Judicial Power And Contempt - A Study Of Indian Law And Key Cases

Author: LawSphereX

Category: General Law

Published: 2026-08-23T20:25:52.45841+00:00

Updated: 2026-08-26T17:10:53.604+00:00

JUDICIAL POWER AND CONTEMPT: A STUDY OF INDIAN

LAW AND KEY CASES

Hasnath K.H, Government Law College, Ernakulam The Law of Contempt of Court is a branch of law in India that permits courts to punish individuals for words or acts that hinder justice administration, and is exercised by all courts, Including Superior Courts, on their own or subordinate courts' behalf. Previously, it was inherent in the powers of a Court of Record, but now it is part of the powers of the Supreme Court and High Courts. There are various types of contempt, including insulting judges, attacking them, commenting on pending proceedings, obstructing court officers, witnesses, parties, abusing the court process, breaching duty by court officers, and scandalizing judges or courts. The last form of contempt involves bringing the authority and administration of the law into disrepute or disregard, which can be committed against a single judge, court, or entire judiciary.

SANYAL COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION:

The Sanyal Committee's recommendation mainly focus on the purpose of a contempt proceeding. It further aims to prove the court's innocence and not satisfy private individual's grudges. An unqualified apology, expressing genuine contrition, may be accepted by the court. However, an apology denying the factum of contempt may not be accepted and is inconsistent with the plea of justification. A belated apology is not usually accepted. The court has the discretion to accept unqualified or belated apologies, as sincere unqualified apologies reduce the severity of offenses.

TYPES AND METHODS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT IN INDIA:

In India, there are two types of contempt of courts: Civil Contempt and Criminal Contempt, which are covered by section 2(b) and section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 respectively. Civil contempt: Civil Contempt refers to wilful disobedience to a court order, decree, direction, judgment, or writ, or wilfully breaching undertakings. Civil contempt are not offences and is of private

nature, as they deprive a party of the benefit for which the order was made. Civil Contempt can be defended under several conditions, including lack of knowledge of the order, disobedience or breach done should not be, order disobedience should be vague or ambiguous, orders involve more than one reasonable interpretation, and command of the order is impossible. In cases where a person is accused of Civil Contempt, they can take the following defences: lack of knowledge of the order, disobedience or breach done should not be, order disobedience should be vague or ambiguous, orders involve more than one reasonable interpretation, and command of the order is impossible. These defences can be successful if the person argues that the act was not willful, a mere accident, or beyond their control.

However, it is important to differentiate between the cases of impossibility and mere difficulties, as these can only be applied in cases of contempt of court. Criminal contempt: A publication or action that has any one of the following effects: (1) scandalizing a court; (2)

interfering with a specific judicial proceeding; or (3) interfering with the administration of justice in general is considered criminal contempt. There is no need for mens rea in this strict liability offense. Section 3 is amended to make it clear that, in the event that publication of information regarding a continuing proceeding gives rise to contempt, the contemnor would not be held accountable if, at the time of publication, they were unaware of the proceeding's status. The norm regarding the imminence of the proceeding has been abandoned, and the Explanation to Subsection (3) of Section 3 provides a definition of the term pendency of proceedings. the conduct of a fair trial was determined in the case of Jaswant Singh v. Virender Singh1, the dismissal of his Election Petition No. 16/91 by the Punjab and Haryana High Court is challenged by the appellant.

The election took place on 20. 5. 1991, with the appellant and other candidates from 71 Namaund Assembly Constituency. The appellant, a nominee of the Indian National Congress, secured 19973 votes, 38 less than the returned candidate. The court found that the allegation of tampering with election material after the declaration of the result has no factual foundations. The court found that the Assistant Treasurer, Dr. Avtar Singh, had sealed the packets and trunks before depositing them in the Treasury. The court concluded that the entry at mark "B" relates to the receipt of election

1 1995 KHC 569

material on 17th June 1991.In this case, an advocate made a disparaging and scandalous attack on the High Court judge. An advocate sought to remain for additional arguments in an election petition and transfer election petitions in this instance, which sparked controversy and an attack on the legal process. According to the court, these acts were an attempt to frighten the judge and obstruct a fair trial.

