Suppression To Expression - Sedition Laws And Free Speech In India, The UK, And The US

Author: LawSphereX

Category: General Law

Published: 2026-08-23T21:10:56.430091+00:00

Updated: 2026-08-26T17:06:08.233+00:00

SUPPRESSION TO EXPRESSION: SEDITION LAWS AND

FREE SPEECH IN INDIA, THE UK, AND THE US

Shruti Bose, CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Lavasa Ms. Anugraha, CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Lavasa

ABSTRACT

This research paper offers a comparative analysis of sedition laws in India, the United Kingdom, and the United States, focusing on how each legal system negotiates the tension between state authority and individual freedoms. While the UK and India inherited sedition laws from a colonial legacy prioritizing governmental control, their trajectories have sharply diverged—Britain abolished sedition in 2009, whereas India continues to retain and apply Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, often to suppress dissent. The United States, rooted in republican constitutional values, provides the strongest legal protections for free speech under the First Amendment, limiting the use of sedition statutes through stringent judicial standards like the “imminent lawless action” test.

This paper examines the historical development, judicial interpretation, and current application of sedition laws in all three jurisdictions, highlighting their alignment (or lack thereof) with international human rights norms. It concludes that while the UK and US have evolved toward narrower, rights-respecting frameworks, India must urgently reconsider its approach to sedition to protect democratic discourse and civil liberties.

INTRODUCTION

Sedition laws always occupy the space between state power and individual rights. In the past, they have been used to silence dissent, especially in politically volatile times when it may be required for governments to steadfastly maintain public order and national integrity. Freedom of expression and other democratic views may risk becoming endangered. This research paper will present a comparative overview of Indian, UK, and US sedition laws—three jurisdictions that provide distinct historical and constitutional perspectives. Sedition laws in India and the UK developed due to the need for colonial powers and monarchies to keep a lid on nationalist or reformist movements.

While Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, implemented by the British colonial regime, is still currently a valid and raucous piece of law, the UK formally revoked sedition as a common law offence in 2009, the paradigm of which seemed entirely outdated and out of sync within a modern liberal democracy. The United States, with its revolutionary beginnings and republican ambitions, offers a contrasting model. Even though sedition statutes, like an Espionage Act or a Sedition Act, were used during times of national emergency, U. S constitutional jurisprudence—focused on original First Amendment principles—has increasingly curtailed the power of the state to punish dissent. This paper aims to explore the history, the judicial interpretations, and the status of sedition laws in these three jurisdictions.

Using landmark judicial decisions, legislative changes, and standards of international human rights, this study demonstrates the different ways in which each of the legal regimes has grappled with the balance between protecting state interests and individual democratic freedoms. It also illustrates India's continuing fight against a colonial law and questions whether it is meaningful to retain it, in the context of India's constitutional duty to uphold free speech.

1. Jurisprudential Differences

1.1 The Role of Free Speech in Democratic Societies

Free speech is viewed in most jurisdictions as a vital and essential prerequisite to democracy. It allows people to issue critiques to power, join public discussions, and affect legislation and public policy. In this way, free speech is integral to government accountability. The contours

of how free speech is construed, and legally protected or limited, differ between jurisdictions, especially when free speech engages laws prohibiting sedition. In the United States, the First Amendment to the Constitution offers the highest level of protection to free speech. The United States courts have developed a robust jurisprudence to protect person’s right to be different even when unpopular odious. Landmark decisions like Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) established a high bar for restricting speech, as the "imminent lawless action" test. Under this standard, speech could only be limited when speech is intended to incite and is likely to provoke imminent unlawful actions. The United Kingdom, while entrenched in common law offences like seditious libel, has begun to adopt a more legislative approach.

Most prominently, the United Kingdom formally abolished the offence of sedition with the the Coroners and Justice Act 20091. Now, freedom of expression in the UK is protected by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), enacted by the Human Rights Act 1998. Limitations on free expression are only permitted when necessary in a democratic society, for the purposes of protecting national security, public order, or the rights of others. UK law now focuses more on specific statutes dealing with incitement to violence, hate speech, or terrorism. The constitutional right to free expression is guaranteed in India under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, but Article 19(2) permits the state to impose "reasonable restrictions" in the interests of sovereignty, public order, morality, and several other interests.

