Competition & Consumer Protection In Digital Ticketing - The Coldplay Controversy & Regulatory Challenges

Author: LawSphereX

Category: Technology, Cyber & Privacy

Published: 2026-08-23T18:52:33.037002+00:00

Updated: 2026-08-26T17:11:44.319+00:00

COMPETITION & CONSUMER PROTECTION IN DIGITAL

TICKETING: THE COLDPLAY CONTROVERSY &

REGULATORY CHALLENGES

Stuti Mehrotra, OP Jindal Global University Diti Kothari, OP Jindal Global University

ABSTRACT

Was it merely a rumour, or were you truly robbed of the once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to attend and experience the Coldplay concert? This question continues to haunt the minds of all those 11 lakh people who stood in queues on multiple occasions, in the hopes of securing just one ticket. While speculations persist about exclusive agreements with black marketers and bots purchasing tickets in bulk, a definitive answer remains elusive. This paper addresses and clarifies this issue by exploring how the incident, involving inflated resale prices and automated bots, highlights systemic issues of dominance abuse, cartelization, and lack of transparency. Through a comprehensive examination of relevant provisions under the Competition Act 2002 call and the Consumer Protection Act 1019 the paper assesses the intersection of consumer protection and competition law in addressing market failures.

The analysis includes key elements such as exclusive dealing, anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance through domestic and international precedents such as Ticketmaster Live Nation case in the U. S. The paper also delves into innovative regulatory measures including Zomato’s resale model and potential frameworks inspired by the UK Digital Markets, Competition and Consumer Acts. This paper concludes with a call for cohesive regulatory reforms to promote consumer welfare competitive neutrality and digital market integrity fostering on an inclusive and fair digital ecosystem in India live event ticketing industry.

I. Introduction

On 22nd September 2024, thousands of fans across India logged onto the BookMyShow (hereinafter called “BMS”) platform with hopes of securing tickets to Coldplay’s “Music of the Spheres World Tour. ” There was a lot of hype created around the event prepared for the muchanticipated concert with discussions regarding ticket purchasing strategies, seat allocations and more, making rounds amongst friend circles. However, this excitement didn’t last long and quickly turned into frustration when ticket sales commenced. Many genuine fans found themselves trapped in lengthy virtual queues, only to discover that tickets sold out almost instantaneously.

For many fans, the event that began with excitement ended in despair, facing the realization that ticket’s that were initially priced between INR 4,000, 12,500 and INR 35,000 were immediately available on secondary marketplaces at dramatically inflated prices, being Rs

1.05 lakh, Rs 3.36 lakh and Rs. 10 lakh respectively far exceeding the original price.1 The swift

rise in prices raised concerns over accessibility and fairness, as genuine fans were left excluded, unable to afford the resale rates from platforms like Viagogo and black market resellers. This pricing escalation underscored emerging issues of exclusivity and potential market manipulation in the digital ticketing industry. Reports emerged suggesting that automated bots and black-market sellers had manipulated the system, to acquire a substantial portion of the tickets as soon as they were released. 2 This led to artificial scarcity, created by bot-driven purchases, effectively inflated prices and placed a significant barrier for genuine fans. This incident has ignited widespread outrage and scrutiny, centered around allegations of unfair practices by BMS, with accusations that the platform had failed to take adequate measures to protect consumers from scalping and price gouging.

There was an extensive outrage on the social media platform with many demanding accountability and transparency. In response, BMS only issued a public apology and denied any involvement with third-party resellers and opposing such unauthorized channels. 3 1 Sunainaa Chadha, Scalping Tactics: What Coldplay-Bookmyshow Online Tickets Row Is All About, Business Standard, (Sep. 24, 2024) https://www. business-standard. com/finance/personal-finance/scalping-tactics-whatcoldplay-bookmyshow-online-tickets-row-is-all-about-124092400010_1. html.

2 Id.

3 Coldplay ticket row: Bookmyshow claims ‘no association with unauthorised reselling platforms’, says they are ‘proactively working’ with cops in investigation, The Indian Express (2024)

In response to these widespread grievances, Amit Vyas filled a complaint which was lodged before the Enforcement Directorate (ED) targeting unknown parties suspected of using automated bots to purchase large volumes of tickets, thereby obstructing fair consumer access. 4 While the ED’s inquiry focuses on potential violations of financial laws, such as profiteering and money laundering, this situation also raises essential questions under competition law. However, there seems to exists a case alleging anti-competitive practices, suggesting that BMS had abused its dominant position in the market and failed to protect consumers from ticket scalping and inflated resale prices. This incident not only highlights the challenges within the digital ticketing landscape but also raises critical questions about competition law and consumer rights in India.

As the case unfolds, it underscores the need for regulatory scrutiny in the face of evolving market dynamics. This paper offers a comprehensive analysis of Coldplay's ticketing scandal through the lens of Competition Law, addressing critical issues of market dynamics and regulatory compliance. It begins by defining the relevant market to identify key competitors and provide a thorough market assessment. The analysis then moves to a Section 4 evaluation to establish the dominant position of the entity and substantiate claims of abusive conduct. Additionally, the paper undertakes an in-depth examination of Section 3(3) and 3(4) provisions, evaluating both vertical and horizontal agreements to highlight their anti-competitive effects and demonstrate how they result in an Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC).

The second half of the paper envisages the concurrence between both the Consumer Protection Law and Competition Law. It provides a detailed overview of how a complaint is lodged in either law and explains the remedies available. The paper also examines issues related to jurisdictional overlaps and proposes solutions to address these conflicts. Additionally, a case study of the Ticketmaster incident in the United States is presented, offering insights into regulatory frameworks in other countries. The paper concludes with suggestions and recommendations aimed at promoting fair competition and fostering a competitive, consumerfriendly digital landscape. https://indianexpress. com/article/entertainment/music/coldplay-ticket-row-bookmyshow-claims-no-associationwith-unauthorised-reselling-platforms-9598472/.

4 PILL/32461/2024 Amit Vyas v Union of India through the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technologu & Ors. BomHC.

