Patenting The Future - Reconciling Innovation And Access In India’s Clean Energy Transition
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Category: Intellectual Property
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PATENTING THE FUTURE: RECONCILING INNOVATION
AND ACCESS IN INDIA’S CLEAN ENERGY TRANSITION
Mrudubhashini Uma Sriram, B.Com; LL.B. (Hons.), School of Law, SASTRA Deemed University, Tamil Nadu
ABSTRACT
Clean technology is a key element of India’s ambitious climate policy, which resolves to achieve 500GW of non-fossil capacity by the year 2030 and netzero emissions by 2070. It is not for the lack of improvements that problems persist in capacity expansions; including storage shortages, grid instability, and 60 billion shortfall in investments. In this aspect, intellectual property rights are pivotal as they influence both innovation incentives and the availability of affordable clean energy technologies. It is only the pharmaceutical patents under the India’s Patent Act, 1970, that have been researched rather extensively and very little is known about the Act’s applicability to renewable energy technology.
This paper addresses this gap by analysing the provisions of the act, including section 3(d) and compulsory licensing, bearing in mind the national frameworks such as Green Hydrogen Mission, Made in India, and the National IPR Policy. A comparative study of the EU, China, and the US reveals disparate strategies: the EU’s accessoriented model, China’s state-led tactic, and the robust pro-patentee regime of the US. This paper argues that India requires modifications in its patent system which can be achieved by implementing policies like patent pools, compulsory licensing, and quicker review of green patents. Such reforms can match India’s intellectual property laws with its development objectives and climate by striking a balance between innovation and accessibility.
Keywords: Clean Energy Technologies, Indian Patent Act 1970, Compulsory Licensing, Innovation and Accessibility, Climate Policy and IP Law
1. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
India has oriented itself as a global leader in renewable energy, avowing to achieve 500 GW by the year 2030 at the COP261, while the same in its Updated NDC (2022) was reframed as achieving about 50% cumulative electric power capacity from non-fossil sources by 2030, supported by technology transfer and concessional international finance2, and a targeted netzero emissions by 20703. Despite the rapid technological advancements, structural gridlocks such as, grid instability4, inadequate storage, and an exponential financing shortfall of 60 billion5, jeopardises these ambitions. These systematic obstructions imply that India’s reliance on domestic financing and infrastructure alone cannot provide much scope for improvisation and that it must leverage global clean technologies. But, access to such technologies is conditioned by the intellectual property rights.
Going forward contextually, intellectual property rights, specifically patents, play a pivotal role. The patent law allows exclusivity and incentives to the private innovators, the discretionary autonomy to decide the access, and the monopoly to dictate the cost at which the invention posits in the market. Consequentially, this volition may essentially disregard affordability as a factor, the reason be it what may. This draws the attention to bridging the gap between innovations and public access and that is what this paper is aimed at researching. While there is arguably abundant resource in the context of pharmaceutical inventions and public health and affordability in India’s patent regime, there is less focus on its applicability to clean energy technologies.
Unlike pharmaceuticals, where barriers to access have direct implications for public health, patents related to clean energy impact the feasibility and dissemination of clean-tech which are crucial for climate change mitigation. What remains under-explored is the question of how 1 Narendra Modi, National Statement at COP26 World Leaders’ Summit (Nov. 1, 2021), Prime Minister’s Office of India, https://www. pmindia. gov. in/en/news_updates/prime-ministers-statement-at-cop26-world-leaderssummit-in-glasgow/. 2 Government of India, Updated First Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement (Aug. 2022), UNFCCC, https://unfccc. int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022- 08/India%20Updated%20First%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contrib. pdf.
3 Id at 1
4 Ember, The Age of Storage: Batteries Primed for India’s Power Markets (Aug. 20, 2025), Ember,
https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/the-age-of-storage-batteries-primed-for-indias-power-markets/ - signifies the increasing importance of battery storage to manage volatility 5 IEA (2022), India’s clean energy transition is rapidly underway, benefiting the entire world, IEA, Paris https://www.iea.org/commentaries/india-s-clean-energy-transition-is-rapidly-underway-benefiting-the-entireworld
India’s Patent act, 1970, balances innovation with accessibility specific to this field. This lacuna is striking considering that India’s socio-economic vulnerabilities requisite the climate technologies to remain modest and extendible, notably for decentralised rural applications, for instance, solar mini-grids and biomass. This paper seeks to examine the current scope of the legal framework in incentivising clean energy innovations while ensuring accessibility, and how it maybe reformed to better align with India’s developmental and climate objectives. This discussion begins with an overview of India’s clean energy imperatives, followed by a doctrinal analysis of key provisions in the Patents Act, 1970.
It subsequently situates India’s approach within a comparative framework, drawing on the jurisprudence of various jurisdictions, namely, the EU and its access-oriented model, China and its State-led model, and the United States with its pro-patentee regime— as warranted by the revelations of the contrasting approaches, to appropriately create an equilibrium between incentives and societal interest. Situating India against this backdrop provides information on potential changes to its patent law that will not compromise on developmental equity. Ultimately, the paper explores the international legal context and proposes appropriate reforms, including fast-tracking of green patents, patent pools, and tailored licensing provisions, to equalise innovation and accessibility.
