Judicial Review Under Siege - How Legislative Amendments Reshaped Reservation Laws

Author: LawSphereX

Category: Constitutional & Human Rights

Published: 2026-08-23T20:26:19.691642+00:00

Updated: 2026-08-26T17:10:52.581+00:00

JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER SIEGE: HOW LEGISLATIVE

AMENDMENTS RESHAPED RESERVATION LAWS

Himank Modh & Manthan Sharma, Unitedworld School of Law, Karnavati University, Gandhinagar

ABSTRACT

This paper critically analyzes how India’s judicial review system is becoming less effective as a result of several constitutional revisions meant to change the judiciary stance on reservation laws. The legislature has regularly responded with changes that weaken or overturn the judiciary attempts to set constitutional limits on affirmative action through seminal instances like Indra Sawhney, M. nagaraj, and Kesavananda Bharati. The pattern shows a systematic deterioration of judicial protections through legislative activism from the First amendment’s reversal of Champakam Dorairajan to the 103rd amendments introduction of economic reservations. The study tracks significant instances in which court decisions attempted to uphold the supremacy of the constitution in reservation policies were ultimately limited by constitutional amendments.

This research emphasizes the structural disparity between legislature and the judiciary through doctrinal examination of constitutional law and case precedents. The paper makes the cases that although acting as gatekeeper for the constitution, the judiciary rulings have frequently been deemed temporary in light of legislative supremacy. In order to restore balance in the separation of powers, this paper suggests institutional reforms, improved inter branch communication and periodic reviews of reservation policies. Keywords: Judicial Review, Reservation policy, Constitutional Amendments, Legislative override, Basic Structure Doctrine.

INTRODUCTION: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND LEGISLATIVE POWER STRUGGLES

In India, the legislative and judiciary have been engaged in a continuous and changing constitutional battle over the country's reservation policy to promote social justice. The legislature has frequently responded by modifying the Constitution to invalidate or weaken court rulings, even though the judiciary has tried to clarify and interpret the constitutional boundaries of reservations through judicial review. The difficult balance between legislative sovereignty and constitutional supremacy is highlighted by this tension. In this context, the judicial review power is especially intriguing. Legislative action can easily overrule judicial interpretation of statutes, therefore it is not unexpected that the separation of powers has focused on the area of statutory interpretation.1 Legislators may try to overturn an unpopular constitutional ruling with a constitutional amendment.2

ANALYSIS AND CONTENT

The first blow to Judicial Review: The Champakam Amendment In case of Reservation, the case that could be considered here can be of State of Madras V/s Champakam Dorairajan, wherein applicants were alleging violations of petitioner fundamental right to admission to state run educational institutions under Article 226 of the constitution. The seats in the engineering and medical colleges that were divided among the four different district groups were occupied for many years in accordance with certain ratios specified in the Communal Government order. This government order violated fundamental rights under Article 29(2) as he was denied entry for being a brahmin despite having necessary academic credentials. 3Although it was short-lived, the Supreme Court's decision in State of Madras v.

Champakam Dorairajan (1951) invalidated caste-based reservations in education, marking a landmark judicial statement of constitutional equality. Parliament quickly responded by passing the First Constitutional Amendment (1951) after realizing the ruling's restricted effect on affirmative action. With the introduction of Article 15(4)4 which states that, “xxxx 1Kieth Whittington, Legislative Sanctions and the Strategic Environment of Judicial Review, 1 Int’l J. Const’l Law 446, 447 (2003), https://doi. org/10. 1093/icon/1. 3. 446. 2Id . at 449. 3State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, MANU/SC/0007/1951, 1,2.

4 INDIA CONST. art. 15, cl. 4.

[(4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. ] xxxx” This amendment gave the state the explicit authority to enact special laws for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and socially and educationally disadvantaged groups. This legislative action essentially reversed the Supreme Court's ruling, establishing a precedent that allowed Parliament to weaken judicial review whenever it saw fit, even though it was a fundamental protection. The basic structure doctrine: Kesavananda Bharati and its legacy In order to understand this interplay between legislature and judiciary better we can take the example of basic structure doctrine that has evolved before the court.

