The Abrogation Of Article 370 - Reassessing India’s Model Of Asymmetrical Federalism

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Category: General Law

Published: 2026-08-23T21:13:00.793923+00:00

Updated: 2026-08-26T17:06:03.117+00:00

THE ABROGATION OF ARTICLE 370: REASSESSING

INDIA’S MODEL OF ASYMMETRICAL FEDERALISM

Riddhi Gupta, LLM, Amity Law School, Amity University, Noida

ABSTRACT

Article 370, which was crafted as a constitutional device in order to address the unique accession of Jammu and Kashmir to the Indian Union in 1947, embodied a distinctive kind of asymmetry within India’s federal structure. Though it was labelled as a “temporary provision”, it evolved into a symbol of autonomy and a means for managing diversity. The constitutional arrangement took a decisive turn in August 2019, when Article 370 was effectively abrogated through a Presidential Order, followed by the enactment of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019. This paper seeks to explore the historical origins of Article 370, examine its constitutional foundation and judicial interpretations, and analyse the political as well as federal implications that emerged from its repeal.

It also situates India’s experience into broader comparative frameworks of asymmetrical federalism structure being followed in countries like Canada, the UK, and the USA. It concludes by revisiting whether India’s shift from accommodation to uniformity strengthens or undermines its constitutional project of unity in diversity. Keywords: Article 370, Jammu & Kashmir, asymmetrical federalism, constitutional law, Indian federalism, abrogation.

I.

INTRODUCTION

India’s constitutional design represents a unique fusion of federalism and unitarism, embodying the idea of unity amidst immense diversity. The framers of the Constitution were conscious of the political fragmentation that came in the wake of decolonisation and Partition, and envisaged a Union of States, federal in form but unitary in spirit. This quasi-federal structure was crafted not through symmetry but through accommodation; an approach that recognised the historical, cultural, and geographical specificities of its constituent units. Within this mosaic, asymmetrical federalism emerged as a constitutional technique to harmonize national unity with regional diversity, as it refers to a federation where constituent units hold varying powers or relationships with the Centre.

This asymmetry may stem from political bargaining, historical circumstances, or socio-cultural imperatives, reflecting “unequal relationships in political, administrative, and fiscal arrangements” among units that are otherwise formally equal. 1 In India, this asymmetry manifests both vertically in the dominant role of the Centre and horizontally, through special constitutional provisions that accord differential treatment to certain States and territories. 2 The Indian Constitution institutionalised asymmetrical federalism through several mechanisms, such as Articles 371A-I accord special arrangements to States such as Nagaland, Mizoram, and Sikkim; the Fifth and Sixth Schedules created autonomous frameworks for tribal regions; and Union Territories reflected administrative asymmetry within the federal schema.

Yet, among these, Article 370 stood apart; not merely as a legal provision but as a constitutional compact born of extraordinary political circumstances. The genesis of Article 370 lies in the turbulent period of India’s independence and the accession of princely States. Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), under Maharaja Hari Singh, was one such princely State that initially sought to maintain its independence. But the tribal invasion from across the newly formed Pakistan in October 1947 compelled the Maharaja to seek military aid from India, leading to the signing of the Instrument of Accession. 3 Under this instrument, J&K acceded to India on three subjects: defence, foreign affairs, and communications, while 1 Charles D. Tarlton, Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A Theoretical Speculation, 27(4) J. Pol. 861 (1965).

2 Bashir Ahmad Wagay, Article 370 and the Asymmetrical Federalism of India, 4 International Education and Research Journal 5 (May 2018) (E-ISSN 2454-9916).

3 Id.

retaining autonomy in all other matters. The Union’s acceptance of these limited terms gave rise to a constitutional arrangement unique in Indian federalism. To give legal effect to this special relationship, Article 370 (initially Draft Article 306A) was incorporated in Part XXI of the Constitution under the heading “Temporary, Transitional and Special Provisions. ” This provision was the result of intense negotiation between Sheikh Abdullah, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel as a product of political necessity rather than constitutional generosity. 4 The article conferred upon J&K substantial autonomy: the State had its own Constitution, its own flag, and residuary legislative powers; central laws and constitutional provisions applied only with the concurrence of the State government.

5 Although labelled as “temporary,” judicial interpretation gradually imbued Article 370 with permanence. The Supreme Court in the case of Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu and Kashmir held that the provision would remain operative until abrogated under Article 370(3) upon the recommendation of the State’s Constituent Assembly; a body that dissolved in 1957 without making such a recommendation. 6 Consequently, the Article continued indefinitely, symbolising both the distinct constitutional status of J&K and the pluralistic character of Indian federalism. Over the decades, however, this autonomy gradually weakened, through successive Presidential Orders, particularly that of 1954, in which the Union extended a wide range of constitutional provisions to J&K, effectively eroding its special status.

