Entrenched Provisions In Indian Constitution & The State Legislatures

Author: LawSphereX

Category: Constitutional & Human Rights

Published: 2026-08-23T19:40:23.456Z

Updated: 2026-08-30T07:11:37.666Z

ENTRENCHED PROVISIONS IN INDIAN CONSTITUTION &

THE STATE LEGISLATURES

Preksha Gopal, B.A. LL.B., CHRIST (Deemed to Be University), Bengaluru

ABSTRACT

The Indian Constitution, renowned for its blend of rigidity and flexibility, outlines the procedure for amendments under Article 368. Among the three methods prescribed, the process requiring a special majority of Parliament and ratification by at least half of the state legislatures stands out for its implications on the federal character of the Constitution. This provision, detailed in Article 368(2), governs changes to deeply entrenched provisions, such as the distribution of powers between the Union and states, representation of states in Parliament, and the structure of the judiciary. This research aims to explore a critical question: does the term “states” under Article 368(2) include Union Territories with legislative assemblies, like Delhi, Puducherry, and Jammu & Kashmir?

It also examines whether these Union Territories should have a formal role in ratifying amendments that affect the federal framework of the Constitution. Furthermore, the study probes the necessity of ensuring that all states and Union Territories with legislative powers are given an opportunity to deliberate on such amendments before they are finalized with Presidential assent. Using a doctrinal approach, this study draws its conclusions from the Constitution of India, debates of the Constituent Assembly, judicial precedents and legal commentaries. It analyses whether the current processes adequately preserve the principles of federalism and democratic representation, as well as the framers' intentions, using analytical reasoning.

This study points out flaws in the current framework, especially with relation to Union Territories' participation in the ratification process, and it promotes the insertion of more precise constitutional language to resolve these ambiguities. By doing this, it aims to reinforce the concepts of equity, federal balance, and democratic engagement in the amendment process while also adding to the larger conversation on constitutional changes. Keywords: amendment, Constitution of India, States, Article 368, Union Territories, special majority, State Legislative Assembly, ratification, entrenched provisions.

1. Background

of the study and Introduction [The amendment procedure of the Constitution has been an altercation ever since the enactment of the Constitution in 1950. The process to amend and alter the provisions of this constitution is seated in Part XX under Article 368. The legal language of Article 368 has been amended twice till date; however, the basic features of the amending procedure have remained intact. This provision in the Constitution confers upon the Parliament the power to amend the Constitution in three different ways: amendment by simple majority of the Parliament, amendment by special majority of the Parliament, and amendment by special majority of the Parliament along with the ratification of at least half of the state legislatures.

This paper centrally focuses on analysing the third method of amendment, that is, amendment by special majority of the Parliament along with ‘ratification of at least half of the state legislatures. ’ This procedure is written as a proviso under Article 368 clause 2, and specifies a separate amendment procedure for the Constitutional provisions which involves a question of altering the federal character of the Constitution, changing the character of both state and Union’s functioning under this constitution. ]1

1.1. Being a quasi-federal country, our Constitution has listed down certain provisions which

can only be amended after getting the ratification of the states, such provisions are called the “entrenched provisions”2. These entrenched provisions3 include manner of election of the President, extent of executive power of the Union and the states, Supreme Courts and High Courts (Articles 124-147 and 214-231), scheme of distribution of legislative, taxing and administrative powers between the states and Union, Representation of states in the Parliament, and the power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution and its procedure under Article 368 itself. After the Bill to amend these entrenched provisions is passed by the special majority of the Parliament, before being sent to the President for his/her assent, it has to be ratified by the legislatures of not less than one-half of the States by resolutions.

Moreover, there is no time limit given to the state legislatures to give their consent to the bill. However, it is this provision of the Constitutional amendment procedure which is the most contentious, and the same is analysed thoroughly by the author of this paper. 1. 2. Through doctrinal research4 adopted by the author, the proviso of the article 368(2) is

1 Backdrop of study.

2 Statement of problem.

3 MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, Eighth edition, Chapter XLII.

4 Research Methodology

adopted by the author is Doctrinal research. examined analytically and thus, the author has sought to interpret the word “states” in this clause. Through thorough examination of various constitutional law commentaries, books, judgments and Constituent Assembly Debates, the author has researched as to how the state legislatures are treated under the quasi-federal structure laid down as per these entrenched provisions.