PUNISHMENT FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT:

By Section 12 of The Contempt of Courts Act, contempt of court is punishable with simple imprisonment for up to six months or a fine of up to two thousand rupees, or both. • Contempt of Supreme Court include contempt on subordinate courts and the high courts: The Supreme Court holds the authority to punish instances of contempt not just against itself, but also against subordinate courts and High Courts. While Articles 19(1)(a) and (g) of the Indian Constitution guarantee freedom of speech, they do not protect acts of contempt. Therefore, actions taken under Article 129 are legitimate and do not violate those freedoms. Essentially, one cannot claim freedom of expression to justify contempt, ensuring that the principles of justice and the integrity of the legal profession are upheld.

• Article 129 and Article 142 of the Constitution of India: Under Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court holds the authority to impose serious penalties on advocates, including suspending their practice and removing their names from the state roll under Section 38 of the Advocates Act. For instance, a contemnor may face six weeks of simple imprisonment with a suspension extending for four years for any subsequent offenses, along with a three-year suspension from practicing law and vacating their elective posts. An example of this authority in action occurred when the Supreme Court rejected an advocate's apology for contempt. The court found the advocate's apology to be insincere and showing no real regret, viewing it instead as a way to justify his behavior.

His defiant attitude and counter allegations against the judge demonstrated a clear lack of respect for the court’s authority. This behavior raised concerns about his understanding of the gravity of his actions and the need for

accountability. While the Supreme Court’s powers are broad, it clarified that disciplinary matters concerning professional conduct are the exclusive domain of the Bar Council’s disciplinary committees.

CONTEMPT PROCEDURE IN THE SUPREME COURT OR ANY HIGH COURT

(SECTION 14):

Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, provides a just process for addressing contempt cases in the Supreme Court and High Courts. It ensures that accused individuals are informed of their charges, allowed to defend themselves, and receive fair treatment. If a person applies to have the charge tried by a Judge other than the one in whose presence or hearing the offense is alleged, the court will place the matter before the Chief Justice for directions regarding the trial. The statement placed before the Chief Justice under sub-section (2) will be treated as evidence in the case.

The court may direct a person charged with contempt to be detained in custody, provided they are released on bail if a bond for sufficient money is executed with or without sureties, conditioned that the person must attend at the time and place mentioned in the bond and continue until otherwise directed by the court. If the court thinks fit, it may discharge the person on executing a bond without sureties for their attendance.

CONTEMPT OF COURT (HIGH COURT OF KERALA) RULES, 1971:

The Contempt of Court (High Court of Kerala) Rules, 1971 No. D1-14606/66, outline the preliminary procedure for cases of contempt in subordinate courts and the High Court. If a formal application is made, the papers will be forwarded to the Advocate-General, who will make the application. The court can proceed suo motu if it deems fit. An application for punishment for contempt must be registered as an Original Petition (Contempt), accompanied by a memorandum of charges, statement of facts constituting the contempt, and an affidavit. The application must be posted before a Bench of two Judges, following the Chief Justice's directions. A copy of the application and the affidavit must accompany the notice to be served upon the party in contempt. If the party is found to be keeping out of the way or cannot be found, the court may order substituted service and arrest.

If the party in contempt cannot be arrested due to absconding or keeping out of the way, the court may order attachment of their property for a reasonable amount and proceed to realize the amount in the same manner as executing a decree for money. If the party appears and shows

that they did not abscond or keep out of the way, direct payment of the net proceeds may be made. Every person arrested for contempt must be brought before the court and examined orally. If the person submits to the judgment, their submission and confession are recorded, and the court may commit them to jail or accept bail for their appearance before the court. The Deputy Registrar will draw up orders made on the application and take necessary steps for enforcement.

