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In The Shadow Of Capital - Environmental Violations And Legal Conundrum

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Category: Environmental Law

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IN THE SHADOW OF CAPITAL: ENVIRONMENTAL

VIOLATIONS AND LEGAL CONUNDRUM

Urshita Saxena, Assistant Professor, The NorthCap University, Gurugram

ABSTRACT

India's environmental obligations, while constitutionally protected and supported by a plethora of statutes, have often come in a whirlwind of legal loopholes, institutional inertia and systemic evidentiary failures. This article explores the broader environmental conundrum in India, breathing in the shadow of Delhi, in a district not far away from the heart of capital through a specific case study of Anjum v. UPPCB. The article explores the troubling instance of a fatality that took place that which became a no man's responsibility, ultimately signalling critical loopholes in environmental responses in India.

The article while discussing the case study through all the angles also spans around the role of NGT, CEC, state empowered committees and judiciary that should work in tandem but are often found to be scattered in coordination, due to overlapping jurisdiction and operation in silos. The case is a significant reminder of due process, a cornerstone that was blatantly ignored by the pollution control agencies. The paper through the microcosm of the case study demands strict procedural adherence, substantively, which, if unchecked might diminish access to environmental justice, especially for the vulnerable and marginalized. Towards the end, the paper recommends some key approaches that can build better environmental compliances while at the same time making sure it is not at the cost of basic fundamental rights of individuals. Keywords: pollution, CEC, environment, due process

1. Introduction

Recently, changes have been made to the laws related to forests. The amendments have received mixed reactions from stakeholders. Viewed critically, the definition of forest now restricts the meaning of forest by bifurcating it into two categories, that is, those declared as forests by law and secondly, the areas recorded in government records as forests on or after the 25th of October 1980. This means that ecologically rich forests, yet unrecorded may fall out of the purview of protection. Patterns of regulatory dilution have been observed earlier as well. Environmental clearance procedures were increasingly engineered to expedite approvals rather than safeguard ecosystems1. This regulatory weakening has heightened concerns about ecological vulnerability, prompting several petitions that cite imminent threats to environmental balance2. In this wake, the Supreme reiterated the T. N.

Godavaraman Thirumulpad3 judgment of 1996 to reinforce the protection granted to forests irrespective of its classification. It is a matter of extreme dismay that despite a ruling to the effect of creating expert committees 29 years back, many states and Union Territories still haven’t constituted them and have again been directed by the top court to expedite the data on forests and file complete record within six months. The court went a step further in attributing accountability in cases of environmental governance and warned that if expert committees are not constituted within the said timeline, the chief secretaries and administrators can also be held personally liable. The institutional complacency is visible here by the fact of almost three decades of inertia in not just one case, but unfortunately looms across cases of all sorts.

Be it the class of law of torts, or environmental law, or administrative law, or the Constitutional law, it would always be incomplete without the unfortunate incident of Bhopal gas disaster of 1984. The case isn’t circumscribed by ‘tortious’ liability alone, isn’t the area concerning mere ‘environmental’ obligations alone, isn’t just limited to highlight ‘administrative’ loopholes, and isn’t just a discussion limited in scope about discussion of Part III versus Part IV of the ‘Constitution’ alone. Yet it is the cumulative effect of all to highlight how one small lapse can lead to irreversible consequences. While the world has moved on 41 years, yet the city of Bhopal still 1Manju Menon and Kanchi Kohli, ‘From Impact Assessment to Clearance Manufacture’ (2009) 44 Economic and Political Weekly 20. 2Debby Jain, 'Will Hold Chief Secretaries Personally Liable’ (Livelaw, 4 March 2025) 3T. N.

Godavarman Thirumulkpad v Union Of India & Ors [1997] SC 1228

reels of the unfortunate happening. So much so, that the toxic waste from that site still hasn’t been removed up until now. Gone are the days when governance was understood in binary connotations and paralleled between the ‘governing’ and ‘being governed’. Governance imports scrutiny, transparency, accountability and is premised on protection of individual’s autonomy. The paper highlights discussion on an important case study of an exothermic reaction in a district of Uttar Pradesh, not far away from the Capital. It involves crucial aspect related to attributing onus in case of death resulting out of oversight arising out of failure to adhere to environmental obligations, which looms around passing the buck in the light of loosely drafted provisions, environmental complacency and negligible evidentiary compliances.

