Quasi-Federal Or Unitary - The Structural Implications Of Simultaneous Elections On The Indian Constitution

Author: LawSphereX

Category: Constitutional & Human Rights

Published: 2026-08-23T20:49:42.162169+00:00

Updated: 2026-08-26T17:09:57.112+00:00

QUASI-FEDERAL OR UNITARY: THE STRUCTURAL

IMPLICATIONS OF SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS ON THE

INDIAN CONSTITUTION

Dr. Jyoti Yadav, Assistant Professor, Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Vishal Patel, LL.M. Student, Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow

ABSTRACT

The submission of the High-Level Committee Report in 2024 has reignited the debate on “One Nation, One Election”, creating a tension between administrative utility and constitutional morality. This research finds whether synchronizing electoral cycles alters or change India’s constitutional identity from a “quasi-federal” structure to a centralized unitary system. While supporters argue that One Nation One Election reduces the public expenditure and policy stagnation caused by the Model Code of Conduct, critics argue that it clashes with the Federal Principle, which is a basic structure of Indian Constitution. The study analyses structural implications as presented by critique and supporters like the loss of state autonomy where regional election cycles become dependent on the Lok Sabha’s timeline, and the “coattail effect,” where national issue overshadow local issues.

Further, this paper also analyse the financial logic of the proposed re-election for remainder term, arguing it may result in an inefficient cost model. The paper conclude that the current proposal risks centralizing power and suggests that any implementation must provide the balance administrative efficiency with the preservation of federal checks and balances. Keywords: One Nation One Election, Federalism, Basic Structure, Coattail Effect, Simultaneous Elections, Constitution.

INTRODUCTION

The submission of the Report of the High-Level Committee on Simultaneous Elections in 2024, chaired by former President Ram Nath Kovind, has restarted the debate around “One Nation, One Election” (ONOE). While the report frames simultaneous elections as a necessary evolution for a maturing democracy, focusing on the reduction of the election cycle, it also sets the ground for a constitutional conflict regarding the nature of Indian federal Structure. At bottom of this debate lies a tension between the administrative utility and constitutional morality. The profound justification lies for one nation one election on the efficiency of administrative and financial work, as law commission highlighted that the premise for synchronizing electoral cycles will reduce the massive public expenditure and ensure policy continuity free from the Model Code of Conduct.

1 However, this approach finds itself in a clash with the Federal Principle, which the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed as an important component of the Basic Structure doctrine. 2 This research argues that the imposition of simultaneous elections is not merely a procedural reform but a structural overhaul. While One Nation One Election aims for continuous and stable governance but whether it risks in fundamentally changing India’s constitutional identity from a federal government structure to centralised unitary government structure.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASELINE

To understand the structural implications of “One Nation, One Election” (ONOE), it must be necessary to analyse the established constitutional principle of India. Although India follow a federal model of government, but it’s application in India differs from the classic federal government structure, as Indian Constitution provide more power to Union Government then state governments and even had centralising tendency in certain condition. For this special arrangement, the K.C. Wheare popularized the term “Quasi Federal”, to describe a system that is unitary in spirit but federal in form.3 This hybrid structure is designed to balance the need for a strong central authority to preserve national integrity with the necessity of regional autonomy to accommodate India’s immense diversity.

1 Law Commission of India, “Draft Report on Simultaneous Elections” 11-12 (August, 2018).

2 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225; S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.

3 K.C. Wheare, Federal Government 27 (Oxford University Press, London, 4th edn., 1963).

Part VI of the Indian Constitution outlines the concept of the State, its composition, powers and functions. Article 1704 mandates that members of the state legislative assembly be elected by direct election, providing a need for state-level elections. The Role of Article 246 The foundation of this federal arrangement is the distribution of legislative powers, provided under Article 2465 read with the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. 6 This article act as the protector of the federal balance, ensuring that the Centre and the States do the work in their own sphere without breaching others and also to work in coordination in need. This distinct spheres in this article is not merely administrative; it is political. It acknowledges that the mandate of a State Legislative Assembly is conceptually distinct from that of the Lok Sabha.

