Clarity V. Chaos – The Double-Edged Sword Of Lis Pendens

Author: LawSphereX

Category: General Law

Published: 2026-08-23T18:48:03.873Z

Updated: 2026-08-30T07:06:25.082Z

CLARITY V. CHAOS – THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF

LIS PENDENS

Pranav Pai, Jindal Global Law School

ABSTRACT

In the vast legal landscape of our country, a few concepts are akin to doubleedged swords, which are needed for delivery of justice but also have unintended consequences. One such example that warrants a close analysis is the doctrine of lis pendens; while it contributes to the legal jurisprudence and efficient functioning of the judicial system, it is not entirely devoid of loopholes. This paper will elaborate upon the essentials, exceptions and evolution of lis pendens so as to garner a cursory but comprehensive understanding of the doctrine. It also explores the link between lis pendens and the Registration Act, 1908, which was envisaged to complement the former and not circumvent its operation. Finally, the paper brings to light a major pitfall in the doctrine with regards to bonafide purchasers of disputed land while offering suggestions to overcome the same.

Introduction

From time immemorial, the aspiration of holding property as a coveted asset has remained steadfast, driving individuals to pursue, purchase and possess property, which is further fuelled by the promise of stability, status and long-term wealth accumulation. Meanwhile, the everopen doors of our judiciary serving as the watchdog of democracy1 and the protector of fundamental values of our Constitution, receives countless parties engaged in property disputes2 in their quest to exercise their rights and seek justice. Though this upholds the principles of natural justice, equity and good conscience, where Courts grant everyone an opportunity to be heard3 irrespective of their social background, the vast number of property and land related disputes reaching the Court see no visible end, but only an increase.

As a result of this, two major problems have arisen which are relevant to the contents of this paper. Firstly, the judicial system is clogged and overburdened owing to the plethora of land related suits, which hampers its functioning and efficiency, while also keeping the parties on an endless wait for justice. Secondly, virtually every other piece of land is under litigation4, making it difficult for owners and interested parties (purchasers) alike to carry out transactions with regards to the land in dispute and preventing them from enjoying their complete property rights. According to the CPR Land Rights Initiative5 and Access to Justice Survey, 20166, nearly 25% of total cases adjudicated by the Supreme Court are conflicts over land and 66% of total cases of civil nature in India are property disputes.

The average time period of property disputes in the judicial system from the initial stage to delivery of judgement by the Supreme Court is around 20 years7. 1 Dr Gupta B. K. , Judiciary: The backbone of Indian Constitutional Democracy, THE INDIAN EXPRESS (Aug. 14, 2023), https://indianexpress. com/article/cities/chandigarh/indian-judiciary-appointment-of-judges-elevationof-judges-constitutional-democracy-indian-constitution-8891276/

2 Adv. Mohanty C., Property Dispute and Family Settlement, 18th April, 2024, available at

https://lawrato.com/indian-kanoon/property-law/property-dispute-and-family-settlement-8 (last visited on Jul. 10, 2024).

3 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCR 621.

4 Carnegie India, Land Litigation in India

Learnings from a Study on Land Litigation in Delhi, 24th September, 2021, available at https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/09/24/land-litigation-in-india-learnings-from-study-onland-litigation-in-delhi-event-7695 (last visited on Jul. 10, 2024). 5 Wahi N., Understanding Land Conflict in India and Suggestions for Reform, 26th June, 2019, available at https://cprindia.org/understanding-land-conflict-in-india-and-suggestions/ (last visited on Jul. 10, 2024); also see Robinson N., A Quantitative Analysis of the Indian Supreme Court’s Workload, 10(3) JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES, 570, 601 (2003).

6 Daksh India, Access to Justice Survey (2015-2016), https://dakshindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Dakshaccess-to-justice-survey.pdf

7 ibid 5.

Keeping this backdrop in mind, the doctrine of lis pendens has emerged as a fundamental principle within Indian legal jurisprudence. Given in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act8, 1882, the doctrine aims to safeguard the rights of parties involved in lands and properties pending litigation. Going by the plain reading of the Section, it states that a property under litigation cannot be transferred or alienated9 by either party in litigation save by the Court’s authority, which therefore upholds the legal and human right10 to property under Article 300A11 of the Indian Constitution. Hence, lis pendens prevents endless litigation from reaching the Court, as in its absence, multiple alienations would lead to fresh cases being filed by the owner and new, successive purchasers of the same disputed land12.