2. Exothermic Fatality: A Case Study

2.1.Background In an incident which occurred in the State of Uttar Pradesh4, an exothermic reaction occurred that resulted in the death of one person while giving serious burn injuries to two others. The nodal authority in-charge in the state, that is the Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board, hereinafter referred to as the UPPCB, directed the appellant to pay environmental compensation tuning to the amount of around four lakhs for a violation of 83 days up to

08.02.2023. Later on, however, the UPPCB reviewed its own order thereby enhancing the

penalty asking the appellant to pay penalty for an extended period of around 5 years upto the tune of 87 lakh rupees5. The case was made out against the appellant that it is due to chemical drums stored in the village Kasampura, sharp odour was emitted. It is the case of the State that it is due to these drums the incident occurred, wherein two people were seriously injured and one was killed. On the other hand, the appellant contended that the land in fact belonged to the irrigation department of the government and hence there was no causal connection between the appellant and the chemical drums recovered. Additionally, regarding the evidence, there was nothing more than general diaries that formed the basis of investigation by the investigating authorities. 4Anjum v. Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board 2024 SCC OnLine NGT 91 5Anjum v.

Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board 2024 SCC OnLine NGT 91 [3]

The copies of FIR never formed part of the original record, as also noted by the Court. The only document that was relied on not just by the State but also the appellant was the case diary report. This case raised critical questions regarding environmental accountability, attributing liability in cases of environmental violations and limits of statutory authority, highlighting the need for clarity on institutional responsibilities and oversight mechanisms.

2.2. Discussion

2.2.1. Violation of Article 21 and Principles of Natural Justice

First of all, as evident from the report of general diary itself, the case leans in favour of the appellant in as much as the appellant had already disposed of the drums and buried them under the soil in the vigilance of an executive authority that happened to be the Sub Divisional Officer in this case. This happened in 2018 when the said burying had to be done on suspicion of pungent smell of chemicals. Eventually, around four years later, in 2022, when the unfortunate incident occurred, claiming the life claiming the life of one person and brutally injuring 2 others, the authorities themselves disposed of the drums.

The appellant’s contention should not be undermined that had the authorities been more vigilant if carrying out the provisions of flagrant violation of Hazardous Waste (Management, Handling and Transboundary Movement) Rules6, hereinafter referred to as the HOWMTM Rules 2016 and disposing them of in 2018 as per the said Rules, the incident might have not even taken place. Till this time the causal connection of the alleged incident with the appellant is neither put at contention by the respondent, nor is it disputed by any of the parties that he stored hazardous substances. The case of the prosecution inspires least confidence also because of the fact that the original copy of the First Information Report, hereinafter referred to as the FIR, has not been made part of the record. The case finds reliance of diary reports.

While even if the culpability of the appellant was yet to be determined, the right to be informed grounds of arrest have already been recognised as a sacrosanct right under part III of the constitution along with it being a procedural mandate under CrPC ,and now the BNSS. In a very recent case titled Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana and Anr. 7, the Supreme Court through its decision bolstered procedural safeguards which led to directives for institutional reforms and highlighted the role of judiciary 6Hazardous and Other Wastes (Management and Transboundary Movement) Rules 2016 (India). 7Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana and Anr. [2025] INSC 162, para 21.

in safeguarding fundamental rights. Although the ruling of the Supreme Court is related to cases of arrest, yet the observation is necessary to highlight the importance of following due process and transparency in legal proceedings, which requires a proactive approach from the investigating authorities the most. Moreover, there is an averment made on part of the respondents wherein the appellant being the primary suspect was already served with a show cause notice first on 09. 02. 2023 for a period of 83 days but then the appellant on 11. 02. 2023 is slapped with a subsequent show cause notice which imposed around 87 lakhs penalty for a violation not for 83 but 1742 days, approximately five years. Moreover, even the copy of the said show cause notice is also not made a part of the record.

The basic tenets of Article 21 fails to achieve its full-fledged importation when major lapses like these are committed on the part of state. Additionally, by two subsequent orders the amount of compensation is not only increased but also the appellant is deprived of an effective representation. The acquiesce of the government authorities for such long period, that is a time of almost five years, in a case of continued environmental offence, if any, raises serious questions of accountability, and sheer negligence.

2.2.2. Evidentiary lapses

Secondly, significant evidentiary lapses have been noted which further undermines the case against the appellant. At the forefront, the only evidence against the appellant is the case diary reports. As per Section 172 of the Code of Criminal Procedure8, case diary reports are legally impermissible to form part of evidence. It is unfathomable how the investigating authorities formed case diary report as the basis of fixing criminal liability upon the appellant, when in criminal cases the evidentiary value of general diary reports is only limited to aid the court under the said provision. The applicability of evidentiary laws still remains the same even in environmental offences. Secondly, the evidences that formed basis of conviction against the appellant were found to have no causal connection with the appellant.