The Indian Penal Code still includes a definition of sedition under Section 124A, which remains active in India despite longstanding criticism. While the Supreme Court tried to clarify the scope of the section in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962)—where it held that only speech that incites "violence or public disorder" qualifies as seditious—the application by lower courts and law enforcement has been more expansive. As a result, the application of sedition and the existence of Section 124A has had a chilling effect on freedom of expression and fostered calls for reform or repeal. In summary, all three jurisdictions outline free speech as an important part of democracy, but the legal treatment of sedition has different implications for dissent. In the U. S. , individuals are

1 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, Section 73

prioritized; in the U.K. it is not as broad, but public interest and narrow legislation balance the difficult exercise; and in India, there is a colonial provision that still exists and is abused.

1.2 Interpretation of Sedition in Indian, UK, and US Courts

Judicial interpretation has been an important part of the evolution of sedition laws in all countries. The courts have either constrained or invalidated the application of such laws (as in the case of the UK) or began to regulate its application as in the case of India. The most notable case from the judiciary regarding sedition in India has been Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962). In this case, the Supreme Court found Section 124A was constitutional, but the type of speech that would be captured was limited to speech that incited violence or would likely lead to public disorder2. The court also repeatedly noted that mere criticism of the government, no matter how vitriolic or unpopular, should not be punishable.

Even after this cautionary tale, the provisions remain in place in India and its ambiguous language still gives room for a wide range of arbitrarily applied aspects against activists, journalists and political opponents. In the UK, the judiciary dismissed sedition grounds for charges, given that the offence was stale, excessive, and incompatible with twenty-first century democratic mores. The seditious offence was repealed under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 as seditious libel and sedition. It was stated that such speech should only be criminalised under a better defined, narrower statute. Incitement or threatening public order is now charged under the Public Order Act 1986, the Terrorism Acts, or across hate speech offences where they have a clear threshold and process protections3.

The US judiciary has incrementally handled seditious law, through a historically summative case-by-case analysis. Following the Schenck v. United States (1919) decision under the Espionage Act where the Supreme Court upheld sedition based on the "clear and present danger" test, the Court gradually transitioned to a rule that exists in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969). In Brandenburg, the Court ruled that speech was only criminal if it incited the imminent lawless action, and likely to incite the action. This approach provides a substantive threshold

2 Kedar Nath Singh v State of Bihar AIR 1962 SC 955

3 Gautam Bhatia, Offend, Shock, or Disturb: Free Speech under the Indian Constitution (Oxford University Press 2015) 174–180.

for political speech in the US and effectively obscures the possibility of applying seditious law which is deliberately avoid. Overall, judicial responses to sedition reflect broader constitutional philosophies and political traditions. While Indian courts have attempted to narrow the law’s scope without abolishing it, UK courts endorsed legislative repeal, and U.S. courts have fortified First Amendment protections, ensuring that only direct and imminent threats to law and order can be penalized.

2. Impact of Sedition on Political Dissent

2.1 Case Studies of How Sedition Laws Have Been Used to Suppress or Support Dissent

Sedition laws were designed with the intent of safeguarding state authority and public order, but they have often been weaponized to curtail dissent and restrict political alternatives. The distinct ways sedition has been enforced--or not enforced--in India, the United Kingdom, and the United States provide an important lens on the democratic vibrancy and legal culture of each jurisdiction. Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code repeatedly targets dissenting voices that are critical of the government. For example, the prosecutions of Arundhati Roy for her comments about Kashmir, Umar Khalid for his alleged participation in anti-CAA protests, and reported sedition charges against Disha Ravi for simply sharing a protest "toolkit" during the farmers' protests.

These individuals were not charged with violence; they were charged for the peaceful but confrontational expression of their dissent. The vague language of sedition within the law-- describing acts that kindle "hatred, contempt or disaffection" toward the government--does not set any standard, creating arbitrary standards of application that leads to politicized enforcement. Civil society organizations, human rights organizations, and former judges have called for repeal or reform of the law as it has a chilling effect on democratic participation. By the end of the 20th century, sedition laws in the United Kingdom were largely inactive, with the last important instances focusing on Irish republicanism and royal critique.

