fair and non-arbitrary manner and upholds the ideals of equality and justice for all citizens. 23

3.2 Article 14 and Places of Worship Act, 1991

Article 14 states that “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”24 Treating all citizens equally is a fundamental concept of liberalism and Article 14 ensures the same for our citizens. The freedom of each person is directly connected with the equality that he obtains in society. There are two aspects of Article 14i) Equality before law ii) Equal Protection of Law Both these concepts may seem similar but are different. Equality before law is a

23 Admin, Judicial Review in India

Importance, Landmark cases and Criticism, Century Law Firm blog, Available at- https://www.centurylawfirm.in/blog/judicial-review-in-india/ (last seen on – 30/11/23)

24 Art. 14, The Constitution of India

negative concept adopted from UK Constitution whereas Equal Protection of a Law is a positive concept adopted from US Constitution. Equality before the law basically means that all people should be treated equally regardless of whether they are poor or rich, male or female, upper caste or lower caste. This state cannot grant any special privileges to anyone in the country. This is also known as legal equality. Thus, the concept talks about the absence of privilege in favour of any individual. Equal protection of law is one of the positive concepts of equality. The same protection of the law derives from Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution25. According to this principle, everyone residing in India should be treated equally and have equal protection of the law.

It guarantees that all people within the territory of India should be treated equally and the state cannot deny it (for equal protection of law). It imposes a positive duty on the state to prevent rights violations. This can be achieved by introducing socio-economic changes. Article 14 of Indian Constitution permits classification but prohibits class legislation. The equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Article 14 does not mean that all laws must be general in nature. It does not mean that the same laws should apply to everyone. It does not mean that every law must have universal validity, all persons are not in the same position by nature, attainment or circumstances. The different needs of different groups of people often require separate treatment.

By the very nature of society, there should be different laws in different places and the legislature directs policy and enacts laws in the best interest of the safety and security of the state. In fact, equal treatment under unequal circumstances would amount to inequality. So reasonable classification is not only permitted but necessary if society is to advance. What Article 14 prohibits is therefore class legislation, but it does not prohibit reasonable classification. However, the classification must not be "arbitrary, artificial or evasive" but must be based on some real and substantial distinction bearing a fair and reasonable determination of the object to be achieved by the legislation. Article 14 applies where equals are treated differently without any reasonable basis. However, if equals and unequal are treated differently, Article 14 does not apply.

Class legislation is one which makes

25 U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, S. 1

undue discrimination by conferring special privileges on a group of persons arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons, all of whom bear the same relation to the privilege granted, and there is no reasonable ground between them and the persons not so favoured. A difference or substantial difference can be found justifying the inclusion of one and the exclusion of the other from such privilege. Test of Reasonable Classification: While Article 14 prohibits class legislation, it does not prohibit the reasonable classification of persons, objects and transactions by the legislature in order to achieve specific objectives. However, the classification must not be "arbitrary, artificial or evasive". It must always rest on some real and substantial distinction which bears a fair and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the legislature.

To be reasonable, the classification must meet the following two conditions:

1. The classification must be based on an intelligible difference that distinguishes the

persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group; and

2. The differentiation must have a rational relationship to the goal to be achieved by the

law. The difference which is the basis of the classification and the object of the law are two different things. It is necessary that there is a connection between the basis of the classification and the object of the law that carries out the classification. Legislation making such a classification can only be declared discriminatory if there is no reasonable basis for the classification. Thus, the legislature may fix the age at which persons shall be deemed competent to enter into contracts with each other, but no one shall claim such competence. No contract can be dependent on hair size or colour. Such classification will be arbitrary. The true meaning and scope of Article 14 have been explained by the Supreme Court in a number of cases. In Special Court Bill v. Unknown 26in the decision of Seven Judge Bench Chandrachud, J.

inter alia restated the new propositions to be followed regarding the applicability of Article 14 which are as follows:

1. Basis of classification can’t be the one which is prohibited by the Constitution

26 Re-Special Courts Bill, AIR 1979 SC 478

itself.

