Creative Liberty And Blasphemy - A Thin Line Between The Two In Balancing Interests

Author: LawSphereX

Category: General Law

Published: 2026-08-23T19:02:13.499Z

Updated: 2026-08-30T07:10:43.473Z

CREATIVE LIBERTY AND BLASPHEMY: A THIN LINE

BETWEEN THE TWO IN BALANCING INTERESTS Sunidhi S. Hegde, School of Law CHRIST (Deemed to be University)

ABSTRACT

The country celebrating its pluralist Constitutional ideals, is time and again faced with a tussle between the exercise of artistic freedom and the respect to the faith and beliefs of its citizens. With students being penalised in Institutions such as IIT Bombay for a play on Ramayan which offended a section of the community, and a boom of boycott culture being practiced in the film industry, there is a need to realise the extent of artistic freedom to be tolerated and determine what constitutes ‘offending’ of religious sentiments of individuals. It is not merely a question of prioritisation of these Constitutional principles but a broader question as to what is the optimum level of toleration to be expected in a country so rich in diversity, to balance the competing interests of the society.

With historical divides and conflicts, along with the growing influence of Western way of thought, the country is plagued with insensitivity to faith on one side and religious extremism on the other. It then becomes a broader question of administrative law as to how to ensure fairness in balancing the conflicting ideals enshrined in the Constitution of the largest democracy. Addressing these issues and acknowledging the problems associated with these, the paper aims to redefine the permissible artistic freedom within the scope of Article 19. Through a study of legal provisions, precedents and the recent developments in the country and across the globe, the paper attempts to draw a line between artistic freedom and blasphemy. Keywords: Artistic freedom, Constitution, blasphemy, tolerance, administrative, insensitivity

Introduction

As Sir Harcourt Butler rightly noted, “Religion is still the beginning and the end, the alpha and omega of Indian life”1 The vision of Western secularism is based on the notion of a ‘wall of separation" between church and state, an idea born out of a struggle for power that found formal expression in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. 2 The Constituent Assembly of India, however, faced the task of shaping the kind of secularism that India needed given its religious complexities. 3 It was debated whether the term ‘secular’ should be included in the Objective Resolution, which eventually became the Preamble of the Constitution. If included, what was the nature of secularism to be espoused in free India? The no-concern approach, separating itself completely from religion? Or a model honouring all religions equally?

These two formulations were two of the most debated topics in the discussions that took place within the Constituent Assembly. 4 Taking an inspiration from the French model of laïcité, this first formulation for a secular state debarred from religious intervention had strong backing from M. Masani and K. T. Shah. The second approach--Western to this concept had been given by K. M. Munshi, Lakshmi Kant Mitra, and H. V. Kamath. 5 Debates extended to other issues, such as the scope of the right to practice religion, introduction of a Uniform Civil Code, protections for minorities, and whether religious instruction should be permitted in schools. 6 However, despite these differences, this role was born of a vision that the framers of the Constitution had about the specific role that the state must play in reforming religion.

7 This has also been referred to as ‘principled distance’, which is an approach whose emphasis lies on the respectful transformation of religions on the part of the state. 8 Thus, apart from the orthodox parameters of secularism: non-discrimination based on religion, the principle of non-establishment, and freedom of religion, the Indian Constitution promotes

1 Sir Harcourt Butler, India Insistent (William Heinemann Ltd 1931) 21.

2 Karwa, S., & Bhatia, G. (2019, September 14). A Blasphemy Law is Antithetical to India's Secular Ethos. Economic and Political Weekly. https://www.epw.in/engage/article/blasphemy-law-antithetical-indias-secularethos

3 Madan, T N (1997)

Modern Myths, Locked Minds, New Delhi : Oxford University Press.

4 Jha, Shefali (2002)

"Secularism in the Constituent Assembly Debates," Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 37, No 30, https://www.epw.in/journal/2002/30/special-articles/secularism-constituent-assembly-debates-1946- 1950.html.