2. INDIA’S CLEAN ENERGY IMPERATIVES
India's energy transformation is a legal and policy problem as well as an economic need. Although the Prime Minister at COP26 committed to 500 GW of non-fossil capacity by 2030,6 the Updated Nationally Determined Contribution (2022) reframed this as reaching roughly 50% of total electric power capacity from non-fossil sources by 2030, subject to international technology transfer and concessional climate finance.7 The nation has continuously set ambitious goals in front of the international community. The long-term trend is further highlighted by the target of net-zero by 2070.8 The structural fragility of India's transformation is highlighted by these assertions, which contrast with a local environment characterized by grid instability, insufficient storage, and a 60 billion finance imbalance.9
6 COP26 Presidency, Glasgow Climate Pact (2021), available at https://unfccc.int/documents/460950.
7 Government of India, supra at 2
8 Id.
9 International Energy Agency, India Energy Outlook 2021, at 17–18, https://www.iea.org/reports/india-energyoutlook-2021
The importance of innovation incentives and technological availability becomes crucial in this context. As the primary legal safeguard for renewable energy technology, patents have a direct impact on the rate and expense of India's shift. It is consequently essential to comprehend India's clean energy imperatives before evaluating how the patent system supports and occasionally undermines these goals.
2.1 Flagship Missions and Targets
The most recent initiative is the National Green Hydrogen Mission, 2023, launched with a budget of ₹ 17,490 crore, having its priority in making India a global centre for producing and exporting green hydrogen with a target of 5 million metric tonnes (MMT) per year by 203010. The mission clearly sees technology as the key to success. It connects targets to the domestic production of electrolysers, the creation of certification standards, and the development of demand aggregation methods. The plan includes incentives for local production and building supply chains that align with the Atmanirbhar Bharat framework. 11 This framework aims for strategic independence in energy technologies that are mainly controlled by foreign companies. The National Electricity Plan (NEP) 2022-23, which forecasts a rapid growth in demand for electricity, provides a useful counterpart to this.
The demand for the same is predicted to peak at around 366 GW by 2031–2022, up from 277 GW in 2026–2027. 12 Additionally, the NEP projects that by 2031–2022, the percentage of non-fossil fuel capacity will have increased from 42% in 2023 to around 68%. 13 This calls for the deployment of 411 GWh of storage capacity by 2031-32, which is almost five-fold the current amount, and an unprecedented increase in solar and wind deployments. 14 The earlier policy frameworks continue to anchor this transformation as evidenced by the institutionalisation of renewable adoption by the National Action Plan on Climate Change, 2008, through the National Solar Mission. 15 The Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan and the Make in India provide incentives for the domestic manufacture of solar PV modules, batteries, and 10 National Green Hydrogen Mission (Jan.
4, 2023), Ministry of New & Renewable Energy, Gov’t of India, https://mnre. gov. in/en/national-green-hydrogen-mission/ (outlay ₹ 19,744 crore, including ₹ 17,490 crore for SIGHT programme; target 5 MMT Green Hydrogen production by 2030).
11 Government of India, Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan (2020).
12 Central Electricity Authority [CEA], National Electricity Plan, Vol. I – Generation (2023–32), at 2.7, https://cea.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/document_upload/2023/06/NEP_2022_32_FINAL_GAZETTE.pdf
13 Id.
14 Id. at 3.9
15 Government of India, National Action Plan on Climate Change (2008).
hydrogen equipment, further layering industrial policy on top of the energy transition.16 When knitted together, these policies demonstrate that the energy transition in India is not a mere environmental one, rather an industrial and geopolitical in nature, necessitating the synchronised accomplishment of economic self-reliance and decarbonization.17
2.2 Technology Access as a Strategic Necessity
The centrality of technology access is evident in three respects: Firstly, the element of affordability. It is only feasible to deploy hydrogen and renewables on a large scale if costs drastically decline. Critical components like improved batteries and electrolysers are still patent-protected and concentrated in a few jurisdictions, despite the fact that India has benefited from the global decline in solar module prices. 18 High royalty rates or restrictive licensing may cause deployment to be delayed or project prices to increase, particularly in industries with narrow profit margins like steel and fertilizers. 19 The second is deployment speed. The yearly aggregate must grow at a rate much more rapidly than it did in the past so as to reach the goals by the year 2030 as pledged.
India runs the risk of meeting capacity targets just on paper without technology transfer, leaving real projects stalled by supply-chain weaknesses. 20 Thirdly, industrial strategy. Energy transition is an area that involves global competition and to exemplify the emphasis of the same, attention is drawn to countries like China have strategically acquired clean-tech intellectual property (IP) and reinforced manufacturing dominance. 21 However, the EU and the US, while having distinguished orientation, maintain robust patent regimes and invest intemperately in R&D. 22 When it comes to India, the lack of equivalent access jeopardises the independence of the economy threatening to lock it in a parasitic role, contemplating the import of technologies rather than innovating them
16 Government of India, Make in India Policy Framework (2014).
17 Government of India, India’s Long-Term Low-Emissions Development Strategy 12, UNFCCC (Nov. 2022),
https://unfccc.int/ldc (defining decarbonisation in the context of India’s development pathway as a transition toward low-carbon energy systems and net-zero by 2070).
18 Int’l Renewable Energy Agency [IRENA], Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2022 (2023).
19 Id.
20 CEA, supra note 7, at 4.11.
21 Int’l Energy Agency, China’s Clean Energy Industrial Strategy (2021).
22 European Commission, EU Strategic Energy Technology Plan (2020).
domestically. This categorically establishes that patents are not mere legal instruments but a determinant of India’s bargaining power in the globalised clean energy economy.
