Federalism Vs. Centralisation - The Power Shift In Indian Constitutional Law
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FEDERALISM VS. CENTRALISATION: THE POWER SHIFT
IN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW K Radhamani, Assistant Professor, School of Law, Prist (Deemed To Be) University,
Madurai Campus
ABSTRACT
The constitutional framework of India provides a good example of a blend of centralization and federalism, typifying the country’s diversities and socio-political complexities. The Constitution refers to India as a "Union of States," but the Constitution values the power distribution between the Union and states under a quasi-federal model that includes the Union List, State List and Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule. The Union's primacy within the federal model creates a semblance of authority over the States, which priority has led to some discussion on whether State sovereignty is eroding, particularly in circumstances where the Union acts, particularly in emergencies.
The development and introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST), for instance, demonstrates a trend of re-centralization of interests that will increase discussion on the persistent tensions within federalism. Federalism also brings to light fiscal issues and concerns over the principles of equitable distribution, indicating that with an evolving society comes the chance to revise the center-sharing relationship as it relates to state identity in preserving cooperative federalism and regional identity while being integrated within a national and single-identity polity. Keywords: Federalism, centralization I. Introduction Union List: subjects over which the Union Government has exclusive authority which includes defense, foreign affairs, and atomic energy.
State List: what individual states may pass laws for which the states have exclusive charge like police, public health, and agriculture. Concurrent List: which items in which Union and States may pass laws but in case of conflict the Union law takes precedence. Although we have this federal structure what is put forth by the Constitution which in turn gives large powers to the central government has made many a scholar to term Indian federalism as a “quasi-federal” or “centralized federalism” system. Provisions which empower the Union government include the appointment of Governors by the President, the Union's role in the case of emergencies, and fiscal matters. There have been changes to the relationship between federalism and centralization in India over the years. With the development of regional parties and coalition politics in the 1990s, the states gained weight in governance.
More recently though, in light of developments such as the implementation of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) and examples of centralization in areas that have traditionally been the domain of the states, we are starting to see a trend of re-centralization. Analyzing this tension between federalism and centralization is necessary to understand India's system of governance. It especially highlights India's continuing efforts to reconcile unity and diversity, centralization and regionalism, and uniformity and pluralism. II. Significance of the study in contemporary constitutional discourse.
In recent discussions of the Indian constitution, the relationship between federalism and centralization has been an important topic that has illustrated the struggle to balance unity and diversity of the nation. The Indian constitution sets up a federal structure but includes unitary characteristics which allow the central government substantial power, especially in times of emergency or national importance. As a result, some scholars have referred to the Indian system as "quasi-federalism" or "centralized federalism. "This study is significant in understanding the implications of that balance on the Indian polity. A recent example of the centralizing tendencies inherent in the constitutional framework is the boundaries of Indian states being a reorganization power of the central government, which was exercised in forming Telangana in
2014. This, and similar exercises, are undertaken by the central government for administrative
expediency, however, often at the expense of the sovereign state's authority.
Judicial interpretations have been an important instrument in shaping federalism in India. The Supreme Court's ruling in S. R. Bommai v. Union of India limited the arbitrary use of Article 356, allowing for the President's Rule to be imposed on any States, and reaffirmed the Indian federal structure. 1 As well, the recent State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu dealt with the important issues of gubernatorial discretion, constitutional conventions, and state legislatures. The implementation of policies such as the Goods and Services Tax (GST) and the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET) also raise questions about further centralization. 2 Although these programs seek to streamline procedures and create parity federally, they raise concerns about the erosion of state privileges and the standardization of regional practices.
the study of federalism versus centralization in India is neither academic nor theoretical; it is representative of the lived experience of the constitutional democracy in the nation. It demonstrates the need for continued conversation, legal scrutiny, and review of policies to ensure the distribution of power continues to balance unity with diversity and central power with regional autonomy in the spirit of the Constitution. III. Historical Genesis of Indian Federalism The historical origins of Indian federalism are shaped by the country's diverse sociocultural context and its colonial history. The federal structure has progressed through differing phases due to traditional rules and practices, the practices of colonial administrators, and the imperatives of nation-building after independence.