CONDITIONS FOR VALID APOLOGY:

Apology should be offered at the earliest opportunity and in good grace, and mere expression of regret is not considered an apology. It is considered in awarding punishment. In a conditional apology, the contemnor apologises on the condition that if the court finds contempt, their apology may be accepted. The question of accepting such an apology arises only when contempt was committed. Typically, an unconditional apology is accepted. It is highly inappropriate for a lawyer to act in the way that the person in contempt did. No justice system can tolerate such conduct. The evidence in a recent case clearly shows that the lawyer committed a serious offense of criminal contempt of court. The lawyer's apology was not genuine and seemed to be made to avoid punishment. The court rejected the apology. The seriousness of the offence led to the need for deterrent punishment.

The court sentenced the contemnor to simple imprisonment for four months and a fine of Rs. 2,000/. If the fine is not paid, the contemnor will face further imprisonment for two months. An apology should be genuine contrition or repentance, not belated or combined with justification that aggravates contempt. Courts are not bound to accept unconditional apologizes, and those tendered after the hearing or by someone who was in contempt on a previous occasion may not be accepted. In K. A. Mohammed. Ali v. C. N. Prasanna2, an advocate raised his voice and used derogatory language against the Magistrate. After the incident, he published posters and staged a demonstration, which was reported to the High Court. The High Court has ruled that the appellant should have stopped and listened to the Magistrate, not remained aggressive. After

2 AIR 1995 SUPREME COURT 454, 1994 AIR SCW 4679, (1995) 1 EASTCRIC 29, (1995) 1 LANDLR 76,

(1995) SC CR R 306, 1994 CRILR(SC&MP) 804, (1994) 3 CRIMES 618, 1994 CRILR(SC MAH GUJ) 804,

(1994) 3 ALLCRILR 403, (1994) 4 CURCRIR 767, 1994 SCC (SUPP) 3 469, 1995 ALLAPPCAS (CRI) 78

being convicted for criminal contempt of court, he sought an apology from the Supreme Court. The court ruled that the apology was not filed at the earliest opportunity and was not acceptable. The appellant was advised not to pay a fine but to pay a sum to the legal aid board. Apology acceptance or rejection depends on the specific case and circumstances. Principles for acceptance include delivering an apology at the earliest, ensuring it is genuine and not just a paper one, being conditional or unconditional, and showing genuine repentance. Apology offered at a time when the court may impose punishment becomes an act of a cringing coward. The basic basis for acceptance of an apology is a finding of committal of contempt. These principles help determine the appropriateness of an apology in a given situation. E. M. S. NAMBOODIRIPAD v. T. N. NAMBIAR CASE: The E. M. S. Namboodiripad v. T. N.

Nambiar 3 case is a significant Indian case involving the Supreme Court's determination of whether comments made by a politician, Namboodiripad, constitute contempt. Namboodiripad criticized judicial decisions affecting the rights of the people, leading to a complaint from Nambiar. The Court emphasized the balance between freedom of speech and the need to maintain the dignity of the judiciary. The appellant argued that his philosophy is based on Marx and Engels and seeks to educate exploited peoples on the reality behind class oppression. He advocates for the radical and revolutionary transformation of the State from a violent instrument of exploiting classes to an instrument that the exploited majority can use against these classes. The law of contempt cannot be used to deprive him of his rights.

The defendants argued that the Contempt of Court had fallen into disuse in England, but it was disproved within one year of Mcleod v. St. Aubyn4. They also argued that all cases of Contempt of Court are with different facts and must be examined on its own facts. The appellant alleged that whatever was said by E. M. Shankaran Namboodiripad was according to the learnings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and that there was no direct attack on the Judiciary selected as the target of people's wrath. The judgment decision held the appellant liable for contempt of court and sentencing him to a nominal fine. The sentence of fine was reduced to Rs. 50/-, and in default of payment. Article 3 AIR 1970 SC 2015 : 1970 (2) SCC 325 : 1971 (1) 697 : 1970 UJ 892 : 1970 Cr. LJ 1670 : 1970 SCC (Cr. ) 451

