Judicial Intervention In Executive Delay - Examining The Role Of The Supreme Court In Protecting State Autonomy

Author: LawSphereX

Category: General Law

Published: 2026-08-23T20:25:38.700099+00:00

Updated: 2026-08-26T17:10:54.556+00:00

JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN EXECUTIVE DELAY:

EXAMINING THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN

PROTECTING STATE AUTONOMY

Yashavardhan Pandey, JRF Scholar, Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law Punjab Shailee Mishra, Law Officer, Bank of Baroda

ABSTRACT

The Supreme Court's decision on April 8, 2025, concerning the Tamil Nadu Governor's prolonged withholding of assent to ten legislative bills, has brought to the forefront critical discussions on the interplay between constitutional mandates and judicial intervention in India's federal structure. Central to this case are Articles 2001 and 2012 of the Constitution. Article

2003 outlines the Governor's options upon receiving a bill: to grant assent,

withhold assent, or reserve it for the President's consideration. Article 2014 pertains to the President's role in this process. Invoking Article 1425, which empowers the Court to pass orders necessary for complete justice, the Supreme Court instituted binding timelines: a one-month period for the Governor to act on a bill, and a three-month window for the President to decide on reserved bills. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that once a bill is re-passed by the legislature after reconsideration, the Governor is constitutionally obligated to grant assent and cannot reserve it again for the President. The judgment also highlighted the advisory role of Article 1436, suggesting that when a Governor reserves a bill citing unconstitutionality, the President "ought to" seek the Supreme Court's opinion to ensure constitutional compliance.

Additionally, Article 1457 was pertinent, as it governs the Supreme Court's procedural rules, including the formation of Constitution Benches to deliberate on significant constitutional questions. This judicial intervention, while aiming to uphold constitutional mandates and prevent executive inaction, has sparked a debate on whether it constitutes

1 India Const. art. 200.

2 India Const. art. 201.

3 India Const. art. 200.

4 India Const. art. 201.

5 India Const. art. 142.

6 India Const. art. 143.

7 India Const. art. 145.

judicial activism or overreach. Critics argue that by setting explicit timelines and directing executive actions, the judiciary may be encroaching upon the functions of the executive branch, potentially disrupting the delicate separation of powers. Conversely, proponents assert that such measures are essential to safeguard democratic processes and ensure that constitutional provisions are not rendered ineffective by inaction. This paper thus serves as a critical examination of the judiciary's role in enforcing constitutional duties and maintaining the equilibrium between different branches of government.

INTRODUCTION

The Indian Constitution, a cornerstone of the nation's democratic framework, meticulously delineates the powers and responsibilities of its various organs to ensure a harmonious balance of governance. Among these, the role of the Governor in the legislative process is pivotal, acting as a bridge between the state and the central government. Articles 2008 and 2019 of the Constitution specifically outline the procedures and options available to a Governor when presented with a bill passed by the state legislature. These provisions empower the Governor to grant assent, withhold assent, or reserve the bill for the President's consideration. However, the exercise of these powers must align with constitutional mandates and democratic principles. In recent times, the boundaries of these constitutional provisions were tested in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu10.

Between January 2020 and April 2023, the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly passed twelve bills aimed at amending the oversight and appointment processes of state universities. These bills sought to shift certain powers from the Governor, acting as the ex officio Chancellor, to the state government. Despite being duly passed, the Governor withheld assent to these bills, leading to a constitutional impasse. The prolonged inaction by the Governor prompted the Tamil Nadu government to file a writ petition before the Supreme Court on October 31, 2023. The central question was whether the Governor's indefinite withholding of assent was constitutionally permissible. The Supreme Court, in its judgment delivered on April 8, 2025, addressed this issue, emphasizing the importance of timely decision-making in the legislative process. 8Id at 1.

9 Id at 1.

10 State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1239 OF 2023 (per J.B.

Pardiwala, J.) (India).

Invoking Article 14211, which empowers the Court to pass orders necessary for complete justice, the Supreme Court instituted binding timelines: a one-month period for the Governor to act on a bill, and a three-month window for the President to decide on reserved bills. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that once a bill is re-passed by the legislature after reconsideration, the Governor is constitutionally obligated to grant assent and cannot reserve it again for the President. This interpretation ensures that the legislative process is not hindered by executive inaction. The Court also highlighted the advisory role of Article 14312, suggesting that when a Governor reserves a bill citing unconstitutionality, the President should seek the Supreme Court's opinion to ensure constitutional compliance.

