Skip to main content

Role Of The Indian Judiciary In Preserving Federalism

Author: LawSphereX

Category: General Law

Published:

Updated:

ROLE OF THE INDIAN JUDICIARY IN PRESERVING

FEDERALISM

Manya Iyer, BBA LLB, O.P Jindal Global University

ABSTRACT

This paper examines Federalism as a concept in the Indian State and focuses on judicial involvement and its role in preserving said Federalism. By exploring the historical and Constitutional backgrounds of Federalism, this paper draws attention to exactly how the Judiciary is involved in upholding Federal principles and in shaping India into a quasi-Federal country as we know it today. Landmark cases such as Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, Calcutta Gas Company v. State of West Bengal and State of West Bengal v. Union of India are analyzed to see exactly how the judiciary exercises its power to ensure the autonomy of the states while also working towards national unity and Federal coordination.

Further, this paper touches upon the criticisms of the seemingly unblemished Federal structure in India and also criticisms when it comes to the involvement of the judiciary to uphold the same. Keywords: Quasi-Federalism, state autonomy, Apex Court, Basic Structure Doctrine, President's Rule, judicial overreach.

INTRODUCTION

Federalism is one of the most important aspects of the Indian Constitution, accommodating a huge variety of regions while maintaining cohesive national unity. With its roots in the Government of India Act, of 1935, it was quite clear that the Constitution drew inspiration from the West when it came to making and adhering to the Indian Federal Principles. The country was to have two levels of Government, each with its jurisdictions and a clean division of powers. This, however, did not work well in terms of what exactly our country required. The drafters of the Constitution took inspiration from the Canadian model of a quasi-Federal Government. Under this model, power was divided between the Union and the States but there still existed a centralizing tendency- word of the centre in matters of overlap prevailed.

Maintaining Federal principles thus became one of the most important tasks for the judiciary. It had to make sure that judgements had to be delivered in such a way that neither was state autonomy compromised nor were the powers of the Union under such a Government. We can see this in the cases of Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala where Federalism was deemed part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution, making it unamendable as well as in the case of S. R. Bommai v. Union of India where the judiciary made it abundantly clear that proclamation of President's Rule cannot be arbitrary and has to be subjected to judicial review. However, cracks in the Federal structure were soon noticed and matters such as regional sensitivity and fiscal independence were brought to light.

Constitutional scholars began critiquing the way the judiciary was involved in matters that undermined Federal principles and have advised on exactly how it should go about including them in judgments. This paper thus explores the role of the judiciary in upholding the Federal structure in India, the history, procedure and shortcomings of the same.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE INTRODUCTION OF FEDERALISM IN

INDIA1:

The Bombay Session in 1927 was one of the first mentions of a Federal Government. It was the Indian National Congress (INC) that proposed it as a system of governance for India. This idea was taken forward by the Simon Commission. The members of the first round table conference convened in this regard consisted of only British Officials and was thus boycotted

1 AJAYAN THANKAPPANNAIR. Evolution of Federalism in Modern India. no. 17, Mar. 2024, pp. 121–51,

https://doi.org/10.61826/ig.vi17.438. Accessed 4 Nov. 2024.

by the INC. A full-party meeting was held where, along with the All India Muslim League (AIML), a Constitutional proposal was drafted. However, this meeting was not successful either. While both parties agreed to a Federal form of Government, the INC preferred a strong centre whereas the AIML preferred strong provinces. The second and third round table conferences dealt with similar boycotts by the INC and the AIML. To put these communal problems to rest, Sir Reginald Coupland’s ‘Coupland Plan’ divided India into Muslim and Hindu regions, balancing out their powers and giving the centre more control. The Government of India Act of 1935, acting upon the proceedings of the Round Table Conferences, was passed by the two houses of the British Parliament. It aimed to rekindle Indian Nationalism under British Rule by allowing controlled amounts of autonomy throughout the country.

Under this Act, 11 provinces, 6 chief commissioners’ provinces and a few princely states were made and Federalism was going to be achieved by giving these provinces autonomy. The powers of the Federal and provincial Governments were divided between three lists- the Federal List, the Provincial List and the Concurrent List. Despite this division, it was made clear that the Federal Government still held a majority of the power, taking over whenever the provincial Governments needed aid, especially during emergencies. The Government of India Act of 1935, as mentioned above, was met with resistance from the INC, AIML and also the princes.

