Relevance Of Religion In The Development Of Law - A Critical Standing

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Category: General Law

Published: 2026-08-23T20:55:04.52773+00:00

Updated: 2026-08-26T17:09:44.892+00:00

RELEVANCE OF RELIGION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF

LAW: A CRITICAL STANDING

Mohd Ammaar, Jamia Millia Islamia Faisal Ali, Jamia Millia Islamia

INTRODUCTION

Religious legal traditions have long served as the foundation and guiding principles for the evolution of legal philosophy and reasoning. ‘Emile Durkheim’ defined religion as “a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them”1. Law according to Austin is the “command of sovereign backed by sanction”. 2 While human societies have rationally adapted and modified the legal principles to meet changing social conditions, religion has consistently played a crucial role in shaping the moral and legal order. Religion and law are inseparable and interconnected, the authority of law and the maintenance of a stable order were often derived directly from divine will.

3 In early civilizations, religion provided moral guidance, social cohesion, and legitimacy for authority. In Mesopotamia, the Code of Hammurabi (c. 1754 BCE) exemplifies one of the earliest known written legal codes which combines divine authority from the Babylonians God Shamash with systematic rules governing property, family, and civil matters. 4 Similarly, in the Indian subcontinent, legal development evolved from the Vedic period, where ṛta (cosmic order) and dharma formed unwritten moral and social norms, to the Dharmasastra period, when texts such as the Manu Smrti codified duties and obligations combining morality, religion, and social order. 5 The Mauryan era introduced edicts reflecting Buddhist ethical principles, while the medieval period saw the coexistence of Hindu, Muslim, and Jain personal laws administered by religious authorities.

Even under British colonial rule, religious personal laws 1 Durkheim, Émile. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life: A Study in Religious Sociology. Translated by Joseph Ward Swain, George Allen & Unwin, 1915.

2 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (John Murray, London, 1832).

3 M.Q. Sibley, “Religion and Law: Some Thoughts on Their Intersections,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1968). 4 Kent, Charles Foster. “The Recently Discovered Civil Code of Hammurabi.” The Biblical World 21, no. 3 (1903): 175–90. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3141207. 5 Kishwar, Madhu. “Codified Hindu Law: Myth and Reality.” Economic and Political Weekly 29, no. 33 (1994): 2145–61. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4401625.

remained relevant for family and inheritance matters. 6 Post-independence, India adopted a secular constitutional framework, yet religious laws continue to shape personal law, reflecting the enduring influence of religion in the legal system. This enduring influence reflects the continuity of religious legal traditions where social order and legitimacy are maintained through shared moral values and collective belief rather than through coercive force. 7 The development and the transformation of religious principles into enforceable law occurred out of necessity to maintain social order, legitimacy, and uniformity. There was a need to convert religious duties into formal texts that allowed rulers and communities to regulate property, inheritance, marriage, and to resolve disputes with a systematic dispute resolution systems.

In Islamic societies Quran and Hadith was the source of law that provides a comprehensive framework for civil, criminal, and personal law. 8 Similarly, Jewish law, through the Torah and Talmud, guided moral and civil conduct. 9 In India, the constitutional guarantees of religious freedom (Articles 25–28) provides a direct link between the religion and law that justifies and accepted the plurality of personal laws, and the principle of secularism as part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Landmark judgments such as Shah Bano (1985),10 Shayara Bano (2017),11 and Sabarimala (2019),12 illustrate the ongoing dialogue between religious practices and constitutional values, demonstrating how religion remains a living force that shapes, challenges, and reevaluates principles of equality, dignity, and justice.

Thus, the relevance of religion in the development of law can be understood as the historical origin of legal norms, where early legal systems evolved from religious teachings and the philosophical foundation of justice and morality, and as a continuing challenge that compels constitutional democracies to reconcile faith with equality, liberty, and secular governance. Religion remains not only a historical precursor but also a dynamic participant in the evolution

6 ibid

7 H. Patrick Glenn, Tradition in Religion and Law, (2009–2010) 25(2) Journal of Law and Religion 503, 515 (Cambridge University Press).

8 Wael B. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

9 Lew, Julian D. M. “JEWISH LAW – ITS DEVELOPMENT AND ITS CO-EXISTENCE IN THE NON-

JEWISH WORLD.” Rabels Zeitschrift Für Ausländisches Und Internationales Privatrecht / The Rabel Journal of Comparative and International Private Law, vol. 40, no. 1, 1976, pp. 101–22. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27875969.