In ancient India, empires such as the Mauryas and the Guptas exercised a centralized authority but also exercised considerable amount of authority over local units. The Mauryan Empire (321–185 BCE), under the reign of Ashoka, centralized much of the administrative power, but he invested powers in provincial governors to chart the province's secular interests. The Gupta Empire (320–550 CE) recognized local rulers and local administrative units and invested them with local authority to govern community affairs, a method of decentralized authority. During the medieval period, early contemporary regional kingdoms emerged, such as the Cholas and the Rajputs, in the mid- 1400s and early 1500s to the early 1700s, with fealty to the Moghul state, which expanded from Morocco to India.
The Chola administration allowed villages considerable autonomy to self-govern their affairs (9th to 13th centuries). The Mughal Empire was centralized, overseen
1 S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 1
2 The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr., (2025) INSC 481
by provincial governors, subahdars, who had considerable local authority with respect to local matters. The onset of British colonialism was a pivotal turning point toward centralization. The British East India Company set the grounds for centralization in order to facilitate the imperial purposes of governance. The Charter Act of 1833 marked a peak in centralizing legislative power. It placed most law-making authority with the Governor-General in Council. In the early 1900s, there were efforts to introduce federal ideas into the colonial system. The depiction of the administration of Hindustan in 1919 in a system named diarchy. '' The major authorities removed the current presumed number of subjects, while the various individuals were managed by the provincial regimes.
The 1935 Republic of India Act foresees the establishment of a federal organization, together with autonomous States and princely States. However, during implementation, the present has encountered many obstacles. Due to the wide range of languages, traditions, and regions, the establishment of a distinct state after India's independence was questionable. However, the diversity presented significant challenges to framers of Indian Constitution. Hence, they settled on a federal system of administration to balance the requirement for imposing centralized authority with allowing states some degree of autonomy. The Union, State, and Concurrent lists were utilized in the Constitution to allocate powers between the Union and the states.
However, unitary features were included so that the central government could flexibly draw state borders and enforce President's Rule under Article 356, where necessary. In political, economic and societal contexts, Indian federalism has changed over the centuries. Why Regional political parties gained strength in the 1990s, while state governments grew increasingly powerless and formed coalition governments. The central government has been regaining more power in recent times. The present form is reflected in the Goods and Services Tax (GST) as well as the increasing involvement of the central authority in asserting personal business. To grasp the current activity in center-state relations and the debate on federalism in India, research on Indian federalism's history is essential. 3 3 Ghughe Govind Bhausaheb, Federalism in India: A Study of Center-State Relations, 12 Int’l J.
Food & Nutritional Sci. 6285 (2023).
IV. Comparative Perspectives: Lessons from Other Federations
The federal systems of the United States, Canada, and Australia each offer a different constitutional platform that takes into account the relationship between power at the national and regional levels. The different models will offer India useful lessons to help wrestle with the issues of Federalism and centralization. A. United States: Dual Federalism with Clear Separation The U. S. Constitution specifies powers between the federal government and the states, and a unique separation of such powers. Specifically, the Tenth Amendment reserves unspecified powers for the states thereby establishing a dual federalism model. The Supreme Court's role often entails interpreting the power balance. The case of National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius4, is instructive regarding the U. S. Constitution's unfinished principle of federal state relations.
The Court upheld the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act as a tax, but invalidated the mandatory expansion of Medicaid thereby affirming state independence. Where the Constitution of India envisions a quasi-federal background which put emphasis on a central government; the U. S. model puts importance on setting distinct constitutional boundaries and judicial role for resolving federal balance. B. Canada: Cooperative Federalism with Flexibility The Constitution Act, 1867, specifies federal and provincial competencies in Sections 91 and 92, respectively. Under the principle of federal paramountcy, federal law prevails over inconsistent provincial law. However, Canada's approach provides opportunities for flexibility and cooperation.