5 Id.

6 Supra note 2.

7 Id.

8 Srinivasan, T N and Rajeev Bhargava (2006)

The Future of Secularism, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. reform and measures that remove socially unjust religious practices. These include the abolition of untouchability and opening up of Hindu temples to one and all. This notion of secularism necessitates a critical relationship with religion that requires the space to question and criticize those beliefs and practices. 9 Blasphemy is defined as ‘speaking evil of divine things. ’ In a secular state like India, there should be no specific blasphemy law. Laws concerning religion in modern contexts almost serve to hold public order together rather than to protect deities or faith. Section 295A was brought in response to ‘competitive communalism’ in early 20th-century Punjab, meant to prevent public disturbances consequent on religious conflicts.

Although this has been criticised for the purpose of further colonial divide-and-rule strategies, in the post-independence scenario, law and order should be the prime aim of this provision. 10 The Objective of Blasphemy Laws The Indian Penal Code (IPC) of 1860 included a Chapter addressing offenses related to religion and caste in Chapter XV, which contained the sections—295, 296, 297, and 298. 11 In 1927, Section 295A was added, followed by the inclusion of Section 153A and Sections 505(2) and (3) in 1898. 12 These offenses pertain to religion, religious beliefs, or individuals or groups that can be specifically identified by their faith. Even though penalising acts on religious grounds is not peculiar to India, these provisions serve the unique needs of the Indian society.

The objective of this Chapter, as is stated in the Explanatory notes as: “The principle on which this chapter has been framed is a principle on which it would be desirable that all Governments should act, but from which the British Government in India cannot depart without risking the dissolution of society: It is this, that every man should be suffered to profess his own religion, and that no man should be suffered to insult the religion of another... The religion may be false, but the pain which such insults give to the professors of that religion is real. It is often, as the most superficial observation may convince us, as real a pain and as acute a pain as is caused by almost any

9 Supra note 2.

10 Nair Neeti (2013)

“Beyond Communal 1920’s: The Problem of Intention, Legislative Pragmatism and the Making of Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code,” The Indian Economic and Social History Review, 50(3).

11 The Indian Penal Code, 1860, Ch. XV.

12 Id.

offence against the person, against property or against character. Nor is there any compensating good whatsoever to be set off against this pain. Discussion, indeed, tends to illicit truth; but insults have no such tendency; they can be employed just as easily against the purest faith as against the most monstrous superstition.”13 However, the drafters recognised that while implementing these provisions, one needs to be cognizant of the fair latitude to religious discussion and the possibility of intentional insults in the guise of such fair religious discussions. With great caution regarding the possibility of misuse by the enforcing authorities and the public at large, J. F. Thomas warned about Section

282 by stating:

“It appears to me a dangerous novelty liable to extensive abuse, that a man should be subject to a criminal prosecution for every gesture or sound that he may utter, offensive to the religious feelings or prejudices of another. There can be no limit to criminal prosecutions, nor to the variety of sentences under Clause No. 282. ”14 Sir Lawrence Peel, who served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1848, argued that the ‘wounding’ of religious feelings should not be penalized unless it resulted in public disorder. 15 This point is significant because the fundamental principle of ‘public order’ underpins all the ‘Offences against Religion’ outlined in the IPC. Although they recognized that such laws could restrict free speech, they believed that maintaining law and order necessitated special provisions to address the so-called uncivilized religious passions of Indians.

16 In colonial India, government regulations either promoted or suppressed various forms of religious expression based on whether they posed a threat to public order and imperial security. 17 This objective is also true for the later added sections, including Section 295A, as the drafters cited the incidents 13 Indian Law Commission, The Indian Penal Code, As Originally Framed in 1837, With Notes by TB Macaulay, JM Macleod, GW Anderson, and F Millett, And the First and Second Reports Thereon by CH Cameron and D Elliott; A Verbatim Reprint. (Higginbotham And Co 1888) 136.

14 Id.

15 Asad Ali Ahmed, ‘Specters of Macaulay

Blasphemy, the Indian Penal Code, and Pakistan’s Postcolonial Predicament’, Censorship in South Asia: Cultural Regulation from Sedition to Seduction (IndIana UnIversIty Press 2009) 172-205 at p. 173. 16 CS Adcock, ‘Violence, Passion, and the Law: A Brief History of Section 295A and Its Antecedents’ (2016) Journal of the American Academy of Religion. 17 Julia Stephens, ‘The Politics of Muslim Rage: Secular Law and Religious Sentiment in Late Colonial India’ (2014) History Workshop Journal 45-64 at p. 47. of violence such as the one in Benaras regarding cow slaughter in 1809, to justify the provisions on the ground that there was a need to maintain inter-religious peace.