2.3 Economic and Policy Barriers
Despite policy ambition, the barriers that complicate India’s transition can be categorised systematically in a three-pronged manner. i. The very first category is cost and technological barriers. Electrolysers for hydrogen production, advanced storage systems, and grid-balancing technologies are extremely capital intensive. India’s projected requirement, per various reports, of over 400 GWh (411. 4 GWh, to be precise) of storage by 2032 represents an investment challenge amounting to exponential cost leading to billions of dollars. 23 Hence, unless India can either make its own cheap green tech or access it affordably form others, the financial foundation of its decarbonisation plan could be unstable. ii. The second barrier is the infrastructure and grid constraints.
The renewable resources are, when mapped, concentrated regionally, such as, solar in the western deserts, wind in coastal belts, etc. To transfer this power to the demand centres the transmission infrastructures must be expanded. India’s National Electricity Plan (2023–32) showcases that interregional transfer capacity will rise from about 119 GW to 168 GW by 2032. 24 But, progress is slowed by land acquisition issues, delays in obtaining permits, and uneven state policies. Grid instability and frequent curtailment of renewable power add on to investor uncertainty, reducing the financial attractiveness of clean energy projects. 25 iii. Lastly, it is financing and policy uncertainty. Research shows that India needs to invest an extra $293–394 billion by 2030 to meet its targets for renewable energy and net-zero emissions.
26 The delay in payment to generators, conformity to different state regulations for procurement, and currency risks, all these essentially contributing to this disparity. The reliance on foreign climate finance, which is in 23 National Electricity Plan (NEP) projections that storage needs will grow from 82. 37 GWh in 2026-27 to 411. 4 GWh in 2031-32, https://mnre. gov. in/en/energy-storage-systemsess-overview/.
24 CEA, National Electricity Plan, Vol. II – Transmission (2023–32), at 2.5.
25 Id.
26 Int’l Energy Agency, Financing Clean Energy Transitions in Emerging and Developing Economies (2021).
turn contingent upon geopolitical negotiations and concessional access, is warranted by the deficiency of strong local funding sources.27 These barriers underscore the need for amending the legal-institutional framework that controls access to technology so as to meet India's clean energy goals. The foundation of this ecosystem is the patent law, which determines whether India can develop, adapt, and implement technology at the rate required by its climate pledges.
2.4 Synthesis
The clean energy roadmap for India’s transition is marked by ambition however is riddled with practical constraints. Perhaps, a clear path to decarbonisation is indicated by the flagship missions wherein their success hinges on quick, inexpensive, and widespread access to cleantech. In this context, intellectual property rights are a structural aspect which determines the transition rather than a peripheral issue. The aim of this study is to examine how the Patents Act, 1970, currently treats clean technologies by studying its provisions on patentability, compulsory licensing, and public interest safeguards. The only way India can effectively bridge the gap between promise and delivery is by fostering coordination between patent regimes and developmental imperatives.
3. PATENT LAW FRAMEWORK IN INDIA: DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS
The patent system in India has evolved largely due to primarily two factors, inter alia, the international obligations and the developmental requirements. The Patents Act of 1970 codified the conceptual notions of patentability, exclusions, exploitation rights, and enforcement, but, its application, predominantly in the pharma industry and in the recent years in up-and-coming fields like clean energy, proceeds to cater equilibrium to promoting innovation and ensuring public access.28,29 The doctrinal assessment of the Patents Act, 1970, provides for the analysis of the practical applications of the provisions to renewable energy technologies and underlines the structural issues which may hinder innovation and access.
27 Id.
28 Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, §§ 2, 3 (India).
29 National IPR Policy, 2016, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, India.
3.1 Patentability and Exclusions
Statutory Framework Perusing the statute, it is quite evident that section 2(1)(j) and 2(1)(ja) of the Patents Act, 1970, form the bedrock for the conceptualisation of Patents into codified frameworks to ensure the legal backbone for the same. Section 2(1)(j) defines “invention” to mean a new product or process involving an inventive step and capable of industrial application, while section 2(1)(ja) elaborates on what an “inventive step” means30,31, which is, a feature of an invention that involves technical advance as compared to the existing knowledge or having economic significance or both and that makes the invention not obvious to a person skilled in the art. These provisions while postulating technological neutrality do mandate that the clean energy innovations, like the novel solar PV panels, high efficiency wind turbine designs, hydrogen electrolysers, etc.
, must conform to the legal thresholds in order to secure patent protection. These provisions and the loopholes identified the corporations to prolong the protection guaranteed by patents brought on the attention of the judiciary to introduce the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005 which defines further as to what constitutes an invention as envisaged under Section 3(d)32 of the act. This became crucial in excluding incremental or evergreening inventions from patentability. While the genesis of this amendment can be found in the pharmaceuticals to prevent monopolistic extension of patent terms, the applicability of the same notion to renewable energies cannot be slighted.
33 To illustrate, modifications to the existing battery chemistries or incremental improvisations in wind turbine efficiency could conjecturally encounter heightened scrutiny under the aforementioned provision, particularly when the claimed upgrade do not significantly enhance efficiency, durability, or costeffectiveness. This triggers two critical issues for renewable technologies; firstly, the conditions for patentability are not just novelty but also non-obvious technical contribution;34 secondly,
30 Patents Act, 1970, § 2(1)(j), § 2(1)(ja) (India)
31 Bishwanath Prasad Radhey Shyam v. Hindustan Metal Industries, AIR 1982 SC 1443 (India) (interpreting inventive step and non-obviousness).