Asymmetric federalism was always precarious, hemmed in by textual ambiguity, political coercion, and judicial acquiescence, but what began as an arrangement grounded in negotiated asymmetry evolved into a system increasingly centralised in practice. The abrogation of Article 370 on August 5, 2019, through C. O. 272 and C. O. 273 by the President of India marked the culmination of this long process. Accompanied by the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, it bifurcated the State into two Union Territories- Jammu & Kashmir (with legislature) and Ladakh (without legislature). While the move was hailed by some as a historic step toward national integration, others viewed it as a rupture of India’s asymmetric federal compact. Critics contend that the abrogation, undertaken in the 4 A. G. Noorani, Article 370: A Constitutional History of Jammu and Kashmir (Oxford Univ. Press 2012).

5 Ritika Kanwar, Abrogation of Article 370: Impact on Asymmetrical Federalism in India, 2 Indian Journal of Integrated Research in Law 3 (2020).

6 Sampat Prakash v. State of J&K, AIR 1970 SC 1118.

absence of a functional State legislature and without the consent envisaged under Article 370(3), undermined constitutional federalism and the principle of cooperative governance. 7 The abrogation also reignited a profound constitutional debate: whether asymmetrical federalism forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution. If federalism itself is a basic feature, as affirmed in S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, then its asymmetric variants that are designed to preserve the integrity of a plural nation will arguably share the same protection. 8 The question, therefore, transcends the boundaries of J&K and goes to the heart of India’s constitutional identity: Can the pursuit of uniformity justify the erosion of negotiated diversity? This research paper reassesses India’s federal design through the prism of Article 370’s abrogation.

It aims to examine whether India, in seeking greater unity, has moved from asymmetrical federalism to constitutional centralism. The following chapters explore the constitutional history, legal mechanisms, judicial responses, and comparative perspectives that illuminate this transformation. II.

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ARTICLE 370 AND ASYMMETRICAL

FEDERALISM IN INDIA

2.1 Historical Genesis: Instrument of Accession and the Political Compromise

Following India’s Independence, the princely states were required to integrate under the Indian Constitution, thereby relinquishing their internal autonomy. However, Jammu and Kashmir chose to join the Indian Union on specific conditions laid out in the Instrument of Accession signed by Maharaja Hari Singh in October 1947. The Maharaja, a Hindu ruler of a Muslimmajority state, faced a complex dilemma- his territory uniquely bordered both India and Pakistan, allowing for potential accession to either nation, and his contemplation of an independent Kashmir further delayed a final decision.9 Amid a local uprising in Poonch and an invasion by tribal militias from Pakistan10, the Maharaja sought India’s military aid, agreeing to accede to India. The accession was accompanied by an understanding that a plebiscite would later determine the state’s ultimate

7 Dr. Rakesh Mondal, Dichotomy of Asymmetrical Federalism and Abrogation of Article 370 in India: A

Constitutional Debate, 11(4) International Journal of Law, 115-121 (2025).

8 S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918.

9 The Fate of Kashmir, Stanford Journal of International Relations, by Vikas Kapur &Vipin Narang, 2006

10 The forgotten Poonch uprising of 1947.

political status. Due to these extraordinary circumstances, Jammu and Kashmir was granted a special and asymmetric position within the Indian federation. Under the terms of accession, the state transferred powers to the Union only over defence, foreign affairs, and communications, while retaining autonomy over other matters, thereby establishing its distinct constitutional relationship with the Indian Union. Clause 7 of the Instrument declared that “Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to be a commitment in any way as to acceptance of any future Constitution of India or to fetter my discretion to enter into an arrangement with the Governments of India under any such future Constitution,”11 signalling the State’s exceptional constitutional status. The political negotiations that followed involved a delicate balancing of competing visions.

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, though an advocate of national integration, recognised the need for flexibility in Kashmir’s case, declaring in the Constituent Assembly that “given the special problem with which the Government of Jammu and Kashmir is faced, we have made special provisions for the continuance of the State with the Union on the existing basis. ”12 Jawaharlal Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah, representing contrasting yet convergent political aspirations, saw autonomy as essential to securing the allegiance of the Kashmiri people within the Indian framework. 13 This negotiated settlement was both political and constitutional in nature, a compact rooted in the idea of cooperative asymmetry, as the asymmetric status of J&K was not an act of unilateral generosity by the Union but the after-effect of a rational bargain among distinctive constituents for political and economic advantage. 14

2.2 Article 370: Draft Article 306A and Its Constitutional Evolution

When the Constituent Assembly of India debated the integration of princely States, J&K was treated as a sui generis case. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, a member of the Drafting Committee and former Prime Minister of J&K, introduced Draft Article 306A, later renumbered as Article

11 Clause 7 of the Instrument of Accession signed on 26th October, 1947.

12 Vijaya Dar, Myths & Facts about Articles 370 & 35A of the Indian Constitution, OpIndia MyVoice, August 9, 2018, https://myvoice.opindia.com/2018/08/myths-facts-about-articles-370-35a-of-the-indian-constitution/

13 Supra note 4.

14 Gazala Peer & Javedur Rahman, An Unpleasant Autonomy: Revisiting the Special Status for Jammu and

Kashmir, 47(23) Economic and Political Weekly 72, (2012).