Additionally, Article 14513 was pertinent, as it governs the Supreme Court's procedural rules, including the formation of Constitution Benches to deliberate on significant constitutional questions. This judicial intervention has sparked a debate on whether it represents necessary judicial activism to uphold constitutional processes or an overreach into executive functions. Critics argue that by setting explicit timelines and directing executive actions, the judiciary may be encroaching upon the functions of the executive branch, potentially disrupting the delicate separation of powers. Conversely, proponents assert that such measures are essential to safeguard democratic processes and ensure that constitutional provisions are not rendered ineffective by inaction.

The case underscores the judiciary's role in enforcing constitutional duties and maintaining the equilibrium between different branches of government. It reaffirms the principle that no constitutional authority can act in a manner that undermines the democratic process. By setting clear guidelines and timelines, the Supreme Court has aimed to prevent future constitutional crises arising from executive inaction, thereby strengthening the democratic fabric of the nation. In conclusion, the Supreme Court's judgment in the State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu14 case serves as a landmark in constitutional jurisprudence. It clarifies the extent of the Governor's powers concerning legislative assent and reinforces the importance of timely 11Id at 1. 12Id at 1. 13Id at 1.

14 Id at 1.

decision-making in the legislative process. While debates on judicial activism versus overreach continue, the judgment undeniably contributes to the ongoing discourse on the separation of powers and the functioning of India's federal structure.

CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR AND ARTICLE 200 AND 201

Under the Indian Constitution, the Governor serves as the ceremonial head of a state, paralleling the President's role at the national level. While primarily symbolic, the Governor holds significant authority in specific situations, acting as a conduit between the state and central governments, thereby reinforcing the federal structure of the nation. The Constitution, through Article 15315, mandates the presence of a Governor in each state, allowing for the possibility of a single individual overseeing multiple states. Article 15416 assigns the state's executive powers to the Governor, implying that all executive actions are executed in their name. According to Article 15517, the President appoints the Governor, who serves at the President's discretion as outlined in Article 15618, typically for a five-year term.

Article 16319 stipulates that the Governor should act based on the advice of the Council of Ministers, led by the Chief Minister, except in matters where discretion is constitutionally permitted. Article 164 further details the Governor's responsibilities in appointing the Chief Minister and, upon their recommendation, other ministers. Though largely ceremonial, the Governor's role encompasses discretionary powers, especially during critical junctures. For instance, in the absence of a clear majority in the legislative assembly post-elections, the Governor must determine which party or coalition to invite to form the government. In scenarios where the state's constitutional machinery fails, the Governor can recommend the imposition of President's Rule under Article 35620.

Another key discretionary function involves reserving certain bills for the President's consideration, particularly those potentially conflicting with central laws or impacting the judiciary's authority. The Supreme Court has elucidated the Governor's constitutional position through several

15 India Const. art. 153.

16 India Const. art. 154.

17 India Const. art. 155.

18 India Const. art. 156.

19 India Const. art. 163.

20 India Const. art. 356.

landmark judgments. In Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab21, the Court emphasized that the Governor must generally act on the Council of Ministers' advice, with discretionary powers being constitutionally bounded. The judgment clarified that the Governor is not an autonomous executive authority but operates within the state's governmental framework. Further clarity emerged from S. R. Bommai v. Union of India22, where the Court asserted that the Governor's recommendation for President's Rule under Article 35623 must be grounded in objective criteria, not personal discretion. This decision curtailed arbitrary use of the power and subjected the Governor's actions to judicial scrutiny. In Nabam Rebia v.

Deputy Speaker24, the Supreme Court reiterated that the Governor cannot summon, prorogue, or dissolve the legislative assembly without the Council of Ministers' advice, except where the Constitution explicitly grants discretion. This ruling underscored that the Governor's discretionary powers are not absolute and must align with constitutional principles. The Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India25 case further established that the Governor's actions are open to judicial review, especially if deemed mala fide, arbitrary, or based on irrelevant factors. Similarly, in State of Rajasthan v. Union of India26 the Court highlighted that the Governor must avoid actions that could destabilize democratically elected governments and should maintain political neutrality.

In summary, judicial interpretations have consistently aimed to uphold the constitutional integrity of the Governor's office, preserve federal balance, and ensure adherence to the Constitution's framework. A neutral and judicious Governor remains vital for the effective functioning of state governance within the constitutional boundaries established by the nation's founders. Therefore, the two Judges bench of Supreme Court recently relied on abovementioned judgments so as to exercise the power of Judicial review on the course of action taken by the unelected head of states.