The lack of prosecutions showed an increasing discomfort with the offence, which, at least at that time, seemed incompatible with free speech and its protections in a modern democracy. By abolishing sedition through the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, the UK formally recognized that the offence was no longer necessary, and thus, demonstrated a shift in values: political

critique as part of active democracy - as opposed to a subversive threat - was an important and legitimate democratic act. Unlike the UK, the United States has used sedition related legal measures during periods of national crises, but typically amid significant backlash. The Sedition Act of 1798, enacted under the watch of President John Adams, was generally perceived as an attempt to stifle dissent from the Democratic-Republican press. Likewise, the United States used the Espionage Act and the Sedition Act during 1917 and 1918 to imprison anti-war voices (like Eugene V. Debs) for their speech. In most cases, a pattern emerges: charges of sedition only appear during politically volatile contexts, and are largely discredited thereafter. Sedition prosecutions are rare since the U. S. Supreme Court adopted the "imminent lawless action" test in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), and the U. S.

legal system holds political dissent in high esteem. Sedition laws have been most affected, typically employed to suppress dissent as opposed to protecting dissent, across all three jurisdictions. India stands alone in enforcing colonial-era sedition in law since its independence, while the UK and U. S. have adopted more protective treatment of speech as expected in a democracy.

2.2 Examination of Recent Cases in Each Jurisdiction

Recent legal developments in India, the UK, and the U. S. reflect diverging attitudes toward sedition and democratic dissent in the 21st century. The case of senior Journalist Vinod Dua in 2020 was a key moment in the debate over sedition as it relates to criticism of the government in India. Vinod Dua was charged under Section 124A for criticizing the government’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Supreme Court quashed the FIR and reaffirmed that criticism is not sedition unless it incites violence or public disorder; this is consistent with Kedar Nath Singh. However, while the Supreme Court decision was welcomed, sedition is still on the books and continuously used so that journalists and activists are left confused and fearful.

Although the Court’s decision was welcomed, the limited application of the ruling pointed to the judiciary’s unwillingness to wholly strike down the sedition law. In the UK, sedition is no longer a legal option. Since its repeal in 2009, the UK has tackled threats to public order using separate legislation, such as the Public Order Act 1986 and Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. These laws criminalise 'incitement to violence', hate

speech and extremism, while enabling dissent4. The UK government's focus has now shifted towards online speech and radicalisation prevention while also attempting to demonstrate avoidance of broad and vague offences such as sedition. There remains some trepidation regarding overreach - through initiatives such as the Prevent Programme - but it occurs within assessments of counter-terrorism, rather than of sedition. In the US, the events of January 6, 2021, and the insurrection of the Capitol renewed interest in charges relating to sedition. Participants, many of whom were members of extremist groups such as the Oath Keepers and Proud Boys, faced charges under 18 U. S. C. § 2384 - but not for speech alone - for the violent actions they undertook to pursue the overthrow of democratic processes.

Prosecuted alongside individuals facing varying degrees of culpability for the rioting that unfolded on that day, these prosecutions were narrowly framed and contained substantial underlying evidentiary support, fully aligned with the Brandenburg standard. However, this insurrection brought into focus the ability of courts in the US to strike the balance between the broad protections afforded to speech and prosecution of people for acting in a conspiratorial manner to engage in genuinely violent actions against the sovereign state. These case studies reveal the contemporary implications of sedition law. The UK and U. S. legal systems have evolved to protect dissent more robustly, while India remains entangled in the remnants of colonial-era sedition, risking the erosion of democratic freedoms in the name of national security.

3. Repeal and Reforms: A Global Trend?

3.1 The Abolition of Sedition in the UK

The United Kingdom formally abolished the common law offence of sedition in 2009 through Section 73 of the Coroners and Justice Act, marking a significant shift in its legal stance on freedom of expression. Historically, sedition and seditious libel were used to criminalize criticism against the monarchy, government institutions, and public officials, especially where such expression was perceived as inciting "hatred, contempt, or disaffection" against the state. 4 Jack Balkin, ‘Free Speech Is a Triangle ’(2018) 118 Columbia Law Review 2011; Daphne Keller, ‘Who Do You Sue? ’(Hoover Institution, 2019); Evelyn Douek, ‘Governing Online Speech: From “Posts-As-Trumps” to Proportionality and Probability ’(2021) 121 Columbia Law Review 759

Over time, however, the offence fell into disuse, reflecting a growing recognition that it was both outdated and incompatible with democratic principles5. The United Kingdom officially removed the common law offence of sedition in 2009, with the formal withdrawal of it in Section 73 of the Coroners and Justice Act, demonstrating a significant and profound movement away from the concept of freedom of expression as it adopted a stance of legal regulation. Sedition had long been used as a criminal offence to suppress criticism of the monarchy, of governmental institutions, of public officials, or any criticism that could possibly be construed as inciting "hatred, contempt or disaffection" toward the state. In time, it's application waned to the point that it was no longer used, and its application revealed that it was outmoded, and incompatible with the values of democracy.

