Comparative Constitution - Comparative Study Of Retirement Age Of Judges & Judicial Independence
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Category: Constitutional & Human Rights
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COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTION: COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF RETIREMENT AGE OF JUDGES & JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE
Dr. Jayshree Gautam Kanchanpurkar, Assistant Professor, Vivekanand Education Society’s College of Law, University of Mumbai
ABSTRACT
The most significant institutional safeguard for judicial independence is frequently thought to be judicial tenure, as it can enhance the impartiality of court decisions. This article examines various tenure schemes and how well they can shield judges. The Constitution of India provides the mandatory retirement age where as there are other system like the retirement age in western liberal democracies is approximately 70 years old, the US Supreme Court and constitutional courts in Austria and Greece are appointed for life. Different retirement ages apply to mandatory and voluntary retirement in several nations. Many constitutions throughout the world support life tenure as the highest standard for protecting judges.
The researcher in this research first will covers in detail the different types followed by countries and the researcher further will compare the different system of retirement and will analyses the advantages and disadvantages of this system. Lastly, the researcher will analyses the effect of retirement age on the judicial independence.
INTRODUCTION:
In democratic countries with constitutional governance, the idea of the judiciary's independence is vital. In order to allow the judiciary to operate impartially and free from undue influence or interference, it is necessary for the judiciary to be separated from the executive and legislative arms of government. For maintaining the rule of law and defending personal liberties and rights the judiciary required independence. Therefore the key component of India's democratic system is the judiciary's independence. It is a distinctive quality that sets India apart from other nations. However, the judiciary's independence has frequently been called into question by outside or political pressure, casting doubt on several of the clauses stated under the concept of separation of powers. Independence not only from the direct but also indirect control of Government.
This research shows the nexus of the retirement age of Judges and the Independence of Judiciary. Here the researcher highlights that the retirement age is one of the indirect controls on the Indian Judiciary by offering them after retirement opportunities. The Judicial retirement age is not the same all over the world. Judges' retirement ages vary greatly between nations and legal systems. The retirement age for judges is set by legislation in many countries and may vary depending on the judiciary's hierarchical structure. The current research is to find the connection between the retirement age of judiciary in India and the Independence of judiciary. Further the researcher in this research shows the nexus between the retirement age of judges and problems of pending cases in High Court and the Supreme Court.
The significant reasons for the problem of the pending of cases are the non-availability of adequate number of judges and the mandatory retirement of judges. Here in this research the researcher highlight one of the significant issue which affects the pending case is the mandatory retirement provision of the Constitution of India. The researcher through this current research try to show that how the lifetime tenure of judges are help full in solve the problems of pendency of cases.
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM:
● Retirement age causes a forceful burden on the purse of the public. The retired judge becomes the burden after the retirement on the citizen. As per the Supreme Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1958 and High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 the judges are entitled to pension after their retirement.
Pensions for the Judges1: Designation Salary Pension Gratuity Rs.16,80,000/- per annum +Dearness Relief Chief Justice of India Rs.2,80,000/- p.m. Rs.20,00,000/- Rs.15,00,000/- per annum +Dearness Relief Judges of Supreme Court Rs.2,50,000/- p.m. Rs.20,00,000/- Chief Justices of High Court Rs.2,50,000/- p.m. Rs.15,00,000/- per annum +Dearness Relief Rs.20,00,000/- Judges of High Court Rs.2,25,000/- p.m. Rs.13,50,000/- per annum +Dearness Relief Rs.20,00,000/-
● This causes the biased attitude of the judges towards the current government. Hopes of the retired judges to serve the country after retirement may lead bias attitude of judges towards the current Government. ● The judges try to favor the current government as to keep a good relationship with the government so that they will be easily appointed on the commission after their retirement.
HYPOTHESIS:
● Hypothesis No. I - Lifetime tenure for the Judge of the High Court and Supreme Court will be more effective. ● Hypothesis No. II - Lifetime tenure will help to reduce the burden of pending cases on High court and Supreme Courts. ● Hypothesis No. III - Early retirement age causes indirectly to the independence of judiciary.
SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH:
The object of this study is to critically analyze and examine whether there is nexus of the age of retirement of judges and the independence of judiciary.