370. The provision was placed under Part XXI of the Constitution, “Temporary, Transitional

and Special Provisions,” reflecting its intended provisional nature. 15 Article 370(1) limited Parliament’s legislative competence to matters in the Union and Concurrent Lists corresponding to the subjects specified in the Instrument of Accession. Any extension of additional provisions required the “concurrence” of the State government. Article 370(2) provided for consultation with the State’s Constituent Assembly, and Article 370(3) authorised the President to declare the Article inoperative only upon the Assembly’s recommendation. While the framers termed the provision “temporary,” judicial and political developments soon transformed it into a quasi-permanent feature. The Constituent Assembly of J&K, convened in 1951, drafted and adopted the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir in 1957 without recommending abrogation.

Consequently, the condition under Article 370(3) remained unfulfilled, rendering the provision effectively permanent. The Supreme Court affirmed this interpretation in Sampat Prakash v. State of J&K, holding that Article 370 would continue to operate until abrogated in the prescribed manner. 16 Moreover, in State Bank of India v. Santosh Gupta, the Court reiterated that the provision had acquired permanence, rejecting the contention that it was transitory in character. 17 Hence, though Article 370 was categorised as a temporary provision, it became a basic and essential feature of India’s asymmetric federal design. 18 Nevertheless, the State’s autonomy eroded gradually through a series of Presidential Orders, particularly the 1954 Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order.

Issued under Article 370(1)(d), it extended numerous provisions of the Indian Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and financial arrangements, to J&K, with the formal concurrence of its government. These incremental extensions blurred the constitutional boundary between autonomy and integration, signalling a slow centralisation of authority.

15 Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. X, 17 October 1949 at Constitution of India,

https://www.constitutionofindia.net/debates/17-oct-1949/

16 Supra note 6.

17 State Bank of India v. Santosh Gupta, (2017) 2 SCC 538.

18 Anuradha Bhasin, A Tale of Two Constitutions: An Excerpt from ‘A Dismantled State’, Supreme Court

Observer (Aug. 24, 2023), https://www.scobserver.in/journal/a-tale-of-two-constitutions-anuradha-bhasin/

2.3 Broader Asymmetry in the Indian Federal Structure

The case of J&K was not the only embodiment of asymmetry within India’s constitutional framework. The framers, acknowledging the diversity of India’s territories, incorporated several provisions to address regional distinctiveness. Articles 371A to 371I provide varying degrees of autonomy to States such as Nagaland, Mizoram, Sikkim, and Arunachal Pradesh, particularly concerning religious and customary practices, land ownership, and administrative control. Similarly, the Fifth and Sixth Schedules create sub-national constitutional spaces for tribal areas. The Fifth Schedule governs the administration of Scheduled Areas and Tribes in mainland India19, while the Sixth Schedule establishes autonomous district councils in the North-East20, empowering them with legislative and judicial authority over customary matters.

These arrangements reflect an acknowledgment that constitutional uniformity could not accommodate India’s pluralism. Such provisions constitute mini-constitutions within the Indian Constitution; these are distinct governing codes that express pluralist constitutionalism. 21 Yet, it is cautioned that these asymmetries are frequently undermined by the presence of a “federal kill-switch”, provisions allowing the Centre to override local autonomy. Even where the Constitution recognises diversity, it simultaneously embeds mechanisms of control, demonstrating a tension between pluralism and centralisation. 22 Thus, while J&K’s asymmetric arrangement was the most pronounced, the broader constitutional scheme reveals multiple layers of asymmetry, both territorial and functional. Each represents an attempt to reconcile India’s national unity with its regional multiplicity.

2.4 Comparative Structure: Vertical and Horizontal Asymmetry

Asymmetrical federalism in India operates along two intersecting axes, vertical and horizontal. Vertical asymmetry arises from the hierarchical distribution of powers between the Centre and

19 V Schedule, Constitution of India.

20 VI Schedule, Constitution of India.

21 Kham Khan Suan Hausing, Asymmetric Federalism and the Question of Democratic Justice in Northeast

India, 13(2) India Review 87 (2014); Louis Tillin, Asymmetric Federalism, The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution, Oxford University Press, 2016.

22 Pu Myllai Hlychho vs State of Mizoram, (2005) 2 SCC 92.

the States. The Constitution endows the Union with greater legislative, financial, and administrative authority, including residuary powers under Article 248 and emergency provisions under Articles 352–360.23 Even in normal circumstances, the Centre’s predominance in fiscal transfers and planning mechanisms entrenches vertical imbalance. Horizontal asymmetry, by contrast, refers to the differential treatment among States themselves. This is visible in the special constitutional provisions for certain regions, Articles

370 and 371A-I, and the Schedules for tribal areas. Such asymmetry allows differentiated

autonomy, reflecting political accommodation rather than uniform federal design. India’s federal model oscillates between these two poles- an enduring contest between the “centripetal impulse of homogeneity” and the “centrifugal demand for diversity. ”24The abrogation of Article 370 thus cannot be understood merely as a political decision but as the culmination of a constitutional drift toward vertical dominance and horizontal uniformity. In comparative perspective, India’s asymmetric federalism mirrors the experiences of other diverse federations such as Canada, where Quebec enjoys linguistic and cultural autonomy, and the United Kingdom, which recognises devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