The provision focused in this study is Section 295A of IPC (Section 299 BNS) which reads as follows: “Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of 2 [citizens of India], [by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise], insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to [three years], or with fine, or with both. ”18 The insertion of this provision was the result of the famous Rangila Rasul saga. ‘Rangila Rasul’ was a book compiled by Mahashe Rajpal responding to a pamphlet written by a Muslim, titled ‘Sita ka Chinala,’, where he had defamed against Sita, the wife of Lord Rama, by referring to her as a prostitute.

19 In that book, Rajpal described the Prophet Mohammed as sexually incontinent. 20 He was charged under Section 153A for willfully promoting enmity or hatred amongst ‘his majesty’s subjects. ’ After the conviction by the Magistrate, the Lahore High Court overturned the conviction,21 which made the Muslim community enraged. The sectarian situation of North India was already tense, and this ruling was about to worsen things further. To make amends over the tensions, the British Governor of Punjab said that a change in the penal law could be taken in to avoid further trouble. It was against this background of inconsistency, hurtful pressure by the Muslim community, and the need to maintain public order that the movement toward Section 295A began.

22 However, as the Legislative Assembly moved in response to these concerns by amending the Penal Code, an increasing number of detractors argued that religious sentiments had no business in politics, as it was the true separation of religion from law and politics, and not the reformation of their conjunction that

18 The Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sec. 295A.

19 Vasant Moon (ed), ‘Pakistan or the Partition of India’, Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar

Writings and Speeches, Vol.

8 (3rd edn, Dr Ambedkar Foundation; Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment, Govt of India 2014).

20 KD Gaur, Textbook on The Indian Penal Code (4th edn, Univeral law Publishing Co Pvt Ltd 2009) 419.

21 Rajpaul v. Emperor, AIR 1927 Lah 590.

22 Neeti Nair, ‘Beyond the “Communal” 1920s

The Problem of Intention, Legislative Pragmatism, and the Making of Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code’ (2013) 50 Indian Economic Social History Review 317-340 at p. 320. would help bring communal harmony to the country. 23 Judicial Interpretation The fear of misuse lead to a series of challenged to the provision. However, Section was upheld by the courts as constitutional in Ramji Lal Modi v The State of U. P24 wherein the editor of a cow-protection magazine had been prosecuted for offending Muslims allegedly in an article. The court determined that Section 295-A is within the purview of Article 19(2) of the Constitution, which allows restrictions to maintain ‘public order. ’25 It stressed that the section only punishes aggravated insults to religion committed with a ‘deliberate and malicious intention’ to outrage the feelings of a particular religious group.

Insults made unintentionally or without malicious intent are not covered by this provision. The Apex court noted that an insult made with good faith, by an author in his endeavor to facilitate some measure on social reform by administering such a ‘shock’ to the followers of the religion, it would not attract the mischief of Section 295A. 26 This distinction, is problematic as it is that ‘shock’ that offends a community. 27 In Veerabdarn Chettiar v Ramaswamy Naicker. the Court has held, in effect that Section 295- A is directed to ‘respecting the religious susceptibilities of a particular group’ and, accordingly, courts ‘must be chary and consider the feelings of different believers prima facie without regard to rationality. ’28 This gives rise to an ambiguity between ‘good faith’ and respectful religious sentiments: reformative intentions are hard to protect when applying these tests.

Courts infer ‘malice’ from language and context with a great deal of facility; that is not so easy in the case of academic or satirical discourse. Furthermore, truth is not a complete defense under Section 295-A if deemed to outrage religious feelings maliciously. This opens the door for misuse, as authors may present uncomfortable truths that could provoke offended parties to initiate legal action. For instance, in State of Mysore v Henry Rodrigues,29 a Roman Catholic criticized practices of his own

23 Supra note 17.

24 Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P., 1957 SCC OnLine SC 77.