Securities Act, the Supreme Court found that a proposed federal regulation of securities intruded on provincial jurisdiction and acknowledged the need for co-operative federalism. Canada's model shows the capacity for intergovernmental cooperation, and also the role of judicial mechanisms in resolving jurisdictional disputes, which is an avenue for India to use to supplement center-state cooperation. 5 C. Australia: Federalism with a Centralizing Trend Australia has a federal system of government with powers divided between the Commonwealth
4 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)
5 Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66
and the states. Over time the High Court has leaned towards centralisation. In Commonwealth v New South Wales the High Court upheld federal laws on industrial relations which significantly increased federal power at the expense of the states. Australia shows how judicial interpretation can upset a carefully balanced federal system and the need for vigilance in the adjudication of federalism in India to prevent unintended centralisation. V. Constitutional Framework: Federalism Enshrined The Constitution of India provides a federal framework through an elaborate distribution of powers between the Union and the states. Legislative powers are determined by Articles 245 to 254. In these articles, Article 246 specifies a system of subjects in the Union List, State List, and the Concurrent List that is outlined in the Seventh Schedule.
Article 263 establishes the Inter-State Council as a mechanism for cooperation between the states and the Centre. Article 280 governs the procedures for financial relations through the establishment of a Finance Commission; the role of the Finance Commission is to make recommendations for the distribution of taxes between the Union and the States. These provisions collectively maintain a balance of power to allow for cooperative federalism to take precedence in the Constitution. Distribution of legislative, administrative, and financial powers and Role of the Finance Commission In great detail, the Indian Constitution outlines the legislative, administrative and financial powers of the Union and the States. Articles 245 to 263 of Part XI of the Constitution cover the legislative and administrative relationship between the Union and the States. Article
245 grants Parliament control over the entire nation and State Legislatures over their individual
states. Article 246 creates the Seventh Schedule, which separates topics into three categories:
1. Union List - subjects on which Parliament may legislate exclusively, like defense and
foreign affairs.
2. State List - subjects on which State Legislatures may legislate exclusively, such as
police and public health.
3. Concurrent List - subjects on which both can legislate, but laws by the Union prevail
in the event of a conflict.
This three-tiered framework provides clearer delineation of legislative powers and less potential for overlaps in responsibilities. Administrative Powers: Articles 256 - 263 relate to the federal-state relations or administrative powers. Under Article 256, states must exercise their executive powers in compliance with applicable laws of the Union. Article 257 allows the Union to direct the States in limited aspects of federal-state relations to promote national standards and policies. Articles
258 and 258A also provide for a mutual delegation of responsibilities by the Union and States,
which enhances cooperative federalism. Financial Powers and the Finance Commission: Part XII (Articles 268-293) deals with the fiscal relations. Article 280 provides for the establishment of the Finance Commission6, a constitutional body appointed in accordance with the rules in the Constitution every five years by the President. The responsibilities of the Finance Commission include: • Suggesting apportionment of net tax proceeds between the Centre and the States. • Advising on the principles concerning grants-in-aid to the States from the Consolidated Fund of India. • Recommending policies to improve the financial position of states to assist panchayats and municipalities.
For this reason, the Finance Commission plays a critical role in the quest for fiscally equity through its mechanisms for reducing vertical and horizontal balance, as well as enhancing the fiscal self-dependence of states. The Constitution's elaborate provisions for power allocation and the organizational mechanism of the Finance Commission reinforce what is being pointed out i. e. , that India is committed to a balanced balancing of unity and diversity within a federal structure. VI. Unitary Features within the Federal Structure Articles 352, 356 and 360 of the Indian Constitution's emergency provisions give the central government extra authority to address situations posing a threat to financial stability, constitutional governance, or national security. In cases of war, external aggression, or armed insurrection, the President may declare a National Emergency under Article 352.
Within a month, both Houses of Parliament must accept this proclamation, which is based on the written
6 India Const. art. 280.
advice of the Union Cabinet. When a National Emergency is proclaimed, there will be a transition from a federal to a unitary structure: Parliament becomes competent to make laws with respect to any matters in the State List, and the life of the Lok Sabha may be extended for a period beyond the five-year term. Fundamental Rights may be suspended, except those guaranteed by Articles 20 and 21 during the emergency. A provision for the integrity of the Cabinet (written recommendation) was introduced before the emergency was proclaimed by the 44th Amendment Act of 1978, along with a restriction on the Cabinet's recommendations because the earlier wording "internal disturbance" and the amended wording were limited to the grounds of armed rebellion. 7 "President's Rule" is what Article 356 refers to.