1.3. This research dives into various aspects of law, in order to explore if the word “states”

include the Union Territories which have state legislative assemblies, namely Delhi, Puducherry and Jammu & Kashmir (not yet recognised under Article 54 and 55 as the UT with legislative assembly); and whether their ratification is of prime importance when it comes to a Constitutional amendment of federal character. Furthermore, this study aims to analyse whether there should be an exclusive provision for all the states (or UTs, as the case may be) to at least consider the Bill for such an amendment once, before the bill gets an assent from the President to be enacted as a Constitutional Amendment Act.

1.4. These research problems are critically looked into by the author so as to unravel the legal

reasoning behind the established procedure as it is or as it should be. While the former issue is highly debatable even today after 76 years of independence, the latter issue first emerged as a legal contention when the Constitutional (3rd Amendment) Bill was passed by the Parliament in October 1954; whereby, before the Mysore Assembly could even discuss the Bill, it was assented to by the then President since it had received the ratification of onehalf of the state legislatures. Thus, the contention came up as to whether constitutional amendment of such a nature can be assented to even before it is being deliberated upon by one or some of the Legislative Assemblies across the country; this amendment act was seen like an announcement of result before even the votes were counted.

Thus, arose the controversies within the legal scholars as to whether the procedure adopted by the Parliament was legitimate or not; whether the procedure under Article 368(2) has to be interpreted through the sieve of Literal Rule of Interpretation or the Golden Rule of Interpretation.

1.5. Hence, the procedure for constitutional amendment under Article 368(2) remains in news

every now and then, because of its silence on these legal issues. Many a times in constitutional history of India, the legislators have included the UTs in the ratification clause under this article, however, in some similar issues, they haven’t been given this opportunity. Therefore, this has given rise to a whole different set of scholarly legal debates on whether the UTs with legislatures should be included within the purview of article 368(2); whether the Constitution should have express provisions on which matters are to be ratified by the legislative assemblies of the UTs; whether the framers of the Constitution intended to give any such power to the Union Territories in the first place. All these research questions form the hypothesis of the study conducted by the author; thus, these have been thoroughly analysed and structured into arguments by the author of this analysis.

This legal analysis of the word “states” will be heavily backed by the arguments of legal scholars, intention of the framers (through the Constitutional Assembly Debates), clarifications by legislators from time to time, and most importantly, judicial pronouncements. This subject matter is of extreme importance when it comes to maintaining the federal nature of our Constitution and giving all the powers to the states and UT’s, which they are constitutionally entitled to. 5

1.6. The Indian Constitution is well known for being both rigid and flexible. It is flexible

because it allows for both open interpretation by legislators and judges, and it is easier to amend than the British Constitution. On the other hand, it is rigid because it requires a special majority in Parliament and the ratification of half of the state legislatures in order to amend a federal law. Therefore, in order to ensure that this rigidity of the constitution is maintained and the Constitutionalism which our country beholds proudly, is preserved, the legal fraternity should get the answer to all the research questions related to such provisions in our constitution, and fill the lacunae in this procedure.

Henceforth, exploring the magnificence of principles underpinning the procedure for constitutional amendment, the author of this study shall be presenting the legal answers with regards to the same through library-based research, looking into both the primary as well as the secondary sources. Towards the end of this paper, the reader shall be able to comprehend Article 368(2) with much more clarity, and unscramble the hidden lacunae in law with respect to interpreting the word “states” in this provision.

2. Statement of problem

Through the hypothesis, the author has addressed and emphasized the need for a deeper and more critical approach towards the interpretation of “states” under Article 368(2), as well as the entrenched provisions in relation to Centre state relations; thus, follow the

5 Research questions and objectives.

amendment procedure strictly in order to ensure the federal character of the constitution.