10 Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, AIR 1985 SC 945.

11 Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1.

12 Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1.

of legal systems and the pursuit of justice.

METHODOLOGY:

Statement of the Problem Despite extensive debates on the role of religion in law, scholarship largely divides into two contrasting perspectives. One views law as strictly secular, independent of religious or moral influence, while the other emphasizes the inseparability of law and religion, often overlooking a nuanced approach that examines their intersection in diverse social and constitutional contexts. This research aims to bridge this gap by analyzing how religious ethical principles have historically shaped legal systems and continue to inform contemporary law, particularly in India, offering a framework that balances moral guidance with constitutional objectivity and secular governance. Research Questions 1. How have religious legal traditions shaped the philosophical and institutional evolution of law in various civilizations?

The question looks at the initial influence of religion on the initial establishment of legal systems in old civilizations like Mesopotamia, India, and the Muslim world. 2. How does religion shape legal reasoning, moral consciousness, and constitutional interpretation in contemporary secular democracies, especially in India? This question examines the continuous dialogue between religious morality and secular legal norms in constitutional structures. 3. How have Indian courts balanced the conflict between religious liberty and constitutional values like equality, justice, and secularism in classic cases? This question tracks the judicial balancing act seen in cases such as Shirur Mutt (1954), Shah Bano (1985), Shayara Bano (2017), and Sabarimala (2019).

4. What are the implications of the preservation of religious personal laws in a secular

constitutional order for the future of legal reform?

This inquiry attempts to address the challenges and possibilities of the harmonization of personal law pluralism with constitutional morality and gender justice. Scope of the research The scope of this research encompasses the historical and contemporary interplay between religion and law, analyzing how religious moral principles shaped early legal systems, influenced jurisprudence, and continue to affect constitutional interpretation, personal laws, and secular governance, with a particular focus on India’s pluralistic legal framework and judicial responses to religious practices. Significance of the study The study is significant as it highlights the enduring influence of religious legal traditions on contemporary legal systems, particularly in pluralistic societies like India.

It provides insights into how law balances moral, ethical, and religious values with constitutional principles, informing debates on personal law reform, secularism, gender justice, and the potential implementation of a Uniform Civil Code. Hypothesis The hypothesis of this research is that religious legal traditions have played a foundational and continuous role in shaping legal norms, moral reasoning, and jurisprudence, and that even in contemporary secular democracies like India, law continues to reflect and negotiate religious ethics, creating both challenges and opportunities for legal reform and equality. Research Objectives 1. To follow the historical development of law from religious and moral beginnings to contemporary codified systems in various civilizations.

This goal is meant to determine how divine authority, moral obligation, and cosmic order evolved into institutionalized legal systems. 2. To study the long-lasting influence of religious ethics and moral philosophy on the jurisprudential evolution of contemporary legal systems.

This involves analyzing natural law, positivism, and constitutional morality as contemporary notion of religious moral principles. 3. To analyze the contribution of the Indian judiciary in reconciling religious rights with constitutional requirements of equality, secularism, and justice. The aim is to research judicial interpretation of Articles 25–28 and important case laws that facilitate the intersection of religion and law. 4. To critically evaluate the possibility and consequences of enacting a Uniform Civil Code in India with reference to religious diversity and constitutional secularism. This objective seeks to understand how India can uphold both religious freedom and constitutional equality in its pursuit of legal uniformity. Research Methodology This study employs a doctrinal and analytical research methodology. It relies on such as religious texts (e. g.

, Manusmriti, Qur’an, Hadith, Torah), constitutional provisions (Articles 25–28, 44 of the Indian Constitution), and landmark judicial decisions (e. g. , Shah Bano, Shayara Bano, Sabarimala). Secondary sources include scholarly books, journal articles, and commentaries on law and religion. The research involves historical-comparative analysis to trace the evolution of law from religious foundations to modern secular frameworks, and interpretative analysis of contemporary constitutional and judicial practices in India. The study also examines the interaction between religious ethics and legal norms, identifying areas of conflict, reconciliation, and transformation within pluralistic legal systems. This methodology allows for a comprehensive understanding of the continuity, influence, and challenges posed by religious legal traditions in both historical and contemporary contexts.