This provision allows the President to take over the administration of a state if it is believed that the state cannot function in accordance with the Constitution. This can commence based on a report from the Governor or by other means. Upon the imposition of such a rule, the state Legislative Assembly may be suspended or dissolved. It also allows Parliament the power to legislate on matters of the state. The initial period for President's Rule is six months, but it can be extended every six months up to a maximum of three years, as long as Parliament approves. Extensions beyond the first year must either declare a national emergency or obtain certification by the Election Commission that it is impossible to conduct elections in the state. There has been strong debate regarding the inappropriate use of Article 356, leading to calls for stricter use of Article356.
Article 360 of the Constitution empowers the President to proclaim a Financial Emergency. This can be issued if the financial stability of India is threatened. During a Financial Emergency, the executive authority of the Union extends to giving directions to the state regarding Financial matters, which even includes the reduction of the salaries being received by judges and/or other state government officials. Any bill dealing with finance that is passed by either House of the Legislature is required to be sent to the President for assent. To the knowledge of the authors of the text, India has never gone through a Financial Emergency since the Constitution was written. All together, these provisions serve to highlight the Constitution's ability to adapt to exceptional circumstances. The fact that they could also be used to centralize power requires them to be more judiciously exercised.
In short, these Hukam Raj, Concept of Emergency Under Indian Constitution (May 31, 2024), https://papers. ssrn. com/sol3/papers. cfm? abstract_id=4850276. provisions should be exercised thoughtfully to preserve the federalist structure and democratic character of the nation. VII. Judicial Interpretations: Balancing the Scales The Indian judiciary has been instrumental in defining the nature and periphery of Centre-State relations to ensure a balance between the Union's imperium and State autonomy. Various consequential judgments have defined the contours of this relationship while asserting the federal framework established in the Constitution. In the case of S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994): The landmark case involved the abuse of the anti-defection law under Article 356, which allows the imposition of President's Rule in states.
The Supreme Court held that a proclamation of the President under Article 356 is justiciable, thus restraining the arbitrary dismissal of state governments known as the 'politics of opportunism' and reinstating the power of federalism8. State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977): The Court held that the Union does have the power to dismiss state governments, but that acting so must not be arbitrary to maintain state autonomy. 9 Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006): 10The case examined the dissolution of the Bihar Legislative Assembly. The Court held that the dissolution was necessarily unconstitutional reinforces that the Centre must show adequate cause for dismissal of state governments. B. P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010): The case examined the removal of Governors by the Governor.
The Supreme Court held that while the President can remove a Governor, it must not be arbitrary in nature. This case provided safeguards in the political and non-political nature of the Governor's office, upholding the federal balance. 11 In State of West Bengal v. Union of India, the Supreme Court considered whether the Union could acquire land owned by a State without the latter's consent. The Court laid it down that Parliament had the authority to enact legislation in such cases under its legislative powers. The decision emphasized the primacy of the Union in legislative matters, including when that legislation relates to State property, and therefore reinforced the unitary aspect of the federal feature in India. 12 The decision indicated that the Constitution did not give State property
8 S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 1.
9 State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (1977) 3 S.C.C. 592
10 Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India, (2006) 2 S.C.C. 1
11 B.P. Singhal v. Union of India, (2010) 6 S.C.C. 331
12 State of W.B. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1241
immunity against Parliamentary legislation regarding acquisition. R. M. D. C. (Mysore) v. State of Mysore, this case looked into the question of the legislative competence of the State of Mysore to tax prize competitions even though the Union had some regulatory power over such competitions. The Supreme Court said that while the Union had some regulatory power, the State still had the power to levy taxes unless that power was expressly restricted. The decision recognized the fiscal autonomy of States to levy taxes and clarified that Union regulatory control over competition, for instance, did not diminish the powers of States in determining the levels of taxation, thereby establishing a base point for the Union to control prize competition while still giving a power to independent tax-raising. 13 State of Tamil Nadu v.