2.1. Research questions

The research questions which the author seek to address as briefly described in the introduction, is whether the word “states” used in Article 368(2) be interpreted in its literal meaning or the intention of the legislators has to be considered while understanding this term. Also, whether the consideration of an amendment bill by all the states is necessary before getting the assent of the President under Article 368(2). The hypothesis of this study thus revolves around whether the Union Territories consisting of State Legislative Assemblies, be considered a part of the “states” under Article 368(2) of the Indian Constitution.

2.2. Research objectives

The main aim sought by the author delivering this research is to bring required changes in the procedure for amending the Constitution under Article 368 clause 2, so as to ensure that all the states and/or Union Territories (as the case may be) get equal opportunity to represent their views while the resolution for amendment is being considered. The ulterior motive of the author is to provide a legal insight of the lacunae in the existing system of law, and present this research in the legal field within the context of exiting literature to make a stance on why further study is required and addressing the open questions left from other researches as well.

2.3. Research methodology

The author have employed Doctrinal methodology of research, with analytical method of collecting relevant data through a thorough examination of the statutes (Constitution of India in particular), reports, Constitutional Assembly Debates and judicial pronouncements. This library-based research has been so used because the primary and secondary sources of legal literature had to be explored in order to find answers to the research questions acknowledged in this study.

3. Discussions from Constitutional Assembly Debates & Origin of this provision

After looking into the Constituent Assembly Debates of 17 September 19496 and Article

6 Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Proceedings), Vol. IX (17 September 1949),

https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2020/05/06/basic-structure-doctrine-was-never-basal-to-the-constituentassembly/.

305 of the Draft Constitution, we find that the final version of the drafted Constitution did

not have the entrenched provisions. The framers surprisingly gave very little thought to even entrench the provisions containing the Fundamental Rights. Such entrenched provisions, when deliberated upon, were added and Inserted by the Constitution (24th Amendment) Act, 1971 through section 3, and Article 368 was renumbered as clause (2) consisting such a proviso, providing for these entrenched provisions.

3.1. Instances where State Ratification was significantly in question

1. 101st Amendment Act 2016- Introduced GST regime

The passing of the GST Bill was in line with Article 368 of the Constitution, which mandates ratification by over half of the State Legislatures as per Clause (2) of Article

368. On August 12, 2016, Assam made history by being the first state to unanimously

ratify the bill through its Legislative Assembly. Other states followed the same, such as Bihar on August 16, 2016, and Jharkhand on August 17, 2016. However other states were expected to ratify the bill soon, but the government had already surpassed the minimum requirement of 16 states. Thus, government aimed for the implementation of GST, marking a significant milestone in the country's tax reform even when the bill is yet to be introduced and ratified by many States Legislative Assembles.

2. 99th Amendment Act establishing the National Judicial Appointment Commission

National Judicial Appointment Commission (NJAC) was given Constitutionality after being passed by the Parliament and receiving ratification by 15 States while it was still pending in the other States.

3. One Nation One election

The High-Level Committee on One Nation, One Election, spearheaded by former President Ram Nath Kovind showed major disagreements related to States ratification. The Presidents panel has said that state ratification of the constitutional modifications that aim to synchronise Assembly and Lok Sabha elections might not be required. Towards the conclusion, the panel did stress that state assent will be required for constitutional revisions that deal with creating a uniform electoral roll and scheduling national elections alongside municipal and panchayat elections.

4. Women Reservation Bill in Parliament (One hundred Twenty eighth amendment

Bill) The Women's Reservation Bill, passed in Parliament with a special majority, was essentially required approval from states as it falls under the subject matter of Article 368(2). The bill aims to reserve 33% of seats for women in both the Lok Sabha and state assemblies. Despite earlier reports suggesting that this constitutional amendment bill would need ratification by at least 50% of states, the women's quota bill falls under a different rule. According to the government, since the reservation of seats for women doesn't impact state representation in parliament, state ratification isn't necessary.