The Parliament was given the authority to propose constitutional amendments through the process described in article 368 when the Indian Constitution was introduced. The Parliament was given two important functions under the Constitution. First, the legislative authority, usually referred to as the ordinary power to legislate. The first case to examine the ambit of the term ‘constituent power’ came before the Supreme Court was in the Shankari Prasad wherein the first amendment of 1951 was challenged and the court distinguished between regular legislative power and constituent power by ruling that amendments made under article 368 of the Constitution are subject to accountability under article 13(2). Regulations and laws created by the legislative branch are referred to as "law" under article 13.

5 Later on similar trends followed that an amendment was introduced and was challenged in Sajjan singh case. 6 Later on the Golaknath case came which stated that Article 368 states that the Constitution's guaranteed fundamental rights are unchangeable and that the Parliament lacks the authority to amend Part III. This decision affirmed the Constitution's primacy over the Parliament. 7

Parliament proposed the 24th amendment, which had certain provisions under Articles 368 5 Reddy, GB and Srikanth N, Revisiting the Basic Structure Doctrine-Challenges Ahead, 65 J. INDIAN L. INSTITUTE 412, 413 (2023), http://14.139.60.116:8080/jspui/handle/123456789/48193. 6Id, at 413. 7Prakhar Singh, The Indian Constitution’s Basic Structure: It’s Development into the Foundation of the Constitution, 6 INT’L J. L. MGMT. & HUMANS 1140, 1143 (2023), https://ijlmh.com/paper/the-indianconstitutions-basic-structure-its-development-into-the-foundation-of-the-constitution/.

and 13 to nullify the decision of golaknath. This amendment pertained to introduction of constituent power of parliament in Article 368 of the constitution of India. These provisions made it abundantly evident that Parliament's power to amend the Constitution is separate from its power to pass legislation. Rather, it gives Parliament the authority to alter the Constitution. This was the amendment through which parliament wanted to weaken the judicial review of the Golaknath case. Subsequently, the Keshavananda Bharati case raised questions about whether the 24th Amendment to the Indian Constitution was lawful.

8 The Supreme Court, which consisted of a 13-judge constitutional bench, upheld the 24th Amendment's legality and came to the conclusion that, aside from the essential framework, Parliament has the authority to amend any part of the Indian Constitution, including fundamental rights, under Article 368. With the purpose of limiting Parliament's unbridled power, this decision established the basic structure theory. According to Article 368, these components are unalterable and cannot be changed by the Parliament. Some of the elements of basic structure are secular character, directive principle of state policy, promotion of equality etc. 9 When considering constitutional revisions, the efficacy of judicial review in India is called into doubt.

One glaring example is the ratification of the 24th Amendment, which was an explicit attempt by Parliament to overturn the 1967 Golaknath decision of the Supreme Court. The court had the chance to overturn it and bolster its control over constitutional modifications when it was contested in Kesavananda Bharati (1973). But rather than declaring the amendment unconstitutional, the Supreme Court maintained it, merely imposing future restrictions using the Basic Structure Doctrine. This is indicative of a larger trend of lax judicial review, in which the courts frequently permit amendments to remain in effect rather than vehemently opposing legislative attempts to weaken constitutional principles—much how later amendments abolished judicial restraints on reservation programs. This would be further explained in this chapter.

Rewriting Judicial Limits: The aftermath of Indrasawhney Coming back to reservations, Indra Sawhney V/s Union of India is considered as another landmark case in reservation due to which significant amendments were made by legislature. 8Aditi Sharma, Basic Structure Doctrine In Indian Constitution: Effects And Applicability, 5 INDIAN J. L. & LEGAL RSCH. 1,4 (2023), https://www. ijllr. com/post/basic-structure-doctrine-in-indian-constitution-effectsand-applicability. 9Id, at 5,6.

Crux of this case was that the court held that reservations maintained under Articles 16(1) and 16(4) combined should not surpass 50% of appointments in a grade, cadre, or service in a given year. The court highlighted how crucial effective administration is and how reservations cannot be made at the expense of administration and also backward classes cannot be identified solely by economic grounds; rather, social and educational backwardness must be taken into account. It also directed state to exclude creamy layer from reservation under OBC’s. It is emphasized that no more than 50% of the available positions in a given year, including those that are carried forward, may be filled. It also makes reservations in promotions as invalid.