This can be substantiated by the observation of the Court as well in para 219:

8 Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 172; Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023, s 192

9Anjum v. Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board 2024 SCC OnLine NGT 91 [21]

“Moreover, how the appellant was involved in the matter is totally unexplained. He is neither the manufacturer, nor producer, nor trader nor transporter of alleged material. At least, no record shows that he had any occasion to handle hazardous substance in any manner or actually handled it. His implication therefore, is wholly erroneous. ” Moreover, the accountability of government agencies falling under the category of ‘state’ under Article 12 comes into question when a statutory authority which is vested with enormous powers, itself corrodes the backbone of the case by basing the entire case on superficial evidence. Evidence as understood under the evidence laws should be relevant as well as admissible.

The entire prosecution case rests upon inferences drawn by the UPPCB not upon the original copies of the First Information Report, but upon the general diary prepared by the investigating officers. The position of law is settled, as explained already, regarding the admissibility of the case diary. The words ‘admissibility of case diary’ although, itself is an oxymoron as case diary isn’t considered evidence, lest admissible. The Supreme Court in a much-celebrated judgment10 has made it expressly clear that when information is related to cognizable offence, then it must be entered in a “book kept by the officer in charge of police station” and not in the General Diary.

In other words, it is only where a preliminary inquiry is needed that an entry in the general diary can precede the registration of an FIR, otherwise the latter is the first crucial step in setting the ball rolling in case of cognizable offence. The same was reiterated very recently in the case of Mobeen vs State Of U. P. 11. In the instant matter, the FIR was registered first disclosing non-cognizable offences, and then the second bore offences of cognizable nature. The credibility of the version of the prosecution becomes tainted in the light of FIRs not forming part of the original record and being effaced by general diaries instead.

2.2.3. Misuse of provisions of the statutes and ambiguous interpretation

thereof The initial order levied a penalty for a violation of 83 days by the respondent and then the order was revised again to hold the appellant liable not for a period of 83 days but an extended period of around 5 years. For any statutory body, even if it is a ‘state’ under Article 12, the power of modifying orders should be seen and upheld only if it is being permitted by the statute itself 10Lalita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh A.I.R. 2014 S.C. 187. 11Mobeen v. State Of U.P Thru. Prin. Secy. Home [2024]

from which the said agency derived power. It is a settled law that for any such body exercising judicial functions, the said body even if is a quasi-judicial authority, for it to exercise the power of review such power should either be specifically conferred upon it by the statute itself or it is otherwise deducible from necessary implication. This position has been analysed again and again and one such case was Dr. Kashinath G. Jalmi And Anr. Etc. Etc vs Speaker And Ors12 , wherein challenge was made to the decision of the acting speaker wherein he set aside the orders passed earlier related to the disqualification of some members. The Court found no merit in the contention of the respondents that the power of review could be inferred from necessary implication in the tenth schedule.

Similarly, in a very recent case13, the High Court of Allahabad noted the scope of a quasi-judicial authority and rightly held to be limited. The Court observed that the functionality of such authorities is to be derived from the four corners from the Act itself. When the interpretation of the precedents regarding power of quasi-judicial authorities to review their own orders is applied in the context of the UPPCB reviewing its own order and thereby changing its original order, the argument contested before the Court was regarding UPPCB’s power to review and whether it could be inferred that the said pollution control board is vested with any such power. The Supreme Court has held that an authority becomes quasijudicial when it is obligated to act judicially and determine rights after following principles of natural justice14.

The subsequent sections of the paper address whether review jurisdiction can be inferred for this quasi-judicial body.

2.2.4. Statutory Powers and Operational Scope of the Pollution Control

Board The relevant sections that are pivotal for discussion are Section 5 of the Environment Protection Act,1986 read with 2016 Hazardous and Other Wastes (Management and Transboundary Movement) Rules framed under Sections 6,8 and 25 of the Act. It is under these provisions that the government agencies, and effectively the pollution control boards take refuge to impose environmental obligations in the form of monetary penalties. While in the instant case the power of statutory agencies to impose penalties was not challenged, however, that doesn’t make it out of context for discussion in this paper. For any agency to exercise power there has to be 12Dr. Kashinath G. Jalmi And Anr. Etc. v. Speaker And Ors A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1873.