Governor of Tamil Nadu, in this case the Supreme Court recently pronounced that the Governor is constitutionally obliged to act according to the advice of the State Cabinet. While the Governor can reserve a bill for the President's consideration, a delay in consenting to bills passed by the State Legislature undermines the principles of federalism and democratic governance. More importantly, the Court affirmed the principle of cooperative federalism which was intended to ensure that Governors remain within the constitutional mandate and not as agents of the Centre to protect State autonomy. 14 U. N. Rao v. Indira Gandh is concerned with appointing a Prime Minister and the requirement to be a member of either House of Parliament.
The Supreme Court held that a person who is not a member of Parliament can be appointed as Prime Minister so long as he or she becomes a member within six months. The Court clarified provisions in the Constitution relating to executive appointments and endorsed the importance of legitimacy and accountability for the democratic operation of the Union government. 15 According to the Basic system Doctrine, which was established in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, Parliament cannot change some fundamental aspects of the Constitution, such as "the federal system. " The Supreme Court ruled that although Parliament has broad authority to change the Constitution, it cannot do so at the expense of the fundamental framework. 16 This ruling has helped to preserve the federal structure of the Indian Constitution against a possible move towards centralization of power. State of Karnataka v.
Union of India is concerned with whether or not the Union could appoint a commission to examine certain
13 R.M.D.C. (Mysore) v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 594
14 State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, W.P. (C) No. 1239 of 2023, decided on April 8, 2025 (India)
15 U.N. Rao v. Indira Gandhi, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1002
16 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 S.C.C. 225.
conduct of the Chief Minister of the State. The Supreme Court upheld the Centre's action and stated that a commission investigation is not an infringement on State autonomy as long as it is in the public interest of investigating the complaint and fits within the ambit of the Constitution. The judgment thereby highlighted the fragile balance between the duties of the Centre to uphold integrity in governance and the rights of the States to self-governance, thereby entrenching the Authoritative - Quasi - federal framework of India's political organization. 17 The judiciary in India has been important in interpreting and impacting a balance of federalism versus centralism in the constitutional framework of India. Although the Constitution prescribes a federal arrangement, the interpretations of the judicial system have generally preferred a more centralized form.
This centralism is reflected through the assertive stance taken by the Supreme Court in defending the interests of the Union occasionally at the stake of state autonomy. More significantly, the Supreme Court has acted as a steward of Indian federalism to the extent possible by defending the interests of the Union while still cognizant of the integrity of the states. In other words, there is a constant evolving process between these federalism and centralism tensions in India, which can be understood and examined through the complex intersection of the centralized order of the government alongside state participation. VIII.
Federalism in Practice The relationship between federalism and centralization in India is clearly illustrated by the relationship between the Centre and the States, especially with regard to the role of the states in relation to the implementation of central schemes, and the way in which states react to central policies. Recently, in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025), the constitutional conflicts of this relationship were made more clear. In this case, the highest court in the land addressed the Governor's unreasonable delay in granting assent to ten bills that have all received the approval of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly. The Supreme Court ruled that this indefinite method of dealing with legislation - or known as a 'pocket veto' - is unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court explained that a Governor has three clear options: to grant assent, to withhold assent and return the bill to the legislature reconsideration, or to reserve the bill for the consideration of the President. In its ruling, the Supreme Court made clear that once a bill that has been passed by the legislature is re-passed, it is the obligation of
17 State of Karnataka v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 68.
the Governor to grant assent. Thus, the Supreme Court reiterated the supremacy of the state assembly as legislative makers, and outlined the constitutional limits of action in terms of a Governor. This judgment has enormous implications for the federal structure of the nation. It underscores the autonomy of the state legislature and limits the possibility of a takeover of federal functions by the centre by inaction of the Governor. In declaring definite limits on the constitution on the powers of the Governor, the Supreme Court has upheld principles of cooperative federalism, and has reaffirmed the constitutional allocation of obligations and power between the Centre and the States. IX.
