Negotiating Diversity - State Reorganisation And Federal Bargain With Comparative Insight From India And Canada

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Category: General Law

Published: 2026-08-23T20:40:10.624915+00:00

Updated: 2026-08-26T17:10:19.639+00:00

NEGOTIATING DIVERSITY: STATE REORGANISATION

AND FEDERAL BARGAIN WITH COMPARATIVE INSIGHT

FROM INDIA AND CANADA

Mrinangini Gurung & Srishti Satish Jadhav, Symbiosis Law School, Pune

ABSTRACT

To reconcile regional autonomy and recognition with unity of a federation becomes a pressing challenge to federalism. In this context, this research examines the institutional mechanisms of state reorganisation in India and Canada, and their sustainability in shaping federal bargain in accommodating linguistic, cultural, and regional demands. It puts India’s Negotiated Parliamentary Model and Canada’s Asymmetrical Referenda-Based model under comparison to study their respective effectiveness in balancing regional pressures with national stability. It argues asymmetric federal arrangements are suitable for diversity management as an equilibrium between secession and accommodation to manage complex plural democracies.

Introduction State reorganisation is more than merely an administrative convenience and by that means making it a response to political mobilisation, cultural recognition and justice. “India, is one of the most complex and diverse polities in the world, which, despite its high ethnic fractionalisation and relative poverty, has held together as a democratic state for most of the time since 1947, across most of its territory. Yet, this ‘holding together’ (Stepan et al.

2011) has been accompanied by a gradual shift from a relatively ‘integrationist’ (McGarry, O’

Leary and Simeon 2008) or ‘centric’ (Adeney 2002) territorial strategy at independence towards a more ’accommodationist’ strategy’ in more recent decades1.” Grounded in parliamentary negotiation and constitutional amendment, is India’s reorganisation starting the States Reorganisation Act of 19562 to the creation of Telangana in 20143 making it a recurring

1 Centre‐State Bargaining and Territorial Accommodation: Evidence from India - Sweden - 2016 -Swiss

Political Science Review - Wiley Online Library

2 States Reorganisation Act, No. 37 of 1956, Acts of Parliament, 1956 (India)

3 The Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, No. 6 of 2014, Acts of Parliament, 2014 (India)

negotiated phenomena. Canada follows system of asymmetry and judicial interpretations to manage separatist assertions like the Quebec issue4 to manage subnational demands highlighting Canada’s rather populist approach to Federal Bargain. Statement of Problem The reorganisation of states exposes the paradox of federalism. The question remains, “How can a state cater to its regional grievances without destabilising national integrity?”. A country like India finds its recurrent bifurcation tendencies rooted in linguistics and regional

identity and administrative considerations are managed on constitutional basis. This process has enabled diverse groups and their claims and expectations of statehood as a political remedy. While the approach in Canada regarding Quebec follows a democratically legitimate approach of referendum, it may deepen polarisation and uncertainty about the long term stability of federalism. There exists ample comparative scholarships on the assessment of these two federations-each extremely diverse which is often tested by linguistic and cultural mobilisation. However, both seem to deploy deeply different institutional mechanisms for federal bargaining. This gap in understanding the two pathways- negotiated parliamentary model versus referendum based model remains unexplored.

This study, thus, seeks to fill that gap by assessing the two contrasting models and highlighting whether an alternative approach in asymmetry drawn from the Canadian Model in managing demands of recognition can be a stable arrangement in a federation. Literature Review Granville Austin, Working a Democratic Constitution: The Indian Experience5 Austin’s study is a seminal study to understand the foundational functioning of the Indian Constitution. His work reveals the intention of the constituent assembly to formulate Article 36

4 Reference re Secession of Quebec - SCC Cases

5 Oxford Univ. Press 1999

6 India Const. art. 3.

to give Parliament unilateral power to reorganise states through legislative adaptation rather than constitutional breakdown. He emphasises on political practice, judicial decisions, and party systems and its interaction with Constitutional highlighting why India has been able to absorb diversity through pragmatic flexibility as a seamless web. Sanjiv Chopra, We, the People of the States of Bharat7 Chopra’s book provides a narrative of the making and remaking of Indian states from 1950s up to 2010s. He emphasises on how demand for autonomy directs aspirations for development, representation and cultural recognition other than purely constitutional/legal treatment. He highlights Article 3 as a tool of conflict management and federal bargain at the hands of the union. He argues whether bargain is capable of absorbing demands such as Gorkhaland and Vidarbha.