In particular the Law Commission and organizations like Article 19 raised concerns regarding sedition, asserting that it was too vague, too broadly applied and entirely inconsistent with the UK's obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (specifically Article 10: freedom of expression)6. The removal of sedition was based on law clarity, proportionality and human rights compliance, and included the symbolic element of distancing the United Kingdom from its colonial legal heritage, particularly as many ex-colonies (India, Pakistan and Malaysia) utilized it as a means to suppress dissent7. Currently in the UK the government responds to threats to public safety and national security through relatively narrow legislative measures such as the Public Order Act 1986, the Terrorism Acts and the Counter- Terrorism and Security Act 2015.

These Acts specifically prohibit hate speech or incitement to violence or other extremism rather than broadly prohibiting political dissent or actions. The abolition of sedition has now been acknowledged by international human rights scholars as a forward step in the alignment of British law with contemporary human rights and democratic practices.

3.2 India’s Struggle with Sedition and Calls for Reform

India continues to grapple with Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860, a colonial-era law that criminalizes sedition. Despite having gained independence in 1947 and 5 P. Walker, Sedition in English Law: A Historical and Political Analysis, Oxford University Press, 2004. 6 Law Commission, Codification of the Criminal Law: Treason, Sedition and Allied Offences (Working Paper No. 72, 1977) 7 David Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales, Oxford University Press, 2019

adopting a democratic constitution in 1950, the law remains in force and has often been used to silence dissenting voices—ranging from journalists and students to activists and opposition leaders. In Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962), the Supreme Court of India upheld the constitutionality of Section 124A but attempted to limit its misuse by stating that only speech inciting "violence or public disorder" would qualify as seditious. However, in practice, the law’s vague terminology has allowed authorities to apply it arbitrarily and subjectively, undermining free speech protections guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution. India continues to deal with Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860, a law that dates back to colonial times and criminalizes sedition.

Even though India gained independence in 1947 and embraced a democratic constitution in 1950, the law is still applicable and has been used repeatedly to silence dissent—be it from journalists, students, activists, or opposition leaders. In Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962), the Supreme Court of India upheld the constitutionality of Section 124A but in trying to curb its use, it stated that only "speech that incites violence or public disorder" could be considered sedition. This attempt to interpret the law and impose some limits has proven ineffective practically due to the vague language in the law that has permitted a broad, arbitrary, and subjective exercise of power against individuals, compromising the right to free speech under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution.

The cases of Disha Ravi, Umar Khalid, and Vinod Dua propelled a massive public outcry and a reinvigorated backlash against Section 124A. In May 2022, the Supreme Court of India temporarily halted all pending sedition cases and ordered the Centre to revisit the provision's validity. The central government welcomed the opportunity to review the provision in the context of developing societal and constitutional value systems. The Law Commission of India has provided mixed accesses, in terms of political scrutiny, for transversing judgment and the law in society. In the 2018 consultation paper, it suggested that the principle of sedition is contrary to democratic values and asked whether we need a sedition law at all. In its 2023 report, it suggested that the law remain - but with safeguards which provoked new controversy. Furthermore, in proposing a replacement for the IPC - the Bharatiya

Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 - the Law Commission omitted Section 124A by name, but retained internally related-discourses under terminologies as "acts of treason" and "in relation to the sovereignty, integrity, or security of India," raising fears of legislative change being a mere change in name8. India now finds itself at a legal and ethical impasse. It is already in the middle of many reforms, but the actual outcome of the sedition law remains to be seen based on political will, judicial bravery, and pressure from the public. If India wants to honour actual constitutional values, it will need to rid itself or drastically limit Section 124A and follow international democratic thoughts.