Literature review

1. M.Q. Sibley – “Religion and Law: Some Thoughts on Their Intersections” (1968)

Sibley explores the complex relationship between religion and law, emphasizing their

interdependence in shaping societal norms and values. He argues that while law provides a framework for societal order, religion offers moral guidance that influences legal principles. Sibley's work highlights the dynamic interplay between these two institutions and their mutual impact on each other.

2. Charles Foster Kent – “The Recently Discovered Civil Code of Hammurabi” (1903)

Kent's analysis of the Hammurabi Code provides insight into one of the earliest known legal systems, showcasing how ancient laws were influenced by religious beliefs and practices. He examines the code's provisions, revealing the integration of divine authority in legal matters and the role of religion in legitimizing legal norms.

3. Madhu Kishwar – “Codified Hindu Law: Myth and Reality” (1994)

Kishwar critically examines the codification of Hindu law in post-colonial India, questioning the extent to which these laws reflect traditional Hindu practices and beliefs. She argues that the codified laws often misrepresent Hindu customs and values, highlighting the tension between religious traditions and legal reforms.

4. H. Patrick Glenn – “Tradition in Religion and Law” (2009–2010)

Glenn delves into the concept of tradition, exploring its significance in both religious and legal contexts. He posits that tradition serves as a bridge between the past and present, influencing contemporary legal systems and religious practices. His work underscores the importance of understanding tradition to comprehend the evolution of law and religion.

5. Wael B. Hallaq – “The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law” (2005)

Hallaq traces the development of Islamic law, examining its roots in pre-Islamic Arabian customs and its evolution through Islamic teachings. He emphasizes the role of religious scholars in interpreting and applying Islamic principles to legal issues, illustrating the deep connection between Islamic law and religious doctrine.

6. H.L.A. Hart – “The Concept of Law” (1961)

Hart's seminal work in legal philosophy introduces the theory of legal positivism,

distinguishing between law as it is and law as it ought to be. While not directly focused on religion, his analysis provides a framework for understanding how legal systems can function independently of religious doctrines, offering a comparative perspective on the role of religion in law.

7. Edward Peters, Review: The Origins of the Western Legal Tradition(1985)

Edward Peters' review of Harold J. Berman's Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (1983) in the Harvard Law Review critically examines Berman's thesis that the Western legal tradition emerged from a transformative revolution in the 12th century, particularly through the rediscovery of Roman law and the establishment of canon law. Peters assesses Berman's argument that this legal revolution was a pivotal moment in Western history, influencing the development of legal systems and concepts of authority. The review provides insights into the historical context and implications of Berman's work.

8. V. M. Tarkunde, Secularism and the Indian Constitution, 22 India International Centre

Quarterly 143 (1995), V. M. Tarkunde, in Secularism and the Indian Constitution, explores the delicate balance the Indian Constitution seeks to maintain between religion and the state. He argues that true secularism in India lies not in hostility toward religion but in ensuring equal respect and freedom for all faiths. His analysis highlights how constitutional secularism aims to harmonize religious diversity with democratic values—an idea crucial to understanding the interaction between religion and law in India. Defining the Key Concepts: Religion, Law, and Legal Development The communication between religious organizations and law systems has existed since the beginning of institutionalized societies.

To understand the importance of religion in the development of law, we must identify their conceptual affinity not as distinct but as interdependent systems of normative and ethical rule. Religion, in its very essence, goes beyond a set of practice or beliefs; it constitutes a sophisticated ethical and spiritual system that brings human behavior into harmony with a postulated order of the cosmos. It was characteristically represented, as stated by Émile Durkheim, as "the symbolic representation of the moral community," for it brings individuals together to form a unified moral whole based

upon shared values, duties, and taboos that go beyond individual selfish ends. 13 By contrast, law means the deliberate creation of a moral order within institutional boundaries. While religion depends upon faith and individual belief, law acts through forces of coercive authority and rational order. Under jurisprudence, the positivist approach of H. L. A. Hart defines law as "a system of rules recognized and enforced by the sovereign," thereby distinguishing legal obligation from pure moral influence. 14 Yet, despite this positivist approach, traces of religious ethicality are still manifest. Principles of justice, fairness, and equity even as they later became integrated into lay systems originally possessed religious content.