1. To study the age of retirement in different countries.
2. To have a comparative analysis of the age of retirement in India and with other
countries.
3. To study the independence of the judiciary.
4. To critically analyze the Nexus between the independence of judiciary and the age of
retirement.
5. To analyze the nexus of permanent judges and the pending cases.
6. To recommend any changes based on the research scholar's observations and results.
METHODOLOGY:
The researcher in this research has used the doctrine method, where the research is solely conducted on the study material available by books, research journal and website for the law of other countries. Further the researcher has applied an analytical-cum comparative research method. The researcher analyzes the provision of the Constitution of India and also the independence of the judiciary. The analytical technique is used to comprehend the provisions of various constitutions, and the comparative-cum-critical method is used to evaluate the hypothesis by considering the provisions found in other nations' comparable constitutions.
INDEPENDENCE OF JUDICIARY
Despite the judiciary’s existence for years, its definition of independence remains unclear. The Constitution of India, just mentioned the independence of the Judiciary but failed to define what in practice independence of judiciary means. Foundation of the Judiciary’s independence can be traced in the theory of separation of powers, which has been in place for a long time. In the Constituent Assembly, Shri. K. T. Shah introduced a motion in the Constituent Assembly on June 7, 1949, to insert a clause in the Constitution prohibiting former judges of the Supreme Court and High Court from being nominated to any executive position under the Union or the State. He thought that by taking this action, the separation of powers and judicial independence would be preserved.
Shah reminded the Assembly that the Executive has tried to sway judges in the past by offering alluring executive positions. Since there will be more jobs available in independent India than in colonial India, he projected that things would only become worse. He disregarded custom and history as adequate defences. Shah believed the issue was important enough for the Constitution to specifically address it. 2 The judiciary's independence is outlined as the judges' ability to carry out their duties impartially, or without interference from other sources. Therefore, the independence of the judiciary may be seen as including both the judiciary's institution and the judges who make up its membership in light of this, the judiciary's independence might be seen as including both the institution's and its members' individual freedom as judges.
The independence of the judiciary from external sources also includes the direct influence of the judiciary and indirect 2 Desk Brief: The Constituent Assembly on Retired Judges Taking Up Executive Office - Constitution of India
influence of the judiciary. Some of the important element of the independent judiciary includes: ● Separation of Powers: According to Article 50, there would be an independent judiciary free from government interference. Securing the judiciary's independence from the executive is the goal of the Directive Principle. The concept of separation of powers refers to the way in which the judicial branch functions independently from the legislative and executive departments of government. Due to the distinct roles and responsibilities of each branch, authority cannot be centralised in one organisation. 3 ● Judicial Autonomy: Judges ought to have the autonomy to decide cases based only on the law and the relevant facts, free from outside interference or pressure. Fair and unbiased decisions are made possible by this autonomy.
● Tenure and Security: The Constitution of India granted the tenure security to the judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. After being appointed, they stay in office until they reach retirement age, which is 65 years for Supreme Court justices (Article 124(2)) and 62 years for High Court judges (Article 217(1))4. They can only be removed from office by a presidential decree, and even then, only on the basis of demonstrated incompetence and misbehaviour. Judges are shielded by this safeguard from political pressure or the worry of facing backlash for making unfavourable rulings.
● Appointment Process: According to the Constitution of India the Chief Justice of India and the Governor of the State in question are consulted prior to the appointment of the Chief Justice of the High Court, whereas the Chief Justice of the Related High Court is consulted before the appointment of the other judges of High Courts. It may be concluded, then, that the Constitution guarantees the judiciary's independence because the Executive has no sole authority over the nomination of judges ● Financial Independence: The judiciary should have control over its budget, ensuring that it has the resources necessary to function effectively. Financial autonomy helps prevent external entities from manipulating the judiciary through budgetary constraints.
3 Principles of Administrative Law, by M P Jain & S N Jain, 9th Edition, LexisNews
4 Article 124 (2) & 217 (1), Constitution of India
● Legal Immunity: Judges are often granted immunity from personal liability for their official actions. This immunity encourages judges to make decisions based on the law without fear of personal consequences. 5 The above mentioned elements of the Judicial independence can also refer to the direct judicial independence which are also mentioned in the Constitution of India. The pivotal meaning of independence of judiciary is that the legislative and executive branches of government shall not impede the judiciary's ability to carry out its duties in order to prevent it from doing justice. The judiciary's judgement should be made without intervention from the other branches of government. Judges have to be free to carry out their duties without fear or favour.