Balveer Arora, On Federalism8 Arora, in his writing, considers state reorganisation as a part of a wider category called “Asymmetrical Federation” with various units enjoy different levels of autonomy, under the constitution, as per Article 3709 and 37110 or by negotiated settlements. Juxtaposing Indian federalism with Canadian, European, and African experiences, he reveals the global issue to managing diversity and context-dependent applications of the federal bargain. Mikhail Filippov, Peter Ordeshook, and Olga Shvetsova, Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions11 William Rikers propounded the concept that federalism as a contract between independent political units that shares sovereignty in mutual interest. In later scholarship, Rui J. P.

de Figueiredo and Barry Weingast’s article “Self-Enforcing Federalism12” defined this insight by recognising federations and self- enforcing agreements. Taking inspiration from this theory, the authors of this book argue that enforcement depends not on external actors but on institutional incentives that induce compliance by both Central and provincial governments thus,

7 HarperCollins 2023

8 Orient BlackSwan 2019

9 India Const. art. 370.

10 India Const. art. 371.

11 Cambridge University Press 2004

12 Figueiredo, Rui J. P. de, Jr., & Barry R. Weingast. Self-Enforcing Federalism. 21 J.L. Econ. & Org. 103 (2005)

concluding that federal bargain is not a fragile contract, but an equilibrium sustained by repeated interactions among institutional variables and their credible threats. Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within13 Erin Ryan gives federalism a process-oriented perspective. She argues that statutes and judicial rulings are rarely sufficient to resolve federal conflicts. Instead, they are mediated through continuous bargaining levels between the levels of government. This framework, she emphasises, is inevitable and beneficial which clarifies why state reorganisation in India from Chhattisgarh to Telangana was not simply an act of unilateral legislation but a culmination of sustained bargaining process. Similarly, Canada's recurring negotiation over cubic's status also highlights the same nature of federal bargain. Is India a Case of Asymmetrical Federalism?

14 Rekha Saxena’s article provides that asymmetry in India’s federal design is a deliberate constitutional feature rather than an exception. She indicates clauses such as Articles 370 and

371 of the Indian constitution, as an example of India’s attempt to identify and accommodate

diversity within a single union, which grant special status to Jammu & Kashmir and several northeastern states. The author has pointed out the intrinsic paradox of India federalism by portraying how the political reality of centralised federalism remains in conflict with the idea of asymmetry. Regional Variations in Federal Power-Sharing: Sub-State Level Perspective15 The article authored by Prerna Manocha considers the sub-state disparities between Delhi and Puducherry to bring the discussion about asymmetry outside the state. She also shows how in Article 239AA16, the city of Delhi has been accorded a hybrid structure which allows it to have partial legislative power but not control over vital areas such as public order, law enforcement and land. Puducherry has an exclusive regime in which the Union supervision exists with the elected government.

Manocha says that the asymmetry of India has formed a patchwork of

13 Oxford University Press 2012

14 Rekha Saxena (2012)

15 Prerna Manocha (2022)

16 India Const. art. 239AA.a

systems in both the Union Territories where there are assemblies elected and the states with special constitutional status. Challenges to India’s Centralised Parliamentary Federalism17 In this article, Mahendra P. Singh and Douglas Verney analyse the manner in which Indian federalism has traditionally been characterised by parliamentary centralism in this article. The article also indicates that the central control was challenged by increased bargaining leverage of the states as a result of the 1990s emergence of regional parties and coalition governments. It shows that the shifting balance between national and regional forces, besides the constitutional design, shapes India’s asymmetry. This viewpoint is a good example of the ongoing conflict between constitutional centralisation and federal accommodation needs.

Federalism, Federative Systems, and Federations: The United States, Canada, and India18 Douglas Verney offers an analytical framework for studying federalism by distinguishing between federations as political realities, its systems as institutional frameworks, and federalism as a guiding philosophy. Under this concept, India appears as a federation, with constitutionally based asymmetry that is open to political challenge. Verney places Canada and its lineage towards asymmetry to fit Quebec’s unique identity in contrast with India which has more often resembled the US federal structure. Thus, making his study helpful in placing India in a larger comparative framework in order to highlight the dichotomy and its differences and difficulties.