32 Patents Act, 1970, § 3(d) (India)
33 Arora, Ashutosh, “Section 3(d) and Its Implications Beyond Pharma,” 12 J. Intell. Prop. L. 45, 52–54 (2021). (Academic source arguing pros/cons of Section 3(d) applicability to incremental innovations, including green tech.)
34 Bishwanath Prasad Radhey Shyam, supra at note 31
section 3(d) may deter frivolous claims but could also disincentivise incremental innovations, which are often applied to energy technologies. The landmark precedent in Novartis AG v. Union of India35 reiterate the principle that the incremental inventions must satisfy the substantial enhancement of efficacy in order to be characterised as patentable. Though the case incidentally dealt with pharmaceuticals, the doctrinal reasoning has a comprehensive implication for the renewable technologies considering the subjectivity of the term “technical advancement,” a term which is often contentious and context-dependant, and rightfully so given that it is most appropriate in the current times were the technology keeps evolving in spectrum.
Challenges of Obviousness and Incremental Innovation According to the Patents Act, an inventive step is "a feature of an invention that involves technical advance as compared to the existing knowledge or having economic significance or both and that makes the invention not obvious to a person skilled in the art. " This is in addition to novelty, which is required in the Indian patent system. 36 The core tenets of this doctrine were outlined in the seminal case of Bishwanath Prasad Radhey Shyam v. Hindustan Metal Industries, which held that any improvement must produce a new or improved outcome rather than just being a workshop expedient. The key question is whether the improvement would have been obvious to someone with ordinary skill in the relevant art.
The Supreme Court in the Novartis case, though addressed Section 3(d) specifically in the context of pharmaceutical jurisprudence, echoes the prudence of the legislative intent by clarifying that surface level modifications which do not have any discernible effect on the efficacy or the technical performance should not be guaranteed any patent protection which further condoned the deterrence to the evergreening practice, which though not illegal, is legally frowned upon. Per these adjudications, standard engineering alterations, like turbine blade designs, small-scale cell architecture, or minor cost savings for storage components, could be rather easily deemed obvious37 with respect to clean energy technologies in the absence of substantial technical backing reduced into performance data, comparative measurements, or innovative structural elements.
35 Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 1, AIR 2013 SC 1311, [2013] 13 S.C.R. 148
36 Bishwanath Prasad Radhey Shyam, supra note 31
37 Novartis AG, supra at note 35, where improvements having no discernible effect on performance is not given patent protection.
Consequently, this requires the applicants who seek patent protection for renewable energy technologies to formulate claims that accurately outline the exact technical contribution, be it through structural modification, mechanism, or quantifiable effect. They must also provide comprehensive technical evidence demonstrating superior performance in order to effectively defend their invention against the objections raised.
3.2 Compulsory Licensing
Legal Basis The legal framework for compulsory licensing is established by Sections 84–92 of the Patents Act,38 which provide the government with the authority to produce patented innovations under certain circumstances without the patent holder's approval. The statutory grounds for the same are as follows:
1. Inability to implement the patent domestically.
2. Non-availability at a reasonable price.
3. Public health or interest considerations.
The framework is technologically neutral, allowing for plausible application to renewable energy technologies even though it has predominantly been used in the pharmaceutical industry. For example, compulsory licensing under Section 84 may be justified if a crucial component for domestic hydrogen generation were monopolized and overvalued. A significant precedent that prioritized price and public access above exclusive patent
ownership was established by India's first compulsory license, which was granted in the Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Bayer Corporation39 case. The fundamental legal concepts of this historic ruling, which weigh the rights of patent holders against the public interest, offer pertinent insight for the present debates over renewable energy policy, even though it dealt with cancer drugs. Compulsory licensing in the renewable energy industry40 might accelerate knowledge
38 Patents Act, 1970, §§ 84–92 (India).
39 Bayer Corp. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., SLP (C) No. 30145/2014 (India Sept. 12, 2014) (Supreme Court of India, dismissing appeal). 40 Thomas, Rohan Cherian, A Legal Analysis of Transfer and Compulsory Licensing of Green Technology in India to Mitigate Climate Change, 8 Envtl. L. & Prac. Rev. 60 (2023), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=5148875.
transfer, particularly for vital components that India presently imports, such as sophisticated battery systems and electrolysers, helping the nation achieve its carbon neutrality targets. The international recognition of domestic policy flexibilities by TRIPS Articles 7, 8, 30, and
3141 facilitates the implementation of frameworks for compulsory licensing that incorporate
public interest or developmental aims. It is further established by the Doha Declaration42 on TRIPS and Public Health (2001) that intellectual property rights should be interpreted to support socioeconomic advancement. The same is true for green technologies, given the current climate necessity.
3.3 National Policy Intersections
India's patent system is not an isolated system. As stated in the National IPR Policy (2016),43 intellectual property ought to be utilized as a development tool that ensures access and fosters innovation. IP strategy and national objectives, such energy security and climate action, are encouraged to align in policy documents. The 161st Parliamentary Standing Committee Report on IPR44 recommends that patents promote research and development while promoting the dissemination of essential technologies. It is possible to immediately apply this concept to the advancement of renewable energy. Additionally, policy intersections highlight points of dispute. In order to attract private investment into high-capacity technologies, robust intellectual property protection is necessary.