10 The Supreme Court's seminal decision in Indra Sawhney (1992), which attempted to control reservations by establishing a 50% ceiling limit and invalidating reservations in promotions, was not upheld for very long. Parliament responded with a number of constitutional modifications that essentially overturned important parts of the decision after realizing the political and social repercussions of these judicially imposed limitations. The legislature severely undermined the Supreme Court's attempt to impose constitutional restrictions on reservations by reintroducing reservations in promotions11, permitting the carrying forward of vacancies beyond the 50% limit, and further expanding affirmative action policies through the 77th, 81st, and 85th Amendments.

77th amendment introduced clause 4A in Article 16 of the constitution of India which states that, “xxxx [(4A) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for reservation in matters of promotion to any class or classes of posts in the services under the State in favour of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which, in the opinion of the State, are not adequately represented in the services under the State. ] . 12 xxxx” 10Indra sawhney & Ors v. Union of India & Ors, MANU/SC/0104/1993, 115,116, 337, 354. 11Arpita Sarkar, Judicial review of reservation in promotion: a fading promise of equality in services guaranteed by the Indian Constitution, 11 NUJS L. Review 214 (2018), https://nujslawreview. org/2018/08/05/judicialreview-of-reservation-in-promotion-a-fading-promise-of-equality-in-services-guaranteed-by-the-indianconstitution/.

12 INDIA CONST. art. 16, cl. 4(A).

Thus the amendment weakened the ruling of Indra Sawhney by allowing for reservation in promotion which was strictly denied in this case. 13In the S. Vinod Kumar v. Union of India case, the Supreme Court invalidated a memorandum that stipulated lower qualifying scores for individuals from reserved categories in matters pertaining to promotions, even after the amendment to article 16(4A) was introduced. Using Indra Sawhney as support, the court ruled that the memorandum was unconstitutional. 14 This judgment was later overruled by Rohtas Bhankar V/s Union of India on the ground that previous precedent had ignored Article 16(4A) which was added by parliament.

15This reversal highlights the fundamental flaw in India's judicial review system, where judges first place restrictions on reservations under the constitution before later upholding the identical laws they had previously declared unconstitutional. It also emphasizes how judicial review is a transient and irregular process that frequently changes in reaction to legislative revisions rather than providing strong constitutional balances. Further in Indra Sawhney case it was also ruled that reservation cannot go beyond 50 percent even if it was done through backlog vacancies. Legislature again amended Article 16 through 81st amendment and introduced clause 4B to its effect to undermine the effectiveness of Indra Sawhney case.

According to Article 16(4B), “xxxx [(4B) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from considering any unfilled vacancies of a year which are reserved for being filled up in that year in accordance with any provision for reservation made under clause (4) or clause (4A) as a separate class of vacancies to be filled up in any succeeding year or years and such class of vacancies shall not be considered together with the vacancies of the year in which they are being filled up for determining the ceiling of fifty per cent. reservation on total number of vacancies of that year. ]16 xxxx” 13Arpita, supra note 11, at 236. 14S Vinod Kumar and Ors v. Union of India and Ors, MANU/SC/1284/1996, 3,4. 15Rohtas Bhankar v Union of India, MANU/SC/0611/2014.

16 INDIA CONST. art. 16, cl. 4(B).

Thus any unfilled vacancies which were to be filled up were not considered under the 50 percent ceiling. By permitting the carry-forward rule for unfilled reserved vacancies, this further relaxed judicial constraints and, in effect, allowed reservations to surpass the 50% threshold in specific situations. These revisions highlight a recurrent trend in Indian constitutional law: anytime the court places restrictions on affirmative action practices, the government quickly amends the constitution to overturn the decisions, undermining the efficacy of judicial review. Article 335, which states that administrative efficiency cannot be compromised by reservation rules17, Courts started to invalidate promotions with lenient requirements. This can be seen from the case like Vinod kumar V/s Union of India and Ajitsingh V/s state of Punjab(1996).