The Congress was concerned about democratic principles being undermined when it came to the inclusion of princely states under the Federal structure, since the rulers were appointed, not elected, the party members were distressed about skewed representation. On the other hand, the All India Muslim League feared a Hindu-majority rule under the Federal system that favours the centre. Surprisingly, the princely states had issues with the Act as well. They expressed concerns about their economic and administrative rights since they were meant to pass on certain powers to the Federal Government. With all three major sects of the country opposing the Act, the British found it difficult to implement the Federal structure in India. However, even though the Government of India Act of 1935 failed to achieve its main purpose, it is clear that it left a lasting impact on Indian governance.

The Constitution of India, 1950 draws its framework and a lot of its principles from the Act. The Constitution is clear proof of how it was transformed from just an instrument of colonial control to a Constitutional skeleton, allowing for the separation of powers between the Centre and the States.

Unlike the USA, which follows a completely Federal Government structure with state-specific constitutions, the Indian Government has adopted a more centralized version of the same. This thus highlights the fact that the Indian Government has both unitary and Federal qualities making it quasi-Federal- a system that has been borrowed from the Canadian Government. This framework was adopted since it would make it easier to regulate a country as large as India and eliminate administrative issues2. The Indian Constitution highlights the existence and necessity of Federalism through 4 different aspects. i) India has a binary Government operating with both a Union Government as well as state Governments. Article 2453 specifies that the centre is in charge of implementing the laws that are created by the parliament.

The state Governments on the other hand have the authority to interpret these laws, to make sure they are implemented in a way that adheres to the customs and traditions of a certain region. ii) Article 2464 talks about the powers of the two levels of Government that are specified in Schedule VII of the Constitution. Responsibilities, as mentioned earlier about the Government of India Act of 1935 were split into three lists: the Union List, the State List and the Concurrent List. Objects and responsibilities in the Union List confer exclusive jurisdiction to the centre. This list of 97 subjects takes care of matters regarding defence, foreign affairs etc. Similarly, the State List which has 66 subjects takes care of state-specific matters such as health, agriculture, etc.

The Concurrent List contains responsibilities over which both the central and state Governments exercise jurisdiction. This list contains 47 subjects and takes care of matters such as marriage or wildlife laws5. Additionally, as mentioned in Article 2486, the Parliament has exclusive power to legislate on matters that do not fall under any of these three lists.

2 Ghosal, A. K. “FEDERALISM in the INDIAN CONSTITUTION.” The Indian Journal of Political Science ,

vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 317–32, www.jstor.org/stable/41853768. JSTOR. Accessed 30 Oct. 2024.

3 Extent of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States.

4 Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States.

5 Huma, Baby. “UNDERSTANDING INDIAN FEDERALISM.” The Indian Journal of Political Science, vol.

76, no. 4, pp. 792–95, www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26575604. JSTOR. Accessed 31 Oct. 2024.

6 Residuary powers of legislation.

iii) India has a written Constitution that clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of the two levels of Government. The Indian Constitution is one of the biggest, most comprehensive Constitutions in the world, consisting of 448 articles, 25 parts and

12 Schedules. This Constitution contains rigid provisions however, if a special

majority is attained, these provisions can be amended under Article 3687. This is wholly different from a fully Federal Constitution which would be extremely hard to amend due to the requirement of participation of both the Union and State Governments. iv) Article 798 establishes that India’s legislature is Bicameral in nature which means that the parliament has two houses. The upper house is called the Rajya Sabha and the lower house is called the Lok Sabha. This split aids in the making of laws that represent diversity and differing perspectives. This however begs the question- what then makes India a quasi-Federal state? This is easily answered when we look at the aspects of the Constitution that are in line with the unitary form of Government. i) The Centre is given more power than the state Governments which means that there is no equal division of power.