Challenges and the Road Ahead Despite India's federal framework being enshrined in its Constitution, the Union and State governments face an array of legal and institutional obstacles that inhibit a consistent balance between both levels of government. These challenges can be conceptualized in a number of ways: • Unclear Provisions of the Constitution: The Constitution provides a federal structure for the division of powers between the Centre and the State. Some provisions have remained disputed, like article 200. The court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu 18held that governors do not have an absolute or a pocket veto over state legislation. In principle, the Court held that if the state re-passes a bill after a governor refuses to assent, the governor is under a constitutional obligation to provide the assent.
The case showed that the exercise of powers must be precise and clear to prevent encroachment by someone acting under a constitutional function. • Interference of Financial Powers: The financial structure emphasized the dominance of the Centre and creates situations of financial dependence for States. The Finance Commission makes recommendations for fund distribution, but transfers are actualized with conditionalities, which remove States' financial autonomy in colonizing it that may impede the spirit of cooperative federalism. • Duplication of Jurisdictions: the Constitution establishes a concurrent list where the Centre and State can make laws, which can lead to a conflict of laws depending on the
18 State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, (2025) 1 SCC 1.
context. Depending on the constitutional questions being asked, on inconsistent federal laws the central law will take precedence, symbolizing the degradation of State space. Many interpretations by the Supreme Court had raised questions on the law relating to the demonstration of controlled duplications in the jurisdictions by varying ways to specify the different powers. • The Role of Governors: The appointment and functioning of Governors has often been contentious. Governors denying assent to bills or delaying action on a bill can raise questions about the impartiality of the office established in the Constitution. The above State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor TN case mentioned above is a relevant example of the tension. • Emergency Provisions: Articles 352, 356, and 360 grant enormous powers to the Centre, and disadvantaged State functioning autonomy during emergencies.
Although emergency provisions are for truly exceptional circumstances, the unwarranted use of these emergency provisions undermines the very essence of federalism. The landmark judgment in S. R. Bommai v. Union of India 19reduced arbitrary use of the President's Rule - regard for State governments as sacred. • Terminological Confusions: There have also been debates on terms like 'Central Government' as opposed to 'Union Government', as the word 'central' can imply supremacy over others. However, in a 2023 judgment, the Delhi High Court held that an associated term or terminology preference does not weaken the federal structure, as federalism in India is a basic feature of the Constitution.
Although India's Constitution envisions a federal structure, practical challenges and confused interpretations always require the attention of the courts and legislation to ensure the balance between the Centre and States is upheld. These three challenges must be met to allow for the free functioning of India's democracy. X. Conclusion We are at a point in India's federalism where there is a progressive evolution in the relationship between the centre and the states. Recent events indicate that we need to rethink our Centre- State relations in terms of cooperative arrangements rather than hierarchical arrangements. One area of concern in this relationship is fiscal federalism. The Reserve Bank of India states that,
19 S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.
States need to clearly mark out their paths toward fiscal consolidation, and they need to rationalize their subsidies in order to avoid "crowding out" productive expenditures. The Reserve Bank of India indicates that the excessive number of centrally sponsored schemes reduces the discretionary spending capacity by state governments and undermines the essence of cooperative fiscal federalism. In addition, the fact that the attempt to conduct simultaneous elections for state assemblies and the national parliament failed also illustrates the difficulties we face. Leaders in favour of a simultaneous election regime often argue that it will provide better governance and efficiency of electoral expenses. However, those against it argue that this undermines the federalism that we have. Simultaneous elections could lead India into a more centralised and presidential style of governance.
It's important for the federal structure to be upheld by strengthening devolution of powers and resources to states and local governments by ways of amendments to the lists in the constitution, enhancing the states' share of central taxes, and overall, providing a little more freedom with state finances. The Sarkaria Commission had recommended that autonomy of the states with respect to their area of the State List of the Seventh Schedule should be increased. The future of Indian federalism is heavily reliant on having cooperative federalism with balanced development and recognizing the limited area of autonomy of the states in accordance with the constitutional arrangements of the centre and states, it is extremely critical!
By tackling the fiscal challenges, promoting cooperative and holistic governance, will serve to strengthen the federal system, and reaffirm India's deep commitment to the democratic and welfare principles inherent in the constitution.