Quebec and Canadian Federalism19 The study of Quebec shows how Canadian federalism promotes and protects linguistic and cultural diversity through dependable institutional frameworks. Asymmetry is a valid feature of the Canadian political system since Quebec’s autonomy is maintained within the Canadian federation. However, asymmetrical provisions are usually contested, unstable or even repealed in India. He attempts to analyse how federations can effectively institutionalise asymmetry to maintain unity while honouring variety, all while using Canada as a comparative example.

17 Mahendra P. Singh & Douglas V. Verney (2003)

18 Douglas V. Verney (1995)

19 Alexander Brady (1959)

Research Gaps The existing comparative works between India and Canada have treated federal practice in merely descriptive nature. There is no systematic test of evaluation in the effectiveness federal bargain when subjected to linguistic or regional mobilisation. Parliamentary Negotiation + Constitutional Amendment vs. Referendum + Judicial/Negotiated Safeguards No prevailing scholarship underlines study of institutionalisation of bargaining in these two federations and what mechanisms endure or fail in the long run is lacking. The prevailing scholarship tendency to stress linguistic principles and the movement of 1956 out of context also fails to plot them into the overall direction of how strategies develop and change under pressure, and leaves the dynamics of the said processes unexplored..

There is only a small amount of empirical studies on what arrangements either introduce long-term stability or risk inequalities. Though the asymmetrical federal arrangements have not been tested in India yet, they can be deemed viable as the alternative to bifurcation and outright secession Further, India and Canada, both being diverse and democratic federations, are studied solely in a normative and theoretical manner. Only limited empirical research on what arrangements bring long-term stability or risk inequalities thus leaving the sustainability of asymmetrical federal arrangements untested as a middle ground between bifurcation and outright secession. What is specifically missing is the study of asymmetry as a response and alternative to state reorganisation to accommodate diversity.

“The Canadian experience with the Quebec question has brought about a bit of turnaround in the theoretical appreciation of asymmetrical federalism as asymmetry was impliedly built into the federal constitution-making in Canada in 1867 (without using the term) and the trajectory of the federalist and sovereigntist debate has brought to the fore the accommodative potential of the device” (Saxena, R. 2012)20. Research Questions: i. What constitutional, political, administrative rationales and temporal dynamics have

20 Rekha Saxena, Is India a Case of Asymmetrical Federalism?, 47 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 70 (2012),

shaped India’s demands for State Reorganisation and Bifurcation since independence? ii. How effective has India’s Negotiated Parliamentary Model been in managing state demands while sustaining “Federal Bargain”? iii. What are the comparative lessons between India and Canada’s models in managing linguistic and cultural diversity within federations and to what extent can asymmetric federal arrangement as a viable alternative to bifurcation or secession? Research Objectives: i. To identify the constitutional, political, administrative rationales and temporal dynamics have shaped India’s demands for State Reorganisation and Bifurcation since independence. ii. To analyse India’s Negotiated Parliamentary Model and evaluate its effectiveness in managing state demands while sustaining “Federal Bargain”. iii.

To draw comparative lessons between India and Canada’s models in managing linguistic and cultural diversity within federations and to highlight asymmetric federal arrangement as an alternative to bifurcation or secession. Research Methodology This study adopts a qualitative and comparative research design to analyse how India and Canada have addressed their demands for state reorganisation and secession. The primary study is doctrinal in nature that relies on statutory and institutional analysis to evaluate constitutional provisions, Parliamentary Debates, the States Reorganisation Commission Report (1955), and judicial decisions that shape the responses to regional aspirations. Therefore, such an approach allows the study to:

1) trace the evolution of legal and institutional responses and contextualise them within

the political scenario.

2) draw systematic contrasts between India and Canada that have faced similar pressures

but have adopted different strategies.

In the case of India, the methodology used is a close examination of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, its subsequent amendments, Constituent Assembly and parliamentary debates and case law on boundary changes. For Canada, emphasis has been laid on the Supreme Court’s Quebec verdict and constitutional negotiations in asymmetry and federal bargain. The research engages with secondary literature, including books, peer reviewed scholarly/journal articles and comparative federal scholarship in order to examine the political, cultural and administrative rationale underpinning state reorganisation. The study does not involve empirical fieldwork and is grounded in systematic textual and institutional analysis to analyse the constitutional, legal and political dimensions of state reorganisation in a federation.