Therefore, it is evident that to an extent, lis pendens solves the first problem mentioned above, but what about the second problem? While the doctrine of lis pendens contributes to the legal jurisprudence as well as efficiency of the judicial system, this paper seeks to examine if it has loopholes that place bonafide purchasers at a disadvantage and whether the principles of natural justice, good conscience and equity are upheld at all times. The background and origin, linkage of lis pendens with the Registration Act, 190813 and merits and shortcomings of the doctrine will also be elaborated upon. Finally, the paper will provide suggestions for the lacunae brought to light to better the implementation and efficiency of the doctrine.

Essentials and Exceptions of Lis Pendens Before proceeding to understand the evolution and applicability of the doctrine in our country, it is important to gauge the basic essentials and exceptions of the doctrine under Section 5214. In Dev Raj Dogra v. Gyan Chand Jain15 and Amit Kumar Shaw & Anr vs Farida Khatoon & Anr16, the following essentials for lis pendens to be applicable were formulated, briefly, • There must be an ongoing litigation/suit in a competent Court/arbitral tribunal17.

8 The Transfer of Property Act, 1882, No. 4, Acts of Parliament, 1882 (hereafter, TPA).

9 Sarvinder Singh v. Dalip Singh, (1996) 5 SCC 539.

10 State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar & Ors., (2011) 10 SCC 404.

11 INDIA CONST., art. 300A.

12 Law Notes, Origin of Lis Pendens

The purpose of the Doctrine of Lis Pendens, 24th September, 2022, available at https://lawnotes.co/tag/origin-of-lispendens/#:~:text=Under%20Section%2047%2C%20from%20the,prohibit%20lis%20pendens%20from%20func tioning (last visited on Jul. 10, 2024).

13 The Registration Act, 1908, No. 16, Acts of Parliament, 1908 (hereafter, RA).

14 TPA 1882, § 52.

15 Dev Raj Dogra v. Gyan Chand Jain, (1981) 3 SCR 174.

16 Amit Kumar Shaw & Anr. v. Farida Khatoon & Anr, (2005) 11 SCC 403.

17 Sardar Singh v. Mohan Lal Major, (1990) 97 PLR 391.

The litigation must specifically deal with the right to immovable property. • There must not be collusion between parties involved. • The rights of the opposing party in litigation must be impacted by the transfer. • The transfer of the disputed property must take place during pendency of litigation. Lis pendens is generally not applied when the above conditions are not satisfied, such as existence of collusion between parties18 or fraud19, Court lacks competent authority20, the rights of parties are not connected to immovable property21 or where the rights of the other party are not impacted22.

Lastly, another important exception includes the Court’s power to enable a party involved in an ongoing property suit to carry out a transfer of the said property without being bound to the final judgement under Section 52, keeping in mind the principles of natural justice, good conscience and equity23. About Lis Pendens: Emergence from Classical to Contemporary Application The Latin phrase “lis pendens” plainly meaning “litigation pending” is derived from the Latin maxim “Pendente lite nihil innovature,” which means “nothing new shall be introduced in a pending litigation24”. The roots of the doctrine can be traced to Bellamy v.

Sabine25, wherein the Court observed that if disputed property could be alienated pendente lite, the suit would never be resolved as it would lead to a continuous and never-ending litigation battle between the owner and successive purchasers, also leading to a violation of res judicata26. Hence, the Court propounded the Theory of Necessity as one of the basis27 for lis pendens28, “where the party to litigation (necessarily) shouldn’t alienate the property so as to affect the opponent” and thus not interfere with the Court’s final judgement.

18 Nagubai v. B. Sham Rao, (1956) SCR 451.

19 Awadesh Pradesh v. Belarani, ILR 33 PAT 389.

20 Amartya Saha, An Introspective Analysis on the Doctrine of Lis Pendens, 2 (1), INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

OF INTEGRATED LAW REVIEW 31, 2021.