2. A single person or single thing may in itself constitute a class.

3. If the legislature has failed to indicate the legislative policy behind the reasonable

classification, then both the classification and the class will be void.

4. Article 14 can be invoked to challenge the validity of the law as well as the

administrative actions. Every administrative action shall be in conformity with Article 14 of the Indian Constitution.

5. Presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the act and the burden of proof

lies on the person challenging it and once it is proved by the person challenging it, the burden of proof shifts on the state. In Air India v. Nargesh Meerza27, the Supreme Court struck down the regulations of Air India and Indian Airlines restricting the age of retirement and pregnancy for flight attendant services as unconstitutional on the ground that the conditions laid down therein were manifestly unreasonable and arbitrary and clearly violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Joining the service and after four years of using her services to terminate her service if she became pregnant was to force the poor flight attendant to have no children, thus disrupting and diverting the normal course of human nature.

Terminating the services of air hostesses under such circumstances was not only a heartless and true act but also an open insult to Indian womanhood - the most sacred and respected institution. The provision to extend the Air Hostess service "at the option" of the Chief Executive, which conferred discretionary power without laying down any guidelines or principles, was discriminatory and over-delegation could be declared unconstitutional. In K. A. Abbas v. Union of India28, the validity of the Cinematography Act, 1952 was challenged on the ground that it was an unreasonable classification. It has been argued that film as a form of expression is entitled to equal treatment with other forms of expression. The court held that film must be treated differently from other forms of art and expression because of its versatility, realism, and coordination of the visual and real senses.

Film can evoke

27 Air India v. Nargesh Meerza, AIR 1981 SC 1829

28 K.A. Abbas v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 481

emotions more deeply than any other artistic product. Its effect is especially great among children and adolescents because their immaturity makes them more willing to reject their infidelity than mature men and women. They also remember the action in the picture and try to imitate what they saw. Therefore, classifying films into two categories of "U" films and "A" films is a reasonable classification. For this reason, too, film must be viewed differently from other forms of speech and expression. A person who reads a book or writes something else or listens to a speech or looks at a picture or a sculpture is not as deeply excited as when he sees a movie. Treating the film on a different basis is a reasonable classification.

Section 5 of the Places of Worship (special provisions) Act talks about the exceptions to the act, it provides “Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the place or place of worship commonly known as Ram Janma Bhumi-Babri Masjid situated in Ayodhya in the State of Uttar Pradesh and to any suit, appeal or other proceeding relating to the said place or place of worship. ”29 The Act does not apply to the specific place of worship known as Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, including any legal proceedings connected therewith. This violates the right to equality of the people who worships other deities under the Hindu religion as same status is given to all the gods under Hindu religion.

In 1991, local priests filed a petition in court requesting permission to worship within the mosque complex, claiming that it was originally a part of the Kashi Vishwanath temple demolished by Aurangzeb. However, in the year 2021, another suit had been filed by five female Shiva devotees before the civil senior judge, Varanasi. Through the case, the women sought "restoration of performance of rituals at the principal seat of an ancient temple" at the Gyanvapi Mosque region. After the Varanasi civil court and the Allahabad High Court passed several orders, the matter reached the Supreme Court on pleas by both the Mosque Committee (Anjuman Intezamia Masjid Varanasi) and the Hindu devotees, and others.

An inspection of the premises had been originally ordered by the Varanasi court on the petitions of the five Hindu women who sought complete year-long access to worship at a Hindu shrine situated behind the Gyanvapi Mosque complex's western wall in Varanasi. Currently, the place is open for prayers once a year. On the other hand, the Anjuman Intezami Mosque, Varanasi had been seeking leave of the apex court that its application under Order 7 Rule 11 ought to be heard by the civil judge prior to proceeding with the case, including hearing the findings by the

29 S. 5, the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991

Commission. The Anjuman Intezamia Mosque Varanasi also alleged that the present case is not maintainable under the Places of Worship Act of 1991. The Anjuman Intezamia Mosque Varanasi also claims that in case a certain law holds the field, the case must be dismissed. In its response, the appellant said that in order to address the cause of the action of the suit, it is important that the reports of the Commission must be read first. The claims and counterclaims have piled up and led to a deadlock in the Gyanvapi Mosque case.