Scope This research seeks to study the institutional mechanisms of state reorganisation in India and compares it with Canada's referendum-based model in managing its regional tendencies. It examines the constitutional, political, and administrative drivers behind India's state bifurcation from the States Reorganisation Act of 1956 (post 1950s) through the creation of Telangana in

2014. The Canadian context focuses on the post 1960s period of rise in nationalism through

the referenda of 1980 and 1995, the Supreme Court's Quebec verdict, and subsequent debates. The study examines asymmetric federalism as a possible alternative to bifurcation/ reorganisation in India and evaluates the impact of institutional strategies on federal stability by closely comparing Indian and Canadian models. Limitation The limitations include the interpretive nature of qualitative comparative research. It does not cover a global survey of federal systems, nor does it attempt to make a detailed case analysis of every statehood movement within India and Canada. The study is based on secondary sources, constitutional texts, parliamentary debates and case law. It does not include empirical fieldwork or interviews.

The study lacks socio-economic impacts of reorganisation as they have been considered only so far as they clarify the constitutional and political processes of state restructuring, rather than as a primary focus on matters of this contemporary relevance.

Thematic Chapterisation

1. Contextual Framework

● Negotiated Federalism ● Conceptual Understanding of Autonomy, Accommodation and Secession ● Federal Bargain through Theoretical Lens

2. State Reorganisation in India — Constitutional, Political, and Administrative

Dimensions ● Temporal Evolution- Linguistic Reorganisation post 1950s to Governance-based Demands till Late 2000s ● Constitutional Provisions and Rationale Enabling State Creation: Article 2, 3 and Subsequent Amendments ● Political Mobilisations and Identity-based Movements ● Administrative, Developmental and Fiscal Rationales for Bifurcation ● Case Study: Telangana as a Parable of Shifting Rationale and its Implications for India’s Federal Stability

3. Canada - The Model of the Referendum and the Interpretation by the Judicial System

● Historical Antecedents of Quebec Nationalism ● Referenda on Sovereignty of 1980 and 1995 ● The Reference re Secession of Quebec of 1998 by the Supreme Court. ● Negotiated Federalism in Practice and Asymmetry ● Strengths and Weaknesses of the Referendum Model

4. Comparative Perspectives on Institutional Approaches

● India’s Negotiated Parliamentary Model vs. Canada’s Referendum-based Model ● Effectiveness in Accommodating Linguistic and Cultural pluralism

● Comparative Perspectives

5. Conclusion

● Asymmetric Federalism as an Alternative ● Recommendations for Managing Diversity in Plural Federations

1. Contextual Framework

Negotiated Federalism Traditional legal-constitutional approach portrays federalism as a static design of the constitution allocating powers and functions between levels of government. However, various federal arrangements in practice reveal that it is indeed an ongoing bargain of intergovernmental interaction. Gagnon and Tremblay (2019) argue, "Federalism is not the product of a fixed design but the outcome of continuous political negotiation that reflects the shifting balance between unity and diversity. "21 Anderson (2013) identifies different models of federal arrangements – ethnic federalism, federacies, asymmetrical federalism, each representing "an attempt to balance the demands for recognition of distinctive identities with the imperatives of political cohesion. "22 Fiscal federalism and resource allocation are crucial matters regarding regional claims.

Quebec's special status in Canada or the now-abrogated Article 370's autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir in India23 is an example of the dynamic and adaptable nature of Federalism as a process. Conceptual Understanding of Autonomy, Accommodation and Secession Autonomy refers to a constitutionally entrenched and politically negotiated self governance. It preserves cultural or linguistic identity, ensuring state competency is not unilaterally dismissed. As Watts (1999) remarks, “autonomy within a federation provides constituent units the 21 Alain-G. Gagnon & Arend Lijphart Tremblay eds. , Federalism and National Diversity in the 21st Century (Springer 2019)

22 Liam Anderson, Federal Solutions to Ethnic Problems: Accommodating Diversity (Routledge 2013).

23Article 370: India Supreme Court upholds repeal of Kashmir's special status

capacity to govern themselves in matters of particular importance to their identity, while maintaining their participation in the federation as a whole”24. Autonomy is a limited and coordinated independence of states or provinces, balancing self rule and shared rule. For example, Delhi and Puducherry enjoy partial legislative powers under central supervision (Manocha, 2022). However, the balance between the central authority and state independence depends on shifting political, economic and security considerations. Accommodation transcends the idea that autonomy cannot coexist with pluralistic societies. Political stability depends not on majoritarianism but on dialogues of collective participation in power sharing and mutual recognition of its constituent groups over time thereby reducing conflicts before they escalate.