4 (1899) AC 549. (1899) UKPC 51

19(1)(a) of the constitution of India guarantees complete freedom of speech and expression to every Indian citizen but also makes an exception in respect of contempt of courts. Judge Hidayatullah's other opinions revolved around the statement he made and how it contradicted itself, as well as how his teachings did not explicitly involve the system of judiciary in any of their writings. Criticizing the judiciary is protected by Article 19(1)(a), and whether the appellant's statements during the press conference constitute contempt of court. The appellant is held liable for contempt of court and is not protected under the right to freedom of speech and expression. The guarantee to expression should always prevail over the law of contempt.

The Contempt of Court Act, 1971, addresses this concept, with Articles 129 and 215 of the Indian Constitution empowering the Supreme Court and High Court to punish people for contempt. However, Articles 129 and 215 are not subject to Article 19(1)(a). To establish contempt of court, the general elements needed include the making of a valid court order, the respondent's knowledge of the order, their ability to comply, and their willful disobedience.

IN RE MATHEWS NEDUMBARA CASE: 5

The Supreme Court case concerning Mathews Nedumpara and the Union of India raises significant questions about contempt of court. The appellant, Mathews Nedumpara, sought acceptance of his apology to be freed from contempt charges. He also requested the withdrawal of legal responsibilities from Justices Rohinton Fali Nariman and Vineet Saran and sought permission to initiate criminal proceedings against them under various sections of the Indian Penal Code. Additionally, Nedumpara called for immediate action under the Contempt of Courts Act, referencing previous cases that established a legal precedent for such actions. The court noted two complaints made against the members of the bench, highlighting that allegations had been made against Justices Nariman and Saran, suggesting a collaboration between individuals involved in the complaints.

The allegations were deemed scandalous, leading the court to issue notices of contempt to Nedumpara, Vijay Kurle, Rashid Khan Pathan, and Nilesh Ojha, demanding explanations for their accusations. The Chief Justice has been directed to establish a suitable bench to consider this contempt case, emphasizing the seriousness of the allegations. Ultimately, the court's

5 (2019) 19 SCC 454.

conclusion recognized the gravity of the situation, signifying a commitment to uphold judicial integrity while addressing accusations that could undermine the authority of the judiciary. The court requires responses to the contempt notices to ensure accountability and adherence to the law.

IN PRASHANT BHUSHAN AND ANOTHER CASE:

The case of Prashant Bhushan and another6 case revolves around whether contemnors scandalize or lower the authority of the Supreme Court as defined in section 2(c)(i) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971. Advocate Prashant Bhushan tweeted about Chief Justice of India. In his tweet Chief Justice of India is riding a motorcycle without a mask during the Covid-19 lockdown. He criticized particularly the last four CJIs of the Supreme Court in destroying democracy in India,. Mahek Maheswari filed a petition against Bhushan and Twitter India, claiming it sparked a feeling of no-confidence in the judiciary's independence and amounted to scandalizing the court. The Supreme Court initiated contempt proceedings, arguing that the tweets were stifling free speech and violating Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.

Bhushan argued that raising questions about the conduct of CJIs does not amount to scandalizing the Court itself and that criticizing the judge fairly is a necessary right in a democracy. The Attorney General of India, Prashant Bhushan, has argued that the alleged contemnor, a senior lawyer, should not have made such proclamations due to legitimate concerns for the organization of equity. He argued that no decision could be passed without hearing appointed authorities, and that such a safeguard cannot be investigated. He also urged the court to caution Bhushan to be cautious when expressing concerns about judges or the organization of justice of equity. The respondent, a senior lawyer, argued that Bhushan's tweets were a response to the incongruity between the CJI's reckless perspective and the SC's inability to hear cases due to COVID-19.