However, excessive exclusivity might delay local deployment, increase costs, and obstruct the industrial policy goals of Atmanirbhar Bharat and Made in India. To reconcile these competing objectives, patentability requirements must be doctrinally clear, licensing terms must be flexible, and inventive step interpretation must be clear. Apart from providing a methodical approach to promoting innovation via exclusive rights, India's patent system has public interest safeguards that were primarily created in the pharmaceutical sector. Even while the purpose of Sections 2(1)(j), 2(1)(ja), and 3(d) is to prevent unnecessary or marginal patents, they may create barriers for minor but strategically 41 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, arts. 7, 8, 30–31, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U. N. T. S. 299.
42 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 14, 2001).
43 National IPR Policy, 2016, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, India.
44 Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce, 161st Report on IPR (2021), available at
https://commerce.gov.in/reports/161st-ipr-report.pdf
important clean energy innovations by establishing standards for innovative step and uniqueness. A practical tool to ensure technological accessibility is required licensing under Sections 84–92, reinforced by TRIPS flexibilities, especially for the widespread installation of renewable infrastructure. This is why combining patent law with national energy planning is crucial. IP incentives may be aligned with India's economic and climate goals through the implementation of patentability doctrine, proactive policy guidance, and potential changes, such as green patent pools or bespoke licensing frameworks. This section claims that India's capacity to research, manufacture,45 and use clean energy technologies domestically at the pace necessary to meet its 2030 and 2070 targets is impacted by patent law,46 which is both a technical instrument and a strategic lever.
4. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES: EU, CHINA, AND US
European Union: Balancing IP, Innovation, and Climate Needs The European Union has implemented a comprehensive intellectual property strategy as part of its climate policy framework with the goal of promoting innovation and increasing the general public's access to environmentally friendly technologies. The EPO lacks a specific "green channel," and PACE is impartial with regard to technology. For any technological sector, including green patents, applicants can request expedited review under the EPO's general accelerated examination procedure (PACE). 47 Through organized frameworks like the UK's Green Channel project, some national patent offices, including those in the UK, Germany, and France, have established green patent acceleration programs that give priority to the evaluation of discoveries that benefit the environment.
48 By enabling quick identification and study of climate-related innovations in its Espacenet database, the EPO's "Y02" and "Y04S" patent classification codes further encourage
45 Patents Act, 1970, §§ 2(1)(j), 2(1)(ja), 3(d), 84–92 (India).
46 Thomas, supra note 40.
47 European Patent Office, PACE – Programme for Accelerated Prosecution of European Patent Applications, https://www.epo.org/applying/online-services/pace.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2025).
48 Green Channel Project (UKIPO), Accelerated Examination for Environmentally Beneficial Inventions,
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/green-channel (last visited Sept. 20, 2025).
transparency and worldwide green innovation. 49 Through Horizon Europe and direct Innovation Fund grants, the EU makes significant investments in green R&D. 50 It also provides financial incentives (such as "patent box" regimes and R&D tax credits) for green innovators and encourages patent filing through subsidies. 51 Research exemptions under both national and UPC legislation, Article 27(b), preserve experimentation, prevent undue restrictions on research on patented innovations for environmental objectives. 52 Recent policy discussions have focused on collaborative methods including open licensing, patent pools, and WIPO GREEN participation, as well as mandatory licensing (in the face of impending global crises). 53 These systems support capacity building, technology transfer, and access without compromising incentives for innovation.
54 China: State-Led Innovation and Licensing Reform Strong governmental participation and aggressive measures to promote green innovation are hallmarks of China's intellectual property system. Environmental goals are indirectly supported by the 2020 Patent Law revision (Article 5, 20), which states that patents cannot be awarded for inventions that are against the public interest. 55 China's "Green Channel," a targeted mechanism connected to the state's industrial policy, speeds up the patent examination process for green innovations. 56 By eliminating access barriers, the Fourth Amendment's significant "Open Licence" provision (Articles 50–52) permits patent holders to issue open licenses, therefore facilitating knowledge transfer. 57
49 European Patent Office, Y02 and Y04S Climate Change & Energy Technologies Classification,
https://www.epo.org/searching-for-patents/helpful-resources/espacenet/classifications.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2025).
50 European Commission, Horizon Europe Work Programme 2021–2022,
https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/what-horizon-2020 (last visited Sept. 20, 2025).
51 European Commission, Patent Box and R&D Incentives for Environmental Innovation,
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/patent-box_en (last visited Sept. 20, 2025).
52 Unified Patent Court Agreement, art. 27(b), Oct. 15, 2015.
53 WIPO GREEN, Supporting Green Technology Transfer, https://www3.wipo.int/wipogreen/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2025). 54 Beldiman, D. & Nicolescu, L., Green Patents and Climate Innovation: Legal Incentives and Barriers in Europe, 29 J. Intell. Prop. L. & Prac. 451, 451–63 (2021).
55 Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (2020 Amendments), arts. 5, 20,
https://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=34523 (last visited Sept. 20, 2025). 56 State Intellectual Property Office of China, Green Channel for Patent Applications, http://english.cnipa.gov.cn (last visited Sept. 20, 2025).
57 Patent Law of the PRC (Fourth Amendment), arts. 50–52.
Additionally, China applies the non-prejudicial disclosure provisions of Article 24 in emergency situations, which aid in the rapid dissemination and protection of green technology during emergencies. 58 These legal reforms are the cornerstone of China's quick ascent to prominence in the global leadership of green technology, together with substantial research investment and state-directed market incentives. 59 United States: Pro-Patentee Regime and Access Dilemmas The strong patent protections provided by the Patent Act (35 U. S. C. ) in the United States system encourage technical innovation. Programs like the Green Technology Pilot Program (USPTO, 2009–2025) attempted to expedite the review process for patents that addressed climate mitigation; however, they were only short-lived and did not solve more general accessibility issues.