II. Assessment Of Relevant Market, Anti-Competitive Agreements, And Abuse of

Dominance Under The Competition Act a. Relevant Market Analysis The first and foremost step would involve determining the relevant market. 5 In this case, the relevant geographic market, as outlined under section 2(s) of The Competition Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”),6 would encompass the entirety of India, as the conditions of competition for demand and supply of goods or services remain homogenous throughout the country and can be distinguished from the other neighbouring areas. 7 Further, in order to contemplate whether the enterprise is dominant, one has to delineate the relevant product market, as outlined in section 2(t) of the Act. 8 Such determination aids in identifying the actual competitors of the undertaking and helps preventing them from acting independently of effective competitive pressure.

9 In this particular instance, the relevant market would entail “online intermediation services for booking of live entertainment tickets”. This live entertainment sector includes sports events, concerts, stand-up comedy shows, choirs and more where one or more performers present or perform live before an audience. According to EU’s ‘Notice on Market Definition’10 it was clarified that the enterprise is subject to competitive constraints, one of which is demand side substitutability (DSS). DSS assists in determining relevant product markets by entailing the range of services that are perceived as substitutes by the consumer. 11 The above delineated market consists of multiple avenues for live entertainment, where the characteristics and their functionalities of these options are interchangeable.

12 For instance, if a concert is not available on a particular weekend, individuals may turn to alternate forms of entertainment, such as stand comedy shows.

5 The Competition Act, 2002, §2(r).

6 The Competition Act, 2002, §2(s).

7 Shri Singh v Ansal Township & Land Development Ltd., 2014 SCC OnLine CCI 55 para 8.

8 The Competition Act, 2002, §2(t).

9 CCI v Coordinate Committee of Technician of West Bengal, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 231 [34- 36].

10 Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Union competition law, Official Journal of the European Union, (Feb. 22, 2024) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52024XC01645.

11 Maharashtra State Power Gen. Company v. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd., Case No. 59 of 2012 (CCI) [77].

12 United Brands v Commission of the European Communities, (1978) ECR 207.

Furthermore, by applying the SSNIP test,13 we can evaluate that even a small but permanent relative price increase in the services would likely lead consumers to choose another alternative entertainment option. This analysis underscores the substitutability among various forms of live entertainment, thereby pinpointing accurately the relevant product market. b. Abuse of Dominance In the case of Fast Track Call Cab Pvt. Ltd. ,14 the Competition Commission of India (hereinafter referred to as “CCI”) rejected allegations of “abuse of dominance” and clarified its stance in terms of what the functionality of India’s competition law regime ought to be. The Act is incorporated with the prime focus being on “consumer welfare” and further explained how any harm accrued to the competitors of the relevant market is not encompassed in the Act’s purview.

In order to file a complaint under Section 4 of the Act,15 therefore, it is firstly essential to prove that the entity is dominant in the delineated relevant market. However, dominance itself is not considered per se illegal. 16 It is upon the onus of the complainant to then prove that there is an abuse of such dominant position that Section 4 is invoked. 17 Section 4(2) sets out a list of activities that shall be deemed abuse of dominant position. 18 The digital economy tends to yield disproportionate returns from network effects and rewards economies of scale, which in turn have a tendency to transform into potentially lucrative lockin effects. The CCI has previously observed that network effects are generally corelated to the size of an enterprise.

19 Moreover, they play a significant role in creating a positive feedback loop, whereby new users are drawn to the platform due to the strength of its existing user base. 20 The Commission has previously observed that market share is one of the many factors that are considered in the assessment of dominance. In the instant case, market share of the platform

13 Mcx Stock Exchange Ltd. v NSE of India, 2011 SCC OnLine CCI 52 (10.16).

14 Fast Track Call Cab Pvt. Ltd vs Ani Technologies Pvt. Ltd., Case No. 06 of 2015 decided on 24.04.2015.

15 The Competition Act, 2002, §4.

16 Ministry of Corporate Affairs Gov’t. Of India, Report of Competition Law Review Committee (2019), ¶4.1. 17 Shri Brajesh Asthana, Proprietor M/s Arpita Engineering v. Uflex Limited, Case No. 07 of 2015, decided on 23.04.2015.

18 The Competition Act, 2002, §4(2).

19 CCI v Coordinate Committee of Technician of West Bengal, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 231 [34- 36].

20 Yuvnesh Sharma & Abdullah Hussain, ‘Network Effects and Dominance: The Evolving Approach of the CCI’, Vol. VI, Issue 2, ICLR http://iclr.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Network-effects-and-dominance-the-evolvingapproach-of-the-CCI-by-Yuvnesh-Sharma-and-Abdullah-Hussain.pdf.

needs to be seen in conjunction with its reach, scale and the network effects that work in its favour, leading to huge consumer footfalls thereby making presence on the platform critical for visibility and competitive ability of other platforms. 21 Further, it has been stated that Reliancebacked BMS is currently the market leader in the online ticketing segment. The above analysis secures the rationale behind BMS being a dominant enterprise in the market. 22 Therefore, based on the assumption that BMS has established its dominant position in the relevant market, the analysis can now be extended to whether its conduct is abusive. The conduct being contemplated here, squarely falls under Section 4(2)(a)(i) with regards to imposing discriminatory behavior towards the consumers.

23 Initially, BMS did not disclose the number of available tickets for sale, creating a lack of transparency that left consumers at a disadvantage. The omission not only obscured their chances of obtaining tickets but also raised questions about who was securing them. During the ticket sale, it became evident that genuine buyers waiting in the virtual queue were unable to purchase tickets as the system was plagued with bots and black-market sellers. The ticketing process appeared to favor these bots, as virtual queue operated on a first-come, firstserve basis. 24 This discriminatory behavior undermined the very tenant of fair competition. Furthermore, by allowing tickets to be resold at significantly higher prices on secondary 21 Vijay Gopal v. Big tree Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. , Case No. 46 of 221, Competition Commission India.

22 Zomato Introduces Secondary Market for Event Ticketing “Book Now, Sell Anytime,” The Economic Times, https://economictimes. indiatimes. com/tech/technology/zomato-introduces-secondary-market-for-eventticketing-book-now-sell-anytime/articleshow/112830429. cms.