This means that any law that is passed by the Union is required to be followed by the States and they cannot interfere in any of the Union’s matters. This comes into play most importantly when the topic of emergency comes up. Part XVIII of the Constitution allows the President to declare emergency under dire

conditions and once that is done, the centre takes control of the entire country and state Governments thus losing their autonomy. ii) Part V Chapter IV of the Constitution highlights Judicial independence in India through the existence of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as the Apex Court. It is meant to resolve any disputes arising between the centre and the states. Additionally, the Apex Court also ensures that the States and the Union stay within their jurisdiction without overstepping any constitutionally set boundaries. iii) The country has a single Constitution which is applicable to both the centre and the

7 Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure therefor

8 Constitution of Parliament

individual states. A true Federal Government would have separate constitutions for the Union and the states if not also separate ones for each state. Also, Part II of the Constitution specifies that citizens of India only hold a single citizenship as opposed to how the USA, a fully Federal country, offers its citizens dual citizenship. The Indian Constitution seamlessly combines features of both a unitary and Federal Government, thus creating a quasi-Federal state.

ROLE OF THE INDIAN JUDICIARY IN DEFINING AND DEFENDING INDIAN

FEDERALISM9:

As mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court of India is the Apex Court with all other courts subordinate to it. It has exclusive jurisdiction over matters concerning disputes between the states and the centre. This points to the fact that the Supreme Court is judicially independent from both the Union and state Governments. It can thus solve Federal conflicts without bias, maintaining a good balance between both levels of Government. Additionally, as the Supreme Court is also an appellate court, it always has the final say on legal enforcement and interpretation. This characteristic of the Supreme Court can be observed through Article 3210 which allows it to directly protect the Fundamental Rights of individuals. This means that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has the power to uphold Constitutional Rights against both central and state breaches.

This can be observed through some landmark judgements delivered by the Supreme Court of India11: i) In re Oriental Gas Company Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, 1960 SCC OnLine Cal 83: The question that arose when it came to this case was whether gas distribution came under the jurisdiction of the State. The company alleged that this case fell under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court due to a slight difference in interpretation between the two parties. The Apex Court held that gas distribution came under the ambit of ‘trade and commerce’ that took place within the state which subsequently gives jurisdiction to the state to decide matters regarding the same. It

9 Mital, P. N., and P. N. Mittal. “Judiciary and the Federal System: AN APPRAISAL of the SUPREME

COURTS of the UNITED STATES of AMERICA and INDIA.” The Indian Journal of Political Science, vol. 25, no. 3/4, pp. 210–18, www.jstor.org/stable/41854032. JSTOR. Accessed 2 Nov. 2024.

10 Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part

11 Jain, M. P. “FEDERALISM IN INDIA.” Journal of the Indian Law Institute, vol. 6, no. 4, 1964, pp. 355–79. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43950710. Accessed 1 Nov. 2024.

was highlighted that trade and Commerce falls in the State List and that State has legislative autonomy in areas not exclusively kept for the Union Government. ii) State of W. B. v. Union of India, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 27: This case was about the Union Government’s authority to acquire property that was owned by the State. The State of West Bengal challenged the constitutionality of such an action. The Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the Union’s actions, citing that it had the authority to act upon matters stated in the Union List12 and thus, acquiring of property, even if it belongs to the state, would be allowed. This case clearly showed that the Union takes supremacy in certain matters- underlining the unequal power distribution between both levels of Government. The case of Gujarat University v. Sri Krishna Ranganath Mudholkar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 146 also highlighted this same principle.

The Supreme Court of India has an extremely unique feature that differentiates it from other Federal States such as the USA. Article 143 of the Constitution13 allows the President to consult the Supreme Court on matters questioning the law. This power was exercised during the Uttar Pradesh Assembly case (Special Reference No. 1 of 1964) where the UP Legislative Assembly conflicted with the State judiciary regarding legislative privileges. One Keshav Singh was imprisoned for contempt after criticizing a few members of the Legislative Assembly. He filed a habeas corpus petition after which the Allahabad High Court granted him bail. The Assembly members viewed this as interference of privilege and issued warrants against the judge who ruled in Keshav Singh’s favour.