3.3 Sedition Laws in the US and the Role of the First Amendment

Unlike India and the UK, the United States has never had a general criminal code like the IPC that included comprehensive sedition statutes. Instead, it has historically had isolated aspects of sedition in individual federal statutes, namely the Sedition Act of 1798, the Espionage Act of 1917, and the Sedition Act of 1918; the stated objectives of these statutes were often overshadowed or ignored during periods of national crises (war, civil unrest, etc. ), and with each iteration there were consistent claims that the Act was politically motivated and unconstitutional. Through the years, judicial interpretation of the First Amendment right to free speech, freedom of the press, and right to assembly has significantly limited the government's ability to prosecute seditious speech.

The watershed moment for this aspect of First Amendment jurisprudence was the Supreme Court ruling in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)9. Under Brandenburg, the government may prohibit speech only if it is designed to incite and it is likely to produce imminent lawless conduct, because if the statute is not subject to prior restraint, the government cannot constitutionally limit speech related to inciting lawless conduct, and once the required burden of proof is undertaken the live sieve necessary for challenging legislation may cease. Brandenburg replaced a vague threshold that allowed government regulation of

8 Law Commission, Criminal Law: Offences against Religion and Public Worship (Law Com No 145, 1985);

David Ormerod and Karl Laird, Smith, Hogan, and Ormerod’s Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2021) 351–353.

9 Brandenburg v Ohio 395 US 444 (1969)

seditious speech by using a less judicially restrained standard called "A Clear and Present Danger," first articulated in Schenck v. United States (1919)10. Sedition-related charges are infrequently used in the United States today. The two remaining sections (18 U. S. C. § 2384 (seditious conspiracy) and § 2385 (advocating for the violent overthrow of the government)) are narrow and only applied in extreme situations. The most notable recent example is the January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol. Some of the rioters from extremist groups like the Oath Keepers were charged with seditious conspiracy; however, these charges were based on violent actions, not speech, that met the stringent constitutional requirements of the First Amendment. In conclusion, the United States legal system reflects its zeal for protecting opportunities for political dissent.

Sedition statutes exist, but they are slightly more narrow, and generally are not used. The American experience exemplifies that national security and free expression are not mutually exclusive ideals if upheld by a statutory outline and stringent constitutional protections.

4. Sedition Laws and Democratic Rights

4.1 The Effectiveness of Sedition Laws in Balancing State Security and Individual

Freedoms At its core, the matter of sedition laws in a democracy implicates the competing interests of safeguarding the personal freedoms of individuals and protecting national security from violent uprisings, acts of secession, and unrestricted propaganda that seeks to undermine the state. Advocates of sedition laws endorse the idea that there must be laws to provide for violent uprisings, and secessionist acts and specifically in politically fragile or heterogeneous nations such as India, there should be a framework of laws for safeguarding national "integrity", and deterring extremist ideologies, and preserving social order in situations of social fragmentation or conflict. Opponents of all sedition laws, and in particular vaguely articulated and broadly applied sedition laws, argue that these laws have dire implications for the very democratic freedoms that we strive to protect.

India's Section 124A of the IPC has frequently come under scrutiny

10 Schenck v United States 249 US 47 (1919)

for use against ironically public protests by peaceful activists to journalists to political adversaries. Within Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962), our Supreme Court attempted to more rigorously to limit the situation where the courts could intervene over sedition against the state in a broad sense11. However, vague terminology and no explanatory guidance further complicates the infringement of freedom of expression in relation to dissent and all forms of criticism confronting government policies as pursued, and all forms of legitimate criticism according to the failure of the state due to reliance on vague terms like disaffection and hatred and black letter laws. In contrast, the United Kingdom has shown that a state can protect national security through narrowly crafted laws.

The UK abolished sedition in 2009 then replaced it with specifically targeted laws like the Public Order Act and Terrorism Acts that better address threats to public safety. Rather than penalizing dissent or restricting free speech, the UK illustrates that they can also ensure national security. The United States similarly preserves liberty with robust First Amendment protections and has narrow legal thresholds for national security like the Brandenburg standard. Law on sedition is still present in the U. S. but limited to extraordinary risks of violence that are imminent and not applied widely as a rejection of dissent. The U. S. model grants liberty and provides legal avenues to confront actual risks as a legal framework to civically manage state security and civil liberties.

Democracies across the world are increasingly realizing the irony of broad sedition laws as poor tools for maintaining security. The bigger risk is that they undermine public trust, damage institutional legitimacy, and impede civic democratic engagement. If dissent is a crime, democracy does not exist.