21 Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, 1975 SCR (1) 814, (per, A.N. Ray., J.) (India).

22 S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, Appeal (civil) 3645 of 1989, (per, S. Ratnavel Pandian, J.) (India).

23 Id at 5.

24 Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker, AIR 2016 SC 3209, (per, Jagdish Singh Khehar, J.) (India).

25 Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India, Writ Petition (civil) 257 of 2005 (India).

26 State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, 1977 AIR 1361, (M.H. Beg, J.) (India).

Scenario under Article 200- Article 20027 of the Constitution directs the Governor to choose one of the three options when the state legislature presents a bill to him and those options are; giving assent to bill, withhold assent to bill, reserve the bill for the president’s consideration. The main issue always arises when the governor withholds the assent or reserve the same for president’s consideration. And it generally opens the door of judicial review for governor’s actions.

When governor does not give the assent to the bills passed by the state legislature then first proviso to the same Article starts playing its role which says that the governor, if withhold his assent to the bill then as early as possible, may return the bill except the money bill to the state legislature for considering the same and if the state legislature with or without amendment sends it or presents it to the governor then governor is bound to give assent to the same. And as far as the reservation of bill for the president’s assent is concerned, it can be done only when the governor thinks that if bill become law, then it would hamper the powers of High Court granted by the constitution to fulfil. So, in this very case the governor shall not give assent rather he can reserve it to president for his assent as per the second proviso to Article 20028.

And the current scenario of Tamil Nadu shows the situation of “Absolute veto” meaning thereby the governor can withhold any bill or sit on any bill for unfettered time without sending it back to the state legislature. That’s why the State Government of Tamil Nadu has opposed the action taken by the respective state governor and filed a plea in front of the Supreme Court opposing the same.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court placed a reliance on State of Punjab vs Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab29 and held that the withholding of assent is valid as far as the returning of the bill to the state legislature is concerned and the power to withhold the assent to the bill must be read with the first proviso to the Article 200 and if the governor would read the withholding of assent without following the first proviso to the same then the power of pocket veto would arise and such course of action is not given by the Constitution to the unelected head of state i. e. , Governor. The court examined another case30 as well and observed that if the

27 Id at 1.

28 Id.

29 State of Punjab vs Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab, [2023] 15 S.C.R. 777, (2023/ Volume 15) (per Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) (India).

30 Union of India v. Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary, (1979) 3 SCC 324, (per Sen, A.P., J.) (India).

delay is occasioned by the state legislature in considering the returned bill meaning thereby if the state legislature chooses not to take any course of action, then the same can be lapse and the discretion to reconsider does not lie to the unelected constitutional head of state rather to the state legislative assembly of a specific state. Scenario under Article 20131- If we talk about Article 20132 then we will get to know what options a President has when a bill is presented to him. Unlike Governor he has only two options that is giving assent or withhold the same. And if president exercises first option, then through the governor, she can exercise the discretion of returning the bill to the state legislature.

And it is when the state legislature has to reconsider within 6 months of returning and once get re-enacted the bill if with or without any changes is presented to the President again. Unlike Governor, the President is not obligated to give assent to the reconsidered bill if presented again to President with or without changes. And as far as reservation of bill by Governor to President is concerned, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed33 that the constitution does not provide any specific timeline in which President has to act upon. So, as to address the same issue, the court has placed some reliance on the

2016 memoranda issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs34, Punchhi Commission35, Sarkaria

Commission36. And in this way the Supreme Court has directed President to seek action within

3 months and if no action is taken by him within the prescribed time period, then writ of

mandamus can be filed to the Court by the affected State Government. So, in this way the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down certain timelines within which the constitutional heads have to exercise their discretion on bills placed before them. And about the timeline prescribed by the court, the author will discuss under other head. Scope of Article 142 of the Indian Constitution and the Supreme Court’s Judgments Article 14237 of the Indian Constitution is a unique and powerful provision that grants

31 Id at 1.

32 Id.

33 Id at 3.

34 Ministry of Home Affairs, Office Memorandum: Time Limit for Presidential Assent to State Bills (Feb. 4, 2016). 35 Punchhi Commission, Report of the Commission on Centre-State Relations, Report No. 5, at 102 (2010).