15 Law did not originate in a void of morals; it evolved as a product of civil society that sought to transmute divine or ethical commands over enforceable codes. The concept of legal evolution encapsulates this change, the shift from divine mandate to democratic agreement, from revelation to rational discourse. Harold Berman articulates this phenomenon as the “juridification of faith,”16 in which religious perspectives slowly give rise to secular legal frameworks. For example, medieval canon law not only offered foundational moral tenets but also established procedural structures that significantly shaped Western legal traditions. If religion was the original source of law’s moral ideas, then religious morality has also remained the model through which law continues to shape and reaffirm its idea of justice.

Whether from ancient codes of law or modern charters of constitutional law, procedure has borrowed from the treasuries of ethics that have been building up over the centuries of religious introspection. Natural law tradition comes as the initial expression of this synthesis. For “St. Thomas Aquinas”, law extended authority's pure commands and was, instead, "a rational participation in the eternal law of God. "17 In this understanding, he incorporated moral thought in legal obligation, holding that laws which are unjust—those which violate the divine or moral order represent deformations of law and not law itself. In the twentieth century, Lon L. Fuller revived this relation in his account of the "inner morality 13 E. Durkheim, “The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 15, No. 5 (1910), p. 623, available at JSTOR.

14 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 1961) p. 89.

15 M.Q. Sibley, “Religion and Law: Some Thoughts on Their Intersections,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1968).

16 Edward Peters, Review: The Origins of the Western Legal Tradition, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 686 (1985)

17 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 91, Art. 2.

of law. "18 For Fuller, lawfulness itself carries a sense of moral form — formality, intelligibility, regularity, and alignment of rule and behavior. These precepts, although articulated in procedural mode, are analogous to the same moral imperatives once enforced by religious conscience. The continued usefulness of fairness, veracity, and good faith in law continues a religious ethical legacy, only re-translated in a positivist idiom. 19 Even civilizations that profess to differentiate law from theology cannot fully avert this legacy. Abolishing slavery, proscribing torture, and affirming human dignity and equality are accomplishments of morality that carry unmistakable residues of religious conscience.

20 The Judaic imperative of justice (tzedek), the Islamic directive of fairness (adl), and the Hindu idea of dharma have all instilled human civilization with the conviction that law must have a higher morality to serve. Moral duty, in every tradition, predated codification of law — a testament to religion's formative authority over law's development. Thus, while modern jurisprudence may claim autonomy from religious doctrine, it remains indebted to its moral architecture. The moral voice of religion continues to echo in law’s pursuit of justice subdued yet unmistakable reminding every legal order that legitimacy without morality is merely organized power without conscience. The relationship between law and religion is not merely historical but deeply theoretical, a continuous dialogue between faith and reason.

Several schools of thought have attempted to explain this intricate interplay, each offering a unique lens through which the moral and institutional connection between divine ethics and human law can be understood. 21 The Natural Law tradition, founded in the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas and reinvigorated in the modern era by John Finnis, positions law in the moral realm of divine order. 22 It holds that human law derives its legitimacy from obedience to an objective moral law, a higher order known through reason but founded in divine wisdom. In this perspective, religion does not figure so much as the cultural dimension as it is the source of the ontological legitimacy of law. The law is only just to the extent that it approximates the moral law; if it diverges from justice,

18 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press, 1964)

19 Ibid.

20 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution, supra note 13.

21 Mulford Q. Sibley, “Religion and Law: Some Thoughts on Their Intersections,” Journal of Church and State, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1960 22 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II–I, Q. 91, Art. 2 (trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Benziger Bros., 1947).

it loses its authority. Natural law preserves the religious connection between morality and legality, claiming religion is the source of both. 23 “H. L. A. Hart” and “Joseph Raz” formulated the notion of legal positivism that rejects any necessary relation between law and morality. 24 Validity in law, in the eyes of positivists, is not based on moral value but rather on its derivation from sovereign command and institutional process. Law is that which is "posited," as opposed to that which is “just”. However, in this apparent disengagement, positivist theorists necessarily acknowledge that moral ideals guide the interpretive and justificatory frameworks of law.

The distinction between what the law is and what the law ought to be may be theoretically separable but is in practice permeable an acknowledgement that law never can fully resist the gravitational pull of moral, often religious, reasoning. 25 "Max Weber" and "Emile Durkheim" considered law as a crystallisation of common moral sentiments, upheld by the ethical agreement that religion used to support. These various theories agrees on a deep reality that law and religion have a shared moral heritage. Law can assert independence from the guiding religious principles, but it is deeply rooted to the moral order from which it originated. 26 In conclusion, religion continues to be a basic norm in the development of law . It is relevant because it always reminds the law of its mission that justice must be served and rooted in conscience in order to be legitimate and acceptable.