3.2. Intent of the legislators in framing ‘entrenchment provisions’

Being a quasi-federal State, Indian Constitution has various features which uphold the principle of federalism as a part of the basic structure doctrine7. Similar are the entrenched provisions embedded in the proviso of Article 368(2)8 of the Constitution. Though the Draft Constitution as laid down by the Constituent Assembly- was devoid of any such provisions yet there was a brief mention of the intent of the framers of the Constitution to uphold the federal relations through various provisions of the Constitution: [“If Members of the House who are interested in this matter are to examine the articles that have been put under the proviso, they will find that they refer not merely to the centre but to the relations between the centre and the Provinces.

We cannot forget the fact that while we have in a large number of cases invaded provincial autonomy, we still intend and have as a matter of fact seen to it that the federal structure of the constitution remains fundamentally unaltered. ”]9 Therefore, the entrenched provisions form the foundation of the federal structure of our diverse country, and is protected by the judiciary aptly under the landmark case of Keshavananda Bharti10, wherein no amendment can be made such that it violates or demolishes the basic structure doctrine of the Constitution . Thus, it can be safely concluded that ratification by the State Legislatures with respect to the amendment of any of these provisions, is of utmost importance, else it can defeat the entire basic structure doctrine itself.

For the further analysis of these provisions as far as their significance with respect to preservation of Centre-State relations is concerned, the author has divided the entrenched provisions under the following categories as per their subject matter. Each of these provisions shall then be analysed so as to

7 Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461.

8 Indian Const., art. 368 cl. 2.

9 C.A.D. Vol IX, p 1661.

10 Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461.

establish if the federal principle is upheld constitutionally w. r. t. the amendment procedure of these provisions. a. Manner of election of the President According to Article 54 of the Constitution, the Electoral College will elect the President of India. The elected representatives of the State Legislative Assemblies and the Houses of Parliament will make up this electoral college. The election is to be held indirectly, by the proportional representation by means of single transferable vote. Such a system of election provides for parity between the Centre and the States on a two-fold basis- one, among the states inter se , second between the states as a whole and the Centre.

The idea of direct election of the President was rejected swiftly during the Constituent Assembly debates as the size of the electorate was considerably large, which would put a great strain on the administrative machinery11. Furthermore, if the Electoral College were to consist of only the representatives of the Union Parliament, it would essentially mean that the elected President would have been an agent of the Union Government itself, and would represent the same party as that in the Union government, and not making his post an independent post12. Thus, the current provision was incorporated.

However, while skimming through the provisions of the Constitution, it can be inferred that in certain cases like the emergency powers or appointment and dismissal of the Governor of the states, President exercises his power is such a way so as to determine whether the Constitution in such cases should work federally or unitarily. The manner of election also gave the states- a substantive right and say to choose the representative for the post of the President. Hence, it made President morally responsible and accountable to the states along with the Centre in toto. The substantial question of law however in this regard is that whether the elections to the post of the President could take place had one or more legislative assemblies been dissolved (as in the cases of Emergency under Article 356 being declared in any state due to which the Legislative Assembly is dissolved).

This question was dealt in In Re Presidential Election (197413) case wherein it was held that the election to the post of

11 C.A.D. Vol VII pp 987-999.

12 C.A.D. Vol IV, pp 734-35.

13 In Re Presidential Election (1974) 2 SCC 33.

the President cannot be challenged on the ground of any vacancy in the electoral college, imposing a total bar on the ground of ‘vacancy’; this judgement upheld the validity and wide ambit of the article 71(4)14 of the Constitution. Furthermore, it can be inferred that the Supreme Court, in the near future might find it extremely challenging to answer as to any conflict arising between Art 54 and 71(4)15, pertaining to the situations where one of the Houses of Parliament might have some vacant seats, for which no election has been conducted till then. [If it is held that no election can take place when any legislature is not functioning, then an out-going President acting on the advice of his Council of Ministers, might be tempted to dissolve one or two legislatures by declaring an emergency and thus perpetuate himself.

On the other hand, if it is held that an election can take place even when any legislature is not functioning, an ambitious President would be tempted to dissolve hostile legislatures and contest for re-election. In any event, the purpose of Art 54- and 55 seems to have been defeated by Art 71(4) and with it the federal principle too. ]16 Therefore, to conclude, the provisions under Article 54 and 5517 are entrenched under the proviso of the Article 368(2). These provisions form an important part of the federal structure, as appointing the Head of Union Executive is of significant nature; thus, any amendment pertaining to the manner of election of the President should have the ratification of the State Legislative Assemblies.