21 Shanmugharsundaram v. Parvathi Ammal, AIR (1945) MAD 454.

22 Dhanse D Kalal v. Vasudeo, (1971) 73 BOMLR 293.

23 Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj, (2010) 8 SCC 1.

24 Swarup R., Rights Of Third Parties Under The Doctrine Lis Pendens, 4th August, 2022, available at

https://iiprd.wordpress.com/2022/08/04/rights-of-third-parties-under-the-doctrine-lis-pendens/ (last visited on Jul. 10, 2024).

25 Bellamy v. Sabine [1857], 1 DE G. & J. 585.

26 Satyadhyan Ghosal And Others v. Sm. Deorajin Debi And Another, (1960) 3 SCR 590.

27 Discussed in Bellamy, the second basis of lis pendens is the Theory of Notice, which states that notice must be given in a reasonable manner to reach the recipient, here, the bonafide purchaser. 28 Jain P., The Doctrine of Lis Pendens, 13th March, 2023, available at https://articles.manupatra.com/articledetails/The-Doctrine-of-Lis-Pendens (last visited on Jul. 10, 2024).

In contemporary Indian jurisprudence, this position of necessity wherein the disputed land cannot be transferred before final adjudication is imbibed and followed under Section 52 of the TPA, which has been established in Faiyaz Husain Khan v. Prag Narain29. However, this bar of necessity is not absolute and the plain reading of Section 52 preventing transfer of disputed property has been relaxed by Courts in various precedents over the years. As held in Hardev Singh v. Gurmail Singh30, the transfer or sale of a disputed property would not be void or invalid under Section 52, but brings the purchaser of the property in litigation under the purview of the Court’s final judgement. This has also been clarified in Nagubai Ammal v. Sharma Rao31 and Vinod Seth v.

Devinder Bajaj32, wherein the transfer of disputed property is valid provided there is no conflict with the rights of the opposing party in litigation. Finally, in Rajendra Singh and Ors. v. Santa Singh and Ors33 and Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami34, the Court laid out the definition of lis pendens under Section 52 as follows: “doctrine of lis pendens has been defined as the jurisdiction, power or control which a Court acquires over property involved in a suit pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgement therein. ” In A. Nawab John v. V. N.

Subramaniyam35, the Court cemented the position of lis pendens as follows: that “the pendente lite purchaser would be entitled to or suffer the same legal rights and obligations as his vendor as may be eventually determined by the Court,” or to put differently, that the sale of the disputed property is subservient to the parties’ rights in the suit36. Therefore, the doctrine of lis pendens prevents endless litigation owing to the Theory of Necessity which prevents the complete transfer of property pendente lite, while also protecting the parties’ rights who are involved in the suit such that neither can transfer the disputed property to the disadvantage of the other party.

At this juncture, we can link this observation to the two major problems mentioned in the introduction, and prima facie, lis pendens seems to be the crucial answer; it solves problem one as it reduces the burden on Courts by ‘necessarily’ preventing countless litigation on the same disputed property, and solves problem two to a large extent as it enables the owners of the property to exercise their right to transfer or sell the

29 Faiyaz Husain Khan v. Prag Narain, (1907) 9 BOMLR 656.

30 Hardev Singh v. Gurmail Singh, (2007) 2 SCC 404.

31 ibid 18.

32 ibid 23.

33 Rajendra Singh and Ors. v. Santa Singh and Ors., (1974) 1 SCR 381.

34 Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami, (1972) 2 SCC 200.

35 A. Nawab John v. V.N. Subramaniyam, (2012) 7 SCC 738.

36 Thomson Press (India) Ltd v. Nanak Builders and Investers Pvt. Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 397.

disputed property during pendency of suit to interested purchasers, who can also exercise their rights to purchase the property they wish to buy. Sub-Issues However, this finding brings to light other pressing issues which will be clarified in the coming sections of the paper: • If the final judgement is not in favour of the owner and in turn the bonafide purchaser of the disputed property, what is the validity of the executed sale deeds prior to the initiation of suit under Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908? • While the rights of the owner and the opposing party in the pending suit are protected and cannot be taken away by each other under lis pendens, what about the rights of the interested buyer, who may have absolutely no knowledge of the pendente lite suit?