4.2 Comparison of International Human Rights Norms and Their Influence

International human rights law provides an essential framework for evaluating the legitimacy and necessity of sedition laws. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)—to which India, the UK, and the US are parties—gives every person the right to freedom of expression. This includes the right to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers. The ICCPR allows for restrictions on the right to

11 European Court of Human Rights, Handyside v. United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737

freedom of expression only if the restriction is provided by law and is necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health, or the rights of others. To be legitimate under international law, restrictions must adhere to the principles of necessity, proportionality, and clarity. Laws that are vague or overly broad—like Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code—have been subjected to repeated criticism for not adhering to these principles. In General Comment No. 34, on Article 19, the United Nations Human Rights Committee stated that laws restricting acts of expression must not be used to protect public officials or institutions from public criticism.

It considered that harsh penalisation, including imprisonment, for offences related to acts of expression are, by their nature, disproportionate and incompatible with the values of democratic engagement in public affairs. Great Britain has emphasized its commitment to international human rights standards by decriminalizing sedition and providing safeguards for freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which overlaps with protections secured through the ICCPR12. The reforms passed by the UK append issue to the field as a model of democratic accountability and adherence to international norms. The United States is also in compliance with the established obligations through its constitutional jurisprudence.

For example, the Brandenburg doctrine limits government interference with expression to cases of incitements to imminent lawless action which is the stringent bar that protects expression. This judicial standard also protects persons from arbitrary government interference in either an arbitrary or politically motivated suppression of expression. India remains under scrutiny from several domestic human rights groups and particularly international human rights organizations. The Supreme Court of India intervened and curtailed the wider abuses related to Section 124A but the existence of any form of sedition law in India and its frequent invocation contradict India's stated commitments to the ICCPR. The 2022 Supreme Court directive to stay all sedition proceedings may signal an attempt for reform but does not represent full recognition of India's obligations under international law.

In conclusion, while the UK and the U. S. have made genuine efforts to align their sedition- 12 United States v Rhodes (2022) (Oath Keepers case); 18 U. S. C. § 2384 (Seditious Conspiracy). See also Department of Justice, Capitol Breach Cases [2023]

related laws to global human rights norms, India, on the other hand, continues to face global criticism. If India wants to position itself credibly as the world's largest democracy, it must reevaluate its sedition laws to international norms.

5. Future of Sedition Laws in a Democratic World

5.1 Prospects of Legal Reforms in India

India is at a unique point in its saga with sedition law. Throughout the years, there has been increasing judicial scrutiny, public activism, and alarm for the global community about the constitutionality and appropriateness of Section 124A of Indian Penal Code, and it has become intensely debated at the national level. This points to something more serious than constitutional guarantees of free speech and rights as citizens to affirm democratic values and purposes. This colonial law is worthy of serious scrutiny as it raises basic questions about the compatibility of such provisions with modern Indian democracy. The Supreme Court's May 2022 interim order temporarily giving pursuers of sedition claims, hoping to stay the siting of Section 124A for good, was an important moment in India's legal history.

The Court's comments that this law was being misused to suppress dissent is resonating courtrooms will onto the judicial legacy, allowed for progressive awareness of just how pervasive the chilling effect had become upon civil liberties13. The central government's intent to "re-examine and reconsider" the provision seems cautiously welcomed, indicating the progression towards abolishment or substantive legislative follow-up. The Law Commission of India has had decidedly divergent views at a pace similar to developments in the Courts and Society. Earlier drafts that questioned the necessity of the law, and the 2023 report which endorsed retaining sedition with some form of procedural safeguards, raised the question of the intents behind reform.

Add to this the proposed Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita(BNS), 2023, whose proposal omits Section 124A but which potentially replaces it with broader and uncertain offences aligned with treason and similar to charge of sedition, appear to be dubious methods of bettering the law while leaving it alone in spirit.

13 Arun Kundnani, The Muslims Are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror

(Verso Books 2014); Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-Extremism (2016–17, HL 105/HC 756) paras 71–76.

Some civil society organizations, academics, and human rights organizations are continuing to provide the campaign for reform. They have indicated clearly that sedition law is unsuitable in its present form for democratic societies, especially since existing laws governing incitement to violence, terrorism and endangering public order would make various forms of sedition and treason distinct. In the final analysis, whether India implements a bona fide repeal, substantive reform, or simply a cosmetic exercise will provide interesting insights into its democracy and constitutional commitment to free expression.