60 The US patent system is criticized for high licensing costs, litigation risk, and complex enforcement procedures that might hinder the adoption of green technologies, especially in underdeveloped areas. 61 New innovations include enhanced openness through publicly available government databases, fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing in eco-standardization frameworks, and the examination of patent pooling agreements. 62 Although access inequities have not been entirely eliminated by these programs, they do show a slow shift in favor of balancing innovation incentives with broader adoption of green technology. 63 Lessons for India These overseas frameworks provide India important lessons for creating a thorough and just intellectual property environment for green technology.
• Simplified Procedures: Using accelerated green patent examination methods, modeled after existing systems like the UK Green Channel and EU's PACE, might improve
58 Patent Law of the PRC, art. 24.
59 He, J. & Chen, Y., China’s Patent Law and the State-Led Green Technology Push, 15 Front. L. China 123, 123–45 (2020).
60 United States Patent and Trademark Office, Green Technology Pilot Program,
https://www.uspto.gov/initiatives/green-technology-pilot-program (last visited Sept. 20, 2025). 61 Cowan, K., Green Patents and the Innovation-Access Dilemma in the US, 43 J. L. & Tech. 67, 67–92 (2018).
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
access to green technologies while upholding examination standards. 64 • Government Leadership and Licensing Mechanisms: To enable the quick dissemination of vital green technology, India should design state-directed innovation support mechanisms and include open licensing frameworks, as China has done. 65 • Cost-Effectiveness and Accessibility: By implementing fair licensing policies, requiring green patents to be licensed, and utilizing research exemptions similar to those in European legislation, India can avoid the disadvantages of patent-holdercentric systems. 66 • Cooperative Networks: In keeping with EU and Chinese traditions, increased involvement in WIPO GREEN initiatives, the establishment of patent pooling agreements, and the promotion of open innovation through targeted government funding and tax advantages.
67 By including open licensing provisions, research exemptions, explicit technology-focused acceleration mechanisms, and international collaboration, India may develop a comprehensive IP policy framework that promotes green innovation while ensuring extensive societal benefits. 68
5. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONTEXT
Technology transfer is crucial to achieving climate goals, as the 2015 Paris Agreement emphasizes. Article 10 emphasizes the establishment of an all-encompassing "technology framework" inside the UNFCCC to bolster initiatives for the development and dissemination of environmentally sustainable technologies.69 Through the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), a division of the Technology Mechanism, this framework helps poor countries acquire and use green technology.70 Because India's Nationally Determined
64 Beldiman & Nicolescu, supra note 8, at 457.
65 He & Chen, supra note 13, at 140.
66 European Patent Office, supra note 3; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 6.
67 WIPO GREEN, supra note 7.
68 Dechezleprêtre, A. & Glachant, M., Patent Policies and Green Innovation: Lessons for Developing Countries,
22 Climate Pol’y 92, 92–114 (2014).
69 Paris Agreement art. 10, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.
70 UNFCCC, Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), https://www.ctc-n.org (last visited Sept. 21, 2025).
Contributions (NDCs) rely on affordable access to clean technology, these requirements offer normative support for implementing flexible patent laws and using compulsory licensing where intellectual property poses a barrier. 71 While granting freedom for climate adaptation and mitigation, the 1995 TRIPS Agreement also mandates that India adhere to fundamental standards for intellectual property. According to TRIPS Articles 7 and 8, which expressly permit actions to safeguard the public interest in areas that are crucial to both technological and socioeconomic development, intellectual property protection must strike a balance between technical innovation and the transfer and dissemination of technology.
72 Additionally, Article 31 allows for obligatory licensing in certain circumstances, which is a measure that India has already employed in pharmaceutical contexts and may modify for use in applications involving green technology. 73 The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (2001), which was first developed for pharmaceuticals, lays forth a more general idea: intellectual property laws shouldn't stop members from pursuing public health protection or facilitating access to essential technologies. 74 Climate change, like health, is considered a "global public good" and may be supported by the same reasoning. As per several scholars, the Declaration establishes a solid precedent for extending TRIPS flexibilities to encompass technology that is crucial for combating climate change.
75 India can thus place its rulings on patent policy within this international legal framework, particularly when it comes to criticizing the extensive exclusions or compulsory licensing included in Section 3(d) of its Patent Act. 76 These disagreements are made worse by conversations on climate justice. Developed countries, who have traditionally created the majority of greenhouse gas emissions, own the majority of patents on green technologies. Demanding strict respect to international intellectual property 71 Lavanya Rajamani, Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative Possibilities and Underlying Politics, 65 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 493, 509–12 (2016) (discussing technology obligations for developing countries). 72 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 7–8, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U. N. T. S.
299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
73 TRIPS art. 31; see also Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Bayer Corp., Compulsory License Application No. 1 of 2011 (India Controller of Patents 2012).
74 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Nov. 14, 2001, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2.
75 Laurence R. Helfer, Pharmaceutical Patents and the Human Right to Health: The Contested Evolution of the TRIPS Regime, in The Oxford Handbook of International Intellectual Property Law 786, 802–05 (R. Dreyfuss, J. Ginsburg & R. Okediji eds., 2018).
76 The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, India Code (1970), § 3(d).
regulations while expecting impoverished nations to decarbonize quickly presents distributive fairness issues. 77 India and other Global South nations frequently claim that without affordable access to technologies like carbon capture, renewable energy systems, or energy-efficient industrial processes, their climate transition goals are impossible. 78 Therefore, in addition to economic considerations, support for flexible patent systems is founded on equitable principles and shared but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) under international climate law. 79 This has led to the emergence of compromise alternatives such as open licensing schemes and patent pools.