In case of Ajitsingh, It was followed by appeals from Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes who were holding positions over their reservation quota, this judgment was made. As a result of expedited promotion, the court decided that they might claim promotion against general category postings. The court here upheld the seniority of general category employees by reaffirming that meritorious candidates cannot be unduly disadvantaged by reservation in promotions. 18However, the government's affirmative action programs were called into question by these judicial interventions, which prompted legislative countermeasures.

Hence legislature brought 82nd amendment which amended article 335 and added proviso clause which states that, “xxxx [Provided that nothing in this article shall prevent in making of any provision in favour of the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes for relaxation in qualifying marks in any examination or lowering the standards of evaluation, for reservation in matters or promotion to any class or classes of services or posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State. ]” By amending Article 335 to specifically permit lowering of qualifying marks for SCs and STs in cases of promotion, Parliament passed the 82nd Constitutional Amendment in 2000. The

17 INDIA CONST. art. 335.

18Ajit Singh Januja and Ors v. State of Punjab and Ors, MANU/SC/0319/1996, 7,10.

balance between legislative supremacy and judicial review underwent a dramatic change as a result of this amendment. Seniority and Catch-up: Legislative pushback continues Catch up rule was also introduced by the court in reservations through Virpal Singh case and Ajitsingh case. In case of Union of India V/s Virpalsingh, The petitioners contended that seniority, or position, should be equal if a member of the reserved category is promoted before his general candidate. They contended that doing so ought to guarantee the upholding of Articles 14 and 16. The court decided that although the reservation rule does not give reserved category candidates precedence of seniority in terms of general candidate, it does permit them to advance more quickly.

19 Catch-up rule was introduced in this case which meant that even though reserved candidate gets promotion ahead of the general candidate, he would still be considered as junior to general candidate even though that candidate did not receive such promotion. There was another such case which mentioned about catchup rule. In Ajitsingh and Ors V/s state of Punjab and Ors, The court held that it is against Articles 14 and 16(1) to classify a reserved candidate as a senior. It was the second case in 1999 which upheld the catch up rule and upheld the judgment of Virpal and Ajitsingh. 20 This led to the introduction of the 85th amendment in response to the catchup rule introduced by the courts. This amendment amended Article 16(4A) and introduced the concept of consequential seniority in it.

The Article after amendment states that, “xxxx [(4A) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for reservation [in matters of promotion, with consequential seniority, to any class] or classes of posts in the services under the State in favour of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which, in the opinion of the State, are not adequately represented in the services under the State. ]21 xxxx”

19 union of India and Ors v. Virpal singh chauhan, MANU/SC/0113/1996, 2, 10, 11.

20Ajit singh and Ors v. state of Punjab and Ors, MANU/SC/0575/1999, 17, 20.

21 INDIA CONST. art. 16, cl. 4(A).

The Catch-up Rule, which permitted general candidates promoted later to regain their seniority over SC/ST candidates who had been promoted earlier, was introduced by the Supreme Court in its decisions in Virpal Singh Chauhan (1995) and Ajit Singh (1999) in an effort to ensure that reservations in promotions did not unjustly disadvantage candidates from the general category. These court-imposed limitations on the advantages of promotional reservations, however, were only temporary. The Catch-up Rule was explicitly abolished by Parliament in 2001 with the 85th Amendment, which changed Article 16(4A) to grant SC/ST candidates "consequential seniority. " This was another case where the legislature overruled constraints on reservation policy set by the Supreme Court, highlighting the judiciary's incapacity to use judicial review to establish long-lasting curbs on affirmative action.