13 Shivani Chaurasia v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine All 1685.

14 A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India A.I.R. 1970 SC 150

statutory backing to it that is constitutional. A bare perusal of these provisions is indicative of the fact that neither the provisions nor the rules are punitive in nature. While the Act15 empowers the central government to merely issue written directions to any person that have to be complied. The person can as well be an officer or authority. The emphasis is then drawn to the clause that is clarificatory in nature16 as it provides an inclusive list whereby any such person, officer or authority can be directed to close the industry, operations or process for giving into effect this Act or such direction can be prohibitory or regulatory in nature. The next clause divides it from the first clause with an ‘or’. While interpreting any statute to find its actual meaning, ‘or’ has to be distinguished from an ‘and’.

So, the government can direct prohibition of regulation under the first clause, and the next clause being preceded by ‘or’ similarly again allows the government to direct any person, officer or authority to stop or regulate the electrical, water supply or any other service. The judiciary on multiple occasions has had the chance to consider the effect of disjunctive and conjunctive words. Meaning thereby since these two clauses are separated by ‘or’, that superficially makes the power of the central government disjunctive. The government can direct any person, officer or authority to comply with any of these two directions, thereby making the list exhaustive. In the case of Kishori Mohan Bera v.

State of West Bengal17, the maintainability of the order of the district magistrate was challenged on the ground that he couldn’t satisfy as to under which of the two categories as separated by the disjunctive word ‘or’ the petitioner’s act fell so as to justify the preventive detention order. Similarly, in a recent case18, the High Court of Allahabad noted in a tax matter that when statute uses the word ‘or’, it indicates disjunctive conjunction wherein each option stands on its own independent footing. However, coming back to the instant matter in the context of environment laws, it is not safe to presume any such interpretation as in such cases it is at least this much certain that it would depend on case-to-case basis. Even then the interpretations rendered by the judiciary cannot be ignored altogether.

Nevertheless, the significance of the effect the words used by the legislature purports to import cannot be disregarded in entirety as Section 5 doesn’t make any punitive obligations vis-à-vis monetary penalty.

2.2.5. Imposition of Penalties by the Pollution Control Board Lacks Backing

It is then a matter of conjecture to read into the said section the power to impose penalty, the

15 Environment Protection Act, 1986, s 5, No. 29, Acts of Parliament, 1986 (India)

16 Environment Protection Act, 1986, s 5, No. 29, Acts of Parliament, 1986 (India).

17Kishori Mohan Bera v. State of West Bengal A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1749. 18Shree Sai Palace v. State Of U.P. And Others Writ Tax No. 50 of 2023.

criteria of which isn’t laid down neither in the parent Act itself nor in the rules. As mentioned earlier, that the power of the pollution control board remained undisputed in the case at hand, therefore the learned court read the power into polluter pays principle that once started as a principle in torts but has now received its full-fledged reception as a statutory principle that can be resorted to by the central government. This has made the entire functionality of environmental compensation to rest on arbitrary mechanisms. It is also because there are no fundamental criteria upon which the penalty can be imposed. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the central government is the sole authority mentioned in the section 5 of the Act. However, in essence it is the state pollution control boards that is levying such penalties.

There should be some checks and balances over such provisions to prevent deeming these provisions as nugatory as even though in the case of Indian Council for Enviro Legal Action v. Union of India19, the polluter pays principle was reaffirmed in these provisions, however, as seen in the instant case, the arbitrary orders being issued at the behest of the state pollution control boards is helping the statutory bodies escape their accountability and instead giving them the implied sanction to not follow the due process of law. As a result, the Board cannot lawfully revisit or alter its previous orders and any attempt to do so would exceed its statutory mandate and risk arbitrariness.

3. Analysis

This case is not secluded in its nature. The analysis demonstrates that the pollution control board operates with powers that are quasi-judicial in nature, enabling it to issue binding directions and enforce environmental obligations. However, these powers are strictly grounded in statutory provisions, particularly Section 5 of the Environment Protection Act,1986 and the related rules, which provide regulatory authority but do not expressly confer a power of review. The purpose of choosing a case study as this was to draw attention to a case that raises serious ethical and legal questions. While mentioning about the same, one must not forget about the case that does not go far beyond, both contextually and geographically, and lies much within the heart of India, the national capital. Not long ago the case of tree felling in the ridge area became center of public discourse.