23 The Competition Act 2002, §4(2)(a)(i).

24 Indian Police Investigate Ticket Resales for Coldplay Mumbai Gigs, The Guardian, (Oct. 1, 2024)

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/oct/01/indian-police-investigate-ticket-resales-for-coldplay-mumbaigigs.

markets and failing to take action against this practice, BMS may have indirectly facilitated price manipulation. c. Cartelization and Anti-Competitive Effects Assuming that a Section 3(3)25 case is filled before the CCI, explaining the horizontal agreement that BMS could have entered before the ticket selling process would have begun. It is absurd that even before BMS opened its portal to begin the sale of these Coldplay tickets they were available on multiple black-marketing sites. 26 There is conjecture of there being coordinated actions indicative of cartelization between these entities in the same horizontal market. This coordinated behaviour indicates an agreement on the price to be charged to consumers, the restriction of output below competitive levels, or the allocation of specific customers to certain firms while others abstain from competing for those customers.

27 In this particular instance, BMS’s behaviour insinuates that they may have collaborated with competitors to predetermine ticket prices on platforms outside BMS. Further it is believed that they also entered into an agreement regarding quality and quantity thereby restricting output or product supply. Section 3 mandates that, to establish an infringement under this provision, there must be conclusive evidence of a mutual agreement or "meeting of minds" to act in coordination, and such concerted behaviour must have been executed. 28 Referencing the In re: Alleged cartelisation by steel producers case,29 the CCI explained that plus factors are economic actions and outcomes, in addition to the parallel conduct by firms in an oligopolistic market, that “are largely inconsistent with unilateral conduct but largely consistent with coordinated action.

” In this scenario as well, the outcomes appear to suggest coordinated actions between the horizontal market players. Despite high demand for tickets, availability on BMS's website

25 The Competition Act 2002, §3(3).

26 ‘Black Market' Coldplay Concert Tickets: BookMyShow CEO called in by Mumbai Police over ticket scalping claims, The Economic Times, (Sep. 28, 202) https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/black-marketcoldplay-concert-tickets-bookmyshow-ceo-pulled-up-by-mumbai-police-over-ticket-scalpingclaims/articleshow/113754634.cms?from=mdr. 27 Nisha Kaur Uberoi, Investigation of Cartels: A Comparative Assessment of the Approaches Adopted by the Indian and EU Competition Regulators, Vol. 1: Iss. 1, National Law School Business Law Review:, Article 6 (2015).

28 Ministry of Corporate Affairs v. Apollo Tyers & ors, Case No. 08 of 2013. ¶86.

29 In re: Alleged cartelisation by steel producers, Case No. RTPE No. 09 of 2008 (MRTP).

was marked as limited. Meanwhile, several competing sites showed ticket availability, albeit at prices significantly higher than those initially quoted by BMS. 30 Further, there isn’t any requirement of direct evidence to prove the existence of agreement, the same can be established from a variety of circumstantial evidence,31 as well as the concurrence of parties or the consensus between them, that can be gathered from their common motive and concerted conduct. 32 One pertinent discovery to note, is that the sale for the tickets were supposed to begin at 12:00pm, however, due to the so-called website crash the website became non-function for these genuine users. 33Alarmingly, these other black marketers had already started the sale of these concert tickets prior to it even being launched for sale by BMS for the general public at large.

Hence, there could be a possibility of the formation of cartel whereby, these tickets were sold to the black marketers at an earlier time with the promise to share profits later. Also, the mere formation of a tacit cartel with intention of colluding could amount to a per se violation. 34 d. Exclusive Dealing Agreement Section 3(4)(b)35 defines an "Exclusive Dealing Agreement" as an arrangement between participants in a vertical market that restricts either the buyer or the seller from engaging in trade involving services other than those provided by the seller or purchaser. Such agreements are not per se considered anti-competitive36 they are only in violation of Section 3(1)37 if they cause or are likely to cause an AAEC. These agreements should be evaluated through the lens of the rule of reason analysis.

38 This analysis evaluates if the vertical agreement entered upon harm or enhance competition. Unlike the per se rule, which deems certain practices inherently anti-competitive, it requires an in-depth analysis of intent, market impact, and consumer effects. The Supreme Court39 opined that the rule of reason analysis mandates three key factors

30 Ibid 1.

31 Sushil Sharma v. State, (2014) 4 SCC 317.

32 M/s. All India Motor Transport Congress v. IFTRT, Appeal No. 60/2015, COMPAT.

33 Bookmyshow App, Website Crash Minutes before Coldplay’s Mumbai Concert Tickets Go Live, Deccan

Herald (Sept. 22, 2024) https://www.deccanherald.com/india/bookmyshow-app-website-crash-minutes-beforecoldplays-mumbai-concert-tickets-go-live-3201535. 34 Study of cartel case laws in select jurisdictions, Cuts International & National Law University, Jodhpur (Apr. 25, 2008) https://www.cci.gov.in/images/marketstudie/en/docs1652440423.pdf.

35 The Competition Act, 2002, §3(4)(b).

36 Shamsher Kataria v Honda Siel Cars India Ltd. 2014 SCC OnLine CCI 95.

37 The Competition Act, 2002, §3(1).

38 M/s Jasper infotech Private Limited (Snapdeal) v. M/s Kaff Appliances (India) Pvt. Ltd 2014 SCC ONLINE CCI 150.

39 Tata Engineering v. Registrar, 1977 AIR SC 973.

being business-specific facts, pre- and post-restraint conditions, and the nature and effects of the restraint on competition. In this specific scenario, it is important to first classify whether the agreement has anticompetitive effects and can lead to AAEC in the market. There exists an agreement between the Coldplay Band and BMS to sell tickets for the concert exclusively on BMS’s platform. As clarified above, BMS has significant market share and the prospect that it would enhance its share through the exclusive dealing arrangements generates anti-competitive effects. 40 Such agreements can lead to concentration of power and substantially weaken competition by reducing consumer options and making it more difficult for rival firms to compete effectively.