However, the judiciary still has to look into the fact that since all Legislatures represent their states in the Electoral College for the election of the president, therefore, such an amendment bill altering the nature of such an election should not be passed until it has been deliberated upon by all the states at least once, irrespective of their ratification or rejection. This is to say that each legislature should at least be given a chance to look into the nitty grits of such a Bill, just as each person is given a right to be heard under the Constitution. Had it not been done, it defeats the entire purpose of state representation in the elections of the President, had they not been given a say while amending this provision. Looking at the number of states our country has, it might be a tedious process, but it holds the essence of the Constitution intact.

Furthermore, since the electoral college consists of the elected members of the legislative assemblies of the UTs of Delhi and Pondicherry, any

14 Inserted by the 11th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1961.

15 Indian Const., art. 71 cl. 4.

16 Basu, Commentary, Vol II, p 398.

17 Indian Const., art. 55.

amendment Bill pertaining to this provision should be looked into by these legislatures as well. Therefore, they should be included in the interpretation of the word ‘states’ under the proviso of Article 368(2). b. Balance of legislative powers between the Centre and the States One of the most essential elements of a federal polity is to strike adequate balance in the distribution of legislative powers between the Centre and the States. Under Article 24518, extent of such powers for both Centre and the State are laid down, according to the territorial extent of validity of such laws. Furthermore, Seventh Schedule of the Constitution underlines the subject matters for both these governments to make laws upon; this is done through enumeration of the specified areas or subject matters under three lists, namely, the Union List, State List and the Concurrent List.

Article 246 further lays down the supremacy of the Union Legislature in the case of a deadlock on any subject matter under such lists. However, this is not entirely federal in character, as the subject matters under the State List can even be legislated upon by the Union. Like, under the proviso of Article 200, if the Governor feels that certain Bill contains provisions so as to derogate from the powers of the High Court, he/she may reserve the Bill passed by such state legislature, for the consideration of the President. Even during the Proclamation of State Emergency under Article 356(1), the Union Legislature can legislate upon matters listed in the State List, as the respective state experiences an exigency w. r. t breakdown of its constitutional machinery.

Therefore, such features under the Constitution significantly affect the federal character of the constitution (making India, a quasi-federal country), as well as the powers of state legislatures. When it comes to the Union Territories, the Article 246(4) empowers the Union Parliament to make laws on any administrative requirements pertaining to the same. However, it can be aptly inferred that the distribution of legislative powers is elastic enough in our Constitution as compared to watertight division of the same under the Canadian and the Australian Constitutions; but, to uphold the federalism in place as a part of basic structure doctrine, it requires that such powers should not be distributed without the consent of the States themselves, whereas entrenchment provision achieves this only to a limited extent. Similarly, it is to be laid down that any amendment w. r. t.

the legislative powers of the Union and the State should not be passed until it is

18 Indian Const., art. 245.

satisfactorily passed by at least two-third of the State legislatures, as it is something which can affect them in the long run after its due implementation. Furthermore, any such amendment pertaining to the legislative powers of the Parliament and state legislature, should be mandatorily ratified by the UTs with legislative assemblies as well, and they cannot be excluded from their right of considering the same. c. Extent of Executive power of the Union and the States Executive powers of the Union Parliament should be such that they should be coextensive with the legislative powers of the same. The same shall be applied to the state legislatures in this regard. Moreover, executive power is all powers left after taking into account, the legislative as well as the judicial powers. 19 Articles 7320 and 16221 come under the ambit of executive powers of the Union and the state respectively.

Executive power is to be extended such that it cannot override the legislative powers of any of the two bodies making such laws22. However, Union Parliament can significantly and validly overpower the executive power vested in the hands of the states, especially with regards to recommendations made w. r. t to such powers to the states, or proclamation of national emergency, where even the financial powers of the state legislatures are suspended as per the discretion of the Union and requirement of the exigency. Under Art 356(1)23, when constitutional machinery in a state has broken down, the President is entitled to assume to himself all or any of the executive powers of the State. Similarly, during Proclamation of financial emergency also, vast executive powers to give directions to the states become available to the Union24.