In Delhi, the Delhi Development Authority is responsible for implementing projects for urban expansion and it is the Court’s mandate that Central Empowered Committee (CEC) approval is necessary in case of felling trees. In early 2024, for

19 Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v Union of India [1996] 3 SCC 212

the purposes of widening of an existing road to facilitate improved access to the institutions in the vicinity, a part of the area was to be cleared that resulted in deforestation. As per the records20 submitted by the government, the number seemed to be disputed as the number of trees as understood by an independent survey carried out by the Forest Survey of India depicted two times more were cut. In a turn of events garnered attention was the felling of trees in the Ridge region without obtaining the requisite permission from the Central Empowered Committee (CEC) as highlighted by the petitioner. This was ultimately put at rest by the Supreme Court, which recently held the DDA liable for contempt despite their bona fide intention for its failure to take due approval and cutting more trees than documented.

The case is a glaring instance of how the Capital was made to reel under the guise of mismatched accounts of accountability, legal loopholes, and quite unfortunately, institutional deflection. In this context, it becomes worthwhile to suggest some recommendations. 3. 1. Strengthening statutory bodies: Central empowered committees, state empowered committees and National Green Tribunal are the statutory bodies functioning at different bandwidth according to their own limitations. While the CEC and NGT have overlapping jurisdictions, the states and union territories haven't even come into existence21 when the court issued a final warning to constitute them after an inertia of 29 years. It is again a matter of time to finally seem them being constituted in reality after the wait of timeline given of six months gets over.

It is recommended that a single window clearance mechanism is adopted instead of multiple to prevent a Delhi like situation as discussed above. This will not only prevent duplication, help increase transparency, but also ensure strict compliance with a single mandate. 3. 2. Reducing dependence on courts through overhauling of provisions, more significantly the provision of review: Power of review, as noted in the case discussed above, is not vested with the pollution control boards. This eventually leads to matters reaching Tribunals and Courts. While it is helpful in ensuring system of checks and balances, yet unwarranted cases also end up reaching courts and tribunals. Like in the civil courts, a review mechanism can be 20 Mallica Joshi, ‘Forest Survey of India says 1,670 trees felled for Delhi project; L-G, DDA said 642’ (The Indian Express, 5 November 2024)

21 Debby Jain, 'Will Hold Chief Secretaries Personally Liable’ (Livelaw, 4 March 2025)

incorporated along with specific exhaustive grounds on which review can be permitted in cases that deserve to be reviewed accordingly. 3. 3. Lesser rules, more compliance needed: While the definition of forest after the amendment act of 2023 is constrauning the definition of forest, environmental activists have rightly expressed concerns over the same. Alongside, environmental impact assessment has also been viewed with caution by the activists. The authorities should acknowledge the fact that the citizens are not wary of development, but lack of public participation and reduced accountability erodes public confidence. For example, ex post facto approvals in the draft environmental impact assessment notification have significantly diluted the aim of environmental protection altogether.

The government should revise exemptions for high-risk projects and mandate full environmental scrutiny to ensure long term sustainability. On the same lines, involvement of local communities, and mandatory public hearings should be initiated before declassifying any area that was previously protected. 3. 4. Enforcement versus regulators: The position of pollution control board, which premised on the present basis, deserves urgent attention and warrants the need for review. The pollution control board has been noted to be a 'regulator' for protection. Meaning thereby anything that comes into notice of the board, they are permitted to impose fines. The statutory framework, although, as discussed above, nowhere grants such extensive powers expressly to impose monetary penalties. And even if assuming that they do, no particular criteria for sanctioning have been prescribed.

The role of the board should be revised to change from mere fine levying authorities to becoming actual enforcement bodies. 3. 5. Principles of natural justice in tandem with transparency: Even though as per provisions22 of the National Green Tribunal Act, the NGT is not bound by the provisions of evidence laws, yet it is guided by the principles of natural justice. There are certain provisions that need to be read into the principles of 22National Green Tribunal Act 2010, s 19(3) (India).

natural justice, for example, as discussed in cases above that the right to be informed grounds of arrest or in matters of environment, the statutory bodies cannot just presume that they have discharged their functions merely by imposing penalties. The grounds for making any person liable, even in cases of environmental obligations involving fatal consequences, should be cogent, and be accompanied by actual records of FIR, testimonies, and substantial evidence. Till the time such provisions are held to be distinct for them being part of ‘codified laws’, cases of severe lapses of accountability shall follow. It is therefore recommended that steps be taken to ensure fundamental laws forming part of principles of natural justice should actually be followed in spirit.

The case study provides critical precedential guidance by emphasizing that quasi-judicial authorities must act within the limits of their statutory mandate and cannot assume powers that are not expressly provided. It reinforces the need for statutory clarity and procedural safeguards to ensure that administrative discretion, especially in environmental governance does not compromise accountability.