The structural separation of elections between centre and state had played a crucial role in history to reinforced this distinction of legislative power between them , preventing any local issue from being consumed by the national waves, a protective armour that simultaneous election pose the risk of erosion. Federalism as Basic Structure The judiciary has played a pivotal role in establishing the federalism as an unalterable part of the Constitution. In the landmark case of S. R. Bommai v. Union of India7, a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court declared that “Federalism is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. ”8 The Court observed that although the Constitution has a strong centralizing bias, the States cannot be held merely a limb attached to the Centre.

They have their own independent constitutional existence, and their legislative and executive powers cannot be crushed upon arbitrarily. 9 This principle was further elaborated in Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India10. While the Court upheld the amendment in 2003 in the Representation of People Act, 1951 removing the domicile requirement for Rajya Sabha elections, it reiterated that the federal principle remains

4 The Constitution of India, art. 170.

5 Id., art. 246.

6 Id., VIIth Schedule.

7 (1994) 3 SCC 1.

8 Id.

9 Id.

10 7 SCC 1.

a dominant feature of the Constitution.11 The Court clarified that the very specific nature of Indian federalism is functional rather than institutional; it bends towards the centre but never breaks the autonomy of the states.12 The court had used this particular doctrine in respective cases to protect the interest of the states.13 Therefore, making the federal structure of Indian governance a constitutional mandate. Any reform, changed or amendment , including like of One Nation, One Election, that seeks to mechanically synchronize the tenure of State Assemblies with Parliament, potentially risks disrupting this delicate structure, potentially violating the Basic Structure of Indian Constitution.

CONCEPT OF SIMULTANEOUS ELECTION AND IT’S PROPOSALS

Simultaneous elections, famously referred to as “One Nation, One Election” in the India, denotes the synchronization of electoral cycles in which elections to the Lok Sabha (House of the People) and all State Legislative Assemblies are conducted concurrently within a stipulated timeframe.14 This concept is a different from the current framework which evolved since 1967, the elections from 1951 to 1967 in India were simultaneous by default, a feat achieved during the first four General Elections. 15 Initially this synchronization was not a mandated by the constitution but was a result of political stability. Although this cycle was disrupted in 1968 and 1969 due to the premature dissolution of several State Legislative Assemblies, and also the dissolution of the Fourth Lok Sabha in

1970.16 This marked the beginning of current framework, the cycle of perpetual elections,

where the no fixed terms of state governments led to a fragmented electoral map. The current proposal seeks to reverse this historical drift, arguing that the desynchronization was an irregularity rather than a feature of India’s federal design.17 The Law Commission of India proposed a structured plan for holding simultaneous elections to

11 Id.

12 Id.

13 See; Mineral Area Development Authority Etc v. M/S Steel Authority of India 2024 INSC 554; State of Uttar Pradesh v Lalta Prasad Vaish 2024 INSC 812.

14 Supra note 1 at 2.

15 Government of India, “High Level Committee Report on Simultaneous Elections in India” 14 (March, 2024). 16 Vivek Debroy & Kishore Desai, Analysis of Simultaneous Elections: The “What”, “Why” and “How”, The Hindu Centre, May 2017.

17 Id. at 6.

the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies, mainly through three options. Under Option I, elections of some States are first aligned with Lok Sabha elections, while elections of the remaining States are conducted around the mid-point of the Lok Sabha term. Thereafter, from the next cycle, complete synchronisation can be achieved so that all Lok Sabha and State Assembly elections are held together. Under Option II, elections are held twice in a five-year period like a mid-term and end-term, meaning the country will face elections only at fixed intervals like mid of 2019, end of 2021, mid of 2024, end of 2026, and so on. Under Option III, if full synchronisation is not feasible, then all elections falling due within one calendar year should be conducted together.