He argued that the contempt proceedings were an attempt to stifle free speech and offensive of basic rights under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. He also argued that the Rule of Proportionality should balance rights against limitations, and that the contemnor's

6 2020 KHC 6516.

assessments were true and without malevolence. He argued that the conviction should be reviewed, and no sentence can be forced. The Supreme Court analyzed Prashant Bhushan's tweets, which were deemed to be a "fair criticism" of the Indian judiciary system. The Court found that the first tweet was a private criticism against the Chief Justice (CJI) and the second part was an undisputed attack on the CJI's capability as the body head of the judiciary. The Court rejected Prashant Bhushan's claim of actual criticism due to his concern for the physical non-functioning of the courts. The Court also noted that Bhushan's comment that the Apex Court had played a significant role in allowing the destruction of democracy was a direct criticism of the establishment of the Supreme Court and the CJI.

The Court also found that Bhushan's behavior without showing responsibility and the fact that the tweets were not inherently religious protected, rendering it ineligible for defense under Article 19(1) freedom of expression. The Court found Bhushan guilty of contempt of court and ordered him to submit an unconditional apology. The Court adjudicated that scandalizing the Supreme Court was a violation of freedom of speech, and honest criticism was a permissible defense but subject to affordable restrictions under Article 19(2) due to public interest. The Court noted that criticism of the judiciary was not protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and amounted to contempt. The Court concluded that while it was impossible to regulate the thinking method and words of one individual, once it came to expression, it must be constitutional.

Therefore, Bhushan was sentenced with a nominal fine of federal agency rather than severe punishment. The court was repeatedly asked for an apology, as the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 outlines the procedure for contempt cases and punishes the offense with simple imprisonment or a fine. However, Section 12 of the Act allows for an exception to the punishment, allowing the court to release Bhushan without punishment even if the Supreme Court found him guilty of contempt of court.

OTHER IMPORTANT CASE LAWS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT BY ADVOCATE:

In Ramadayal Morarkha v. State of Madhya Pradesh7, an advocate accused a Magistrate of

7 1978 KHC 552.

having a wayward mind and convicted him of contempt. The High Court found him guilty and the Supreme Court confirmed the conviction. The case highlights the importance of contempt jurisdiction, which involves the prosecutor and judge as one, and the need for restraint and circumspection when using it. The High Court can consider the appellate court's judgment when deciding on the judgment of the trial Court, as it is concerned with the administration of public justice while acting in the discharge of their public duty. This jurisdiction should be used sparingly and with caution. In Re, Vinay Chand Mishra8, the contemnor was an advocate. In 1994, Justice S. K. Keshote of the Allahabad High Court wrote to the Acting Chief Justice of that Court, Shri V. K. Khanna, describing the misconduct of Mr. Vinay Chandra Mishra. The Supreme Court took up the case, M/s. Bansal Forgings Ltd. v. U. P. F.

Corp. , which involved a loan default and an injunction order against the company's assets. Mishra, a Senior Advocate, appeared as counsel for the appellant company. Mishra denied all charges against him and contended that Justice Keshote had committed contempt of his own court by losing his temper and using terms like "goondaism. " He argued that a court can initiate contempt proceedings only if the contempt committed was against it, and that the Supreme Court did not have the jurisdiction to initiate such proceedings. The advocate showed resentment to the questions asked by the judge of the High Court, before whom he was appearing and was disrespectful to the learned Judge. The contemnor questioned the authority of the judge to ask questions, shouted at him and threatened him with transfer and impeachment.

The advocate-contemnor used insulting language, abused the presiding judge and tried to dictate the order that the learned Judge ought to pass. He created a scene in Court and addressed the learned Judge by losing his temper. The learned Judges of the Bench of the High Court could have taken action, but instead of doing so, reported the matter to the learned Chief Justice. The contemnor was issued a notice with specific allegations of contempt. He filed his reply in answer. His defence was that he was only performing his duty as an outspoken and fearless advocate of the Bar and requested for an examination of the Judge of the High Court. The Supreme Court took cognizance of the criminal contempt committed in the face of the High Court and treated the statement of the learned Judge of the High Court, the affidavit