Is the application of lis pendens fair to bonafide buyers whose enjoyment of the property might cease on the delivery of the Court judgement? Is this in line with justice, equity and good conscience, which is the very rationale behind the doctrine37 of lis pendens? Polishing the Friction between TPA, 1882 and RA, 1908 Section 4738 of the RA, 1908 states that “a registered sale deed operates from the date of execution when the entire consideration is paid”. Hence, even before a signed sale deed is registered under the RA and the entire sale consideration is paid, the sale deed will be held to operate from the date of signing and payment post successful registration under the RA39.

When the above is analysed through the lens of lis pendens, the doctrine cannot be applicable in the event that the signed sale deed and purchase consideration is executed before commencement of the property suit in Court and registration of sale under the RA takes place during the suit, as this would mean that the sale was completed long before trial commenced under Section 47 of the RA. In light of this seeming escape from lis pendens, the Court clarified the above in Har Narain v. Mam Chand40. The Court relied on Ram Saran Lall v. Mst Domini Kuer41, wherein it was held that the sale cannot be considered to be complete before registration, even though Section 47

37 Shivshankara & Anr. v. H.P. Vedavyasa Char, (2023) 5 Scale 218.

38 RA 1908, § 47.

39 Kanwar Raj Singh (D) Th. Lrs. v. Gejo. (D) Th. Lrs. & Ors., (2024) INSC 1.

40 Har Narain v. Mam Chand, (2010) 13 SCC 128.

41 Ram Saran Lall v. Mst Domini Kuer, (1962) 2 SCR 474.

of RA allows the document to relate back to its execution date, as only after registration does the sale become legally effective from the earlier date of execution. Hence, until registration under the RA, the sale cannot be deemed to be complete. Therefore, in Har Narain, it was held that not registering a sale deed at the start of the suit and subsequently registering it during the impending suit will still bring the disputed property under lis pendens, and that “Section 47 (of RA) cannot circumvent the operation of lis pendens. ” The Caveat Emptor Curse While lis pendens protects both parties’ rights locked in litigation, i. e.

, the owner and opposing party, it completely ignores the rights of interested, bonafide purchasers of the said land who, more often than not, are completely unaware of the fact that the purchased property is under litigation as owners, though bound to42, do not disclose the same43. Due to this, when the final Court judgment is passed to the detriment of the owner (and purchaser), the disputed land is snatched away from the purchaser, making his or her right of enjoyment over the property limited and contingent, and not complete. Even if notices of lis pendens are recorded as encumbrance certificates under Section 18 (as “optional documents”)44 of the RA and lie with the Registrars established under the RA, the quality and maintenance of property records are extremely poor45.

This infringes upon the purchaser’s right to inspect records under Section 5746 of the RA, and does not provide any useful information whatsoever regarding the pendente lite. Further, as held in Abdul Chanimomin v. Bishaheri Kom47, since lis pendens itself is based on “public policy”, purchasers cannot plead ignorance of knowledge of the suit or as being bonafide purchasers lacking notice48 in Court, owing to the Theory of Necessity. In addition to this, the purchaser is very

42 Sethi M., Indian Law on Lis Pendens, 4 (2) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LAW MANAGEMENT AND

HUMANITIES, 1967, 1976 (2021).

43 Law Commission of India, 157th Report

Section 52: The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 And Its Amendment, (Law Commission Report No. 157, 1998), https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s3ca0daec69b5adc880fb464895726dbdf/uploads/2022/08/2022081035.pdf

44 RA 1908, § 18.

45 Damle D. and Gulati K., Charactering Land and Property Related Litigation at the Delhi High Court, 34 (1) art. 8 NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA REVIEW, 178, 204 (2022).

46 RA 1908, § 57.

47 Abdul Chanimomin v. Bishaheri Kom, (1973) 1 MYSLJ.

48 Balwinderjit Kaur v. Financial Commissioner (Appeals), (1987) 1 LANDLR 392; see also Ceean International Private Limited v. Ashok Surana and Anr., (2003) 2 CALLT 322 (HC).