To implement these options, the Commission recommended some constitutional amendments, especially to Article 17218 to allow one-time curtailment or extension for synchronisation, and insertion of a proviso to Articles 83(2)19 and 172(1)20 to legally introduce the “remainder term” concept. For maintaining continuity and preventing disruption of the election cycle, the Commission proposed reforms addressing the major causes of early dissolution: no-confidence motions, hung Houses, and budgetary defeat. It recommended adopting a constructive vote of no-confidence, meaning a no-confidence motion should be allowed only when it includes the name of an alternative leader who can form the government, thereby ensuring stability and reducing mid-term elections.

The most important safeguard suggested is the Remainder Term Rule, which states that if Lok Sabha or a State Assembly dissolves before completing its full term and fresh elections are held, the newly elected House must continue only for the remaining portion of the original term and not for a fresh five-year term. This rule is crucial to ensure that the synchronised election cycle remains intact. Building upon the report of Law Commission, the High-Level Committee (HLC) chaired by former President Ram Nath Kovind in 2024 proposed a phased process for synchronising elections in India across the three tiers i. e. Lok Sabha, State Legislative Assemblies, and Local Bodies. The report proposed a two-step implementation model. First step involves synchronizing the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assembly elections.

The Second step requires synchronizing elections for Municipalities and Panchayats with the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies, to be held within 100 days of the general election. 21 Similar to Law Commission report of 2018, this report also discusses the protection of synchronised cycle,

18 The Constitution of India, art. 172.

19 Id., Art. 83.

20 Id., Art. 172.

21 Supra note 14 at 246.

although unlike the earlier report of Law Commission 2018, this report also discusses and propose the election for remainder term, in situation where a legislature dissolve early. 22 The Report recommended the introduction of Article 82A to fix an “Appointed Date” for this transition and emphasized the creation of a “Single Electoral Roll” to be used across all three tiers of government, necessitating amendments to Article 325. 23 Internationally, simultaneous elections are practiced in several democracies, though constitutional structures vary significantly. Federal countries such as Brazil, and Belgium conduct national and state elections concurrently. These country conduct these election simultaneously without disturbing their federal structure, due to fundamental structural differences.

For instant, Belgium and Brazil despite been federal government, provide more power to regional or state government without much interference from centre,24 leaving the question of regional issue to suppressed by national issue; whereas in Indian federal system grants the Union government extensive powers to dismiss state governments under Article

35625 and exercise control through Governor appointments.26 It was argued that simultaneous

elections would further centralize power by nationalizing state elections, where local issues become overshadowed by national narratives and dominant party personalities.27 Additionally, it's been argued that India is a diverse nation having distinct linguistic, cultural, and political identities, it requires electoral flexibility that fixed cycles might compromise, potentially undermining the federal balance that accommodates regional aspirations.

STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF ONE NATION ONE ELECTION ON

FEDERALISM

The proposal for the implementation of ‘One Nation, One Election’ would constitute a significant model shift in Indian constitutionalism with profound structural implications for the federal framework. This is a point supported by both sides of the debate, who provide

22 Id. at 110.

23 Id. at 5-8

24 Kris Deschouwer, The Politics of Belgium: Governing a Divided Society 113-147 (Red Glober Press, 2nd edn., 2012); Alfred P. Montero, Brazilian Politics: Reforming a Democratic State in a Changing World 39 Journal of Latin American Studies (2014).