25 Id.

26 Sujato Bhadra vs State Of West Bengal, 2005 SCC OnLine Cal 516.

27 Baviskar, Harshal, Reimagining State Response to Religious Offences- With a Special Focus on Section 153A and Section 295A of IPC (January 3, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4682624 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4682624

28 Veerabdarn Chettiar v Ramaswamy Naicker, 1958 AIR 1032.

29 State of Mysore v Henry Rodrigues, 1962 CriLJ 564

church based on his interpretation of the Bible. Although acquitted at first, he was later convicted under Section 295-A, with the court rejecting truth as a valid defense and focusing instead on the ‘religious susceptibilities’ of the offended. 30 The court inferred malicious intent from the language used, suggesting that the manner of expression can be as significant as the content itself. This approach is flawed, as it implies that offensive language can be separated from objectionable ideas, which is often not the case. Serious discussions may require robust language that some find offensive, leading to unjust constraints on free speech. This situation evokes the historical plea by Lala Rajpat Rai for the protection of genuine criticism and scholarly research. 31 In the landmark case of Baragur Ramachandrappa and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka and Ors.

, the Apex Cour upheld the ban on a book that included a chapter allegedly meant to insult the Sri Basaveshwara’s followers. 32 The author defended the book by arguing that the controversial topic was part of ongoing academic discourse. However, the court maintained the state’s ban and advised the author to revise the offending chapter. 33 However, the decision of the Court does not lay down any clear guidelines. In contrast, the Kolkata High Court’s ruling in Sujato Bhadra vs. State of West Bengal34 offers a clearer approach to implementing this legislation. In this case, Taslima Nasreen was accused regarding her book ‘Lajja’, which discussed the atrocities against Hindus in Bangladesh following the Babri Masjid demolition. The court ruled that unless insults to religion are made with a deliberate and malicious intent to outrage religious feelings, Section 295A would not apply.

35 The court emphasized that unintentional or careless remarks should not fall under this section. The court established that to invoke Section 295A, it must be proven that the author acted with the specific intent to insult a religion maliciously. 36 If the intent was aimed at social improvement or awareness, even if the statements were offensive, they wouldn’t qualify under this provision. In the Backdrop of Creative Liberty Freedom of artistic expression is the concept that artists should feel free to create without

30 Id.

31 Supra note 27.

32 Baragur Ramachandrappa and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors, MANU/SC/2239/2007.

33 Id.

34 Sujato Bhadra vs State Of West Bengal,MANU/WB/0290/2005.

35 Id.

36 Id.

obligations from law or tradition. Every individual has the right to express his art and be a participant in and audience of art. 37 This comprises the freedom to create, to distribute, and to have access to any artistic work. Artistic liberty is vital to the cultural as well as political health of the society. 38 Respecting the rights of the individual with all this goes into making one, it follows that the democratic society has to ensure the right to freedom of thought and expression. This ability to express personal belief has to be protected and so article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)39 and article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),40 support this by recognising and protecting the right to artistic expression and creativity.

The UN Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of Cultural Rights brought to public attention serious impacts of censorship and unfair limitations of artistic speech and creativity. It pointed out that such limitations, lead to severe cultural, social, and economic losses, causes deprivation to artists of their means of expression and of income-generating activities; creates a dangerous environment for artists and viewers; causes restraint of discussions on human, social, and political issues; and thereby undermines democracy. Article 19 of the Constitution of India offers citizens in India the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression, though such rights come with reasonable restrictions. 41 Freedom of speech is the ability through various media like spoken words, literature, and art and is considered an essential component of modern liberal democracies.

Though the Indian Constitution does not specifically include films as a form of speech and expression, through judicial decisions, films have been recognized as such. There have been several instances where this artistic freedom is curtailed by penal provisions is that of the book ‘Islam: A Concept of Political World Invasion by Muslims,’ by R. V. Bhasin, which, in 2007 faced charges under Section 295A for while B. V. Seetharam was arrested for allegedly offending Jain sentiments through his periodical ‘Karavali Ale’. In 2013, Yogesh Master was booked for his Kannada novel Dhundhi for depicting Lord Ganesha in a way deemed hurtful to Hindus. 42 Under the threat of Section 295A and lengthy legal battles, 37 Chandana Arval, ‘A Conceptual and Legal Analysis on How Film Censorship Hampers The Freedom of Artistic Expression,’, Manupatra.