6 Here through this research the researcher is putting the innovative concept that is the indirect element for judicial independence. The novelty of the subject of independence of judiciary also includes the judges to be free from the hopes of appointing on the commission after their retirement. In India, the judiciary after the retirement of their service as a judge is also placed by the Government on different commissions constituted by the statutes. It is apprehended by the researcher that there is a high possibility that the judges in lurk to get appointed on the commission may be biased with the Government. The researcher states that the mandatory appointment is affecting the independence of judiciary indirectly and therefore it is required to follow the U. S pattern of appointment of Judges.
CONSTITUTION AND RETIREMENT AGE OF JUDGES:
In the Constituent Assembly, while discussing the age of retirement of judges, there are different views are proposed by the K. T. Shah, Jaspat Roy Kapoor, Jawarlal Nehru, M Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, BR Ambedkar, etc. The Constituent Assembly members like Roy Kapoor, Jawarlal Nehru and M Ananthasayanam Ayyangarn have proposed on keeping the age limit of retirement of judges. K. T. Shah proposed that the Judges will not be appointed for a set term or within a set age range, at which point they will be required to retire. Instead, judges—especially those on the Supreme Court—should be appointed for life, as is the practice in England and, and in the United States of America. Under no circumstances should they be left fearing that officials or the executive branch may fire them from their position.
It is not appropriate to put them in danger of having to choose between taking up a job that might not
5 Principles of Administrative Law, by M P Jain & S N Jain, 9th Edition, LexisNews
6 https/:ijlmh.com, Independence of Judiciary, by Shaila Arora, International Journal of Law Management and Humanities, ISSN 2581-5369,
align with their impeccable independence and integrity or returning to their regular practise at the bar in order to support themselves7. According to the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court judges will retire at the age of 65 years old and judges of the High Court hold their positions until they reach retirement age, which is 62 years old. [Article 217 of Constitution of India]. Further the Constitution provides the appointment of the retired judges under Article 224A,8 it provides that the retired judges can be appointed as High Court ad hoc judges. Countries all over the world have different age of retirement of Judges. The Parliament has been assigned by the Constitution of India to make changes by amendment and can increase the number of Judges as per requirement and also can raise or reduce the retirement age of the judges.
A bill introduced in the Parliament (114th Amendment Bill, 2010 &) is still pending which proposes to increase the age of retirement of Supreme Court and High Court judges from 65 to 68 and 62 to 65 respectively. We can find that the legislature is not convinced on the age of retirement of judges and therefore the bill is still pending since 2010. 9 The Venkatachalliah Committee which was constituted in the year 2000 and Report of the National Commission to review the working of the Constitution (2002) have suggested then to increase the age of retirement of the Supreme Court judges from 65 to 68 years. 10 .