25 The Constitution of India, art. 356.

26 Id.

27 V. Krishna Ananth and C. Rammanohar Reddy, “Simultaneous Elections’ or Centralisation of Power”, The Wire, April 20, 2018, available at: https://thewire.in/politics/simultaneous-elections-centralisation-power (last visited on February 10, 2026)

arguments to support their respective motions while also countering the other’s. Critics argue that the model would compromise the autonomous existence of State Legislatures and subordination. This is countered by the argument that the framework would not hinder the existing federal model. On the other hand, the petitioner supports the proposal on the grounds of administrative efficiency which has been countered by the point that the upfront cost would be substantial. Some of these points given by critics are as; A Loss of Autonomy and Electoral Independence

The imposition of simultaneous elections would deprive the states of temporal autonomy, the constitutional right to determine their own electoral timelines based on local political need and democratic mandates. 28 Under the current constitutional framework, State Legislative Assemblies enjoy independent existence under Article 172, with their duration and dissolution governed by local state political dynamics. 29 It is been criticised and been raised by analyst that Simultaneous election would undermine the regional autonomy, due to Lok Sabha’s Electoral calendar. It's been said that this would effectively transform the state elections from independent democratic exercises into derivatives of national politics.

30 It's been also been pointed out that, such synchronization would also effect the fluidity, which is essential to democracy, where governments derive legitimacy from continuous legislative confidence rather than predetermined time periods. 31 The Parliamentary system of India, does not have provision regarding the fixed term for any government, to allow ensure good governance among the elected individuals of the party and it also facilitate change leadership through noconfidence motions and voluntary dissolutions of the government. Due to imposition of such nuances, the current flexibility will be sacrificed, leaving no choice other than continuing with unstable, delegitimized and improper government to continue until the fix term.

32 This rigidity 28 Mithilesh Kumar Jha and Kamal Nayan Choubey, Indian Politics And Political Processes Ideas, Institutions And Practices 1-5 (Routledge, New York, 2024)

29 Supra note 19.

30 Murali Krishnan, “Will simultaneous elections work in India?”, DW, September 24, 2024, available at: https://www.dw.com/en/will-simultaneous-elections-work-in-india/a-70313182 (Last visited on February 11, 2026) 31 R. Rangarajan, “The pros and cons of simultaneous elections | Explained”, The Hindu, March 15, 2024, available at: https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/the-pros-and-cons-of-simultaneous-electionsexplained/article67790554.ece (Last visited on February 11, 2026) 32 Shreya Borah, “ Simultaneous elections could silence India’s regional voices”, East Asia Forum, July 14, 2025, available at: https://www.dw.com/en/will-simultaneous-elections-work-in-india/a-70313182 (Last visited on February 11, 2026)

of fixed terms undermines the bargaining power of regional party in a coalition government, as any mid-term reshuffling would not be possible. The High Level Committee report does not directly answer to the argument that synchronisation destroys State autonomy. It provides One Nation One Election as primarily a timing and governance reform, not a constitutional restructuring of either election system of India or Centre–State relations. As the report suggests, the State governments will retain their legislative and executive powers exactly as before, and only election schedules will be aligned to reduce repeated disruptions caused by frequent elections. On the question of parliamentary flexibility like dissolution, instability, no-confidence, the report explicitly rejects proposals that would weaken parliamentary democracy.

It states that no-confidence motions are a legitimate and necessary feature of the Indian parliamentary system and should not be diluted. Unlike western concept of fixed term, the report provides that if a House is dissolved early, elections can be held and it should be held only for the remainder of the term, this is method presented way through which both democratic accountability and election-cycle stability can be preserved. 33 Centralization of Electoral Discourse It's been argued that One Nation One Election fundamentally nationalize the state elections, risking India’s Parliamentary democracy in Presidential sort of democracy, in which national issues can be used to be tool of campaigning even for state or regional election by overlooking the regional issues or narratives.