Under Art 258(2)25, a law made by Parliament relating to a union subject may authorise the Central Government to delegate its functions or duties to a State Government or its officers, irrespective of the consent of such Government. Therefore, in our quasi-federal Constitution, the demarcation of executive powers between states and the Union is not rigid, rather very flexible and elastic. Moreover, both the provisions in question (Article 73 and 162) are subjected to the provisions of the Constitution, that is to say that the latter can override the former at any given point

19 Ram Jawaya V State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1955 SC 554.

20 Indian Const., art. 73.

21 Indian Const., art. 162.

22 Ram Jawaya V State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1955 SC 554.

23 Indian Const., art. 356 cl. 1.

24 Article 360(3), 360(4)b and 360(4).

25 Indian Const., art. 258 cl. 2.

in time. Furthermore, because there is a direct consequence for disobeying centre-issued directives, the authority to issue them is a powerful tool for controlling the States. The President may then use his authority under Article 356 in the event that the directives are not followed, declaring that an emergency has occurred that prevents the State from operating under the terms of the Constitution. To conclude, one can contend that though distribution of powers has been very flexible with regards to the Union and the states, the provision for entrenching such powers under the proviso of Article 368(2) upholds the significance of the fact that no matter what, somewhat borderline demarcation would always remain as far as amendment in this regard is concerned.

Moreover, an amendment brought in to alter such power division between these two bodies shall not be assented to by the President, unless it is ratified by at least half of the state’s legislatures, though even this provision is a bit contentious to this regard. However, entrenching these provisions would ultimately result in safeguarding the powers vested with the states, without arbitrary or unconstitutional arrest of such executive powers by the Union. d. Representation of the states in Parliament It is argued that "the representation of States in Parliament" is a highly ambiguous term. It is unclear what the writers of the constitution actually intended when they said the aforementioned sentence because the entrenched articles were not thoroughly addressed in the Constituent Assembly.

There is nothing to be gained from the Constituent Assembly Debates in this area, other from the entrenchment's overall goal and the fact that the entrenched articles are the important clauses that define the relationship between the federal government and the states. It is challenging to define what kind of constitutional modification would need to be ratified by half of the state legislatures due to the ambiguity of the term "representation of States in Parliament. " The lack of explicit articles or provisions that come under this category and the fact that some Constitutional provisions contradict entrenchment exacerbate this confusion. For example, Art. 226 permits the admission or creation of new states, while Art. 327 permits the creation of new states as well as changes to the boundaries, areas, or names of already-existing states. By ordinary law, Parliament has

26 Indian Const., art. 2.

27 Indian Const., art. 3.

the authority to act under these articles. Naturally, a law under Articles 2 or 3 would impact the First and the Fourth Schedule. Stated differently, Parliament may influence a state's representation in Parliament by acting under Article 2 or Art. 3, but Art. 368 does not apply to such laws. It is noteworthy that Parliament has frequently amended the Fourth Schedule by regular laws. A few examples of these amendments are the State of Nagaland Act of 1962, the Andhra Pradesh and Madras (Alteration of Boundaries) Act of 1959, and the Bombay Reorganisation Act of 1960. Consequently, Parliament may change the number of members of the Council of States that are allotted to the States in accordance with Article 2 or Article 3. This type of modification does not trigger the application of Article 368 and, as a result, escapes the requirement of ratification by the States.

Furthermore, was it not necessary to enshrine the Fourth Schedule as well within the entrenched provisions, if "the representation of States in Parliament" was meant to refer to the number of members elected by each State to the Council? Given the current provisions of the Constitution, any modification to the Fourth Schedule for purposes other than those listed in Art. 2, 3 or 4 would likely be considered a constitutional amendment and necessitate approval from the special majority of Parliament required by Art. 368 as well as at least half of the state legislatures. 28 e. Procedure to amend the Constitution itself The last of the entrenched provisions is pertaining to the Article 368; its entrenchment is of utmost importance logically as well as practically.