Judicial Moderation: M. Nagaraj and Its partial reversal Although the 77th, 81st, and 85th Amendments further broadened the definition of reservations in promotions, they were immediately challenged in court. The Supreme Court was requested to decide whether these legislative modifications breached the Basic Structure Doctrine by compromising the ideals of equality and administrative efficiency in the case of M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, which contested the constitutionality of these reforms. The Court

reaffirmed the judiciary's role in ensuring that reservation policies do not disproportionately affect constitutional guarantees of equality in its ruling, upholding the validity of these amendments but imposing additional conditions. According to the Court's view, consequential seniority was held as a policy decision that is allowed by the 85th Amendment but is not a right that is guaranteed by the constitution. These amendments did not violate basic structure doctrine. 22 In M. Nagaraj (2006), the Supreme Court established important safeguards by requiring the State to present measurable evidence of backwardness, insufficient representation, and administrative efficiency prior to implementing reservation in promotions, even though it upheld the validity of the 77th, 81st, and 85th Amendments. 23 This judicial restriction was not, however, uncontested for very long.

The Supreme Court reexamined these requirements in Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta (2018), greatly weakening the Nagaraj decision by doing away with the need to demonstrate the SC/STs' backwardness before granting them 22M. Nagaraj and Ors v. Union of India and Ors, MANU/SC/4560/2006, 8,19,20,22,25. 23Id, at 32,37,38.

reservations in promotions. This also reduced the ability of judicial review to regulate affirmative action measures and signaled another change in the ongoing battle between the judiciary and the legislature. Parliament attempted to overrule the Supreme Court's limitations in Indra Sawhney (1992) with the 77th, 81st, and 85th Amendments. Similar to Kesavananda Bharati (1973) and M. Nagaraj (2006), the Supreme Court maintained their validity in spite of objections. This is consistent with Indian constitutional law, which allows Parliament to gradually reshape constitutional interpretations because judicial review is present but cannot completely restrain legislative authority. Private Institutions and the 93rd amendment The Supreme Court upheld the independence of private, unaided schools in P. A. Inamdar v.

State of Maharashtra (2005), holding that the State could not enforce quotas or reservations in admissions since doing so would infringe upon the institutions' fundamental rights. 24 The government's capacity to enforce affirmative action laws in private institutions was severely limited by this ruling. But Parliament quickly overcame this limitation by adding Article 15(5) in the 93rd Constitutional Amendment (2005).

Article 15(5) which was introduced due to 93rd amendment states that, “xxxx [(5) Nothing in this article or in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of article 19 shall prevent the State from making any special provision, by law, for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special provisions relate to their admission to educational institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other than the minority educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of article 30. ]25 xxxx” This gave the State the express authority to impose reservations in private schools, whether 24P. A Inamdar &Ors v. state of Maharashtra and Ors, MANU/SC/0482/2005, 42.

25 INDIA CONST. art. 15, cl. 5.

they were assisted or not. Minority educational institutions, which were still protected by Article 30(1), were the only exception made. In addition to overturning the Supreme Court's attempt to restrict State involvement in private organizations, this amendment confirmed the long-standing trend that judicial review eventually fails to stop legislative activity even when it imposes short-term restrictions. This amendment was further challenged in Ashoka kumar thakur V/s Union of India which further held the amendment as valid and stated that the basic right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) is not negated by Article 15(5) if it only slightly restricts or modifies equality principles outlined in Article 19(1)(g). 26 No private institutions challenged 93rd amendment due to which this amendment was not in dispute in regard to private institutions and was not considered here.

Thus, in regard to aided educational institutions, the basic structure is unaffected by 93rd amendment. 27Article 15(5) is constitutionally legitimate because it can also be interpreted as an enabling clause to fulfill specific constitutional mandates. This amendment was contested, but the Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality instead of declaring it unconstitutional. This shows that even though judicial review imposes constitutional restrictions, it frequently gives way to legislative amendments that reduce its power when it comes to reservation policy. OBC Identification and the 102nd and 105th amendments The 102nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 2018 was passed by Parliament in recognition of the need for a more organized and unified system to supervise the identification and welfare of Other Backward Classes (OBCs).