34 Critics argued that such synchronized election would lead to ‘Coattail effect, which means “ tendency for a popular political party leader to attract votes for other candidates of the same party in an election”35, overlooking weakness of that candidate. They suggest that in case of synchronized election popular political party leader contesting for the National election on national issue, would attract the vote for his party for the state election overlooking regional issues. A study published by the IDFC Institute in 2015 analysing voter behaviour over 16 years, presented that a 77% probability that voters will choose the same

33 Supra note 14 at 110.

34 Supra note 30.

35 Coattail effect, available at: https://www.dictionary.com/browse/coattail-effect (last visited on February 11, 2026).

political party for both the Center and the State when elections are held simultaneously. 36 This behavioural homogenization of voters marginalizes state-specific issues forcing state issues to become mere subordinate to the national agenda. Such can distorts the fundamental premise of vertical accountability at the state level. 37 In light of coat-tail effect, the petitioner for One nation One election does not provide any solid ground to support their motion, although it provide that voters can distinguish between levels, and can be provided with separate ballot and candidates exist. It ensure that state issues will still exist even if elections coincide. Report treats this as a political concern, not a constitutional barrier.

Structural Dependency and Subordination Critics also points out that Simultaneous elections risk creating structural dependency and subordination within India’s federal design; where the Union Government becomes the head for all state Assemblies. As the Kovind Committee’s proposed framework treats the Lok Sabha’s term as the reference point for synchronization, making State Legislatures to align their duration with Parliament. They argue that this transforms states from coordinated constitutional units into institutions whose political cycle becomes dependent on the Centre’s electoral timeline, undermining the very principle of Indian federalism that Union and States exercise autonomy within their respective spheres. This contradicts the Supreme Court’s position that states are not “agents or delegates” of the Union but independent units within their domain.

38 They also argue that simultaneous elections may heavily favour national parties, as they superior resources that regional party, national party can also easily amplifying their already superior resources, messaging reach, fundraising, and organisational strength. 39 The Regional parties could be at risk losing visibility as the local issues can get easily overshadowed in a nationwide campaign. It may also centralise election funding and administration, reducing the 36 One nation, one election’ will test the limits of our democracy, available at: https://theleaflet. in/dueprocess/one-nation-one-election-will-test-the-limits-of-our-democracy (last visited on February 11, 2026).

37 Supra note 30; See, Emanuele Bracco and Federico Revelli, “Concurrent Elections and Political

Accountability: Evidence from Italian Local Elections” 148 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 135-

149 (2018)

38 State Of West Bengal v. Union Of India 1963 AIR 1241, 1964 SCR (1) 371.

39 Supra note 30.

role of State Election Commissions and increasing states’ fiscal dependence on Union institutions. The Rajya Sabha’s system to retire where one-third of members retire biennially protects federalism, it ensures continuity and protects it from Lok Sabha election waves. 40 It was pointed out simultaneous elections could indirectly weaken this stability by synchronizing state-level political victories, making Rajya Sabha elections more uniform and aligned with Lok Sabha trends. This would erode its role as a federal check, making it a puppet parliamentary body. These issues were treated as mere argument by the petitioner and reports on this framework, which provide it have no major threat to Constitution, if One Nation, One Election will be implemented.

Supporter argue that although synchronisation requires a common electoral cycle but it was argued this does not make the states subordinate to union, they provide that since state remain independent constitutional units with their own elected legislatures. The report justifies alignment mainly to reduce frequent elections and repeated imposition of the Model Code of Conduct, which results in disruption governance. On State Election Commissions, the report clarifies that State Election Commission will continue conducting Local Body elections, while a single electoral roll will be prepared by the Election Commission of India in consultation with State Election Commission.

Not only critics but the petitioner of this framework also puts out certain argument to support the motion of the one nation, one election, some of these are: Efficiency and Cost Argument The claim regarding “efficiency” for One Nation One Election (ONOE) rests on a assumption that elections are primarily an administrative disruption. Supporter believes that continuous elections are not a obstacle in a governance but the core accountability mechanism in a constitutional democracy. They believe in treating the elections as a “cost” to be minimized. The High Level Committee report itself provides the major justification of One Nation, One election is reduced expenditure and reduced disruption due to the Model Code of Conduct (MCC).