As per Section 3(4)(d)41 such agreements are violative and in contravention to the act as they lead to “a substantial lessening of competition” or create a monopoly. 42 The public backlash against the Ticketmaster in 2010,43 following its merger with Live Nation, highlighted similar concerns over exclusive contracts that restrict competition in the ticketing industry. The U. S. antitrust laws, such as Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 44 states that such agreements are considered as restrictive trade practices. The U. S. Department of Justice (hereinafter referred to as “DOJ”) argued that Ticketmaster's exclusive contracts regarding the venue hindered competing ticketing platforms from accessing the market, effectively limiting competition. Similarly, Section 3 of the Clayton Act,45 targets agreements that foster monopolistic practices.

These actions, according to the DOJ, solidified Ticketmaster's dominance, to the detriment of consumers. 46 In India, BMS’s exclusive rights to sell tickets for events like Coldplay's concerts warrants for scrutiny from the CCI. It is the responsibility of CCI as a vigilant regulatory body to investigate

40 The Competition Act, 2002, §19(3).

41 The Competition Act, 2002, §3(4)(d).

42 Rajat Sethi & Simran Dhir, Anti-Competitive Agreements under the Competition Act, 2002, Vol. 24: Iss. 2, National Law School of India Review, (2013) Article 3 https://repository.nls.ac.in/nlsir/vol24/iss2/3. 43 The Ticketmaster /Live Nation Merger Review And Consent Decree In Perspective, United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division (25 June 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/ticketmasterlive-nation-mergerreview-and-consent-decree-perspective.

44 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 1890, §1.

45 Clayton Antitrust Act , 1914, §3.

46 Justice Department Sues Live Nation-Ticketmaster for Monopolizing Markets across the Live Concert Industry, Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Sues Live Nation-Ticketmaster for Monopolizing Markets Across the Live Concert Industry, United States Department of Justice, (23 May 2024) https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-live-nation-ticketmaster-monopolizing-markets-acrosslive-concert.

whether such arrangements stifle competition or harm consumers.47 While exclusive deals may appear beneficial for companies, they can have significant implications for competition and consumer choice. Moving through the ticketing landscape, BMS must be mindful of such legal implications and strive for an environment that encourages fair competition so that consumers still retain access to a variety of options.

III. Harmonizing Consumer Protection And Competition Law In India: A Dual Approach

To Market Welfare The Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter referred as “CPA”) seeks to protect the rights and interests of individual consumers by addressing grievances and preventing unfair trade practices. 48 Whereas, the Competition Act aims to ensure fair competition in markets, fostering collective consumer welfare through equitable and transparent mechanisms. Together, these frameworks provide a comprehensive approach to consumer protection, addressing both individual transactional exploitation and systemic market imbalances. 49 The Supreme Court further reiterates this in multiple other cases,50 thereby explaining the way in which the Act aims to protect consumers by eliminating anti-competitive practices and fostering healthy competition, aligning it with broader consumer protection goals. a.

Competition Law as A Guardian Of Consumer Welfare Section 18,51of the Act entrusts the CCI with the dual responsibility of fostering competition and safeguarding consumer interests, underscoring the crucial connection between effective competition regulation and the enhancement of consumer welfare. 52 47 Anil Kumar Bhardwaj, and Ms. Maria Khan, Introduction To Competition Law, Competition Commission of India, (2016) https://cci. gov. in/public/images/publications_booklet/en/introduction-to-competition-law-part-1basic-introduction1652182155. pdf.

48 ‘Sanjucta Das, Convergence of Competition & Consumer Protection Laws: National & International

Perspectives, TaxGuru, (May 12, 2024) https://taxguru.in/corporate-law/convergence-competition-consumerprotection-laws-national-international-perspectives.html. 49 Anil Kumar Bhardwaj, and Ms. Maria Khan, Introduction To Competition Law, Competition Commission of India, (2016) https://cci.gov.in/public/images/publications_booklet/en/introduction-to-competition-law-part-1basic-introduction1652182155.pdf. 50 Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (2010) 10 SCC 744; Excel Crop Care Ltd. v. CCI, (2017) 8 SCC 47.

51The Competition Act, 2002, §18. 52 Shivika, Narang “Promoting Competition, Empowering Consumers: The CCI Game-changing Contribution to the Marketplace” (MAY.

2023)

(ICSI)

https://www.icsi.edu/media/webmodules/CSJ/May/11ArticleShivikaNarangMansiSharma.pdf

The Act’s definition of “Consumer” under Section 2(f)53 is exaustive, covering individuals who purchase goods or services for personal use or resale, thereby extending protection broadly across diverse consumer interests. 54 This inclusivity ensures that market-dominant firms are discouraged from exploitative practices. In Mr. Ramakant Kini v. Dr. L. H. Hiranandani Hospital,55 the CCI emphasized consumer welfare as a core objective, indicating that agreements stifling competition ultimately harm consumers by inflating prices or restricting choices. Section 4,56 further targets the abuse of dominance, recognizing that dominant firms may undermine consumer interests by stifling innovation or engaging in unfair practices. In the landmark case DLF Limited v.

Competition Commission of India,57 the CCI reinforced the principle that abuse of dominance distorts market choices and imposes unfavourable conditions on consumers, as in this case they had unilaterally altered contract terms. took a pro-active stance, as demonstrated in Neeraj Malhotra v. Deutsche Post Bank Home Finance Ltd,58 wherein the CCI independently launched an inquiry into observed unfair practices. This Suo moto action emphasizes its commitment to pre-emptively addressing consumer exploitation rather than waiting for formal complaints. Competition law is thus designed not just to prevent unfair competition but to protect consumer rights. 59 The CCI released a draft bill,60 seeking to curb anti-competitive practices by implementing ex-ante regulations specifically targeting significant digital enterprises.