By giving the National Commission for Backward Classes (NCBC) constitutional status under Article 338B28 and introducing Article 342A, this amendment reinforced the organization. Although the goal of this amendment was to strengthen the foundation for OBC reservations, it also sparked constitutional and legal discussions about states' authority to establish backward classes, which paved the way for judicial review in Dr. Jaishri Laxman Rao Patil v. Chief Minister. It was also said in Indra Sawhney that OBCs require their own commission and that the government has the authority 26Ashoka kumar thakur v. Union of India, MANU/SC/1397/2008, 37,38, 58. 27Id, at 59. 28Sakshi Shairwal and Shrushti Mulgund, Understanding the 102nd Amendment of the Constitution of India, Lexology (May 2, 2022), https://www. lexology. com/library/detail. aspx? g=fb0455a8-0e2d-42ce-947eeb33b74b5086.

to establish a permanent structure similar to a commission for reviewing requests from the OBC list. 29 Further Article 342A states that, “(1) The President may with respect to any State or Union territory, and where it is a State, after consultation with the Governor thereof, by public notification, specify [the socially and educationally backward classes which shall for the purposes of the constitution be deemed to be socially and educationally backward classes in relation to that State or Union territory, as the case may be. (2) Parliament may by law include in or exclude from the Central List of socially and educationally backward classes specified in a notification issued under clause (1) any socially and educationally backward class, but save as aforesaid a notification issued under the said clause shall not be varied by any subsequent notification.

]”30 By essentially centralizing the process of identifying backward classes, this amendment reduced the latitude that various state governments had previously had. Judicial inquiry followed the reorganization of the OBC categorization under Article 342A. Before going forward to Dr. Jaishri Laxman Rao Patil v. Chief Minister, it is important to know the context of the case which started from 2014, an ordinance granting the Marathas 16% reservation in public jobs and education began the process of granting them reservations in July 2014. The ordinance was placed on hold by an interim order issued by the Bombay High Court. Following this, the Socially and Educationally Backward Classes Act, 2014 was passed by the Maharashtra government. The Bombay High Court also halted this Act. The State Backward Class Commission, led by Justice Gaikwad, was constituted by the government in 2017.

It recommended 12% and 13% reservation for Marathas in public services and educational institutions, respectively. Maharashtra passed the Special Educational and Backward Class ("SEBC") Act, 2018 ostensibly in response to the Commission's recommendations, which did not decrease Maratha reservation below 16 percent. This was also challenged and High Court held the Act as valid but to follow guidelines of Gaikwad commission and this was again challenged in the Supreme Court. 31 29Indra Sawhney and Ors v. Union of India and Ors, MANU/SC/0104/1993, 137.

30 INDIA CONST. art. 342A.

31 Bisht V and Aggarwal R, The Case of the Maratha Reservations: Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. Chief Minister of State of Maharashtra, Constitutional Law Society

NUJS,

(October 20, 2021),

In Dr. Jaishri Laxman Rao Patil v. Chief Minister, The Supreme Court also heard a challenge to the 102nd Amendment, arguing that by denying States the authority to identify and inform SEBCs inside their borders and instead giving the Union Government exclusive authority over such authority under Article 342, it was held that state should not breach the limit of 50 percent provided for reservations and The President would confer with the Governor of each State, who would then get assistance from the State Commission for Backward Classes and the State Council of Ministers, in order to finalize the list of SEBCs under Article 342. The opinions of the States should not be entirely disregarded. As a result, the 102nd constitutional amendment challenge has also been dismissed.

32 States, who have long cherished the authority to assign SEBCs to state services from their own list, have been shocked by this portion of the verdict. As expected, in order to overturn the impact of this ruling, the Union Government proposed the 105th amendment to the Constitution. The 105th amendment made amendments to Article 342A and introduced amendments to clause 1 and introduced explanation and clause 3 to Article 342A. Article 342A is now read as, “(1)The President may with respect to any State or Union territory, and where it is a State, after consultation with the Governor thereof, by public notification, specify 2 [the socially and educationally backward classes in the Central List which shall for the purposes of the Central Government] be deemed to be socially and educationally backward classes in relation to that State or Union territory, as the case may be.

xxxx [Explanation. —For the purposes of clauses (1) and (2), the expression “Central List” means the list of socially and educationally backward classes prepared and maintained by and for the Central Government. (3) Notwithstanding any contained in clauses (1) and (2), every State or Union territory may, by law, prepare and maintain, for its own purposes, a list of socially and educationally https://wbnujscls. wordpress. com/2021/10/20/the-case-of-the-maratha-reservations-jaishri-laxmanrao-patil-vchief-minister-of-state-of-maharashtra/