A radical alternative is secession when autonomy and accommodation fail which is even often framed as a claim for self-determination. Buchanan (1997) “Secession is a group’s unilateral withdrawal from the political authority of a state to achieve independent statehood”25. Federal Bargain through Theoretical Lens The contours of our federal system are under constant negotiation, as governments construct the scope of one another’s interests and powers while pursuing their agendas 26. Hence, it has become a discretionary space of coalition building, strategic delegation and conflict resolution between the state and its people. 27 In India, it began as “holding-together federalism” with centralised power to preserve unity but regional mobilisation has progressively compelled the Centre to share fiscal and policy space.

“Indian federalism has historically been marked by parliamentary centralism, with state autonomy often curtailed during the one-party era. However, the rise of regional parties and coalition governments since the 1990s has shifted the bargaining power toward the states, illustrating how the tension between constitutional centralisation and the need for federal accommodation shapes India’s asymmetrical arrangements” (Singh & Verney, 2003).

24 Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems 96–100 (3d ed. 2008).

25 Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce (Westview Press 1997).

26Cristina M. Rodríguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and Popular Perspectives, 123 Yale L.J. 2094 (2013–14) 27Craig Volden, Origin, Operation, and Significance: The Federalism of William H. Riker, 34 Publius: J. Federalism 89 (2004)

The constitutional text that draws formal lines but the bargain is ever continuing through statutes, judicial and intergovernmental practice and mediations. Innovation and diversity accommodation remain normative strong points of a resilient federal bargain but they also run the risks of creating disparities and unequal rights protection. Hence, it requires more robust normative protections, redistributive mechanisms, and transparency.

2. State Reorganisation in India — Constitutional, Political, and Administrative

Dimensions Temporal Evolution- Linguistic reorganisation post 1950s to governance-based demands till late 2000s There was a wave of linguistic mobilisation in the 1950s with it epitomising the establishment of the state of Andhra Pradesh in 195328 following Potti Sriramulu’s fast. The logic linguistic claim as the major principle of federal agenda was institutionalised under the States Reorganisation Act 195629. By the 1970s - 80s, movements arose in Punjab and Assam that demanded ethnic, cultural and security balances. A new rationale of efficiency and equity30 transpired as a shift to governance and development

was observed in the statehood of Jharkhand, Chattisgarh and Uttarakhand in 1990s and 2000s with the view of administrative efficiency, resource development and local aspirations of self rule (Saxena, 2002). Later demands of Telangana, Gorkhaland, Vidarbha cited governance deficits and economic marginalisation. At the end of the 2000s, statehood has been used as a bargaining instrument that demonstrated dynamic nature of federalism in its changing foundations of identity and political pressures31 (Choudhry, 2008). Constitutional Provisions and Rationale Enabling State Creation: Article 2, 3 and Subsequent Amendments The Parliament’s power to admit or form a new state under Article 232 was invoked for Sikkim’s

28 Rama Sundari Mantena, The Andhra Movement, Hyderabad State, and the Historical Origins of the

Telangana Demand: Public Life and Political Aspirations in India, 1900–56, 13 India Rev. 337 (2014)

29 States Reorganisation Act, No. 37 of 1956, Ind.

30 N.C. Saxena, Administrative Reforms for Better Governance (Daanish Books, Perspective Series No. 4, 2002) 31 Sujit Choudhry, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation (Oxford Univ. Press 2008).

32 India Const. art. 2.

accession in 197533. Article 334 empowers bifurcation, unification or change of boundaries or name of states which have simple majority in the Parliament seeking the opinion of the affected state though “not binding”35. “The deliberate asymmetry of India’s federal design is evident in provisions such as Articles 370 and 371, which grant special status to Jammu & Kashmir and several northeastern states, reflecting an effort to accommodate regional diversity within the Union. ” (Saxena, 2012). Numerous amendments to the Constitution, including the amendments of the First and Fourth Schedules, indicate the desire of the framers of the Constitution to have a balance between flexibility and unity without referring to Article 36836.

Political mobilisations and identity-based movements Even identity politics (ethnic, linguistic, cultural or regional) have not been the most intractable cause of statehood. Linguistic mobilisations by movement in Andhra (1953), Mahagujarat movement (1960) and subsequent movements like the Telangana and Uttarakhand with separate regional identities were a combination of the felt economic marginalization and political marginalization. The central and regional strategic actors, opportunities, language/ dialect symbols, intellectual articulation, media and cultural markers are very much involved in such mobilisation. Administrative, developmental and fiscal rationales for bifurcation Big states are made an administrative oddity.