61 According to the draft regulations companies like BMS, are recognized as key digital players in India's live ticketing industry, 62 would be subject to regulatory scrutiny for significant

53 The Competition Act, 2002, §2(f).

54 Rohit Chaudhary & Anr. Versus M/S Vipul Ltd, 2015 SCC ONLINE NCDRC 2660.

55 Mr Ramakant Kini and Dr L.H. Hiranandani Hospital, Powai Mumbai, CCI Case No 39 of 2012, ¶11.

56 The Competition Act, 2002, §4.

57 DLF Limited v. Competition Commission of India appeal No. 20 of 2011. Competition Appellate Tribunal New Delhi

58 Neeraj Malhotra v. Deutsche Post Bank Home Finance Ltd, 2010 SCC ONLINE CCI 34.

59 Suhail Nathani, Pınar Akman, The interplay between consumer protection and competition law in India, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Volume 5, Issue 2, August 2017, ¶ 197–215, https://doi. org/10. 1093/jaenfo/jnx006 60 Avimukt Dar, Unnati Agrawal, Hrishav Kumar , Digital Competition Bill, 2024: Is ex-ante regulation the next best thing since sliced bread or a Frankenstein in the making? , Newsletter Indus Law, April 2024, https://induslaw. com/publications/pdf/alerts-2024/digital-competition-bill-2024-is-ex-ante-regulation-the-nextbest-thing-since-sliced-bread-or-a-frankenstein-in-the-making. pdf. 61 D. I. Waked, Antitrust as Public Interest Law: Redistribution, Equity, and Social Justice. The Antitrust Bulletin, 2020). 65(1), ¶ 87-101. https://doi. org/10.

1177/0003603X19898624 62 Bookmyshow FY24 Revenue Jumps 43% on Live Events Growth; Online Ticketing Drives Profitability ,The Economic Times,(Dec. 09 2024, 9:40 PM ) https://economictimes. indiatimes. com/tech/technology/bookmyshow-

decisions, particularly those related to revenue, to ensure fair market practices. This approach signifies the CCI’s transition towards proactive regulation, prioritizing consumer interests in the evolving digital economy. b. Filing a complaint under the competition law: In our impugned factual scenario of the anticipated concert ticket sales, a complaint can be lodged against BMS for alleged anti-competitive practices and abuse of its dominant position as India’s largest online ticket reseller. 63 This complaint will likely be initiated by affected consumers or consumer advocacy groups who believe BMS’s actions violate the Act. It will be filed under the specifically address Section 3,64 which prohibits anti-competitive agreements that adversely affect competition.

Highlighting concerns regarding potential agreements between BMS and third-party sellers that may facilitate price-fixing and impose inflated ticket prices, thereby restricting competition. Additionally, the complaint will invoke Section 4 stating that BMS restricts output by thereby limiting consumer access to affordable tickets and choices in the marketplace. Such conduct, showcases that BMS has a dominant status and it distorts market competition and harms consumer welfare by indulging in such anticompetitive practices. It is the duty of the Director General to conduct a preliminary inquiry in order to assess the validity of these allegations, once a complaint has been filled. However, there does exist a significant issue, when raising a complaint with the CCI.

While Section 48 of the Act,65 holds a persons in charge of a company accountable for anticompetitive agreements, there exists no provision to impose liability on individuals acting independently in their capacity as dealers or traders. 66 This limitation can hinder the effectiveness of addressing anti-competitive behaviours at the individual level, particularly among third-party resellers who may contribute to these practices. 67 Furthermore, the Act does fy24-revenue-jumps-43-on-live-events-growth-online-ticketing-drivesprofitability/articleshow/116146429. cms? from=mdr 63Purnima Shah, Coldplay Concert: Petition Seeks Guidelines to Prevent Online Ticket Scalping, Touting and Black Marketing, The Hindu, (21 Oct. 21 2024) https://www. thehindu. com/news/cities/mumbai/coldplayconcert-petition-seeks-guidelines-to-prevent-online-ticket-scalping-touting-and-blackmarketing/article68779123.

ece

64 The Competition Act, 2002, §3.

65 The Competition Act, 2002, §49.

66Gurman Narula & Sharad Khemka, Ticket Scalping Fiasco: Need for a Change in the Law, The Contemporary Law Forum, (Oct 19. 2024) https://tclf.in/2024/10/18/ticket-scalping-fiasco-need-for-a-change-in-the-law/. 67 Prateek Pankaj & Gupta Arman, Analysis of individual or personal liability in Indian competition law https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=3ea4808d-4755-49cb-925d-9bcfefe6a865.

not specifically address critical issues such as hoarding and black-marketing of goods to address these challenges effectively, it is essential for any complaint regarding anti-competitive practices, particularly those involving third-party resellers, to be lodged. This approach would allow for a more comprehensive evaluation of unfair trade practices affecting consumers. 68 c. Consumer Protection in the E-Commerce Era The Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (hereinafter referred to as “COPRA”) under Section 2(7)69 defines a “consumer” as broadly encompassing of anyone who purchases goods or services. This inclusive definition is critical in the e-commerce context, where transactions often occur between consumers and various sellers. Further, the Consumer Protection (E-Commerce) Rules, 2020, complement COPRA by introducing specific provisions tailored to online transactions.

70 For instance, Rule 4(2),71 mandates that e-commerce platforms shall disclose some critical information about sellers, fostering transparency and empowering consumers to make informed decisions. Similarly, Rule 4(11)72 prohibits unfair pricing practices, protecting consumers from exploitative pricing strategies that may arise in a less regulated environment. Lastly, Rule5(3)73also requires e-commerce platforms to provide comprehensive product information like warranties and return policies. This provision ensures consumers have a clear understanding of their purchases, guarding against deceptive advertising and misrepresentation. Together, COPRA and the E-Commerce Rules helps to establish a robust framework aimed at promoting consumer welfare in the digital marketplace. 74 d.

Filing A Complaint Under the Consumer Protection Act When a complaint would arise under the CPA, the complaint may be lodged by the involved parties, affected consumers, advocacy groups, or even industry stakeholders before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum or the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum. This complaint would be founded on several key provisions of COPRA. 68 Arjun Singh Tamang, Competition Law Enforcement: Challenges Faced by the Competition Commission of India, Metalegal Advocates, (Oct. 16 2024) https://www. metalegal. in/post/competition-law-enforcementchallenges-faced-by-the-competition-commission-of-india.