32 Natarajan G, The Supreme Court Judgement on Reservation – An Analysis, Swamy Associates (2021),

https://www.swamyassociates.com/articles-2021.htm.

backward classes, entries in which may be different from the Central List. ]”33 By adding Clause 3 to Article 342A, this modification essentially overturned the Supreme Court's ruling in Jaishri Laxman Rao Patil, reinstating states' express authority to create and manage their own list of SEBCs. As Parliament uses its amending power to weaken judicially imposed restrictions on reservation policies, this development once again exemplifies the recurrent pattern where judicial review, while temporarily limiting legislative power, ultimately fails to impose lasting constitutional constraints. Economic Reservation and the 103rd amendment The 103rd Constitutional Amendment (2019), which established a 10% reservation for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS), caused a new dispute.

This amendment marked a dramatic change in India's reservation policy because it specifically excluded SC, ST, and OBCs, in contrast to earlier amendments that extended benefits to these historically underprivileged groups. This modification, which was contested in Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India (2022), brought up important issues regarding the exclusion of underprivileged populations, the violation of the 50% reservation cap, and the significance of economic criteria in reservations. According to 103rd amendment it was introduced in Article 15(6) and Article 16(6).

Article 15(6) states that, “xxxx [(6) Nothing in this article or sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of article 19 or clause (2) of article 29 shall prevent the State from making,—(a) any special provision for the advancement of any economically weaker sections of citizens other than the classes mentioned in clauses (4) and (5); and (b) any special provision for the advancement of any economically weaker sections of citizens other than the classes mentioned in clauses (4) and (5) in so far as such special provisions relate to their admission to educational institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other than the minority educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of article 30, which in the case of reservation

33 INDIA CONST. art. 342A.

would be in addition to the existing reservations and subject to a maximum of ten per cent. of the total seats in each category..... ”34 xxxx” Article 16(6) states that, “xxxx [(6) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any economically weaker sections of citizens other than the classes mentioned in clause (4), in addition to the existing reservation and subject to a maximum of ten per cent. of the posts in each category. ]35 xxxx” This was challenged before Janhit Abhiyan V/s union of India. The case was that amendment permits the state to give a maximum of 10% reservation for economically poorer sectors of citizens, other than the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and the non-creamy layer of "Other Backward Classes.

Articles 15(4), 15(5), and 16(4) prohibit the granting of reservations based only on economic considerations. In Indra sawhney case, the court did not allow economic reservation but in this case the court held that this Court had not completely prohibited the provision of reservations for other Sections that are disadvantaged because of economic circumstances, despite its previous rulings stating that reservations cannot be made solely on the basis of economic criteria and this only apply to the class or classes covered by or seeking coverage under Articles 15(4), 15(5), and 16(4). 36 This represented a significant revision of reservation policy, illustrating how judicial review has changed to allow for legislative actions that were previously thought to be illegal.

Because the Court did not uphold its own earlier decision and permitted Parliament to circumvent it through a constitutional amendment, this illustrates poor judicial review. The Supreme Court made it clear in Indra Sawhney (1992) that reservations should not exceed 50% of the total. By adding 10% EWS reservations, the 103rd Amendment (2019) went above this

34 INDIA CONST. art. 15, cl. 6.

35 INDIA CONST. art. 16, cl. 6.

36Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India, MANU/SC/1449/2022, 2, 28.

cap, pushing the total number of reservations in several places beyond 60%. 37This undermines judicial review by demonstrating that Parliament can change constitutional principles at any time and that the judiciary is powerless to impose long-term limitations. It also illustrates how the Indian judiciary has frequently found it difficult to serve as a reliable check on parliamentary authority when it comes to affirmative action. Summary of legislative Amendments undermining Judicial Review The ongoing conflict between the legislative and the judiciary over reservation rules has been examined critically throughout this paper. The Supreme Court has frequently attempted to enforce constitutional limitations through judicial review.