36 Sarkaria Commission, Report of the Commission on Centre-State Relations 45 (1988).

37 Id at 1.

extraordinary powers to the Supreme Court to ensure complete justice38 in any matter before it. This wide language gives the Court the ability to craft remedies that may not strictly fit within the rigid boundaries of existing statutes, allowing it to ensure fairness, equity, and justice in extraordinary situations. The scope of Article 14239 is extremely broad and has been expansively interpreted over time through various landmark judgments. It acts as a residuary source of power, ensuring that judicial decisions do not fail merely because there is no specific law covering a particular situation. Article 14240, therefore, empowers the Court to fill gaps in law temporarily until the legislature enacts appropriate legislation. In Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, U. P. 41 the Supreme Court first discussed the scope of Article 14242.

The Court clarified that while it could pass any order to do complete justice, it could not contravene any express statutory provision or fundamental right. Thus, Article 14243 is powerful, but not unbridled. Over time, however, the Supreme Court expanded its understanding of Article 142. In Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India44, the Court noted that although the power under Article 14245 is vast and meant for complete justice, it cannot be used to supplant substantive law. Yet, in appropriate cases, it can supplement existing laws to bridge gaps and ensure that justice is not defeated. The celebrated judgment in Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India46 arising out of the Bhopal gas tragedy showcased Article 14247’s pragmatic use. The Court approved a settlement 38 “Article 142 – Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court and orders as to discovery, etc.

- The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe. ”

39 Id.

40 Id.

41 Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, U.P., AIR 1963 SC 996, (per P.B. Gajendragadkar J.) (India).

42 Id at 1.

43 Id.

44 Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409 (S.C. Agrawal, G.N. Ray, S.P.

Bharucha, S. Rajendra Babu) (India).

45 Id.

46 Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584 (per Pathak, R.S., CJ.) (India).

47 Id at 1.

to provide compensation to victims, invoking its powers under Article 142 to ensure speedy relief, even though there were criticisms that it bypassed some procedural norms. Another important use of Article 14248 was in M. C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath49 where the Court used it to protect the environment and natural resources, holding that when the situation demands, the Court can pass any order necessary to prevent environmental degradation, even if there was no specific statutory remedy at the time. More recently, in the Ayodhya land dispute case, M. Siddiq (D) Thr. Lrs. v. Mahant Suresh Das50, the Supreme Court invoked Article 14251 to direct the allotment of alternative land for construction of a mosque, while upholding the Hindu parties’ claim over the disputed land.

This use of Article 14252 highlighted how the Court employed its powers to balance competing claims and ensure finality and closure to a historically sensitive issue. In State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih53, the Supreme Court utilized Article 14254 to protect lowpaid employees from recovery of excess salary payments, thus safeguarding the interests of equity and fairness. Article 14255 has also been used in matrimonial disputes, especially to dissolve marriages where it was found that the marriage had irretrievably broken down, even though such a ground is not yet codified under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. For instance, in Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan56, a Constitution Bench held that the Supreme Court can grant divorce by mutual consent by exercising its powers under Article 14257, without following the statutory cooling-off period.

At the same time, the Court has also recognized limitations on its powers under Article 14258. It has stated that it cannot be used to disregard substantive law, and must be exercised judiciously to avoid creating situations where the separation of powers between the legislature, executive, and judiciary is blurred. Thus, Article 14259 gives the Supreme Court of India an extraordinary tool to dispense justice even in situations where existing law is inadequate or where strict adherence to law would

48 Id at 1.

49 M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 SCC 388 (Kuldeep Singh J.) (India).

50 M. Siddiq (D) Thr. Lrs. v. Mahant Suresh Das, (2019) 18 SCC 1.

51 Id at 1.

52 Id.

53 State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih, (2015) 4 SCC 334 (Jagdish Singh Khehar, J.) (India).

54 Id at 1.

55 Id at 1.

56 Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) SCC OnLine SC 544 (S.K. Kaul, J.) (India).

57 Id at 1.

58 Id at 1.

59 Id at 1.

cause injustice. However, the consistent caution exercised by the Court over time ensures that this provision remains a shield for equity and justice, rather than a sword cutting across constitutional boundaries. In essence, Article 14260 embodies the spirit of a dynamic and responsive judiciary, ensuring that legal technicalities do not defeat substantial justice. It is a testament to the faith reposed by the framers of the Constitution in the Supreme Court to act as the ultimate guardian of justice in India. In conclusion, Article 14261 serves as a vital tool in the Supreme Court's arsenal to address unique challenges and ensure justice prevails.