8 AIR 1995 SC 2348 : 1995 (2) SCC 584

filed by the contemnor and the reply given by the learned Judge as evidence in the case. In R. K. Garg v. State of Himachal Pradesh9, an advocate in a Mofussil Rent Court was found guilty of hurling a shoe at the dais after his case was dismissed. The Supreme Court confirmed the conviction but altered the sentence. The appellant in this case is an advocate in Solen, Himachal Pradesh, was dismissed for non-payment of a processing fee, leading to a court hearing. The appellant hurled his shoe at the judge, hitting him on the shoulder. The judge evaded the warrant and prevented proceedings. The appellant provided an impure account of the incident, claiming it was his fault. He later apologized and his sentence was reduced to one month and a fine of Rs. 1000.

The court deemed the appellant's conduct unbecoming and argued that such incidents can devalue respect for authority in law education and politics. The court reduced the appellant's sentence to one month and increased the fine from Rs. 200 to Rs. 1000. The court emphasized the importance of respecting authority and avoiding such incidents in the future. The court's decision highlights the importance of respecting authority in law education and politics. In Prem Surana v. Additional Munsif & Magistrate10, the case involved an advocate of Jaipur district court who slapped a magistrate in the open court, denying his request for exemption from personal appearance and striking the officer in front of the court. The court disallowed the appellant's application for exemption and issued a non-bailable warrant.

The appellant left the court without permission, and no one can claim immunity from the operation of the law of contempt. The appeal failed and the bail was cancelled, and the appellant was lodged in Tihar jail. The court analyzed the case, finding that the appellant's actions were justified as they interfered with proceedings and scandalized the court, lowering its authority in public eyes. The court emphasized that courts must use this regulation with appropriate care and caution for the greater good. In this case, an advocate's slap on the Magistrate's face for rejecting his application for exemption from personal appearance in a criminal case was deemed gross criminal contempt by the High Court. The contemnor was not allowed to apologize or undertake any undertaking, and the sentence of six months' simple imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 2000 must be upheld.

9 AIR 1981 SC 1382 : 1981 (3) SCC 166: 1981 (3) SCR 536: 1981 Cr. LR 325(SC) : 1981 Cr. LJ 1029 : 1981 SCC (Cr. ) 663: 1981 (1) Scale 767.

10 (2002) 6 SCC 722 : AIR 2002 SC 2956

CONCLUSION:

Contempt of court in India is a legal mechanism that upholds the judiciary's authority and dignity, preventing acts of disrespect or obstruction. It is classified into civil and criminal forms, addressing specific violations of court orders and interference with judicial proceedings. The Sanyal Committee's recommendations emphasize the importance of genuine apologies in mitigating contempt offenses. The Contempt of Court (Amendment) Act, 2006 introduces conditions for contempt punishment, balancing freedom of speech with preserving judicial respect. Judicial precedents, like E.M.S. Namboodiripad and Ramadayal Morarkha, demonstrate the judiciary's commitment to addressing contempt with appropriate severity.

REFERENCES:

1. G.C.V Subba Rao’s commentary on CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT,1971

(1285,1286,413,514,523- 527, 531,598), (ALT Publications, 2014)

2. Justice P.S Narayana’s Law of Contempt, 6th edition, (488-539), (Asia Law House).

3. Contempt of Courts Law & Practice by Ranadhir Kumar De, (211-246), (Eastern Law

House, 2012).

4. Law of Contempt by Justice P.S Narayana and Vidyadhar Bhatt Chakrahari, 7th edition,

(579,580), (Asia Law House).

5. The Contempt of Courts Amendment Act, 2006.

6. The Contempt of Courts Act,1971 section 2(b), section 2(c), section 3, section 13,

section 14, Acts of Parliament, 1971 (India).

7. Indian Constitution, article 19(1)(a) and (g), 129, 215, 19(2), 19(6), 142.

8. The Advocates Act, 1961 section 38, Acts of Parliament, 1961 (India).

9. The Contempt of Court (High Court of Kerala) Rules, 1971 No. D1- 14606/66