However, unlike these federations, India’s asymmetry has always been conditional and reversible- subject to executive discretion rather than entrenched constitutional guarantees. The constitutional history of Article 370 illustrates how India’s federal structure evolved as a compromise between integration and autonomy. Born out of a historical bargain, it embodied the principle that federal unity could coexist with negotiated asymmetry. Yet, over time, the tension between constitutional pluralism and centralising nationalism eroded this equilibrium. The gradual dilution and eventual abrogation of Article 370 reveal not merely the collapse of one State’s autonomy but the transformation of India’s federal identity from a plural federation that celebrated asymmetry to a homogenised Union privileging uniformity over diversity. III.

THE ABROGATION OF ARTICLE 370: LEGAL AND POLITICAL

DIMENSIONS

23 M. Govinda Rao & Nirvikar Singh, Asymmetric Federalism in India, NIPFP Working Paper No. 006 (Apr. 2013), https://www.nipfp.org.in/media/medialibrary/2013/04/wp04_nipfp_006.pdf 24 M. Asad Malik, Changing Dimensions of Federalism in India: An Appraisal, ILI Law Review, Vol. II, Winter Issue 2019, 85 https://ili.ac.in/pdf/mam.pdf

The abrogation of Article 370 on 5th August,2019, represents one of the most profound constitutional transformations in post-independence India. Through C. O. 272 and C. O. 273, the Union government effectively revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and reorganised it into two Union Territories-Jammu and Kashmir (with legislature) and Ladakh (without legislature). The move was accompanied by the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, passed by Parliament under Article 3 of the Constitution. While the government defended the step as a measure to promote national integration, economic development, and uniformity, critics viewed it as a constitutional rupture that subverted federalism, democratic consent, and the rule of law.

The abrogation’s legal mechanism, its political context, and its implications for India’s federal fabric together invite deep constitutional scrutiny.

3.1 The Legal Procedure: Presidential Orders and Parliamentary Role

3.1.1 The Mechanism of Abrogation

The legal process unfolded in two coordinated steps. First, Presidential Order C.O. 272 (issued under Article 370(1)) applied all provisions of the Indian Constitution to J&K, superseding the earlier 1954 Order. This order achieved its objective through a linguistic device; by modifying Article 367 (Interpretation) as applicable to J&K. It substituted the phrase “Constituent Assembly of the State” in Article 370(3) with “Legislative Assembly of the State.”25 At the time, however, J&K was under President’s Rule (Article 356), and the powers of the State legislature were exercised by Parliament. Consequently, Parliament’s recommendation was treated as the equivalent of that of the State legislature, effectively satisfying the condition under Article 370(3). The subsequent C.O. 273 invoked this “recommendation” to declare Article 370 inoperative, thereby completing the abrogation.26

3.1.2 The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019

Following the Presidential Orders, the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill, 2019, was

25 Gautam Bhatia, The Article 370 Amendments: Key Legal Issues, Constitutional Law & Philosophy

https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2019/08/05/the-article-370-amendments-key-legal-issues/ 26 John Simte, The Basic Structure Doctrine, Article 370 and the Future of India’s Democracy, Verfassungsblog (Oct. 20, 2023) https://verfassungsblog.de/the-basic-structure-doctrine-article-370-and-the-future-of-indiasdemocracy/

introduced and passed in both Houses of Parliament. Enacted under Article 3, it bifurcated the State into the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and the Union Territory of Ladakh. Notably, Article 3 requires the President to refer any Bill affecting a State’s boundaries to its legislature for views, yet, since J&K’s legislature was dissolved, Parliament acted in its place.27 This dual reliance on Articles 370(1) and 3 was legally innovative but constitutionally contentious. Critics argued that Article 370(3) demanded concurrence from the State’s Constituent Assembly, not its Legislative Assembly, and that substituting the latter amounted to altering the very text of the Constitution without following Article 368’s amendment procedure.28 The government, conversely, contended that such substitution was a legitimate exercise of Presidential modification powers under Article 370(1)(d).29

3.2 Constitutional Validity and the Debate on Basic Structure

The abrogation reignited the jurisprudential question of whether asymmetrical federalism, which allows certain states a special degree of autonomy, forms part of the Constitution’s basic structure. The Supreme Court has consistently recognised federalism as one of the Constitution’s essential features. However, the extent to which the uneven or differentiated federal arrangements, like those once granted to Jammu and Kashmir, are also protected under this doctrine remains debatable. The debate ties back to the Kesavananda Bharati case, where the Court held that Parliament cannot alter the Constitution’s basic structure30, and in earlier judgments such as Sampat Prakash and State Bank of India v. Santosh Gupta, it had been recognised that Article 370 is enduring until the J&K Constituent Assembly itself recommended its repeal.