5.2 Emerging Debates in the US and UK Regarding Free Speech, National Security, and

Sedition In both the US and UK, traditional sedition laws have either been completely repealed, or curtailed, new threats to free speech are now predominantly in the area of digital space or national security. These developing discussions illustrate that although the legal concept of ‘sedition ’may be fading, the ethical and political problems that ‘sedition ’entailed are not, they are just taking on new forms. In the UK, governments ’focus has now shifted on regulating online speech and dealing with extremist behaviour and content moderation as it relates to social media.

The Prevent Programme, which is a programme aimed at stopping people from being radicalised via the internet, has generated its own share of controversy and criticisms, especially in regards to being overly aligned with Muslim communities and attempting to blur the line between actual political expression and extremism14. The role of technology and tech platforms, and their want and ability to curate online speech more cleanly, brings up important questions around what right to free speech actually consists of and amounts to, as well as how and when censorship, if at all, is appropriately engaged by governments in the 21st century. While sedition is no longer a criminal offence, the apparent tension between state security interests and individual liberty rights remain central to contemporary policy discussion and ongoing debates around counter-extremism.

In the United States, the structure of the law brought by the First Amendment still offers the most significant protection for speech anywhere in the world, although the events of the Capitol riot on January 6 renewed discussions about the limits of this law. The case built on charges of seditious conspiracy made under 18 U. S. C. § 2384, but only in some instances related to direct and coordinated violence - exposing a narrow, cautious approach to claims about sedition and

14 Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2005) 437–440.

related offences. On a broader level, however, the rise of debates about misinformation and hate speech (alongside the role newly-created algorithms on social media platforms such as X [formerly Twitter], Meta and YouTube), has added to this discussion on free speech and the different issues related to it. The questions of platform liability, dangerous content and its amplification through algorithms, and the ability of government to regulate tech companies, are the key topics about free speech that democratic societies are grappling with15. In both countries, the apparent challenge is less the criminalization of dissent in the traditional sense, but rather how to manage, deploy, and diffuse information within an increasingly hyper connected, polarized, and politically sensitive security environment.

In many ways these developments reveal that even in jurisdictions that have distanced themselves from the category of sedition as a criminal law, the fundamental questions, such as who controls speech, what constitutes a threat, and how to protect democratic institutions from being disrupted from within and without, and other legal notions, remain salient. Conclusion This study examined the historical inception, legal meanings, and ongoing significance of sedition laws in three major jurisdictions—India, the United Kingdom and the United States. Its origin was meant to defend against a state's authority, but most sedition laws have been used as a repressive instrument that obstructed dissent and curtailed democratic freedoms. The comparative study identifies a significant fracture in the legal and constitutional perspective moving forward to address sedition.

The UK Law Commission recommended to the UK Parliament that the offence of sedition, last prosecuted in 1978, was obsolete and had repressive consequences, which prompted Parliament to abolish the offence in 2009 and create laws that are specific in meaning, respect rights and deal only with threats against public order and national security. The US sidestepped the legal definition of sedition, relying on constitutional protection for freedom of speech through the First Amendment, and judicial doctrines in case law like Brandenburg v. Ohio limited the application of sedition to imminent lawless action. The issue in India sits with one colonial era sedition law—s. 124A of IPC. Some precedents of judicial restraint have been adopted to limit the potential misapplication of

15 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, s 26; UK Home Office, Revised Prevent Duty Guidance for

England and Wales (2021).

s. 124A IPC, but the sedition law remains an instrument of political control and is a threat to constitutional democracy. The shifting global consensus indicates that vague and sweeping sedition laws are fundamentally inconsistent with democratic values and international human rights standards. Good governance does not require suppression of dissent, but rather promoting lively public discourse. From this perspective, India’s continued use of sedition law creates a dichotomy between the democratic vision of the country and the colonial vestige of the law it seeks to uphold. India appears to be at a potential tipping point—with likely legal action from the judiciary, working its way through parliament, and an active civil society—dealing with whether or not to continue a legacy of suppression or respect constitutional freedoms in their entirety.

Whether or not the India repeals or ameliorates the sedition law is not just legally necessary. It is essential for democracies. If democracies are to survive, they must not only protect the right to dissent, they must respect dissent responsibly.