40 The Constitution of India, art. 83.

This argument was countered by the critic on the point that purchasing upfront cost of the purchase will be significantly high, and the Law Commission in his report of 2018, that financial analysis shows that synchronisation also creates front costs, particularly the procurement and storage of additional EVMs and VVPATs, they estimated ₹4555 crore expenditure merely for equipment shortfalls, with recurring replacement costs linked to shelf life. 41 But they also incorporated that high cost will be one time rather than reoccurring cost. The other thing pointed out by the critics was that, largest costs in Indian elections are not limited to administrative polling logistics; they also include continuous political mobilisation, campaign finance, enforcement, and opportunity costs which do not automatically disappear.

The Law Commission and High Level Committee report acknowledges that its cost comparison is restricted only to government expenditure, not party/candidate spending. 42 The High Level Committee’s proposal for re-election for the remainder term in the event of the dissolution of the state legislative assembly raises a question of cost. Re-election for the remainder term incurs the cost of that particular election. If multiple state legislative assemblies fail in a five-year cycle, multiple elections will be held within that cycle. These elections will be held regardless of the remaining term in the cycle. Consequently, the next cycle will also hold elections for the same assembly resulting in an inefficient cost model.

Strengthening of Federalism It's been claim that by proponents that One Nation One Election will strengthen federalism by promoting coordinated governance and reducing repeated Moral Code of Conduct resulting in the policy paralysis. However this point is heavily being rebutted on the ground that sometime this cooperation is being confused with subordination. They believe that cooperation presupposes autonomy; states cannot meaningfully cooperate when their fundamental electoral independence has been eliminated and their legislative existence depends on Lok Sabha’s term. Further, India already has a Union-tilted federal design; One Nation One Election may deepen this imbalance rather than “strengthen” federalism. 43

41 Supra note 1 at 7,8.

42 Id. at 4,5.

43 Id. at 102-03.

International Argument The High Level Committee report and the Law Commission report both cite international examples to support the framework of one nation, one election framework. They provide that, Sweden conducts elections for Parliament, county councils, and municipal councils together, and Belgium frequently aligns federal elections with European elections. 44 They considered Germany as a example to show “constructive vote of no-confidence,” which ensure stability in government without repeated dissolutions. 45 However, it is said that these comparisons cannot be transplanted mechanically in India. Many cited systems operate under proportional representation like Sweden, South Africa, Belgium, unlike India’s simple majority system, which already tends to magnify majorities.

46 Moreover, the German model’s stability depends on strong constitutional constraints on government collapse, which India does not currently have in the same binding form. 47 The High Level Committee itself relies on Germany and Japan style stability proposals through consultation submissions, suggesting India may need structural redesign of parliamentary confidence procedures. 48 Although, international practice supports the proposition that synchronisation is possible, but also provide a strong counter-argument: places where harmonisation succeeds, it is backed by deeper institutional reforms not merely election-date alignment.

CONCLUSION

The proposal for “One Nation, One Election” represents a critical turning point in India’s constitutional journey. As this research has analysed, the debate is a fundamental inquiry into the character of the Indian Federalism, a basic structure of Indian Constitution. The tension lies in two competing visions of democracy: one that prioritizes administrative efficiency and stability, and another that safeguards pluralism and regional autonomy. The vision that support pluralism and regional autonomy put out claim that this framework will

44 Id. at 30-32.

45 Ibid.

46Proportional Representation Voting Systems, available at: https://fairvote.org/archives/proportionalrepresentation-voting-systems/ (last visited Feb 13, 2026).

47 Supra note 14 at 119-20.

48 Id. at 102, 119.

challenge the existing federal framework and reduce the state autonomy, will make the state subordinate to Centre. They also claim that any fixed term model to maintain the synchronised cycle will result in the destruction of no confidence, motion and party bargaining in case of coalition government. Although these point had been rebutted by the government through the reports that these claim are merely theoretical, the proposal of simultaneous election will not affect the Indian federalism. The vision which support that this framework will result in the administrative efficiency brings out claim that, as per current framework election held every year whether it’s Lok Sabha or any state election resulting in the policy, disturbance and application of model code of conduct and such election will also bring the cost.