The J&K High Court also stated that the provision cannot be abrogated even using the amending powers of the Parliament under Article 36831, and thereby drawing from S. R. Bommai, where federalism was held to be part of the basic structure32, it is argued that India’s asymmetric federalism, symbolised by Article 370, is itself a core and inseparable feature of the constitutional design. 27 “Reorganisation of J & K into Two Union Territories, Constitutional? ,” Citizens for Justice and Peace https://cjp. org. in/reorganisation-of-j-k-into-two-union-territories-constitutional/

28 Supra note 4.

29 In Re: Article 370 of the Constitution, 2023 INSC 1058.

30 Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225.

31 Ashok Kumar v. State of J&K, 2015 SCC OnLine J&K 210.

32 Supra note 8.

The abrogation has been criticized on the grounds that removing Article 370 undermined the very foundation of constitutional federalism, which was designed to protect India’s diversity. And observing that the move diluted the asymmetric nature of India’s federal design, it weakened the principle of cooperative federalism. On the other hand, supporters of the abrogation maintain that Article 370 was always meant to be temporary, evidenced by its placement under “Temporary Provisions” in Part XXI, and hence, its removal fulfilled the integration process envisioned by the framers, rather than violating the constitutional intent. The Supreme Court upheld this reasoning, ruling that Article 370 was transitional and that the President was within his powers under Article 370(1)(d) to modify interpretive provisions like Article 367.

33 While the judgment settled the legal question, it left open broader normative concerns about consent, representation, and the democratic legitimacy of such unilateral action.

3.3 Political Context and Executive Justifications

The abrogation of Article 370 must be understood not merely as a legal manoeuvre but as a culmination of a longstanding political project. The demand to fully integrate J&K was central to the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) ideological vision since the 1950s, articulated in the Jana Sangh’s slogan “Ek Vidhan, Ek Nishan, Ek Pradhan” (One Constitution, One Flag, One Head). The party’s 2019 election manifesto explicitly promised the removal of Article 370. 34 The Union government justified its action on several grounds: • Integration and Equality: The government argued that Article 370 fostered separatism and hindered integration by maintaining dual constitutional arrangements. • Development and Governance: It was asserted that full application of Indian laws would promote economic development, gender equality, and social justice by extending constitutional protections to J&K residents.

• National Security: The revocation was also justified as necessary to curb cross-border terrorism and ensure better administrative control.

33 Supra note 27.

34 Bharatiya Janata Party, Sankalp Patra 2019: BJP Manifesto for Lok Sabha Elections (Apr. 2019).

However, the manner in which the abrogation was carried out, marked by the mass detention of political leaders, communication blackouts, and restrictions on movement, drew widespread criticism for being inconsistent with democratic principles.35 The decision was described as an “exercise of majoritarian power that bypassed constitutional morality and the spirit of cooperative federalism.” Moreover, it was viewed as part of a larger constitutional trend reflecting the growing assertion of executive centralism over deliberative federalism. In other words, while India’s federal system formally allows for asymmetry, its constitutional design has always contained a subtle “centralising drift.” The events of 2019 are seen as having transformed that tendency from a latent feature of governance into an established constitutional doctrine.

3.4 Federalism and the Transformation of Statehood

In addition to its immediate political context, the abrogation has redefined the constitutional concept of statehood in India, as it is for the first time in Indian history that a State was reduced to Union Territories, diminishing its legislative and executive autonomy. Such a reversal of the integration trajectory, i. e. , from autonomy to direct central administration, exemplifies the paradigmatic shift of Indian federalism. Such reorganisation undermines the presupposition that in India, federalism is just the division of power; it is also the sharing of political identity. The abrogation changed the symbolic relationship between the Central and the peripheral by eliminating the negotiated asymmetry that had characterized the relationship between J&K and the Union. Comparatively, a federation such as Canada has expanded autonomy to preserve unity.

India’s decision, by contrast, employed centralisation to achieve integration, revealing a distinct constitutional logic where unity precedes diversity, rather than emerging from it. The revocation of Article 370 is therefore not only a constitutional affair, but a political one as well. It shows, in legal terms, the flexibility of the constitutional apparatus in India, the way structural change can be effected, through an interpretationally flexible application of interpretation and executive authority, without constitutional amendment. Politically, it implies

35 Charlotte Thomas, Centralism and Authoritarianism in India: The Abrogation of Jammu and Kashmir’s

Autonomy, Noria Research, https://noria-research.com/south-asia/centralism-and-authoritarianism-in-indiajammu-and-kashmir/

the victory of centralising nationalism over the pluralist vision of federalism, which shaped the early Republic. The 2019 abrogation, regardless of its interpretation as a claim to sovereignty or a weakening of federalism, is a game-changer in the history of constitutional changes in India. It not only reshaped the territorial and political borders of Jammu and Kashmir but also redefined asymmetry in Indian federalism, not as a policy of concession but of an exception that could be withdrawn at any time. IV.