It is so far strongly argued by hindu priest that the availability of Nandi in Mosque and the shivling which now seems to be converted and addressed as fountain by Muslims side are never observed in Mosque so there claim should be allowed, Not excluded this case from the Places of Worship act is a big problem and muslim side is opposing this case because the said disputed place is protected under the act and petitions on this issue shall not be allowed. Even while the passing of the Places of Worship Bill, 1991, Member of Parliament Shri. Ram Naik has focused on the point that people of all communities have pious feeling for the temple of Kashi Vishwanath and Krishna Janmabhoomi. Hindu religion places all the gods at equal footing, thus exception to the Kashi Viswanath, Krishna Janmabhoomi & other such places should also be given.

He emphasized on this by stating- “Speaker, Indians, particularly the devotee of Rama, have a particular attachment for Ram Janma Bhoomi. Similarly, the people of all religions have a pious feeling for the temple of Kashi Vishwanath and Krishna Janmabhoomi that is why I say Krishna Janmabhumi situated In Mathura and Kashi Vishwanath situated in Varanasi. I want to say that as Ram Janmabhumi has been kept out of the purview of the bill, similarly Krishna Janmabhumi and Kashi Viswanath temple must be kept out of its purview. ”30

3.3 Conclusion

Therefore, there is a grievance that this legislation is violative of Article 14 because it places worshipers of one deity (Shri Ram) in a higher position than other Hindus who worship other deities such as Shri Krishna (at Shri Krishna Janmabhoomi) or Lord Shiva (at Kashi Vishwanath, Varanasi). Parliament should have treated claimants from other occupied religious sites the same as Ram Janmabhoomi so that they too would have an opportunity to present evidence before the court to make their case for restoration of their places of worship. 30 Statement by Member of Parliament Ram Naik, statement regarding infringement of equality, Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Bill, 1991, Lok Sabha (22/08/1991) CHAPTER 4: IRRATIONALITY AND ARBITRARY NATURE OF THE CUT-OFF

DATE

4.1 Introduction

India remains one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world. In addition to many religions and sects, India is home to countless castes and tribes, as well as more than a dozen major and hundreds of minor language groups from several unrelated language families. 31India has seen the rule of various invaders for many years in history. The period of Mughal rule in India lasted from the early 16th century to the mid-19th century. The British and Mughals have ruled India for a long time. It has witnessed a complex interplay of cultural, religious, and political dynamics. One aspect of this historical era that has attracted significant attention is the instances of destruction and devastation of Hindu temples by some Mughal rulers.

During certain phases of Mughal history, some rulers, driven by various motivations including political, religious, and strategic considerations, ordered the destruction of Hindu temples. This policy was not exclusive to the Mughals, as instances of temple destruction were common in medieval India, where rulers of various dynasties engaged in acts of iconoclasm for various reasons.

4.2 Irrational and Arbitrary cut-off date

The law prescribes 1947 as the cut-off date for the maintenance of the status quo for all places of worship, from which date it mitigates all existing disputes; exempts Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid, ASI-managed buildings and cases decided by mutual consent or court decree before the Act and prescribes a sentence of up to three years and a fine for anyone involved in converting worshippers. a shrine of another faith or denomination. Section 4(1) of the Place of Worship (special provisions) Act, 1991 provides for the Maintenance of religious character it says- “It is hereby declared that the religious character of a place of worship existing on the 15th day of August, 1947 shall continue to be 31 Allchin, Frank Raymond , Schwartzberg, Joseph E. , Thapar, Romila , Wolpert, Stanley A. , Calkins, Philip B. , Dikshit, K. R. , Spear, T. G. Percival , Srivastava, A. L.

, Subrahmanyam, Sanjay , Champakalakshmi, R. , Alam, Muzaffar and Raikar, Sanat Pai, "India". Encyclopedia Britannica, (last revised and updated on – 05/12/23), available at - https://www. britannica. com/place/India, last seen on –(05/12/2023) the same as it existed on that day. ” This provision guarantees that the religious character of a place of worship remains unchanged from what it was on August 15, 1947.