The Here the researcher here put up some of the reasons which shows what are the outcome of the amendment of the Constitution for the retirement age of Judges: ● That the judges with strong talent and huge experience will help the country with their continuous contribution by giving justice. ● The raising the age of judges will help in speedy delivery of justice. ● The lifetime tenure or the increase in age of retirement will contribute to developing low interest in the post-retirement assignments and become more unattractive. This in turn, built up into the rule of law in the country and the independence of the judiciary. 7 Legal Age: The Constituent Assembly Discusses Judicial Independence and Judges' Retirement | The Caravan (caravanmagazine. in)
8 Article 217 & Article 224 A, The Constitution of India
9 https://legalaffairs.gov.in/VOLUME-2, VOLUME 2 Book 1 | Department of Legal Affairs, MoL &J, GoI
10 ibid
AGE OF RETIREMENT AND PENDING CASE:
The researcher here highlights the nexus between the age of retirement and pending cases in High Courts and Supreme Courts. The number of cases pending in the Supreme Court and High Court is rising day by day. The researcher has borrowed the data from the official website of National Judicial Data Grid to draw attention to the huge number of cases pending in the Supreme Court and all High Courts. The researcher also tried to draw attention to cases pending in High Court Mumbai.11 National Judicial Data Grid – Supreme Court of India Fig. (A)
Fig. (B)
Fig. (C) The data of NJDG is cited in Figure A, B, & C. The Figure (A) displays the pending Civil cases data of the Supreme Court. The total number of pending Civil cases are 63042. The figure further shows the number of pending Civil cases in the supreme Court less than last year is 18,088.. In figure (B), it appears that the total number of pending Criminal cases are 17,177 out of which less than last year's pending cases are 6977. The overall number of pending cases is shown in Fig. (C) is 80219 and the total number of pending cases for less than the last 1 year is 25065. The above figures show that the burden of pending cases of Civil and Criminal is increasing every year. 12
11 https//;njdg.ecourts.gov.in/scnjdg/, NJDG-National Judicial Data Grid (ecourts.gov.in)
12 Ibid – Supreme Court Data
National Judicial Data Grid – Bombay High Court Figure (D) The data of NJDG for all the High Courts is displayed on Figure D. The above figure shows that the total number of pending cases in all High Courts in the country is 6199386 out of which
4436593 are pending Civil cases and 1762793 are pending Criminal Cases. Further, the figure
also shows the data of more than 1 year old pending cases, 3654094 is the pending civil cases and 1369308 is the pending criminal cases and total number of data for more than a year are 5023402. 13 The National Judicial Data Grid shows that the number of burdens on the High Courts are much higher. The researcher here also selected the data of the High Court of Mumbai, for the study and it is found that the number of pending cases is huge. As per the Fig. D the total number of pending cases in Mumbai High Court are 713305 and out of which civil & criminal pending cases are 596852 & 116453 respectively. 14 The researcher found that the burden of pending cases is the huge problem facing the country. The solution to this problem is also given by the constitution itself. An ad hoc judge may be appointed from among retired judges, according to Article 224A of the Indian Constitution.
This approach is found to be ineffective; it reveals that only three retired judges have been designated as ad hoc judges to high courts (HCs) for a one-year term each: Justice Suraj Bhan to the Madhya Pradesh HC in 1972; Justice P Venugopal to the Madras HC in 1982; and Justice
13 https//;njdg.ecourts.gov.in/scnjdg/, , NJDG-National Judicial Data Grid (ecourts.gov.in)
14 Ibid – High Courts Data
O P Srivastava to the Allahabad HC in 2007 for the Ayodhya case. In addition, it has been
discovered that the Supreme Court recently took the effort to lessen its own workload by paving the path for the retirement of a judge to be appointed to an ad hoc position. 15 Here the researcher suggests that the solution to the huge number of pending cases is to increase the tenure of judges to lifetime. That gives rise to a positive effect by way of getting more years for the judges to handle cases which are still in a huge number.
National Commission To Review The Working Of The Constitution (NCRWC) Report The NCRWC Report put light on the appointment of the retirement judges/chief justices of the High Courts and the judges/chief justices of Supreme Court of India are eligible to be appointed on the several commissions, tribunals and other similar bodies like chairperson and the members of the National Human Right Commission and the Chairperson of the Press Council of India were the statue provide selection panels and were the statute is silent then the selection is on the discretion of the Government (Central and State).
The Commission notice that there were some statute is silent on the appointment or selection of judges on commission, tribunals and other bodies and were the statute is not insisted on the consultation of the Chief justice of the Supreme Court or High Court than the Central Government or State Government were making such appointments on considerations other than merit (political considerations). The commission apprehended that the government was playing the game of favourites which would indirectly affect the independence and integrity of the judiciary. The researcher discovered that the Supreme Court's in State of A. P. v. K. Mohanlal16 (1998 (5) SCC), the decision discusses the virtues of the suggested course of action.