Its application in the Tamil Nadu Governor's case highlights the Court's proactive role in safeguarding constitutional principles, reinforcing the importance of accountability, and maintaining the equilibrium between different branches of governance. Seeking Supreme Court's Opinion under article 143 on Reserved Legislation Article 14362 of the Indian Constitution empowers the President to seek the Supreme Court's advisory opinion on significant legal or constitutional questions. While this provision has been invoked in various contexts, its application concerning reserved legislation, particularly in the recent Tamil Nadu scenario, underscores its potential role in resolving constitutional ambiguities.

Understanding Article 143 Article 14363 comprises two clauses: Clause (1): Allows the President to refer to the Supreme Court any question of law or fact of public importance for its opinion. Clause (2): Permits the President to seek the Court's opinion on disputes arising out of preconstitutional treaties, agreements, or covenants. The Supreme Court's opinion under Article 143 is advisory and not binding; however, it holds significant persuasive value and is often acted upon by the government.

60 Id at 1.

61 Id at 1.

62 Id at 1.

63 Id at 1.

Application in Reserved Legislation In the context of reserved legislation, Article 20064 of the Constitution allows a State Governor to reserve certain bills for the President's consideration. However, the Constitution does not explicitly mandate the President to seek the Supreme Court's opinion under Article 14365 in such cases. In the recent Tamil Nadu case, the Governor withheld assent to several bills passed by the State Legislature and later referred them to the President. The Supreme Court observed that the Governor's actions raised concerns about the constitutional process, particularly when bills are re-passed by the Legislature. The Court emphasized that the Governor must act promptly and cannot indefinitely withhold assent, as it would disrupt the legislative process and governance.

Criticism- If the President, upon receiving a reserved bill, harbours doubts about its constitutionality, seeking the Supreme Court's advisory opinion under Article 14366 could provide clarity and uphold the constitutional balance between the Union and the States. Therefore, in this specific case, Supreme Court has taken precautionary measure that if any substantial question of law or fact arises then President “ought to” take advisory opinion from the Supreme Court itself under Article 14367. But the President in this specific case, did not referred the matter to Supreme Court which open the door of criticism. As far as Article 145(3)68 is concerned, it stipulates that a minimum of five judges must sit to decide any case involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution or for hearing any reference under Article 14369.

But in this very specific case the bench was of 2 Judges namely, Justice J. B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan only. This requirement ensures that significant constitutional matters receive due deliberation. Critics argue that the absence of Constitution Bench and the discretionary power of the Chief Justice to constitute benches lead to inconsistencies in constitutional adjudication which has been held in the present scenario.

64 Id.

65 Id.

66 Id.

67 Id.

68 Id at 1.

69 Id.

While Articles 14370 and 145(3)71 provide mechanisms for addressing constitutional questions, there is a need for reforms to ensure consistency and efficiency in constitutional adjudication. Establishing a permanent Constitution Bench and clearly defining the criteria for constituting larger benches could enhance the Supreme Court's ability to address significant constitutional issues effectively. Timelines and Accountability: Supreme Court's Directive on Assent to Bills. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of prolonged delays by constitutional authorities in granting assent to state legislation. The Court examined the interpretation of phrases like “as soon as possible” and “reasonable period” in the context of Article 20072 of the Constitution, which outlines the Governor's role in the legislative process.

The Court referred to the recommendations of the Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions, which suggested specific timelines for the Governor to act on bills. Justice J. B. Pardiwala emphasized that prescribing a timeline does not amend the Constitution but reinforces the intended expediency of Article 20073. He clarified that these timelines serve as guiding prescriptions rather than rigid mandates, allowing for judicial review in cases of inaction. The Court prescribed the following timelines for the Governor's actions and President’s action under Article 20074 and 20175 respectively- • The Governor must act within three months to either grant assent or reserve the bill for the President's consideration if without aid and advice of the legislature it is passed.