Through the 2008 introduction of the Eco-Patent Commons by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), corporations such as IBM, Nokia, and DuPont were able to promise environmentally favorable patents for unrestricted application. 80 Even while participation declined and the project ultimately came to a standstill, it demonstrated how voluntary pooling may reduce transaction costs and promote the broad adoption of green technology. Academic research indicates that, despite adoption restrictions, the Commons proved that cooperative intellectual property management in the environmental sector was feasible. 81 Such structures might be utilized by India by leading South-South cooperation initiatives or participating in global patent pools.
Countries with similar developmental requirements, such as South Africa, Brazil, and ASEAN members, may pool their patents, exchange information, and work out cooperative licensing arrangements with international rightsholders. 82 Such collaboration reduces reliance on wealthy nations and increases negotiating leverage in global climate negotiations. 83 77 Daniel Bodansky, Climate Change and Human Rights: Unpacking the Issues, 38 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 511, 528–30 (2010). 78 Chidi Oguamanam, Beyond Theories: Intellectual Property Dynamics in Climate Change and Clean Energy Technology Transfer, 9 J. World Intell. Prop. 188, 202–07 (2012).
79 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, art. 3(1)
(establishing the principle of CBDR). 80 World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Eco-Patent Commons, https://www.wbcsd.org (last visited Sept. 21, 2025). 81 Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How International Law Is Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property, 36 Mich. J. Int’l L. 557, 591–94 (2015) (assessing Eco-Patent Commons). 82 Peter K. Yu, South-South Collaboration in Intellectual Property Lawmaking: Lessons for the Future, 14 J. World Intell. Prop. 1, 22–27 (2011). 83 Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property “From Below”: Copyright and Capability for Education, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 803, 841–44 (2007) (arguing for collaborative approaches to IP in global South contexts).
6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA
Equitable access to clean technology and innovation incentives are difficult to reconcile under India's patent system. Originally created in the pharmaceutical industry, the Patents Act, 1970 shows a consistent dedication to protecting the public interest by including safeguards like Section 3(d) and mandatory licensing clauses. Similar logic applies to renewable technology, where increasing adoption depends on price and accessibility. 84 The MNRE's Annual Reports emphasize that achieving India's renewable energy goals still depends critically on costeffectiveness. 85 Technological monopolization, which includes exorbitant licensing fees, reliance on foreign patent holders, and the exclusion of small enterprises from distributed solutions, can result from overly robust protection.
An excessive dependence on imports and monopolistic control over essential technologies have been cautioned against by the Standing Committee on Energy (2023). This might impede India's transition and endanger energy justice. 86 Additionally, researchers argue that too strict patent protection might hinder the diffusion of low-carbon concepts, citing examples from pharmaceutical patent cases where required licensing was justified by the public interest. 87 On the other hand, insufficient protection may result in a decline in private investment and foreign technology transfer. The NITI Aayog Renewable Energy Roadmap acknowledges that scaling advanced solar, wind, and storage technologies requires strong R&D incentives and private sector participation. 88 Overly restrictive laws or aggressive licensing practices may make it more difficult for new technologies to enter the Indian market.
89 This equilibrium is different in India than in developed nations because of the country's socioeconomic circumstances, which include a heavy reliance on coal and ongoing energy poverty. In addition to innovation incentives, distributive equity must be a top priority in patent reform. According to academics, climate change technology should be considered "global 84 Bhargavi V. Mandava, Climate Change, Patents, and Access to Clean Technologies: A Case for Compulsory Licensing in India, 17 J. Intell. Prop. L. & Prac. 435, 438–40 (2022).
85 Ministry of New & Renewable Energy, Annual Report 2022–23 (2023), at 12–15.
86 Standing Comm. on Energy, Promotion of Renewable Energy with Special Reference to Ethanol Blending Programme (17th Lok Sabha, 2023), at 28–30. 87 K. Gopakumar & S. Dhar, Clean Technologies, IP Rights and Climate Justice: India’s Options under TRIPS,
14 Indian J. Int’l Econ. L. 67, 74–77 (2021).
88 NITI Aayog, Renewable Energy Roadmap 2030 (2022), at 18–20.
89 Id. at 23–25.
public goods," requiring legal frameworks that strike a balance between the needs of domestic industry and global equity.90 Among the potential tactics to match IP regulations with national energy and climate objectives include increased R&D spending, open licensing practices, and expedited evaluation of green patents.91
7. FINDING: REFORMS & PROPOSALS
While writing this paper a lot of questions arose, the one that stood out the most and the one requiring to be absolutely answered is the one that every policy-maker has to answer when drafting the legislations that codify the legislative intent, which is: Why is there a need to expand the scope of the term “public interest” to include the climate change? It is justifiable that in the pharmaceutical field, it was interpreted to include public health because the consequences of monopolistic trend in this industry with patents as their legal backing tended to have immediate repercussions, however, the same could not be argued here because the harm doesn’t appear as immediate, and rather can be counter-argued to this paper’s intention that it is merely to cater to achieving an easier path towards fulfilling the pledged goals for climate justice.