Section 4(2) of the Place of Worship (special provisions) Act, 1991 talks about Abatement of pending cases it provides “If, on the commencement of this Act, any suit, appeal or other proceedings with respect to the conversion of the religious character of any place of worship, existing on the 15th day of August 1947, is pending before any court, tribunal or other authority, the same shall abate, and no suit, appeal or other proceedings with respect to any such matter shall lie on or after such commencement in any court, tribunal or other authority. ” It declares that any pending legal action for conversion of the religious character of the venue prior to August 15, 1947, shall be terminated and no new cases may be instituted. 32 Many argue that the date mentioned as the cut-off date in the Place of Worship Act,

1991 is arbitrary and irrational. The cut-off date of August 15, 1947, is discretionary and

random. With respect to the date of India's independence from the British crown, the Act gives finality to the status quo determined by the colonial power. 33 The petitioners claimed that the destruction/occupation of their religious places of worship has been going on for centuries, which period has no connection with the cut-off date of 15th independence from the external colonizer, which is the latest date to achieve the objective of preventing communal disharmony. Many parliamentarians have opposed the bill on this issue: The undemocratic manner in which the bill was presented and approved by the Parliament caused legitimate resentment among opposition MPs. Shri Ram Naik, the former Governor of Uttar Pradesh, who at the time represented the North Mumbai Lok Sabha constituency from Maharashtra, called the bill the "blackest bill" in the history of the Bhartiya Parliament.

The Sentiments of the crores of the Hindus were correctly described by him, who in his introductory remarks had said opening remarks, Shri Naik said, “This Bill proposes to legalize all encroachments on Hindu temples made during the Mughal and British rule. This bill wants to pay a premium to those who have caused religious insults at Hindu shrines... ”

32 Ss. 4(1),4(2), The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991

33 Ibid., at 9

Anand Ashokrao Chavan from Parbhani has strongly opposed this bill on various points- According to him, the draft law does not aim to bring communal harmony, rather it may increase tension in the society in the future. He referred to this law as a commemoration of Aurangzeb's rule. He also labeled it as a black note. While opposing the date given as the final date, he said, "We consider the Parliament House as the temple of our constitution and many shlokas, mantras and suktis of our religious texts are written in this temple of the constitution and they were written after August 15, 1947. Now if you want to maintain the status quo as of August 15, 1947, and suppose that if somebody says tomorrow that these files should be removed, will you remove them? That is why I oppose this bill. Some places of worship in Sindh and Punjab were handed over to refugees from Sindh.

Now, if the status quo of August 15, 1947, is maintained, you will have to take these sanctuaries back from them and that would eventually fuel the unrest in the society. This bill has been introduced at a time when the country is going through a critical phase. It was not a good time to introduce this bill. Shri Chavan is our leader. He hails from Maharashtra and is a freedom fighter. I mean, it shouldn't have been brought up now. It is a Black Bill. " He also pointed out why the act was limited to 1947 and not the time when India was invaded by various rulers. He also mentioned that supporting this bill would be tantamount to perpetuating the crimes of foreign invaders, stating, "Sir, why are they limited to 1947 only? Why didn't they maintain the position of the 10th century when Muslims came to this country with their religion Islam?

Were Ganga and Saraswati names like Ameena or Rubia at that time? Our country has its own culture. They make a fuss about temples which have never disturbed the unity and integrity of the country rather these temples and our rivers have strengthened the unity and integrity of this country. I would like to state that this bill will spoil the relations between Hindus and Muslims in the country. Both communities have very great respect for Nehru and Gandhi. Hon. Nehru was like our father and Indian Muslims must have had the same feelings about Nehruji. Both communities eat the same fruits, same food etc. and we have to understand each other.