69 The Consumer Protection Act, 2019, , §2(7).

70 The Consumer Protection Rules 2020.

71 The Consumer Protection Rules 2020, § 4(2).

72 The Consumer Protection Rules 2020, §.4(11).

73 The Consumer Protection Rules 2020, § 5(3).

74 ‘Consumer Protection (e-Commerce) Rules, 2020’ ACM Legal, 20 Feb. 20 2024 , https://tinyurl.com/45hbm46

Section 2(47)75 defines “unfair trade practices” as trade practices involving any unfair methods used to promote the sale, use, or supply of goods or services, including false representations concerning their quality, standard, affiliation, or guarantee. In the present scenario, BMS advertised widespread ticket availability without disclosing the use of automated bots that secured tickets in large quantities. This misled consumers into believing they had fair access to purchase tickets, thereby constituting an unfair trade practice. Additionally, Section 2(1)(g)76 addresses "deficiency in service," which refers to a failure to provide adequate or expected service quality. In the present factual scenario, there was a failure to book tickets due to the website crashing at 12 p. m.

when the tickets were released, causing multiple users to be automatically logged out by BookMyShow, thereby denying them a fair chance to secure tickets. 77 e. Blurring the Lines: Confusion Over Filing Complaints A significant "blurring of lines" between the two regulatory frameworks exist due to

overlapping provisions in the COPRA, the Consumer Protection (E-Commerce) Rules, 2020, and the Act. The core principle of the Act is to prevent abuse of dominance, while in Consumer Protection, it focuses on addressing price manipulation. This often leads to significant overlap, creating confusion regarding which regulatory authority should be approached in cases of default. One key issue is that pro-consumer actions by companies like deep discounts may seem beneficial from a consumer protection perspective but could be deemed anti-competitive under competition law if they restrict market entry or drive smaller competitors out of business. 78 Meesho uses aggressive discounting to appeal to users and offer savings on products from sellers, often focusing on customers in smaller towns.

While this practice has raised concerns under competition law for potential anti-competitive effects, the consumer law perspective,

75 The Consumer Protection Rules 2020, § 47.

76 The Consumer Protection Rules 2020, § 2(1)(g).

77 Bookmyshow App, Website Crash Minutes before Coldplay’s Mumbai Concert Tickets Go Live, Deccan

Herald (Sept. 22, 2024) https://www.deccanherald.com/india/bookmyshow-app-website-crash-minutes-beforecoldplays-mumbai-concert-tickets-go-live-3201535. 78 Interface between Competition Commission of India and Consumer Protection Law, Indian bar association https://www.indianbarassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Interface-of-Competition-Commission-of- India-and-Consumer-Protection-Law.pdf

where such discounting may be permissible, is often overlooked.79 The absence of distinct boundaries between these regulatory domains may cause inefficiencies and conflicts, impeding both e-commerce operations and consumer benefits. In order to navigate this complexity, it is essential to carefully revise the initial rules to avoid interfering with the CCI’s authority while still adequately safeguarding consumer rights in the changing digital market. IV. A Case Study of Ticketmaster and Live Nation

The debate over ticket sales for popular events like Taylor Swift's 2022 Eras Tour and the recent Oasis reunion tour has highlighted the imperative requirement for regulation in the ticketing sector. 80 The rush for tickets to the Eras Tour highlighted the monopolistic nature of the ticketing industry. Ticketmaster’s system was flooded with an unexpected amount of requests, leading to numerous malfunctions, causing fans who waited in line for hours to be unable to purchase tickets. 81 The increasing prices in the resale market added to the frustration, with concerns about restricted consumer options and high prices due to strong market control, leading to a situation where fans have less chance to enjoy live entertainment.

82 Further, on May 23, 2024, the DOJ Antitrust Division, along with 30 state attorneys general and local district attorneys, brought a lawsuit against Live Nation and Ticketmaster. 83 The accusation alleges that these firms engage in monopolistic behaviours breaking U. S. antitrust regulations, with a specific emphasis on their control of the ticketing and event promotion sectors. The DOJ's lawsuit relied on two important sections of antitrust law being Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 84 Part 1 of the law bans agreements that limit competition, like Live Nation’s exclusive contracts with venues, which restrict other ticketing services. Section 2

79 Sudpito Dey ,When a Huge Discount Is Not Anti-Competitive, Business Standard, (Oct. 12 2014),

https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/when-a-huge-discount-is-not-anti-competitive- 114101200700_1.html. 80Derrick Rossignol, Taylor Swift Reportedly Refused to Use Ticketmaster’s Dynamic Pricing, UPROXX, (Oct.

29 2024) https://uproxx.com/pop/taylor-swift-ticketmaster-dynamic-pricing/

81Zack Sharf , Ticketmaster Explains Taylor Swift Ticket Chaos Amid Outrage; “eras Tour” Broke Record with over Million Tickets Sold in One Day’ Variety, (Nov.17 2022) ,https://variety.com/2022/music/news/ticketmaster-explains-taylor-swift-ticket-crisis-eras-tour-1235435673/.

82 ERIK HOLMSTROM, Dancing In The Dark: An Analysis Of The Live Entertainment Industry And The

Deceptive Market Practices Of Ticketmaster And Live Nation https://Ojs.Lib.Uwo.Ca/Index.Php/Uwojls/Article/Download/8070/6596/14572. 83 Justice Department Sues Live Nation-Ticketmaster for Monopolizing Markets across the Live Concert Industry, Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Sues Live Nation-Ticketmaster for Monopolizing Markets Across the Live Concert Industry, United States Department of Justice, (23 May 2024) https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-live-nation-ticketmaster-monopolizing-markets-acrosslive-concert. 84The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 §1.

focuses on monopolization and anti-competitive practices,85 specifically looking at the merger of Live Nation and Ticketmaster which resulted in one dominant entity controlling ticket sales. 86 This market control is said to drive up prices and limit consumer options, leading to demands for regulatory measures to bring back competition. Colorado's SB23-060,87 in acknowledgment of growing concerns and regulatory developments at both state and federal levels, mandates sellers to be transparent about ticket pricing by revealing the complete cost upfront, encompassing all associated fees. However, the DOJ's lawsuit against Live Nation and Ticketmaster experienced considerable delays in 2023, as there were talks of possible settlements that raising concerns about antitrust regulation.