This provision of the constitution is entrenched so that the entrenchment of all the above listed provisions is protected and safeguarded constitutionally; this is to say that Parliament cannot amend any entrenched provision under this Article itself, otherwise, Parliament could have easily removed the provision of ratification required for these entrenched provisions, thus, defeating the entire purpose of the provision. Furthermore, such an amendment to the entrenched provisions is to be ratified by the state legislatures of “not less than one-half of the states”. It is to be noted that it is not the majority of the states, but even if one-half of the states ratify such an amendment, it can be sent for presidential assent by the Union Parliament, as what happened in the case of the GST Bill as well. Therefore, it seems highly concerning that some states are

28 MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, Eighth edition, Chapter XLII.

either not even asked to pass such a resolution pertaining to the amendment bill, or, if asked, they are not given adequate time to do so. Yet, there is no such landmark judgment, as to directing the Parliament to amend the proviso of Article 368(2) to brin gin the consent of at least more than half of the state legislatures. Considering the vast extent of the Indian states, it is notable to say that each state should have adequate right to be represented in cases of amendments pertaining to provisions of federal character or the entrenched provisions. Furthermore, it was held in Golak Nath vs. State of Punjab29 that the direct test can be used to determine if the amendment of the unentrenched provisions is affecting the entrenched provisions.

And if the amendment of the unentrenched provisions is affecting the entrenched provisions, then it is to be ratified by one-half of the state legislatures as well. Conclusion Although state participation is not always necessary for the amendment procedure, the same is however desirable in a quasi-federal structure, as any alteration in the federal provisions of the constitution would be significantly affecting the nature of relations between the Centre and the States. However, there still exists certain provisions like, one under Article 3 of the Constitution. , which lays down that Parliament can alter boundaries of a state without its consent, by passing a law, after giving a fixed time to the state legislature of that state to give its views, after which it lapses, and the bill deems to be passed.

In such a scenario, the federal structure as well as territorial integrity of a state is highly under threat. Therefore, such provisions and amendments under them, must be entrenched under the proviso of Article 368(2) of the Constitution. It is rightly said "If the territorial integrity of a State can be destroyed by a simple majority in Parliament, it is no wonder that a theme of subordination of the states to the national government runs right through the fabric of the Indian Constitution. "30 Article 24931 allows for changes to the power structure without going through the amendment process. The emergency power granted to the President eliminates the need to alter the constitution in order to change the federal structure. The Union's powers have been increased at the states' expense due to the Third Amendment Act of 1954, which amplified the concurrent

29 Golak Nath vs. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643.

30 Chanda, Ashok., Federalism in India, 1965, p 41.

31 Indian Const., art. 249.

list. All these instances can be enumerated while arguing for including these under the entrenched provisions, as the latter form the basis of the federal structure of the Constitution; therefore, all these provisions as well as provisions listed under Article 368(2) should go hand in hand. To uphold quasi-federal structure as well, it is high time that the concerned authorities take into account these legislative lacunae, so as to bridge the gap between the Centre and the State, as far as their power to amend the Constitution w. r. t. to the federal provisions, is concerned.

Last but not the least, the author submits that provisions of the Constitution which possess federal character to it, and are likely to affect the dynamics of power between the Centre and State or integrity and existence of the State, the amendments to such provisions should only be subjected to the ratification by the Union Parliament, but also, essentially should be ratified by at least majority of the State Legislatures, rather than just half of them. Furthermore, the UTs having a Legislative Assembly should be aptly considered under the connotation of ‘states’ under the debated provision, as is included in many other provisions of the Constitution such as the Article 54 and Article 3 clauses (a) to (e)32.

32 Indian Const., art. 3 cl. (a) to (e).

References • Commentaries

1. MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, Eighth edition.

2. MP Singh, VN Shukla’s Constitution of India, Tenth edition.

Websites

1. Constituent Assembly Debates - https://sansad.in/ls/debates/historical

2. Lok Sabha- https://eparlib.nic.in/handle/123456789/4

Databases

1. SCC OnLine

2. Jstor

3. Manupatra

4. Lexis

5. Westlaw