" 34 The Islamic invasions witnessed several prominent temples being destroyed and converted into Mosques, such as the Kashi Vishwanath in Varanasi which was converted into 34 Statement by Member of Parliament Ashokrao Shankarrao Chavan, statement regarding irrationality of the cut-off date mentioned in The Places of Worship (Soecial Provisions) Act, 1991 , Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Bill, 1991, Lok Sabha (22/08/1991) the Gyanvapi Mosque, the Krishna temple in Mathura that was converted into Idgah Mosque, the Adinath temple in Malda which was converted into Adina Mosque, the Kali temple in Srinagar that was converted into Khanqah-e-Moula and the list goes on endlessly. Even in today’s date, there are about 3000 worship places of indigenous communities of India which were devastated at the time of Mughal rule.

The denomination of these places was completely changed while India was under rule, and the remains of some of such places are still clearly visible even today. To quote some examples Adi Visvesvara a temple was built nearby Raziya Mosque, which occupied the place earlier temple; Gyanvapi mosque, remains of visible temple wall on the back side; The Rudramahalaya of gujrat turned into a mosque; the Dwarka temple destroyed; Bharat Mata mandir converted into jami mosque at Daulatabad etc. 35The law's decision to freeze the religious status of places of worship since August 15, 1947 raises concerns about justice, equality and the preservation of historical justice. The date chosen to represent India's independence may not adequately account for the diverse historical, cultural and religious landscapes that preceded this period.

4.3 Conclusion

In conclusion, the arbitrary and irrational cut-off date set out in the Places of Worship Act 1991 raises significant concerns about its fairness and historical accuracy. Freezing the religious status of places of worship as of August 15, 1947 oversimplifies the complex historical and cultural dynamics of these places, which may lead to the perpetuation of inequalities and historical injustices. A more nuanced and context-specific approach is needed, one that acknowledges the various pre-dated religious histories and ensures fair and just resolution of religious disputes. A review of the final date is necessary to align the legislation with the principles of secularism and equality.

By adopting a more inclusive approach that takes into account the unique historical contexts of individual places of worship, policymakers can better address the complexities surrounding religious sites in India. This amendment would contribute to a legal framework that respects the nation's diverse religious heritage while promoting fairer and more comprehensive resolution of place-of-worship disputes. 35 Meenakshi Jain, Flight of Deities and Rebirth of Temples: Episodes from Indian History, Pg. 94, 94-100, 175- 177, 177-178, 28.

CHAPTER 5:

CONCLUSION

Due to the huge number of Hindu temples which were barbarically demolished this question is related to the collective identity of Hindus and the fundamental right to assert one's religious identity as guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution and The Places of Worship Act 1991 is an insult to collective identity of Hindus. Affirmative action toward the historically disadvantaged is the basic thread that runs through the constitution a is evident in affirmative action toward the historically oppressed. However, The Worship Act 1991 is totally against this the concept of intergenerational justice and instead it provides the intergenerational justice it exercises intergenerational injustice among Hindus. 36 The study concludes by delving into the complex challenges surrounding the Places of Worship Act 1991 and shedding light on the complexities that have emerged since its inception.

The law, which aimed to freeze the religious status of certain places of worship from 15 August 1947, has come under considerable scrutiny on both legal and ethical grounds. Criticism has been directed at its perceived violation of the principles of secularism, as freezing the status quo can be seen as a departure from the inclusive and nondiscriminatory nature of the secular state. Additionally, concerns have been raised about the law's potential to perpetuate historical injustices by entrenching religious differences that existed at the time of independence. The research also highlights the evolving socio-political environment that has added another layer of complexity to the challenges associated with the law.

Demands for changes and reassessments arise from changing demographics and changing communal dynamics, leading to a reassessment of the law's applicability in the current context. This underscores the dynamic nature of religious relations in India and the need for legal frameworks to adapt to these changes. In meeting these challenges, policy makers face the delicate task of balancing conflicting interests—preserving religious harmony, promoting the principles of secularism, and protecting the rights of individuals. The study highlights the importance of ongoing dialogue, stakeholder consultation and a comprehensive, inclusive approach to policy-making.

Addressing the multifaceted challenges surrounding the Places of Worship Act, 1991 requires a nuanced understanding of the historical context, an appreciation of evolving social dynamics and a commitment to fostering an environment of religious tolerance and coexistence in India's diverse landscape.

36 Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India, (2020) 7 S.C.C.

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