“limited” in recovering the investments or consideration paid for the land49 and cannot file a suit against the owner of the property50 except in cases of improper litigation or collusion51. Hence, the current status of law forces unassuming purchasers to bow down to the ultimate outcome of the Court without any remedy whatsoever. Not only is this in contravention of natural justice, equity and good faith as the bonafide purchasers are denied even an opportunity to be heard, but also tilts the scale of disadvantage unequally on caveat emptors and not caveat venditors. Weighing the Pros and Cons of Lis Pendens Before moving on to the analysis and suggestions which can be implemented to better the application and efficiency of lis pendens, it is important to briefly summarize and understand the pros and cons of the doctrine, which thus establishes it to be a “double edged sword.

” Pros: • Reduces burden on Courts by preventing endless litigation between parties and helps in maintaining stability of property transactions between parties. • Protects rights of parties in suit and grants an opportunity to be heard to both sides. • Prevents collusion and fraud and is in line with principles of natural justice, equity and good conscience. • Overlaps with other property legislations like RA, and is not in conflict with other laws. • Protects the right to property under 300A, as owner/purchaser can only be dispossessed of property (under dispute) under “authority of law”. Cons: • Ignores rights of third party bonafide purchasers and does not provide them with a remedy before law, thus violating audi alteram partem52. • Renders the right to enjoyment of property of third party bonafide purchasers, who are not even party to the suit, contingent and limited.

• No compulsory provision on giving a notice of suit pendente lite to the bonafide purchaser, leading to absolute lack of knowledge of whether a suit is pending or not.

49 Sardar Hari Bachan v. Sardar Har Bhajan, AIR (1975) P&H 205.

50 ibid 24.

51 Moti Lal v. Karab-ud-Din, (1898) 25 CAL 179.

52 ibid. 3.

No proper maintenance of property law records and encumbrance certificates (notices of lis pendens) with the Registrars established under RA, making it extremely difficult for the purchasers to obtain information. The Way Ahead: Analysis and Suggestions In light of the identified lacunae, there is a pressing need to come up with effective suggestions to make the doctrine of lis pendens more efficient and equitable in its application to third party purchasers. Coming to the rights of purchasers, in Bhanumani Sahu v. State of Orissa53 it was held that purchasers must be given a chance to protect their right to the said property, as their interest in the property is “substantial”. Further, it urged that purchasers must enjoy the same rights and obligations as the owner in the suit. In Saila Dassi v. Nirmala Dassi54 and Amit Kumar Shaw v.

Farida Khatoon55, the Court held that the purchasers must be given an opportunity to be heard and be impleaded as parties in the same suit. The absence of a mechanism/compulsory notice for knowing the pendency of a litigation on a land was highlighted in T. G. Ashok Kumar v. Govindamma56, which also noted the plight faced by the purchasers and thus pressed the need for a “reliable method” of ascertaining pendente lite. In this era of digitization, there is a need to convert property records like notices of lis pendens to digitized form so that the same is easily available and accessible to individuals, while preserving the quality and credibility. This view was supported in Aslam Pasha And Chief Commissioner & Others57, where the Court ordered the authorities to initiate digitization of old property records for easy access.

Keeping the above precedents in mind, the following suggestions can be implemented: • Give more emphasis to the Theory of Notice58, based on which Section 52 of TPA is amended to make giving of a notice of lis pendens to third party purchasers compulsory. This has already been done in Maharashtra and Gujarat59, and can be implemented in the rest of the country as well.

53 Bhanumani Sahu v. State of Orissa, (2013) 1 CLR 4.

54 Saila Dassi v. Nirmala Dassi, (1958) AIR 394.

55 ibid 16.

56 T.G. Ashok Kumar v. Govindamma, (2010) 14 SCC 370.

57 Aslam Pasha v. Chief Commissioner & Others, (2023) KHC 35364.

58 ibid 27.

59 Transfer of Property and The Indian Registration (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1939, § 52 (1), No. 14, Acts of Bombay State Legislature, 1939.

Amend Section 17 of RA to include notices of lis pendens if in existence, as a compulsory document requiring registration, as the notice significantly impacts the rights of the purchaser by making them limited or contingent. • Amend Section 52 of TPA giving third party purchasers an opportunity to be heard and determine whether they had been given a notice of lis pendens or were victims of fraud, and also award fair compensation and suitable penalty to the violators where needed. • Complete digitization of property records by creating a national online database, including modifying encumbrance certificates to contain a field of any suits the property is involved in.