To answer this, we need to realise that the India’s patent regime has historically balanced private rights with public interest. The same delicate balancing act is desperately needed for renewable energy, but the justification cannot be based only on generalizations about "climate justice. " Concrete, enforceable hooks are required by courts and lawmakers. India's legally binding domestic and international obligations, including the National Electricity Plan (NEP), the National Green Hydrogen Mission, and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), are the basis for the argument. These obligations cannot be met without reasonably priced access to vital technologies. Reforming the patent law is therefore essential to ensuring that India achieves its legally acknowledged energy and development goals as well as for distributive equality.
1. Fast-track examination of green patents.
There is now a large backlog in the Indian Patent Office, which delays approvals and 90 Lavanya Rajamani, Innovation, Access, and the Climate Challenge: IP in a Warming World, 10 Indian J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 1, 12–16 (2019).
91 Ministry of New & Renewable Energy, Annual Report 2022–23, supra note 2, at 40–42.
discourages innovation.92 On the other hand, China, the USPTO, and the EPO have established fast tracks for "green" innovations, enabling their quick adoption.93 India would send a message to investors and inventors that renewable technology is a national priority by establishing a legislative fast-track route. The innovation side of the equation is addressed by this reform, which supports the National IPR Policy's request for sectoral prioritizing and encourages private sector R&D by lowering uncertainty and waiting times.
2. Expanding compulsory licensing to cover environmental and energy security
needs. Because of unmet domestic demand, expense, and public health concerns, compulsory licensing is required by Sections 84–92 of the Patents Act. A stronger legal foundation is provided by framing the energy transition as a public purpose problem that is directly tied to India's NDC and energy security obligations, even though climate justice alone may be too vague. Just as life-saving pharmaceuticals might justify required licensing, so too can technologies that are necessary to meet legally enforced energy targets. Clarifying the "public interest" of renewable energy technology would strengthen the case for mandatory licensing in this sector.94
3. Encouraging patent pools and open licensing models.
Two major barriers to the growth of renewable energy are transaction costs and patent tangles. Initiatives like the Medicine Patent Pool and the short-lived Eco-Patent Commons demonstrate how community licensing may reduce duplication and boost availability.95 If India created a green patent pool, perhaps in collaboration with other Global South nations, it would have greater bargaining leverage with global rightsholders and lower pricing for its own businesses. Such strategies would
92 Indian Patent Office, Annual Report 2022–23, at 45–47.
93 WIPO, Fast-Tracking Green Patent Applications: Comparative Study (2020), at 10–15.
94 See Laurence R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?, 5 Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. 47, 62–65 (2003) (arguing that compulsory licensing frameworks can and should be broadened beyond public health to encompass pressing global challenges such as climate change). 95 Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 Yale L.J. 804, 845–48 (2008); World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Eco-Patent Commons Report (2012).
supplement, not replace, required licensing by establishing collaborative pathways to technology transfer.
4. Leveraging government-use provisions for national targets.
The government is already allowed to exploit patents for public purposes under Sections 100–102. By making it clear through legislation or policy that meeting objectives for renewable capacity counts as one of these purposes, India would be able to implement vital technology without having to deal with the formalities of private negotiations. This policy explicitly links IP flexibilities to legally binding national obligations and is legally defendable under TRIPS Article 31.96
5. Integrating reforms with domestic industrial and climate policy.
Patent law is not a quick fix for grid instability, storage limitations, and financing gaps. But without legal ways to obtain patented ideas for advanced batteries, electrolysers, and offshore wind technologies, India would remain dependent on expensive imports. Instead of just consuming technology, the patent system is utilized to develop industry when IP changes align with initiatives like the Green Hydrogen Mission and Made in India. 97 In contrast to impersonal moral arguments, this ensures that reforms are framed as strategies to increase domestic industrial capacity, energy security, and long-term competitiveness. Instead of merely making sure that the supply of renewable energy is in keeping with India's established national objectives, the suggested modifications really address a fundamental policy need, which makes them appealing.
When transforming legal intentions into practical frameworks, policymakers must take into account the challenges of achieving domestic developmental goals. This justification extends beyond the language of climate justice. Even if the long-term repercussions of IP reform may not manifest as rapidly as those in the pharmaceutical business, they may be just as harmful to national interests as the short-term ones. India can overcome the technology gap and play a significant role in the global clean 96 Shamnad Basheer & Prashant Reddy, The "Evolving" Role of Compulsory Licensing in India: A View from the Trenches, 10 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 1, 29–33 (2010) (noting that government-use provisions under Section 100 provide an underutilized but legally defensible tool for advancing national public purposes).
97 Peter Drahos, The Global Governance of Knowledge: Patent Offices and Their Clients 201–07 (2010)
(discussing how aligning IP policy with industrial strategy enables states to transition from technology importers to producers).
energy transition by implementing these steps, which will also answer the important issue of why legislative engagement is not just justified but needed.
10. CONCLUSION
The patent system in India strikes a purposeful balance between compensating inventors and safeguarding the general welfare. In the pharmaceutical industry, this equilibrium has worked rather well, but in the renewable energy sector, where technological lock-up might jeopardize national transition goals, it is insufficient. There are no clear procedures under the current structure to expedite green patents, make mandatory licensing more climate-friendly, or fully implement government-use clauses. In order to ensure affordability and industrial capacity without undermining R&D, urgent changes should concentrate on explicitly connecting IP flexibilities to legally enforceable local and international responsibilities.
By rethinking intellectual property as a dynamic vehicle for balancing innovation frameworks with climate equality and sustainable development goals, rather than as a barrier or panacea, my research contributes to larger conversations. Patent law in India must change to become a tool of the transformation process itself; it can no longer function independently of industrial and energy policy.
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