These delays have fueled worries that monopolistic practices may persist, exposing consumers to higher prices and limited access to events, thereby casting doubt on the effectiveness of U. S. antitrust laws in addressing the complexities of the live entertainment industry. The ticketing situation was closely examined when the Oasis reunion tour was announced, sparking public anticipation but soon causing widespread disappointment among fans. The original ticket prices were initially listed at approximately £148, but surged to £355 because of Ticketmaster's dynamic pricing approach. This substantial rise in price led to backlash from consumers and sparked concerns about the fairness and transparency of ticket sales.

88 The UK’s Competition and Markets Authority(hereinafter referred as CMA) initiated an inquiry to assess whether these pricing practices were considered as an abuse of market dominance or unfair trading conditions. In India, the ticketing sector faces similar challenges of monopolistic practices, albeit on a smaller scale. Platforms like BookMyShow dominate the market, often charging high convenience fees and limiting consumer choices. Unlike the U. S. or UK, where regulatory bodies like the DOJ or CMA actively investigate monopolistic behaviour’s, India lacks robust oversight in this area. The unfair pricing practices during popular events, such as IPL matches or concerts, have also drawn criticism for lack of transparency and affordability. The absence

85 The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 §2.

86 The Ticketmaster /Live Nation Merger Review And Consent Decree In Perspective, United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division (25 June 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/ticketmasterlive-nation-mergerreview-and-consent-decree-perspective.

87 Consumer Protection In Event Ticketing Sales Act, SB23-060, 2023.

88Ben Sisario, Oasis Fans Balked at High Ticket Prices. but Were They “Dynamic, The New York Times, (Sep.

06 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/06/arts/music/oasis-reunion-tour-tickets.html

of specific legislation mandating upfront cost disclosure, as seen in Colorado’s SB23-060, leaves Indian consumers vulnerable to opaque pricing and limited competition. To address these issues, India must introduce comprehensive regulations to ensure transparent pricing, fair competition, and stronger consumer protection in the ticketing sector.

V. Way Forward

In light of the discussion and analysis above, this section proposes several recommendations that could be integrated in India's regulatory framework to address the challenges in digital ticketing and improve consumer protection. These suggestions aim to mitigate issues of anticompetitive practices, prevent price gouging, and enhance transparency in ticket sales, fostering a more consumer-friendly market.

1. Zomato's Ticket Resale Model: Balancing Fairness and Accessibility

Post-pandemic, the live entertainment industry has experienced a significant resurgence, with concerts and events reaching unprecedented level of popularity. This surge has not only generated excitement among consumers, eager to participate but has given rise to a range of challenges. In response, various platforms have been compelled to device innovative solutions. A stand out initiator in this context is Zomato’s “Book Now, Sell Anytime” feature, which

establishes a secondary market for ticket sales directly on its platform. 89 This system operates in a dual capacity: it not only secures initial buyers at the onset of ticket sales, but also guarantee the marketplace for sellers later on. Zomato enhances this experience by implementing a ceiling price for resales, which helps prevent price gouging while still permitting sellers to profit, if they choose to sell their tickets at a higher price, than their original purchase price. This mechanism is designed to ensure fair pricing and act as a safeguard against black market transactions, promoting transparency within the ticketing process. Moreover, this initiative appears to be in accordance with fair market practises, as it minimise the potential for anti-competitive behaviour or cartel formation.

Zomato also enforces additional measures to uphold fairness, such as capping the number of tickets a single consumer 89 Zeenah Vilcassim, Book Now, Sell Anytime: Experience A Seamless, Secure and Stress-Free Ticket Booking Experience Book Now, Sell Anytime: Experience a seamless, secure and stress-free ticket booking experience, (Aug. 27 2024) https://blog. zomato. com/book-now-sell-anytime-experience-a-seamless-secure-and-stress-freeticket-booking-experience

can purchase or list for resale at ten per category. However, a notable flaw in this system arises from the possibility of individuals exploiting these limits by purchasing the maximum number of tickets, solely for resale, rather than personal attendance or in other words to later flip. This practice can lead to genuine fans, facing challenges in securing tickets, as resellers may inflate prices or monopolise access to popular events. As a result, the integrity of the marketplace can be compromised with authentic fans, left scrambling for tickets while resale reap significant profits. Ultimately, the effectiveness of this feature hinges on the intention of the buyers. Zomato has introduced this initiative with the hope that it will be embraced by genuine customers who seek to enjoy live entertainment events.

For this model to thrive, users must be willing to embrace it over illegal ticket-selling practices. Additionally, it is the responsibility of event organisers to cultivate a marketplace that discourages black market activity and unfair pricing practises by fostering a culture of integrity and fairness, the industry can work towards creating an equitable environment for all participants. 90

2. Suggestions for a new act by analyzing the UK’s Digital Markets, Competition, and

Consumers Act Implementing a framework in India modelled on the UK's Digital Markets, Competition, and Consumers Act (hereinafter referred to as “DMCCA”,91 can enhance regulatory structures, establish new oversight bodies, and adopt a proactive approach toward digital market regulation. 92 India could benefit significantly from creating a specialized regulatory body akin to the UK’s Digital Markets. This proposed authority, the Digital Competition Authority of India (hereinafter referred to as “DCAI”), would oversee firms with substantial influence in the digital ecosystem. Its primary focus would be on companies that dominate key sectors such as 90 Coldplay, Diljit Dosanjh, Karan Aujla Concerts Have Viagogo Ticket Resale Scam in Common, Republic World, (Sep. 23 2024) https://www. republicworld.

com/entertainment/explained-coldplay-diljit-dosanjh-karanaujla-concerts-have-viagogo-ticket-resale-scam-in-common-ticket-scalping-black-market-book-my-show

91 Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act, 2024.