• The Governor must act within one month to either grant assent or reserve the bill for the President’s consideration if on aid and advice of the legislature it is passed. • If the bill is returned to the legislature and re-passed, the Governor is obligated to grant assent immediately, or within one month at most. • If the bill is reserved for the President’s advice, then President has to act on reserved bills within three months. And in the meantime, if the President does not act then States are entitled to file writ petitions

70 Id.

71 Id.

72 Id at 1.

73 Id.

74 Id.

75 Id.

seeking the issuance of mandamus in the court of law. These timelines aim to prevent the Governor from exercising a "pocket veto" by indefinitely withholding assent. The Court noted that any inaction could impede the lawmaking process and affect public perception of the elected government, posing a serious threat to the federal polity of the country. The Court also drew parallels to the decision in Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly76, where it prescribed a three-month limit for the Speaker to decide on disqualification petitions. This precedent supported the Court's authority to set reasonable timelines for constitutional functionaries to perform their duties. The Supreme Court's directives establish a framework for timely assent to state legislation, ensuring that the legislative process is not hindered by undue delays.

This development marks a significant step towards making unelected head of state i. e. , Governor and Nominal head of Government i. e. , President accountable for their course of action. Judicial Activism or overreach? Analysing the Supreme Court’s role in Tamil Nadu Legislative process The separation of power doctrine is borrowed under Indian Constitution from U. S. A. This doctrine says that the all three branches of the Government is not dependent on any other branches. It means they are independent to do their act without the encroachment of another branch. And as per the Justice Ruma Pal, the classical separation of power theory is nothing but the functional separation of power meaning thereby every other branch is assigned those functions which are best suited to them i. e. , as per their nature of work.

So, separate departments are created for the exercise of legislative, executive and judicial power and care taken to keep the three as separate and distinct as possible except so far as each is made a check upon the other to keep it proper bounds or to prevent hasty action. The recent Supreme Court's verdict77 has ignited a significant debate on the judiciary's role in India's federal structure. While the Court aimed to prevent executive inaction from stalling state legislation, critics argue that it may have overstepped its constitutional boundaries. So, it’s time to understand whether the course of action which the judiciary has taken is judicial activism or judicial overreach. 76 Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly, (per R. F. Nariman, J. ) (India).

77 Id at 3.

The most important thing which is noticeable in the current scenario is that withholding of assent by one of executive body i. e. , Governor on State Legislation. This only highlights the intervention of Executive on Legislature. The Court deemed the Governor's inaction as "illegal" and "erroneous," emphasizing that such delays undermine the legislative process. To prevent indefinite withholding of assent, the Court prescribed specific timelines for the Governor and the President to act on bills to as to do complete justice. However, some legal experts view this as judicial overreach. They argue that by setting timelines and deeming bills as assented, the Court has effectively amended Article 20078, which does not specify any time frame for the Governor's actions. But, as per the author’s view it was a check put on Executive functions by the judiciary.

The ruling sets a precedent for judicial scrutiny of gubernatorial actions, reinforcing the accountability of constitutional functionaries. It underscores the judiciary's role in safeguarding the democratic process and ensuring that no branch of government exceeds its constitutional limits. Striking the right balance between judicial oversight and respect for the separation of powers remains essential to preserving India's democratic ethos. Conclusion The Supreme Court's verdict marks a pivotal moment in delineating the constitutional boundaries of gubernatorial authority within India's federal framework. By unequivocally rejecting the notions of 'absolute' and 'pocket' vetoes under Article 20079, the Court reaffirmed the primacy of democratic processes and the imperative for constitutional functionaries to act within defined parameters.

The Court's decision to prescribe specific timelines for gubernatorial actions such as granting assent, withholding assent, or reserving bills for presidential consideration addresses the longstanding issue of indefinite delays that can hinder the legislative process. These timelines, while not altering the Constitution, serve as essential guidelines to ensure prompt and accountable decision-making, thereby preventing the misuse of discretionary powers. Furthermore, the invocation of Article 14280 to deem pending bills as assented underscores the judiciary's commitment to upholding constitutional morality and preventing executive inaction from stalling governance. This exercise of judicial discretion, though extraordinary, was

78 Id at 1.

79 Id at 1.

80 Id.

deemed necessary to maintain the balance between different branches of government and to protect the sanctity of the legislative process. While the judgment has been lauded for reinforcing federal principles and ensuring accountability, it also invites scrutiny regarding the extent of judicial intervention in executive functions. The delineation of roles among the legislature, executive, and judiciary remains a delicate balance, and this verdict serves as a reminder of the ongoing dialogue required to maintain that equilibrium. In essence, the Supreme Court's ruling not only clarifies the constitutional role of Governors but also strengthens the democratic fabric by ensuring that no constitutional authority operates beyond the scope of accountability and reason.

It sets a precedent for proactive judicial engagement in preserving the integrity of legislative processes and upholding the foundational principles of the Constitution.