Historical and Comparative Analysis The development of law shows a transition from divine revelation to statutory rule. Law developed not as a secular expression but as a sacred phenomenon, as a moral architecture in divine will and cosmic order. 27 In law and religion, authority was legitimized, and justice was embedded in a notion of obligation and spirituality. Over time, the divine morals has begun to change: divine moral sanction transitioned into the resolution of the sovereign, and finally to aspect of modern constitutional democracies. However, sentiment still exists within the procedural bounds of law. Law is still shaped by religious morality and order into collective

23 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford University Press, 1980,

24 H.L.A. Hart, supra note 12, 1994

25 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, Oxford University Press, 1979,p.

26 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, Yale University Press, 1964

27 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution, supra note 13.

ideas of right and duty. Religion and secular governments, rather than presenting a dichotomy, set the stage for the emergence of a continual moral dialogue of legal consciousness. 28 Early civilizations understood law as a divine trust, not a human artifact. For example, with its Code of Hammurabi, ancient Mesopotamia proclaimed that justice was a command of the sun god Shamash, suggesting that divine authority was needed for laws to be legitimate. 29 Rooted in the will of God, notions of moral obligation and social order were bound to law in Judaic, Talmudic, and early Christian traditions.

From this divine orientation, we see the crystallization of law in the Medieval period through the establishment of Canon Law, in which moral theology was formalized into a system of procedures and substantive law by the Church, often described in writings such as Gratian’s Decretum on law and moral law. 30 The moral authority of Church courts was probably one of the most formative effects on the development of European legal systems, particularly in England where concepts of morality, promises, and formal fairness were absorbed into the Common Law tradition. 31 Over the next few centuries, however, theology ceded to the rationalist thinkers of the Enlightenment, who began to make a distinction between the morality of the gods and the will of sovereign power. This was a fundamental moment of change from ecclesiastical law- making to secular law-making.

Still the effects of our religious history emerged within the secular legal systems of the west. That is, we often still appealed to a moral consciousness or fairness, even if only to justify or need their application to help solve a legal issue. In the case of Islamic civilization, law i. e. Sharia is not understood simply as a body of enforceable norms; it denotes a divine pathway with which the almighty Allah manifests his will on earth. Sharia is rooted in the Qur'an and Sunnah but has been developed through ijma(consensus) and qiyas (analogy) into an all-encompassing moral and legal order which harmonizes faith, ethics and governance. 32 Classical jurists framed the law in terms of justice and moral salvation, and they identified maqasid al-sharia, or the higher objectives of law, such as protection of life, faith, intellect, lineage and property.

In the experience of the encounter between Islamic law and colonial modernity, Sharia's

28 John Witte Jr., Religion and the Roots of the Rule of Law, Cambridge University Press, 2010

29 Kent, Charles Foster, supra note 4.

30 James A. Brundage, Medieval Canon Law, Longman, 199

31 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution, supra note 13,p.112

32 Wael B. Hallaq, supra note 6, p. 18.

institutional form has changed over time. In Egypt, Pakistan, and other Muslim-majority states, some aspects of Islamic law were visibly and officially codified into a modern legislative framework. 33 In other cases, such as Turkey and Indonesia, Islamic ethics were accommodated into secular governing principles. Nonetheless, Sharia still matters to conversations about constitutionalism, human rights, and public morality in the world of Islam, and its dedicated dimension survives as a conceptualization of law as a divine trust — or to credit justice to divine ethics as opposed to state interest in governance, preserving a moral core to governance in the midst of legal secularism. 34 Hindu law, one of the oldest continuous legal traditions in the world, developed from the combination of moral, spiritual, and social duties that are delineated by the Dharmashastra texts.

The texts, such as the Manusmriti, Yajnavalkya Smriti, and Naradasmriti, described law (dharma) not as a command of the king but as a manifestation of rita — the cosmic order that governed both nature and society. In this view, law was inseparable from morality, and moral failure was as much a social failure as it was spiritual. The nature of this holy legal order was reconceived through British colonial engagement. In an effort to govern justice for Hindus, the British translated and selectively assembled portions of Dharmashastra into Anglo-Hindu law, eliminating the ritual-philosophical foundation of dharma. It reshaped a flexible, interpretive ethical system into a formal code of personal law.