92 Sonam Mathur, Dhruv Dikshit and Rishabh Joshi , India: Navigating Digital Markets through the Proposed Ex-Ante Framework, Global Competition Review, (Oct. 2024) https://globalcompetitionreview.com/guide/digital-markets-guide/fourth-edition/article/india-navigating-digitalmarkets-through-the-proposed-ex-ante-framework

e-commerce, social media, and search engines93 where monopolistic practices are most likely to occur. 94 Like the DMU, this body could enforce codes of conduct, ensuring that these companies avoid restrictive practices like bundling or self-preferencing, which harm competition. The recently introduced Digital Competition Bill, 2024, incorporates qualitative and quantitative criteria (the twin test) to identify Systematically Significant Digital Enterprises (hereinafter referred to as “SSDEs”). This identification is crucial for regulating dominant players effectively. The bill defines ‘Core Digital Services,’ encompassing essential digital platforms, marketplaces, and intermediation services. By restricting SSDEs from using non-public data to compete unfairly, India aligns itself with the EU’s stringent data protection standards.

95 To further enhance market fairness, major firms could be required to maintain transparency in their algorithms. For instance, platforms like Flipkart could be mandated to disclose their product ranking algorithms, ensuring consumers understand how products are prioritized. 96 Additionally, the DCAI could investigate how buyers are selected over others on live media ticketing platforms, especially when tickets are purchased simultaneously. Such scrutiny would help illuminate potential biases and unfair practices, reinforcing a commitment to consumer rights. By balancing preventive regulation with market adaptability, India’s approach could help foster a competitive, consumer-friendly digital environment without imposing excessive compliance burdens on emerging tech companies which is the need of the hour.

3. Adapting the U.S. Bots Act for India to address the issue of black-marketing and

hoarding of ticketing Integrating lessons from international laws like the U.S.’s Better Online Ticket Sales (hereinafter referred to as “BOTS”) Act,97 could significantly improve consumer protection

93 Google and Alphabet v Commission (T-612/17, EU:T:2021:763)

94 Sonali Khanna, Digital Competition Laws: Beginning of a New Era, Bar and Bench - Indian Legal news (Oct. 31 2024) https://www.barandbench.com/law-firms/view-point/digital-competition-laws-beginning-of-a-newera,) 95Lokesh Bulchandani, Overview of India’s Digital Competition Bill, 2024: GW Competition & Innovation Lab: The George Washington University,

GW

Competition & Innovation Lab, https://competitionlab.gwu.edu/overview-indias-digital-competition-bill- 2024#:~:text=Key%20provisions%20of%20the%20draft,on%20financial%20and%20user%20thresholds. 96Emma Hill, ‘Pricing Algorithms and Competition Law in the UK and Beyond’ (19 April 2024) https://shepwedd.com/knowledge/pricing-algorithms-and-competition-law-uk-and-beyond

97 Better Online Ticket Sales (BOTS) Act 2016,15 U.S.C. § 45c.

within India’s digital economy. Enacted in 2016, the BOTS Act targets fraudulent ticket-buying practices by banning the use of bots to bypass security measures on ticketing websites, particularly for events in venues with over 200 seats. 98 By preventing the hoarding and resale of tickets at inflated prices, this law aims to foster fair access to event tickets, protect genuine buyers, and curb black-market activities. India could benefit from adopting similar legislation as part of its broader digital regulatory framework. Such measures would specifically address issues in India's ticketing market, where bot-driven ticket scalping often limits access and inflates prices, impacting consumer welfare.

By establishing clear prohibitions against automated ticket-purchasing software and enforcing penalties for non-compliance, India could enhance transparency and fairness in its digital economy. 99

VI. Conclusion

The Coldplay ticketing controversy has highlighted the pressing need for a cohesive and robust regulatory framework that ensures transparency, fairness, and accountability in the digital ticketing industry. The dynamic nature of digital markets necessitates time-bound investigations and efficient regulatory oversight to prevent anti-competitive practices, such as abuse of dominance, cartelization, and lack of transparency. The delays in enforcement, caused by procedural inefficiencies and jurisdictional overlaps, undermine consumer welfare and market integrity, making it essential to adopt a more harmonized approach. To address these challenges, the establishment of a specialized regulatory body dedicated to overseeing dominant digital platforms is crucial.

Implementing anti-bot legislation to prevent automated scalping, mandating transparency in platform algorithms, and capping resale prices are vital steps toward ensuring equitable access for consumers. 100 Cognisant procedural guidelines, enhanced collaboration between regulatory authorities, and stringent penalties for unfair trade practices can further bolster consumer confidence. With the fostering of cooperation between 98Christopher Koopman & Anne Hobson, ‘Consumer Protection, Ticket Bots, and the Better Online Ticket Sales (Bots) Act’, The Center for Growth and Opportunity at Utah State University (Aug. 2023) https://www. thecgo. org/research/comment-on-consumer-protection-ticket-bots-and-the-better-online-ticketsales-bots-act/

99 Savan Dhameliya and Mridula Bhat, Is Ticket Scalping Legal in India? A Look Through the Coldplay

Controversy IPRMENTLAW, (Oct. 12 2024) https://iprmentlaw.com/2024/10/12/is-ticket-scalping-legal-inindia-a-look-through-the-coldplay-controversy/.

100 Planning Commission Government of India, Eleventh Five Year Plan 2007-12, Vol. I

https://www.niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2023-08/11th_vol1.pdf

stakeholders and embracing adaptive regulatory measures, the digital ticketing industry can overcome existing challenges and support sustainable growth. This integrated approach that would prioritize fairness, consumer welfare, and competitive neutrality will not only curb monopolistic behaviour but also cultivate innovation and inclusivity. Ultimately, such an approach will ensure that digital marketplaces remain transparent, resilient, and beneficial for all stakeholders, contributing to a more equitable and thriving digital economy. 101 101 Lazar Radic, Geoffrey A. Manne, & Dirk Auer, International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE),Digital Competition Regulations Around the World https://laweconcenter.org/spotlights/digital-competition-regulationsaround-the-world/