Similar to how all citizens are allotted Aadhar cards under the Unique Identification System, properties can be allotted a unique property identification number and these two systems can be merged to have a well organised, accessible and efficient system to gain information about the property. • In order to achieve the goal of complete digitization, the functionaries under the RA like the Inspector General, Registrars and Sub-Registrars must be given the power to verify and enter the collected data into the database. An online portal can be opened for submission of documents and certificates, and if need be, parties can be asked to approach the Registrars and Sub-Registrars Offices for cross checking information.

Conclusion The doctrine of lis pendens, while cementing its position as a legal necessity in today’s age of increasing property disputes and litigation, is not egalitarian in its application. The merits of reducing caseload, preventing endless litigation and protecting the parties’ rights in suit does not justify leaving bonafide purchasers without any rights of their own or an opportunity to be heard before the law. In fact, it contravenes the principles of natural justice, equity and good faith, which is the very basis on which the doctrine rests60. To justify the above, provisions of the Indian Constitution as well as international conventions which India has ratified can be scrutinised.

Article 1461 of the Indian Constitution assures “equality before the law” to all individuals within India’s domain, and this ‘equality’ extends 60 LiveLaw, Section 52 TP Act - Alienation Of Suit Property Pendente Lite Not Invalid; But It'll Be Subject To Rights Of Litigants : Supreme Court, 30th March, 2023, available at https://www. livelaw. in/top-stories/section-52tp-act-lis-pendent-alienation-of-suit-property-pendente-lite-rights-supreme-court- 225191#:~:text=The%20Supreme%20Court%20has%20observed,applicable%20in%20the%20strict%20sense (last visited on Jul. 10, 2024).

61 INDIA CONST., art. 14.

to the civil rights of individuals62. In NALSA v. Union of India and Ors. 63, the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 197664 and Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 194865 were highlighted, wherein the former held that “everyone shall have a right to recognition, everywhere as a person before the law” and the latter held that civil rights, which come under the umbrella of “human rights, have equal status and cannot be placed in a hierarchical order”66. In M/S. Shekhar Resorts Limited v. Union Of India67, it was held that no individual can be left remediless in law, especially when there is a legal impediment which is not in their control.

Further, Article 3268 of the Constitution also contains the right to constitutional remedies which enshrines the right of individuals to approach the judiciary when they believe their (fundamental) rights have been infringed, thus giving them an opportunity to be heard and obtain remedy in law. Finally, the significance of the right to access information or the “right to know” was emphasized to be a fundamental right under Article 19 (1)(a)69 in State Of U. P vs Raj Narain & Ors70. The current application of lis pendens discriminates against the bonafide purchasers as it only addresses and protects the rights of those parties involved in the suit while completely ignoring the purchasers’ rights and grievances.

Purchasers are also left remediless before the law and cannot even voice their views, which frequently renders them to be innocent victims of fraud and deception with no justice in sight. The poor condition of physical property documents maintained under the RA further adds to the problem of the purchasers being completely oblivious of any pending suit on the purchased property. Therefore, this paper while recognising the importance of lis pendens as an important principle of property law, emphasizes the urgent need to plug the loopholes in the current status and application of the doctrine in our country by implementing the suggestions offered. By doing this, the tenets of natural justice, good conscience and equity would be available to all the

62 Venkateshwara Theatre v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., (1993) 3 SCC 677.

63 National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and Ors., (2014) 5 SCC 438.

64 UNGA, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), A/RES/2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966).

65 UNGA, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), A/RES/217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948).

66 UNFPA, Human Rights Principles, 2005, available at https://www.unfpa.org/resources/human-rightsprinciples#:~:text=Indivisibility%3A%20Human%20rights%20are%20indivisible,positioned%20in%20a%20hi erarchical%20order (last visited on Jul. 10, 2024).

67 M/S. Shekhar Resorts Limited v. Union of India., (2023) 3 SCC 220.

68 INDIA CONST., art. 32.

69 INDIA CONST., art. 19(1)(a).

70 State of U.P v. Raj Narain & Ors., (1975) 3 SCR 333.

stakeholders within the realm of lis pendens, thus paving the way towards a more just and equitable society for generations to come.