Since independence, India's practice of codifying Hindu law - including the introduction of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and Hindu Succession Act, 1956 has been significantly secularizing dharma in accordance with constitutional norms surrounding equality and justice. But, as it has developed, Hindu law still contains an ethical memory to its beginnings, and where the thread of competing tensions subsists between spiritual duty and reform to society. 35 The evolution in contemporary constitutional democracies anticipates its eventual manifestation into the concept of constitutional morality, where notions of liberty, equality, and fraternity become secular surrogates of the moral virtues cards in religious faith. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar conceived of this as the moral foundation (bottom line) of the Indian Constitution 33 Nathan J.

Brown, The Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and the Gulf, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 23

34 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Sharia, Harvard

University Press, 2008, p. 102.

35 Donald R. Davis Jr., The Spirit of Hindu Law, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 19.

a law grounded not in the word of God, but in the sociological aspects of India's social conscience. 36 Hence, the sacred lives on in the secular, transmuted into rights, dignity, justice. While law may have disentangled from the temple and the church, it's moral heartbeat now continues to beat along with humanity's oldest ambition to bring power in accord with virtue. The dialogue between religion and law remains unfinished work. The continued moral thinking in secular democracies draws continually upon religious ethics. The constant challenge is to create a mutual coexistence in which faith inspires justice without compelling faith, and law manages belief without destroying it. Religion and the Indian Legal System India has its own unique constitutional, social, and legal framework relating to religion.

The Constitution of India contains very strong guarantees of religious freedoms for individuals and communities, yet its pluralism of personal laws, judicial interpretation and ongoing debates (e. g. , on the Uniform Civil Code) suggest the extent to which religion is related and connected to the development of law. This section will discuss, (i) constitutional recognition of religious freedom in Articles 25-28; (ii) personal laws and religious pluralism; (iii) judicial interpretation around secularism and reform in leading cases; and, (iv) the debate over a Uniform Civil Code and the relationship between faith and equality. The fundamental rights under Articles 25-28 of the Indian Constitution form the religious liberty in India.

Article 25 states that every citizen has the right to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion (subject to public order, morality, and health). Article 26 provides for religious denominations to have a right to manage their own affairs in matters of religion; Article 27 prohibits any compulsion for the payment of taxes for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion; and Article 28 protects individuals from being compelled to attend religious instruction in schools or other institutions that are maintained out of state funds (and allows for such religious instruction, if any is attended, only with consent). 37 Some leading cases related to the religious issues discussed below:

36 B.R. Ambedkar, Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, 4th November 1948

37 The Constitution of India, arts. 25–28.

1. Shirur Mutt Case (1954) (Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowment, Madras v. Sri

Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt), established the denomination test and held that religious denominations have certain autonomy under Article 26, but cannot claim rights for practices not essential to the religion.38

2. Rev. Stanislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1977), clarified that the right to propagate

religion does not include the right to convert others forcibly or through coercion.39

3. Ananda Marga Case (Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police,

Calcutta, 1984), dealt with the public performance of religious ritual (Tandava dance) on public streets; held that some activities may be restricted under public order. 40 These examples demonstrate that while Articles 25-28 offer extensive protection, the Constitution also allows for the regulation of religious practices that might conflict with public order or morality. The "essential religious practice" test is therefore an important threshold to determine when the State can intervene. 41 India has several personal law systems based on the different religions: Hindu law, Muslim personal law, Chrisian law Parisi law, and so on. These laws relate to marriage and divorce, inheritance, adoption, and maintenance.

When India was colonized, the major religions' personal laws remained largely intact and were not interfered with, and once independent, some changes were introduced in Hindu personal laws through codification (Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Hindu Succession Act, 1956; and etc. ), while Muslim personal laws remained largely un-codified but were regulated by statute ( for example the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986. )42 Religious pluralism accommodates religious communities to regulate personal affairs in accordance with their traditions. However, complications arise when these traditions contradict constitutional tenets (equality, gender justice, non-discrimination). For instance, the triple talaq practice (instant divorce) was challenged under Muslim personal laws and in Shayara Bano v. 38 Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v.

Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt, AIR

1954 SC 282.

39 Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1977) 1 SCC 677.

40 Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, (1984) 4 SCC 522.

41 Id.

42 The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; The Hindu Succession Act, 1956; The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.