Our provisional opinion is that mandatory consultation should be implemented for the appointment of retired judges or judicial officers to commissions, tribunals, and similar bodies, in order to safeguard the judiciary's independence, which was highlighted in the aforementioned decision. The researcher found that the current age of retirement is giving scope to the Government to interfere in the decision of the judiciary while giving the decision against the Government. This 15 Supreme Court for posting retired judges to clear backlog in High Courts - The Hindu. www. thehindu. com
16 State of A.P. v. K. Mohanlal (1998 (5) SCC)
affects the power of the judges in imparting justice in issues where the government is the party.17 Age of Retirement in Other Countries: Here the researcher wants to put light on global comparative study for determining the retirement age for the judges. While in the research it is found that there are three tenure of judges followed all over the world, firstly, lifetime tenure which is applied and positively accepted by the United State, secondly, there is Mandatory retirement tenure where the retirement age is mentioned and thereby the judges have to leave the chair as per the age of retirement and lastly the fix year method by which the fixed time period is given (eg. 5yrs or
10 yrs),where after the expiry of time the judge has to leave the chair of judiciary.
Lifetime Tenure: United States: Alexander Hamilton argued against the superannuated bench. His work in The Federalist paper changed the view of framers of the Constitution. Considering Hamilton's view the Constitution placed no term limits on the service of federal judges. Therefore at present in the federal judiciary, including the Supreme Court, there is no fixed retirement age. Federal judges are appointed for life, but they can choose to retire or take senior status. 18 The Constitution of India, provides the age of retirement 62 for High Court and 65 for Supreme Court, it found that the early age of retirement is also one of the reasons for pending cases. If the life tenure rules apply in India it will definitely help in reducing the burden of the Courts and can be a solution for the pending case.
Joint Court of Justice of Aruba, Curacao, Sint Maarten, and of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba or "Joint Court of Justice" (sits as a 3-judge panel); final appeals heard by the Supreme Court in The Hague, Netherlands judge selection and term of office: Joint Court judges appointed for life by the monarch subordinate courts: Court in First Instance. 19
17 https://legalaffairs.gov.in/VOLUME-2, VOLUME 2 Book 1 | Department of Legal Affairs, MoL &J, GoI
18 https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/09/supreme-court-retirement-age/616458/
19https://en.unionpedia.org/Joint_Court_of_Justice_of_Aruba,_Cura%C3%A7ao,_Sint_Maarten,_and_of_Bonai re,_Sint_Eustatius_and_Saba#:~:text=The%20Joint%20Court%20of%20Justice%20of%20Aruba%2C%20Cura %C3%A7ao%2C,of%20the%20Netherlands%20%28Bonaire%2C%20Sint%20Eustatius%2C%20and%20Saba %29
Mandatory Retirement Age: United Kingdom: The present retirement age for most judges in the United Kingdom is 70. However, judges can continue to serve on a part-time basis or in certain capacities beyond the age of 70. The United Kingdom showed the future plans to increase the mandatory age of retirement of Judges, magistrates, and coroners; it was stated by the Lord Chancellor that they will be allowed to continue to serve until they are 75, as the Lord Chancellor today confirmed plans to increase their mandatory retirement age. 20 Canada: The retirement age for judges of the Supreme Court of Canada is 70. In some provinces, the retirement age for judges at the provincial level may be different. In Canada the age of retirement of judges is as per the provision stipulated in the Judges Act, 1985.
Regarding the retirement age of judges, Section 8 (1) of the Judges Act provides that a judge of the British Columbia Supreme Court who served as a judge of the County Courts of British Columbia between March 1, 1987, and June 30, 1990, may retire at the age of seventy. A judge of the Superior Court of Justice in and for the Province of Ontario who served as a judge of the District Court of Ontario between March 1, 1987, and August 31, 1990, may retire at the age of seventy years, according to section 8 (2). 21 Australia: The Constitution's Section 72 governs federal judges' tenure and retirement. 1978 saw the Constitution Alteration (Retirement of Judges) 1977 (Cth) alter Section 72 to add a provision for judicial retirement. Federal judges were appointed for life until they made the decision to resign or were removed from office prior to the passage of this amendment.