REASSESSING INDIA’S MODEL OF ASYMMETRICAL FEDERALISM

4.1 Conceptual Foundation: Theoretical Framework and Indian Context

The concept of asymmetrical federalism is rooted in the recognition that equality among constituent units is not always necessary, or even desirable, for sustaining unity within a diverse federation. It is an articulated asymmetry as a structural condition in which “constituent units of a federation do not share identical constitutional relationships with the central authority. ”36 Further, it is distinguished between de jure asymmetry, created through constitutional design, and de facto asymmetry, which arises from political and economic disparities. Applied to plural societies, asymmetry becomes an instrument of accommodation. It permits differentiated arrangements to address distinct ethnic, linguistic, or territorial identities while preserving overall sovereignty.

Alfred Stepan and Louis Tillin later expanded this theory through the concept of “state-nations”, federations that acknowledge multiple national identities within a single state structure. It is often argued that in such contexts, asymmetry is not an exception but a precondition for stability, offering what they term “robust multinational democracy. ”37 In India, asymmetrical federalism emerged as a pragmatic tool to integrate diverse political entities into a common constitutional framework. It is critical to observe that India’s federalism “was designed to be flexible and accommodating, responding to diversity rather than suppressing it. ”38 Provisions such as Articles 370 and 371A-I, and the Fifth and Sixth

36 Supra note 1.

37 Alfred Stepan, Juan Linz & Yogendra Yadav, Crafting State-Nations: India and Other Multinational

Democracies (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2011).

38 Id.

Schedules, illustrate the framers’ willingness to balance the centripetal force of national unity with the centrifugal realities of diversity. Yet, Indian constitutionalism has always been marked by an uneasy coexistence between pluralist aspirations and centralising imperatives.39 The 2019 abrogation of Article 370, in this sense, serves as a prism through which to reassess the trajectory of India’s asymmetrical federalism, whether it remains a living constitutional principle or has been subsumed by an increasingly unitary political logic.

4.2 Comparative Perspective: Lessons from Other Federations

4.2.1 Canada - Quebec’s Autonomy

One of the most persistent models of asymmetrical federalism is in Canada. The province of Quebec enjoys considerable constitutional distinctiveness, including jurisdiction over the language, education, and immigration policy. Autonomy in Quebec is based on the understanding of its French-speaking majority and cultural identity. This asymmetry has enabled Canada to remain stable in a multinational system because the federal government accepted this asymmetry via the adoption of the Constitution Act, 1867, and subsequently the Meech Lake Accord.40 It has been pointed out that the Canadian experience highlights how asymmetry, instead of posing a threat to national unity, can in fact bolster it by providing flexible constitutional pluralism. Federal accommodation of Quebec distinctiveness, despite the periodic tensions, has been a key factor in maintaining the integrity of the federation.

4.2.2 United Kingdom-Scotland and Northern Ireland

The United Kingdom presents a more flexible and negotiated asymmetry through devolution. The advent of devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland under the Scotland Act 1998 and other related statutes introduced a constitutionally sanctioned system of differentiation within a unitary state. Scotland has extensive powers over education, health, and

39 Anmol Jain & Tanja Herklotz, Indian Constitutionalism at Crossroads: 2014-2024 (2025)

https://verfassungsblog.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Jain- Herklotz_IndianConstitutionalismAtCrossroads_2025.pdf

40 Philippe Chassé, Olivier Jacques, Colin Scott, Between Decentralization and Asymmetry: Explaining

Preferences toward the Division of Power in Canada, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Volume 55, Issue 1, Winter 2025, https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjae034

tax, while the arrangements in Northern Ireland accommodate the unique historical and political relationship between Britain and Ireland.41 These asymmetries are the products of negotiated constitutional pluralism; agreements forged through dialogue and consent. It is crucial to notice that, UK’s devolution is premised on political legitimacy and negotiated participation, both unfortunately missing from India’s 2019 abrogation process. The UK model demonstrates that asymmetry, when grounded on mutual consent, can operate as a stabilising mechanism for regions of distinct identities.42

4.2.3 United States- Alaska and Puerto Rico

The United States is an ostensibly symmetrical federation, albeit with some light asymmetries. Hawaii and Alaska have special federal treatment due to their remote location and demographic composition. More saliently, an independent territory, Puerto Rico, is in a constitutionally distinct relationship with the federal government. Although Puerto Ricans are citizens of the U. S. , they do not have representation in Congress and typically do not pay federal income taxes on income earned on the island, do not have the same eligibility for some federal programs as those in the states, and do not vote in presidential elections. 43 Such statuses of difference are a classic example of what scholars refer to as functional asymmetry- constitutional divergence in response to political, economic, or historical circumstances, but not ethnicity or language affiliation.

44 The American experience shows that asymmetry, when moderated within a stable constitutional order, need not undermine national cohesion.

4.3 Evaluating the Indian Experience Post–2019

The abrogation of Article 370 represents a decisive shift in India’s approach to asymmetrical federalism. Historically, India maintained a plural federal design, allowing different States to

41 Josep M Tirapu-Sanuy, Devolution, National Pluralism and the Role of the UK Supreme Court, Oxford

Journal of Legal Studies, Volume 45, Issue 3, Autumn 2025 accessed on https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqaf014.