To circumvent these court restraints, Parliament has responded by introducing constitutional amendments on multiple occasions, exhibiting a distinct pattern of legislative dominance in establishing reservation jurisprudence. A thorough summary of this paper is given in the table that charts Supreme Court decisions

that limited reservations and the ensuing constitutional amendments that lessened their effect. Sr. Name of Case Constitutional Amendment which weakened its No ruling 1st Constitutional Amendment(1951) inserted Article State of Madras V/s champakam 15(4) to allow reservations. dorairajan(1951)

85th constitutional amendment(2001)- inserting Union of India V/s Virpal Singh consequential seniority to SC/ST candidates in Article chauhan(1995) and 16(4A).

Ajitsingh v. state of Punjab(1999) M. Nagaraj v. Union of

Though any amendment was not introduced to weaken its ruling but 77th, 81st, 82nd and 85th amendment were India(2006) upheld in this case and lastly Jarnail Singh v. Lachhminaraingupta removed the requirements to prove backwardness in SC/ST promotions. 93rd Constitutional amendment(2005) introduced P.A Inamdar v. state of Maharashtra(2005) article 15(5)- allowing reservation in private unaided institutions. This amendment was further upheld in Ashoka kumar thakur v. Union of India. It upheld the 102ndamendment(2018) restricting state Dr. Jaishri Laxman Rao power to create list of OBC and thus 105th Patil v. chief minister(2021) constitutional amendment(2021) was introduced by parliament to weaken its ruling allowing state governments to maintain their own OBC list.

reaffirming Parliament's authority to review constitutional amendments, especially those that aim to undermine equality norms; and enacting a comprehensive law that outlines the conditions and evidentiary thresholds required for implementing reservations. The basic structure concept, which aims to improve institutional dialogue by creating frequent consultation forums between the legislative and the court on constitutional issues, requires that any alteration that violates the equal treatment principle be carefully examined. Requiring Regular Reservation Reviews to prevent their endless continuation, the Constitution should be changed to mandate that all reservation programs undergo periodic legislative reviews to determine their efficacy and necessity.

Encouraging Judicial Specialization and Training In order to guarantee consistent and knowledgeable decision-making, the judiciary should establish specialized constitutional benches with knowledge of affirmative action, considering the intricacy of reservation jurisprudence. Public discourse and civic education should include things like in order to foster constitutional literacy on affirmative action and a more knowledgeable and fair public discussion.

CONCLUSION

A major obstacle to the efficiency of judicial review in India is highlighted by the continuous

conflict between the legislative and the judiciary over reservation policy. Parliament has regularly challenged these limitations through constitutional changes, even though the Supreme Court has made historic decisions in an effort to control and establish constitutional limits on affirmative action. The fact that judicial decisions have been consistently diluted, whether by the 77th, 81st, 82nd, 85th, 93rd, 102nd, 103rd, and 105th Amendments, shows that although judicial declarations are authoritative, they are sometimes transient obstacles that can be removed by legislative action. The durability and enforceability of judicial review in forming India's reservation jurisprudence are seriously called into question by this.

The legislature's power to change constitutional provisions has undermined the judiciary's function as a long-lasting constitutional check, even if it still has the authority to interpret the Constitution and set restrictions. This examination has demonstrated how legislative amendments have often overruled Supreme Court decisions, shifting the balance of power in the legislature's favor. Judicial review in India is not absolute, as demonstrated by the cumulative effect of these constitutional revisions. Even while the court is essential to upholding constitutional ideals

through interpretation, lawmakers have the power to overrule it. The consistent trend of changing the Constitution to weaken court rulings shows that the authority of judicial review is dependent on parliamentary intent and political viability rather than just principle. The judiciary's capacity to serve as a last constitutional safeguard is diminished by this institutional restriction, which turns judicial review from a permanent check to a transient roadblock in the way of legislative majorities.

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A. INDIA CONST. art. 16, cl. 4(B).

B. INDIA CONST. art. 335.

C. INDIA CONST. art. 16, cl. 4(A).

D. INDIA CONST. art. 15, cl. 5.

E. INDIA CONST. art. 342A.

F. INDIA CONST. art. 15, cl. 6.

G. INDIA CONST. art. 16, cl. 6.

H. INDIA CONST. art. 15, cl. 4