38 Id.

39 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, Art. 15.

40 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, Art. 19.

41 The Constitution of India, Art. 19.

42 CN Ramachandran, ‘Little Reason to Restrict the Freedom of Speech’ The Hindu (26 September 2013).

Penguin India withdrew and destroyed copies of Wendy Doniger’s The Hindus: An Alternative History. Comedian Munawar Faraqui was similarly charged in January 2021 for a joke that supposedly offended Hindus. 43 While his remarks may have been criticized, they shouldn’t have been escalated to blasphemy. Even if deemed hurtful, many argue that it doesn’t justify inferring malicious intent from a few sentences. A new trend has emerged in which Section 295A is being used to challenge the publication of material about historical figures such as Shivaji and Rani Padmavati, who cannot reasonably be classified as religious figures. 44 Courts have inferred intent by content form, type of discourse, and type of headline with available protections for criticism of religion if expressed in restrained and reasonable language.

Likewise, varying opinions and artistic content are protected provided the manner and words used do not show an evil intent to offend. Scholarship is also included under this protection except that the linguistics used are foul or obscene. In general, the standard for readers or viewers is one reasonable and strong-minded person, rather than a sensitive individual easily upset by differing opinion. One notable instance of judicial misjudgment is the Dharmakaraana case45, which as explained previously was a controversy that arose when the Veerashaiva community in Karnataka objected to the suggestion in the book that one of their revered figures might have been born out of wedlock. It is almost an ironic situation in which reformist figures who once challenged orthodoxy are now used to suppress artistic expression.

The case is exemplary of the challenge of treating subjects revered by politically influential communities. 46 Another example is the violence against James Laine’s book, ‘Shivaji: Hindu King in Islamic India’, in Maharashtra. 47 In that case, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction against Laine’s publishers, ruling that the intention of the author was not to cause trouble and that the state has a responsibility not only to uphold law and order but also to also settle community 43 Pennington, B. K. (2016). The Unseen Hand of an Underappreciated Law: The Doniger Affair and Its Aftermath. Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 84(2), 323–336. http://www. jstor. org/stable/43900191 44 Sanjay Leela Bhansali and Ors v State of Rajasthan and Ors 2018(1)RLW513(Raj); State of Maharashtra v Sangharaj Damodar Rupawate Manu/SC/0466/2010.

45 Baragur Ramachandrappa and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors, MANU/SC/2239/2007.

46 Mehta, Pratap Bhanu (2015)

‘The Crooked Lives of Free Speech: Liberals Lose Plot from Paris to Delhi,’, Open Magazine, Vol 07, Issue 05, 4-10 February. 47 Kamlesh Damodar Sutar, ‘4 Booked for vandalising Marathi poet’s statute, government orders probe’, (2017), India Today. Available at https://www. indiatoday. in/india/story/pune-vandalism-marathi-poet-ram-ganeshgadkari-statue-sambhaji-brigade-probe-953024-2017-01-03 disputes. 48 The Court emphasized that the state has a duty not only to maintain law and order but also to resolve disputes between communities. In a 1962 case, the Madras High Court convicted the editor and the publisher of ‘Nathigam’ for publishing two articles under Section 295A. The controversy was about a dialogue between Sita and Draupadi, which criticized the morality of each other. The court held it to be portraying them as ordinary women without moral virtues.

49 Some of the only cases in which the progressive take has been observed includes the one where the Uttar Pradesh government directed the seizure of a book titled ‘Samman ke liye dharm parivartan karen’ (Revolutionalise religion for the sake of equality), accusing it of violating Sections 153A and 295A of the IPC. 50 It was a book in which B. R. Ambedkar delivered Hindi speeches, advocating for the conversion of Scheduled Castes from Hinduism to Buddhism as a form of resistance against the caste system. Government accused that this book incited discord and malice between different castes and caused intentional offensive towards Hindus. The Supreme Court held government’s claims as such rational criticism of religious beliefs expressed in measured language does not fall foul of either Section 153A or Section 295A.