42 Vernon Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom (Oxford Univ. Press 2001).

43 Congress, Political Status of Puerto Rico: Brief Background and Recent Developments for Congress, CRS Product R44721 (Sept. 14, 2021), accessed at https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R44721. 44 G. Alan Tarr, Symmetry and Asymmetry in American Federalism (prepared for delivery at an international conference, June 5–7, 2006), Rutgers University Camden, accessed at https://sites.camden.rutgers.edu/wpcontent/uploads/sites/19/2022/10/symmetry_and_asymmetry_in_american_federalism.pdf

enjoy differentiated powers under Articles 371A-I and the Schedules. However, the 2019 decision altered this constitutional equilibrium in three significant ways:

4.3.1 Centralisation of Constitutional Power

By using Article 370(1)(d) to amend the interpretive provisions of Article 367, the Union government effectively exercised constituent power through executive means. This move blurred the separation between amendment and interpretation, reinforcing the predominance of the Centre over the federal compact. The Indian Constitution’s centripetal drift has reached its logical culmination, the transformation of asymmetric consent into executive decree.8 The effect extends beyond J&K. The precedent of unilaterally altering a State’s constitutional status raises concerns for other regions with special protections-particularly Nagaland, Mizoram, and Meghalaya under Articles 371A-H. Their autonomy, though safeguarded textually, now appears vulnerable to similar reinterpretation under the pretext of national integration.

4.3.2 Transformation of Asymmetry into Administrative Uniformity

The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, which downgraded a full-fledged State into two Union Territories, marks the first instance in Indian history where federalism moved in reverse, from Statehood to direct central rule. This transformation redefined asymmetry as a temporary privilege rather than a structural principle. Louis Tillin describes this phenomenon as “reverse asymmetry”, where the centre reclaims powers once devolved, reducing the federation to a hierarchically managed union.45 In practice, such centralisation diminishes the spirit of cooperative federalism envisioned in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, where the Supreme Court emphasised that federalism is part of the Constitution’s basic structure.46

4.3.3 Symbolic and Political Consequences

The erosion of asymmetric autonomy also carries symbolic consequences. Article 370 represented a constitutional acknowledgment of diversity, a bridge between sovereignty and

45 Louis Tillin, Remapping India: New States and Their Political Origins (Oxford Univ. Press 2013).

46 Supra note 8.

self-governance. Its abrogation, accompanied by the bifurcation of J&K, signals a reassertion of homogenising nationalism over negotiated pluralism. This shift can appropriately be asserted as “the replacement of consensual federalism with majoritarian unitarism.” The constitutional principle of accommodation, central to India’s unity-in-diversity ethos, thus risks being supplanted by uniformity enforced through legal reinterpretation.

4.4 Comparative Reflection: India’s Evolving Federal Trajectory

Contrasting India’s trajectory with other federations highlights an essential paradox. In Canada and the UK, asymmetry has been strengthened through renewed autonomy and institutional dialogue. In India, however, asymmetry is increasingly perceived as an obstacle to national unity rather than its foundation. It is argued that India’s constitutional imagination, while rhetorically pluralist, remains structurally majoritarian. 12 The Constitution recognises difference but simultaneously embeds mechanisms of central control, such as the Governor’s discretionary powers, financial dependence on the Union, and the use of Article 356. The abrogation of Article 370, in this sense, did not create a new constitutional logic; it merely exposed and solidified the centralising tendencies latent in the text since 1950.

This development raises profound normative questions: Can a federation sustain unity through uniformity? Does the pursuit of integration justify the erasure of negotiated autonomy? The comparative evidence suggests otherwise. Federations that endure, whether Canada’s accommodation of Quebec or the UK’s devolution to Scotland, do so by institutionalising diversity, not dissolving it.

4.5 Towards a More Unitary Federation?

India’s post-2019 federal landscape reveals a discernible shift from asymmetrical pluralism to unitary consolidation. The abrogation of Article 370 has redefined the meaning of federal accommodation, replacing it with administrative uniformity and executive supremacy. While the framers envisioned asymmetry as a tool for inclusion and integration, its erosion marks the rise of a homogenised constitutional order where differentiation is seen as disloyalty. The logic of asymmetry, rooted in recognition and consent, has been supplanted by a logic of control. Whether this transformation enhances national unity or erodes the plural foundations

of the Indian Union remains an open question. Yet, as comparative federations demonstrate, enduring unity often depends less on the erasure of difference than on its constitutional embrace. The challenge for India’s federal future lies not in achieving symmetry but in restoring the spirit of negotiated asymmetry that once defined its constitutional imagination. V.

JUDICIAL RESPONSE AND CONTEMPORARY DEBATES

The judicial interpretation of Article 370 has played a decisive role in shaping India’s asymmetric federal framework. Over seven decades, the courts have alternately reinforced and eroded Jammu and Kashmir’s (J&K) autonomy, reflecting the tension between constitutional pluralism and centralising nationalism. The trajectory from Prem Nath Kaul (1959) to the 2024 Constitution Bench verdict reveals a gradual but consistent judicial shift, from acknowledging negotiated autonomy to legitimising central dominance. The following analysis traces this evolution and situates it within broader debates on federalism and the basic structure doctrine.