According to them, the simultaneous election will result in stable federal system with a less spending and they support this model with various international model of simultaneous election. But it is believed that since India is a already union tilted federalism, the application of such model will result in further dilation of the gap between the centre and state. The report of High Level Committee also failed to consider that re-election model they suggested in case of dissolution, can be a cost inefficient model. A critical view of One Nation, One Election highlights the Coat Tail effect which presents a

strong argument that could disrupt the federalism structure and compromise the checks and balances between the centre and state. To counter this effect, a focus should be placed on voter education to ensure they are aware and understand the distinction between national and regional interests, thereby preventing them from being influenced by a single personality or party. Another suggestion is a two-step election with a gap between the centre election and the state legislative and local government elections. This would allow regional parties to campaign during the gap. Additionally, the election commission should ensure that parties running for both centre and state elections manifest both national and state interests without prioritising one over the other. Furthermore, the commission should regulate campaign spending to prevent local parties from being suppressed by stronger parties.

These suggestion will highlight Candidate Visibility and Local Campaign Autonomy reducing the coal tail effect during one nation, one election. Another critical point which was raised after high-level committee, provide a suggestion that in case of dissolution of any State Legislative Assembly, the re-elect will be held for the remaining term; the critics point that this will be a cost in efficient model. The suggestion to

counter such inefficiency, stronger anti dissolution mechanism and anti-defection law need to be adopted, like Germany’s constructive vote of no-confidence without disturbing the bargaining power of the small and regional party. To maintain the federal check and balance, it is also been suggested that Rajya Sabha’s Federal Role must be increased, it must be empowered to act as a powerful tool to represent the House of States. This could include for any central legislation that encroaches upon the State List (List II) before it can be passed, ensuring that even if elections are nationalized, legislative power

remains balanced. To conclude the whole debate, it's been argued that since most of question regarding had been answered by the High Level Committee report and there still left hung to open. After the analyses of both side points, proposal in the current stage still have tendency to centralise the federal structure of India. Further work and research needed to be done to propose the model which ensures that it does not infringe the federal check, and can maintain the balance between state and centre relation and can also achieve administrative and as well as financial efficiency.

References:

1. Alfred P. Montero, Brazilian Politics: Reforming a Democratic State in a Changing

World 39 Journal of Latin American Studies (2014).

2. Emanuele Bracco and Federico Revelli, “Concurrent Elections and Political

Accountability: Evidence from Italian Local Elections” 148 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2018)

3. Government of India, “High Level Committee Report on Simultaneous Elections in

India” 14 (March, 2024).

4. K.C. Wheare, Federal Government 27 (Oxford University Press, London, 4th edn.,

1963).

5. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225.

6. Kris Deschouwer, The Politics of Belgium: Governing a Divided Society (Red Glober

Press, 2nd edn., 2012)

7. Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006) 7 SCC 1.

8. Law Commission of India, “Draft Report on Simultaneous Elections” (August, 2018).

9. Mineral Area Development Authority Etc v. M/S Steel Authority of India 2024 INSC

554.

10. Mithilesh Kumar Jha and Kamal Nayan Choubey, Indian Politics And Political

Processes Ideas, Institutions And Practices (Routledge, New York, 2024).

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2024.

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March 15, 2024.

13. Shreya Borah, “Simultaneous elections could silence India’s regional voices”, East Asia

Forum, July 14, 2025.

14. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.

15. State of Uttar Pradesh v Lalta Prasad Vaish 2024 INSC 812.

16. State of West Bengal v. Union Of India 1963 AIR 1241, 1964 SCR (1) 371.

17. The Constitution of India, art. 170.

18. Vivek Debroy & Kishore Desai, Analysis of Simultaneous Elections: The “What”,

“Why” and “How”, The Hindu Centre, May 2017.

19. V. Krishna Ananth and C. Rammanohar Reddy, “Simultaneous Elections’ or

Centralisation of Power”, The Wire, April 20, 2018.