Over centralisation is also likely to under-service regional units rendering poor infrastructure, underdeveloped sectors, inefficient administration and improper utilization of local resources. Administrative- developmental logic is a discourse of size, political participation and governance that have justified bifurcation such as the case of Jharkhand, Uttarakhand and Chattisgarh. Arguments on fiscal federalism in India support economic exploitation, inequitable investment and revenues, unequal distribution of local resources such as was experienced in Telangana (2014). Regions demanding statehood usually 33Dhanraj Rai, Monarchy and Democracy in Sikkim and the Contribution of Kazi Lhendup Dorjee Khangsherpa, Int’l J. Sci. & Research Publ’ns Vol. 3, Issue 9, Sept. 2013.

34 India Const. art. 3.

35 Babulal Parate v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 51 (India).

36 India Const. art. 368

refer to unfair sharing of revenues and need to have increased ownership of the natural resources 37 (Rao and Singh, 2005). Table 1. Amendment/Acts/Orders pertaining to State Reorganisation 37 M. Govinda Rao & Nirvikar Singh, Political Economy of Federalism in India (Oxford Univ. Press 2005)

Case study: Telangana as a parable of shifting rationale and its implications for India’s federal stability The creation of Telangana in 2014 is the evolving justification of reorganisation of the state in India. It initially reflected the linguistic ideology that institutionalised the States Reorganisation Act of 1956 by stating that the Telugu-speaking people of Telangana were culturally separate, due to its Nizam background. Nevertheless, the proponents later fashioned their argument to their demand in terms of development and governance not just identity politics but “internal colonialism” alleging negligence in education, job prospects, irrigation, and other fiscal and developmental inequalities by the Andhra elites.

Political expediency dangled before Congress-led UPA government with the approaching elections, amidst protests and bifurcation was accepted as feasible under coalition pressure. Telangana revealed the contradiction of federalism: equality at a price of chronic instability. It described the accommodation power of Indian federalism in adapting regional ambitions in constitutional provisions of Articles 2 and 3, and also pointed out the frailty of the system, in which responsiveness enhanced democratic legitimacy but also led to continuous fragmentation.

Later other statehood proposals of Gorkhaland, Vidarbha and Bodoland grew bolder indicating that state reorganisation is a warring bargaining instrument in subnational politics38 (Rao 2010) Unresolved ethno-regional grievances have been warned by scholars to destabilize peripheral regions 39(Baruah 2005) and the administration is undermined when proliferation is uncontrolled. Telangana underpinned state reorganization as a converging point for identity, developmental justice and political expediency. It is the sustainability of the balance between inclusiveness and coherence of the system.

3. Canada - The Model of the Referendum and the Interpretation by the Judicial System.

Historical antecedents of Quebec Nationalism. The nationalism in Quebec is in its own language, civil-law tradition, Catholic background, 38 C.H. Hanumantha Rao, Regional Disparities, Smaller States and Statehood for Telangana (Academic Found. 2010). 39 Sanjib Baruah, Durable Disorder: Understanding the Politics of Northeast India (Oxford Univ. Press 2005).

traditionally distinguished against the English-speaking majority of Canada. The culture and religion of the Francophone elites was defended against Anglophone assimilation since 17060s, and the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s changed Quebec into a contemporary, secular state, the production of a francophone middle class that demanded the constitutionally entrenching status, with many doubting Canada's ability of appropriately accommodating them. Referenda on Sovereignty of 1980 and 1995. In 1980, Parti Québécois, headed by Pierre Léveque, offered that Quebec would gain political sovereignty but continue to share economic relationships with Canada. About 60 percent of the voters voted out the proposal, favouring reform within the federation. In 1982, the feelings of alienation were further enhanced with the patriation of the Constitution that was undertaken without the consent of Quebec.

Another referendum in 1995 also failed to give a mandate to the Parti Québécois with Jacques Parizeau as its leader. The Reference re Secession of Quebec of 1998 by the Supreme Court. Following the 1995 near-miss, the federal government wished to have a legal clarification where the Court, in its unanimous opinion, held that there is no unilateral right to secede under either the Constitution of Canada. A clear majority on a clear question on a referendum question would, however, establish a political obligation, to negotiate secession in good faith, on all parties. Such negotiations must uphold constitutional principles of federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and minority protection. Judicial balancing, D. V.