This case led to a constitutional crisis and it questioned whether legislative privilege could take priority over judicial authority14. The President, under Article 143 consulted the Hon'ble Supreme Court when it came to deciding this matter and defining the extent of the legislature’s privileges. The Supreme Court advised that legislative privileges, although important and significant, cannot override judicial authority, especially in matters of Fundamental Rights. Using this, the President concluded that 12 The subject in this case was coal mining which is covered in entry number 55 of the Union List- Regulation and safety in mines and oil fields.

13 Power of the President to consult the Supreme Court

14 Mital, P. N., and P. N. Mittal. “Judiciary and the Federal System: AN APPRAISAL OF THE SUPREME

COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND INDIA.” The Indian Journal of Political Science, vol. 25, no. 3/4, 1964, pp. 210–18. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41854032. Accessed 1 Nov. 2024.

the Assembly could not exercise their privileges in a way that would interfere with or infringe upon the judicial process.

KEY AREAS WHERE FEDERAL EROSION WAS PREVENTED:

It is clear from the previous section that the Supreme Court of India has time and again clarified the scope of State and Union powers, making sure they do not clash and most importantly, that they are exercised within their appropriate jurisdiction. The obvious question that arises next would be- has the Hon’ble Supreme Court done anything to preserve the principles of Federalism? The answer is a clear yes and can be clarified by looking into a few cases. Firstly, Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225. This case was based on a petition filed by one Swami Kesavananda Bharati which challenged the Kerala Land Reform Act, 1963 through which the Government tried to acquire the land on which a mutt was located. He argued that by doing so, the Government would be denying him his fundamental rights under Articles 25, 26, 14, 19(1)(f) and 3115.

The case began by focusing on property rights. However, it soon shifted its attention to the bigger question- whether or not the Parliament could amend fundamental rights. A 13-judge bench in the Hon’ble Supreme Court ruled on this case and it led to the creation of the Basic Structure Doctrine, one that limited the Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution. Although it was not explicitly mentioned, Federalism was clearly placed under the protection of this doctrine. This thus safeguarded the existence of the Union and the States and the distribution of power between the two. The Basic Structure Doctrine also allowed the judiciary to review amendments made to/affecting essential Federal principles. This checked the powers of both levels of the Government and also retained the authority to strike amendments that threatened to violate said principles. We can also look at the case of S.

R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1. Due to defections, the State Government of Karnataka was dismissed in 1985 since it led to a majority

15 Article 25- Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion.

Article 26- Freedom to manage religious affairs. Article 14- Equality before law. Article 19(1)(f)- right to hold, acquire or dispose of the property — Removed. Article 31- Compulsory acquisition of property. —Omitted

loss. This action was done under Article 356 of the Constitution which is the 16President’s Rule. The nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court was quick to note that Presidential Rule under Article 356 is to be exercised with caution and only after both houses of the parliament thoroughly analyze the cause of this action. This needs to be done within two months after the imposition of the same. This requirement goes to show that the judiciary works towards maintaining checks and balances when it comes to the organs of the Government and in the process, all possible arbitrariness is dismissed. It also stated that the Apex Court can subject the imposition of Article 356 to judicial review and that it will also entertain petitions questioning its validity.

This action must be based on valid cause and justification which has to be submitted to the Parliamentary houses to ensure that it is being carried out for legitimate reasons. This allows the Federal structure to be protected as it ensures that the power of the Centre is not misused. This case set a precedent for many future cases that talk about the overreach of the central Government and the judgement helps uphold the rights of the States within the Federal framework of India.

CRITICISMS FACED BY THE FEDERAL STRUCTURE AND THE INDIAN

JUDICIARY17:

The quasi-Federal structure of the Indian Government, although seemingly well-fitting for the country, has quite a few loopholes and loose ends that need to be addressed. The Federal structure prescribed in the Constitution is idealistic in nature and this can be clearly seen when we notice the recent trends when it comes to Federalism. The power of the centre is ever-increasing, interfering with state Government autonomy and thus hindering the balance between the two levels of Government. This leads to Federal inequality and states end up demanding more power. The other side of the same coin is regional sensitivity. To please a few states they are given more regional focus. This helps to strengthen their local governance and interests. However, in the process, it ends up undermining the cohesive nature of Federalism.