51 It was of the opinion that the said passages were deems to be valid criticism which no reasonable person could possibly raise an objection to. 52 It called attention of the court to note that the arguments set out in the book were obviously meant for consideration and not said to raise an affront. The Court held that such passages had nothing to offend Hinduism and castes with quarrel. 53 These precedents show that there have been several instances of limiting the creative expression. However, the judiciary has developed different standards while deciding upon them. The Ought to be ‘Balance’ Sections 295A and 153A are habitually used together, which is nothing but a sledgehammer bludgeon used by police in their presumption that ‘outraging religious feelings’ is somehow connected to ‘promoting enmity between different groups of religions’. 54 This assumption

48 Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 12 SCC 157.

49 In Re P Ramaswami v Unknown 1962 CriLJ 146.

50 Lalai Singh Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1971 CriLJ 1773.

51 Id.

52 Id.

53 Id.

54 Supra note 27.

complicates artistic expression, religious reform and academic inquiry that might outrage religious feelings but patently have no intention of promoting enmity. 55 It is indeed tough to chart these legal minefields, and obtaining multiple FIRs across different states can bleed an accused dry merely in financial terms for legal defense. If the FIRs come from the same incident, then the accused must file an application in the Supreme Court to have them joined together. 56 Claims of ‘hurt sentiment’ are an easily abused ground for considerable ‘chilling effect’ on free speech in a society as diverse as India, with a history replete with communal tensions, and enforce a form of thought policing. 57 It is problematic to base laws on subjective feelings of a group, as it bestows discretionary rights on hypersensitive sensitivities.

A simple theological disagreement might be misconstrued as ‘outraging religious sentiments,’ and charges of promoting enmity follow. 58 The relevant question, then, is whether a person’s freedom of speech is tied to another’s judgment of its non-offensiveness. If it is, the free speech guarantee is undermined, and the placement of laws on religious sentiments provokes competitive political mobilization and conflict over rather than harmony with human moral experience. 59 Conclusion The Supreme Court must, therefore, clarify the scope of Section 295A as urgently as people demand such clarification, particularly with regard to the rights of free speech that artists, historians, and storytellers enjoy. This provision has inhibited academic discourse concerning historical subjects where authors have no intent to cause harm.

The increasing concern of the judiciary on religious defamation is indicative of an emerging trend of religious intolerance in the country from the 1980s onward. The procedural laws accompanying it have aggravated the strictness of this section. Section 295A is non-compoundable and cognizable, and Section 95 of the Criminal Procedure Code allows state governments to ban publications based solely on assumptions, without requiring proof that religious sentiments were genuinely hurt. The mere 55 Siddharth Narrain, ‘Hate Speech, Hurt Sentiment, and the (Im)Possibility of Free Speech’ Economic and Political Weekly.

56 Supra note 27.

57 Pratap Bhanu Mehta, ‘A Blasphemous Law’ The Indian Express (25 August 2018)

58 Supra note 27.

59 D. A. Fernandes, ‘Protection of Religious Communities by Blasphemy and Religious Hatred Laws: A

Comparison of English and Indian Laws. Journal of Church and State’ (2003) http://www. jstor. org/stable/23920934 possibility of offense is considered sufficient. From Ambedkar and Periyar to Ram Manohar Lohia, Bhagat Singh, and many other voices of resistance, political ideologues began to publicise vociferous criticisms of specific religious practices. Indeed, Ambedkar famously publicly burned the Manusmriti during the Mahad Satyagraha protesting casteist Brahminical traditions on grounds of discrimination. Section 295A now curtails such symbolic challenges to such practices in the name of wider interpretations of such section. But even as Section 295A acts to preserve religious harmony-an ideal deeply embedded in the constitutional principle of fraternity-its words cannot be stretched so far that all meaningful conversation about religion is strangled.

A transition from maintaining public order as an end to content that is merely hostile to religion can lead to the protection being afforded to speech that merely suggests displeasure. This current framework puts religious beliefs beyond the reach of democratic critique and encourages religious fanaticism-an indirect contradiction to the constitutional commitment to secularism.

References

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