Verney40 observes, is characteristic of the Anglo-Canadian tradition of asymmetric federalism-an acquiescence towards a question and majority vote challenge at the threshold of the so-called clear holding. Negotiated Federalism in Practice and Asymmetry. The Canadian federation has also been historically characterized by asymmetries so as to allow Quebec to be in a special position. The province has the exclusive right over civil law, culture

40 M.P. Singh & D.V. Verney, “Challenges to India’s Centralized Parliamentary Federalism” (2003)

and immigration and has the fiscal provisions, which is explicitly aimed at preserving the linguistic heritage. This kind of negotiated asymmetry, as Arora notes, is not a constitutional anomaly but rather these pragmatic accommodations to diversity, a logic of asymmetry that he also, on the other hand, finds present in India. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Referendum Model Although the chances of direct democracy, and the corresponding dangers of the new system, have not been altogether settled, asymmetry has played an important role in protecting unity. ● Direct legitimacy is a case where the sovereign decision-making process is granted a lot of normative power by the citizen consultations. ● The pressure requires that federal and provincial parties be acting in good faith.

● Institutional flexibility is the ability to adapt to changing political moods without having to amend the constitution. ● Despite these merits, polarization is at stake because close events like the 1995 vote are likely to promote schisms on language and culture. ● The ambiguous or narrow determined results diminish legitimacy until further clustering by the judicial or legislative force, such as the Clarity Act41. ● The uncertainty of the recurring weakness is a threat to the investor confidence and consistency of the national identity.

4. Comparative Perspectives on Institutional Approaches

Negotiated Parliamentary Reorganisation in India vs. Referendum-based Legitimacy in Canada Who decides? Both India and Canada face risks of regional polarisation: India with linguistic and identitybased movements, and Canada, on the other hand, through Quebec’s distinct identity and land

41 Clarity Act, S.C. 2000, c. 26 (Can.)

claims of Indigenous groups. The Supreme Court has held, “a clear majority of the votes cast on a clear question in favour of secession would confer democratic legitimacy.... the expression of the democratic will of the people," hence any clear popular mandate should be given "considerable weight" when sought to alter the province's status. 42 Mechanism India has a legislative negotiating mechanism with central and state players. In Article 3, the Union is made competent with reorganisation, but the legitimacy of politics is based on the state involved. The State Reorganisation Commission suggested the idea of a “balanced approached”43, condemning one dimensional reorganisation on language or culture.

Canada uses referenda alongside political negotiations and constitutional procedures like Quebec referendums (1980 and 1995), Charlottetown Accord (1982) proving that popular vote has important political impact, but it is not unilateral and a foundation of secession. Effectiveness in Accommodating Linguistic and Cultural Pluralism Restructuring in the 1950-60s created linguistically homogeneous states, identifying 22 official languages today. Scholars call this “institutional engineering” which has enabled India to “hold it together despite numerous odds” 44. Canada’s pluralism is characterized by a French-English population including 1. 8 million (5%)45 indigenous people .

Quebec has been given special status by the Constitution in language and civil-law arrangements, even though modern policies assert multiculturalism despite the controversy of asymmetry and strong minority protections. Comparative Perspectives The ability of India can be used to create a sense of fragmentation; reorganisation has led to 42 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S. C. R. 217 (Can. ), Reference re Secession of Quebec - SCC Cases.

43 Report of the States Reorganisation Commission, 1955 (Gov’t of India Press 1955),

44 Balveer Arora, On Federalism (Orient BlackSwan 2019)

45 Population and demography statistics

frequent centrifugal demands of new states46 (Sharma & Sweden, 2022). Even though secession risk is minimal, the spread of the subnational movements remains a source of tension to national unity and governance. Canadian plebiscites (1980,1995) made constitutional referenda battlefields, revealing the near-equipartition in 1995 (49. 4% yes vote) and deepening polarisation without resolving it. The inability of both models to limit or increase diversity shows the weaknesses of both methods. The flexibility model adopted by India has to a great extent suppressed an array of linguistic and regional agitations. The State Reorganisation Commission Report says that such claims can be countered in accommodated units through elite bargaining which is backed by constitutional power.