Union of India (2017), the Supreme Court ruled instant triple talaq unconstitutional, citing that it was unconstitutional violations of fundamental rights, including gender equality guaranteed under Article 14 and dignity protected under Article 21. 43 Secularism in India is not the strict separationist model (as e. g. in the US or France), but rather a model of equal respect for all religions, state neutrality, and non-interference except where necessary. The Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted secularism as a basic feature of the Constitution. As V. M. Tarkunde observed, Indian secularism is “not the denial of religion, but the equal treatment of all religions under the framework of constitutional democracy. ”44 It implies a positive secularism where the State maintains principled distance while ensuring that no faith-based practice violates constitutional morality.

There are various important landmark cases on secularism in which the Hon’ble Court of India specified it as a basic structure of Indian constitution. In the case of S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Court held that secularism is a part of the “basic structure,” meaning Parliament cannot abrogate the secular character of the Constitution even by amendment. 45 In Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (Sabarimala case, 2018-2019), the Court held that the tradition banning women aged 10-50 from entering the Sabarimala temple was unconstitutional, since it violated women’s fundamental right to equality (Article 14) and religious freedom (Article 25). 46This decision shows how the judiciary reinterprets religious tradition through constitutional values. In the recent case of Balram singh v.

Union of India (2024), Hon’ble Supreme court of India said that secularism has always been held to be part of basic structure of Indian constitution and addressed constitutional validity of inserting the word ‘secular’ in the preamble. 47 The Constitution's Article 44 instructs the State to "endeavour to secure for its citizens a Uniform Civil Code throughout the territory of India. " While this is found within the Directive Principles of State Policy, which are unenforceable, the Court, in Shah Bano(1985) remarked ruefully that Article 44 was a "dead letter. " The discussion of the UCC brings up a lot of issues:

43 Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1.

44 V.M. Tarkunde, Secularism and the Indian Constitution, 26 J. Indian L. Inst. 3 (1984).

45 S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.

46 Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1.

47 Balram Singh v. Union of India, (2024) SCC OnLine SC 667.

should India have one uniform civil code for all citizens covering marriage, divorce, family law, etc? If such a code were enacted, could it respect religious diversity while guaranteeing equality, especially gender equality? Detractors will argue it would violate religious freedom and minority rights by enforcing the laws of the majority or dominant community. Advocates will argue that personal laws promote gender inequality, especially discrimination, and keep old customs for social norms. The Supreme Court mentioned in the case and Judgement of Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India (1995), it is difficult to rationalize the uncodified discriminatory personal laws when over 80% of its citizenry subjects itself to codified laws of personal law. 48 And in the case of John Vallamattom v. Union of India (2003), the Court reaffirmed the need and aspiration for UCC.

49 Religion is to be found arguably as a fundamental bedrock into India's own legal landscape: in constitutional (and therefore public) guarantees, in personal law pluralism and diversity, in judicial reform and debates over UCC. The Indian case shows that secularism in the Indian sense does not mean the elimination of religion, but rather it means inclusion, controlled accommodation, and constitutional transformation. Religion in India does not sit as an artefact, but a living part of ongoing project of rights, justice, and legal transformation. Conclusion In conclusion, the relationship between religion and law represents one of the most enduring and transformative forces in human civilization.

From the divine codes of Hammurabi and Dharmashastra to the constitutional morality of modern democracies, law has continuously drawn from the moral vocabulary of religion to shape its pursuit of justice, order, and legitimacy. Even though secularism has redefined the institutional autonomy of law, it has not removed the ethical and religious foundations that religion initially provided. The sense of morality instilled by religious cultures ,justice, fairness, truth, and compassion continues to shape legal reasoning and anchors the legitimacy of law in a plural society. In India, this dialogue between religion and law is strongly established within the constitutional framework. India's secularism, which has been supported by the judiciary and intellectuals like

48 Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635.

49 John Vallamattom v. Union of India, (2003) 6 SCC 611.

V.M. Tarkunde, is pro-equality of all religions under the law of the land but is not anti-religion. Through its judgments in cases like Shah Bano, Shayara Bano, and Sabarimala, the Supreme Court has made it clear that constitutional principles must dominate and modify religious practices whenever they conflict with vital rights. Yet, that personal laws and the Uniform Civil Code controversy persist shows that religion remains a source of identity and discord in Indian legal development. Ultimately, it will have to be grounded on a constitutional morality which harmonizes faith with freedom, tradition with change, and divine duty with human dignity.