16 Provisions in case of failure of constitutional machinery in State

17 Sahu, Mukti. “Revisiting Indian Federalism: An Overview of Contemporary Issues and Challenges.”

International Journal of Political Science and Governance (Print), vol. 4, no. 1, Jan. 2022, pp. 10–19, https://doi.org/10.33545/26646021.2022.v4.i1a.129. Accessed 4 Apr. 2024.

The Goods and Services Tax (GST) introduced in the year 2017 is one of the most noticeable issues with our Federal Government. It sought to unify the national tax process by balancing out the revenue raked in by the central and state Governments. It abolished several indirect taxes imposed on both levels to achieve its purpose. However, the implementation of the same has raised obvious concerns regarding Federal principles and structure. The states were quick to point out that with the implementation of GST, their financial autonomy vanished. All routes linked to the scheme led back to the central Government, giving it more power than it already possessed. The compensation under the GST scheme increased the states’ reliance on the Union which only upset them further. 18 This paper, however, focuses on the judicial interference with the Federal Structure of India.

The critiques when it comes to the same are not too many, but still extremely important and are to be dealt with immediately. The judiciary usually deals with disputes between the Union and the state in matters of public health or economic reforms. The judiciary, since the Federal structure is given so much importance in our country, often fails to balance the power between the two levels in these cases. Judgements are to be given while taking into account what is best for each state individually all while trying to maintain national unity. However, it is always one or the other, undermining the Federal principles that this India is built on. For example, During the COVID-19 pandemic, it took the Hon'ble Supreme Court a long time before it allowed the autonomy of the states to assess their regions on their own and appropriately issue lockdowns.

Until then, the Union Government was completely in charge, making decisions for the entire country. In this matter along with matters relating to agriculture and labour, the judiciary must use its power to interpret the boundaries set by the Constitution by respecting state independence all while recognizing and working towards Federal coordination needs. Drawing back to the earlier criticism about GST, the judiciary has to ensure that the fiscal autonomy of each state is not compromised when it comes to the new tax regime since most disputes regarding this matter would arise while interpreting central laws that directly impact state revenue streams. This leads to a Federal imbalance and only the judgements delivered by the Judiciary can help preserve Federalism in this case. 18 Ratha, Bhaba Bhaya Hara. "Center-State Financial Relation under the GST Regime: A Critical Study.

" Indian Journal of Integrated Research in Law, vol. 3, no. 1, January-February 2023, pp. 1-13. HeinOnline.

Additionally, as mentioned earlier in the case of S.R. Bommai v Union of India, it is extremely important for the judiciary to keep a check on the powers exercised by the centre and the Executive under Article 356 of the Constitution of India. It is upon it to make sure overreach is prevented and that each level of Government exercises power within the appropriate jurisdiction for the same.

CONCLUSION:

To summarize, it is clear that although the Indian Federal structure seems to be rigid, it is constantly adapting itself to suit the needs and necessities of the country, ensuring that no powers are misused and no boundaries or jurisdictions are overstepped. This is done with the help of the judiciary, whose role in a Federal Government is to preserve the sanctity of the same. This paper highlighted the history and emergence of the Federal Government in India and the value of judicial interference in matters concerning it. It has drawn a clear picture as to exactly what the judiciary has done to protect the Federal principles- whether it is deeming it a part of the Constitution's Basic Structure or subjecting arbitrary acts of the Union to judicial review.

In the process of the same, it has distinguished between the separate powers of the Union and the States, as it aimed at conserving state autonomy all while protecting cohesiveness and national unity. The country, however, is ever-changing and with this comes different expectations and necessities from not only the general public but also from the Governments as well. In the recent past, it was noticed by the state Governments that the quasi-Federal structure followed by India is slowly losing the "quasi" part of the term as the centre assumes more and more power each day. Whether it is complete blindness to local requirements or its wholly new tax regimes that are, behind the curtains, giving all the power to the Union, it is evident that this method of governance is partial.

It is here that the judiciary steps in as it has to deliver judgments in such a way that justice is delivered, boundaries are not overstepped, power is checked and Federalism is preserved. Judicial involvement is the only way, as of now, to make sure that the "quasi" in India's quasi-Federal structure is not lost.