However, the report warns that too many divisions could tear away coherence when granted demands run out of control. The referendum system adopted by Canada justifies the right of direct democracy in addressing federal matters and the chances of polarisation of the society as seen by the Quebec experience is mitigated. The bigger point is that plebiscitary legitimacy, with judicial and constitutional safeguards is the way to stable majoritarianism. Federal systems entail an ongoing system of negotiation and accommodation. Federal security cannot be guaranteed with the help of a single tool. Still, the considerations that can be crucial are the following: ● Educate ethno-regional reorganisation with cultural criteria with administrative, economic, and integrity.

● Entrench constitutionality, appropriate majority, and bargaining requirements in such a way that models can be run within norms that protect the minorities, rule of law and federalism. ● Impose rules like clarity of question and majority adequate in the resolution of constitutional matters to avoid vagueness. ● Have institutional checks (commissions, debate) to maximise legal and democratic

46 C.K. Sharma & Wilfried Swenden, The Dynamics of Federal (In)Stability and Negotiated Cooperation

Under Single-Party Dominance: Insights from Modi’s India, 30 Contemp. S. Asia 601 (2022)

norms. ● Establish avenues to reconciliation and constitutional dialogue to deal with the postdecision polarisation or centrifugal contestation.

5. Conclusion

Asymmetric Federalism as an Alternative Asymmetric Federalism is where constituent units are granted different levels of autonomy based on varied historical, cultural, linguistic, economical or political influences. This avoids unitary distribution of authorities and is optimally tuned to heterogeneity, to which traditional institutions might be inadequate47. Before 2019, Article 37048, Article 37149 along with the Sixth Schedule50 outlines exceptional rights and independence of Jammu and Kashmir and tribal councils in the North-Eastern part, in India. Quebec, too, is granted specific authorities regarding the language policy, immigration, and civil law.

There are also fiscal mechanisms and highly decentralized system of governance in Canada, which is pragmatic in acknowledging the diversity, recognizing the rights of the aboriginal and treaty rights, land-claim settlements, and judicial ruling like the Tsilhqot’in Nation case51, which recognize the rights of the Indigenous people to land, their territories, and their resources besides accommodating the diversity within the federation. This ad hominem style which combines self-governance with collective administration in a country and addresses the constantly changing needs of sub-national units and dynamically fills the legal gaps through conciliation where legalism would fail.

Altogether, Asymmetric federalism offers a pragmatic approach to handling complex multiethnic societies that acknowledges the uniqueness of the distinct parts of the region, embedding cautiously planned asymmetry into institutional and constitutional structures.

47 Rekha Saxena, Is India a Case of Asymmetrical Federalism?, 47 ECON. & POL. WKLY . 70 (2012)

48 India Const. art. 370 (special provisions for Jammu & Kashmir, now largely abrogated)

49India Const. art. 371

50 India Const. sched. VI

51 Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia - SCC Cases

Recommendations for Managing Diversity in Plural Federations India, Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland federal solidarity in light of regional authority. The following recommendations are central to such kind of management: ● The constitutional recognition of linguistic, cultural and historical diversity are prerequisites of federations. The legal status of diversity based on such recognition should be adequately placed in a legal framework, as an intrinsic part of national identity. ● Developmental equity must be incorporated in federated systems along with maintenance of identities. Eg. , financial grants that are being channeled to tribes majority states in India should be designed not only to finance infrastructure development but also to protect linguistic diversity and promote tourism in these local areas.

● Federal conflicts must also be resolved using institutionalized mechanisms such as debates or discussion panels or commissions to promote dialogue and bargain on fiscal and administrative conflicts instead of being resolved by the central government in isolation. Issue-specific forums for resource-sharing, minority-language states, or borderland states can also be introduced enabling effective policy-making. ● Differentiation of autonomy must be included to meet the heterogeneous needs between provinces and states. Article 371 in India grants more autonomy to northeastern states over land and cultural administration and in Quebec a special jurisdiction over the immigration and civil law also shields the regional specificities. These mechanisms avoid having one size fits all policies.

● The democratic legitimacy means that the voices of the minorities should be taken into account in the process of decision-making. The consociational model52 used in Switzerland illustrates this with a calculated representation of language groups in the Federal council and in India with the Inter-State councils which are still in the process of development but showing the further development of cooperative federalism by institutionalising inter-governmental consultation. ● Economic asymmetries birth regional grievances. Effective fiscal transfer mechanisms can

52 Consociational Model in Switzerland

be used to address the imbalances in the development process and damp down the separatist tendencies, which acts as a stabilising mechanism. They can be seen in the equalisation payments that were made in Canada, or the Finance Commission suggestions in India meant to redistribute resources and have a more balanced development.

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