Currently, 70 is the retirement age. The researcher found that countries like Australia, which was earlier following the life tenure and later changed to mandatory retirement to 70, are facing the problems of pressure on the purses of the general people. 22 New Zealand: All judges in New Zealand must retire at the age of 70. However, in specific processes, retired judges under 75 years of age may be appointed as acting judges. When a quorum cannot be reached by the supreme or a high court because of a conflict of interest,
20 https//:www.gov.uk/government/news/judicial-retirement-age-to-rise-to-75
21 https//:laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/J-1/FullText.html
22 https//:law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/2061019/02-Blackham.pdf Melbourne University Law Review, Judges and Retirement Age
retirement, or other reasons, a retired justice of the Supreme Court of New Zealand, for instance, may be appointed as an acting justice. It is found that the mandatory retirement age system of the judiciary adopted by the above mentioned countries is 70 years and comparing the same to India constitutional provision it is
62 for HC and 65 for SC which is very less. These distinct judges who can serve the country
for some more years were stopped by the constitution by putting an end to their services. Further it is found that these retired judges indirectly affect the purses of the people. The retired judges gets the benefit of pension and some other funds e.g. in case of India, a High Court Judge is burden on the country from the age of 62, the government has to give pension plus other benefits to the such retired judges. Therefore the researcher suggests that if we increase the age of judges to lifetime they will contribute to the good number of judgment for the Country.
CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION:
The retirement of age of judges, independence of judiciary and the pendency of cases shows the significant relationship between each other. The early retirement age of Judges show relation with the subjects of independence of judiciary and also with the pendency of cases. This research suggest that the lifetime tenure for the judges is the best solution for the hurdle of independence of Judiciary and also for the huge pendency of cases all over the country. It is found that the constitution of India provides that the retired judges can be appointed on different commission or on committees by the statutes and also by the government. The pendency of the cases is one of the biggest problem faced by the judiciary. The researcher states that the Hypotheses No. II is proved, that there is the connection between the retirement of judges and the pendency of the cases.
The research proves that the early age of retirement of judges in High Courts and Supreme Court compared to other countries affects the pendency of cases. The Parliament have the constitutional power to make the judges as the permanent judges i. e lifetime appointment of judges. The researcher further states that in such cases there will be no requirement of appointing the retired judges on ad hoc basis. This shows that the currently appointed judges can be used to reduce the burden of pending cases by raising their age of retirement as life time. The researcher states that the present age of retirement of judges affecting the independence of
Judiciary. The Hypothesis No. III is also proved, it is shown in the current research that the early age of retirement of judges and the appointment of judges on the commission makes the judges bias towards the government which indirectly affects the independence of judiciary. 23 In this current research, the researcher found out that the Lifetime tenure for the Judge of the High Court and Supreme Court is more effective than the fix time of retirement of judges. The Hypothesis No. I is also proved, the Lifetime tenure system is more effective than fix time of retirements of judges. Lifetime tenure of judges protect the independence of judiciary and there will be less interference of the government. Judges will serve life time therefore there will be no issue of appointing the retired judges on the commission.
Further in support of the lifetime appointment of judges, the researcher found that the Countries who have adopted the mandatory retirement age have chosen 70 as an age for judges to retire and in future planning to increase up to 75 years of age which is almost like life tenure. Therefore, the researcher states that the lifetime tenure system is requirement of Indian judiciary system. Throughout in this research the finding of the researcher is given as under: • The lifetime appointment of Judges gives more freedom to the judges. • There will be no burden of the Government or the politician on the working of the Judges. • These distinct judges will remain in the service till the life and will give some fruitful services to the justice system. • Further the lifetime system will no longer affect the purses of the people.
• The problem of the pending cases can be solved by the lifetime tenure of the judges. • There will be less scope for the government to interfere in the justice system if there is no changes of the judges to get appointed on any of the commission.
23 https://legalaffairs.gov.in/VOLUME-2, VOLUME 2 Book 1 | Department of Legal Affairs, MoL &J, GoI
The parliament have to find the way for composition of the commission and tribunal. • Further the parliament have to make the changes in the provision of the Constitution so that the existing judges cannot be appointed on any commission. Therefore, the researcher concluded that the retirement of the judge India is recommended to be for life time. The researcher suggest that in a country like India, where the problems of huge numbers of pending cases are on alarming stage, the parliament has to rethink on the current system of mandatory retirement which is not helpful for solving the problem but instead of that it further create of problem of biases on the part of judiciary in expectation getting further assignment of commission after their retirement.
Therefore lifetime tenure is the best in all ways where it helps in reducing the number of pending cases and the judges will act more independently while giving justice instead of keeping second thoughts in their mind.