5.1 Early Judicial Approach: Recognition of Autonomy

The earliest authoritative pronouncement on Article 370 came in Prem Nath Kaul v. State of J&K, where the Supreme Court emphasised that the continuance of Article 370 was contingent upon the will of J&K’s Constituent Assembly. The Court, speaking through Justice Gajendragadkar, held that until the Assembly made a decision regarding the State’s relationship with the Union, the President could not unilaterally alter or abrogate the Article.47 This judgment recognised the bilateral nature of Article 370, interpreting it as a constitutional compact between the Union and the State. It implicitly acknowledged J&K’s limited sovereignty within the Indian federation, an acknowledgment that would later be diluted. It thus reflected a vision of cooperative federalism, wherein both entities shared constitutional responsibility for maintaining the asymmetrical arrangement.

5.2 Consolidation of Central Authority

A decade later, in the case of Sampat Prakash, the Supreme Court took a markedly different

approach. The petitioner argued that Article 370 had ceased to exist after the dissolution of the

47 Prem Nath Kaul v. State of J&K, AIR 1959 SC 749.

State’s Constituent Assembly in 1957. The Court rejected this contention, holding that Article

370 continued to operate until abrogated under the procedure prescribed in clause (3).48

However, while reaffirming the Article’s formal validity, the Court adopted a centralising interpretation by recognising the continuing power of the President to issue Orders under Article 370(1)(d) even in the absence of the Constituent Assembly. This reasoning effectively transferred the locus of constitutional power from the State to the Union executive. The case redefined temporariness into perpetuity while simultaneously legitimising unilateral presidential action, setting the stage for future executive interventions that progressively weakened J&K’s autonomy.

5.3 Late Judicial Developments: Reaffirmation of Constitutional Continuity

In State Bank of India v. Santosh Gupta, the Supreme Court confronted the question of whether the SARFAESI Act, 2002, applied to J&K. The Court held that the Act was validly extended to the State by a Presidential Order, but its reasoning is notable for reaffirming that Article 370 had not lapsed despite its temporary label. 49 The Court observed that Article 370 had “acquired permanence through usage,” emphasising that its abrogation required compliance with Article 370(3), a clause rendered inoperative after the Constituent Assembly’s dissolution. Thus, although the judgment appeared formalist, it endorsed the Article’s constitutional endurance. In another case, the special status of J&K was challenged on the grounds of being discriminatory and inconsistent with Article 14.

The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition, holding that Article 370 is a valid constitutional provision embodying a unique historical compromise. 50 The Court reaffirmed Parliament’s competence to legislate for J&K within the constitutional parameters of Article 370 but refused to treat it as an anomaly. Together, Santosh Gupta and Vijayalaxmi Jha demonstrated judicial restraint, acknowledging Article 370’s asymmetrical character while avoiding intervention in its political underpinnings.

48 Supra note 6.

49 Supra note 17.

50 Kumari Vijayalaxmi Jha v. Union of India, W.P. (C) No. 541/2016.

5.4 The 2019 Abrogation and the Supreme Court’s 2024 Verdict

The abrogation of Article 370 through C.O. 272 and C.O. 273 and the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, generated an unprecedented constitutional challenge. Petitioners contended that:

1. The substitution of “Constituent Assembly” with “Legislative Assembly” via Article

367 was unconstitutional;

2. The absence of a functioning legislature under President’s Rule invalidated the

purported “recommendation” required by Article 370(3); and

3. The bifurcation of the State into Union Territories violated the principle of federalism.

In December 2024, a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the abrogation, holding that Article 370 was “a temporary provision that had outlived its purpose. ”51 The Court reasoned that: • The President’s powers under Article 370(1)(d) included modifying constitutional provisions to facilitate the full integration of J&K; • Since the State was under President’s Rule, Parliament could validly exercise the functions of its legislature; and • The reorganisation of the State was a matter of legislative policy under Article 3, not judicial review. The verdict represents a decisive judicial endorsement of executive supremacy in federal relations. Critics argue that it marks a shift from cooperative to coercive federalism, replacing constitutional negotiation with unilateral assertion.

The judgment criticised on the point of being a judicial legitimisation of constitutional centralism, effectively conflating executive convenience with constitutional necessity. Such reasoning will enable the Union to dismantle asymmetrical arrangements under the pretext of

51 Supra note 27.

national integration, thereby undermining the federal spirit and diluting the Constitution’s pluralist design.

5.5 Doctrinal Themes: Cooperative vs. Coercive Federalism and Judicial Restraint

The judicial evolution surrounding Article 370 reveals shifting interpretations of federalism. Earlier decisions, such as Prem Nath Kaul, reflected cooperative federalism, premised on dialogue between the Union and the State. Later judgments, particularly Sampat Prakash and the 2024 verdict, embody coercive federalism, privileging executive power over regional consent. This trend also underscores the judiciary’s increasing deference to political branches. The 2024 judgment’s invocation of “non-justiciability” in matters of State reorganisation represents a retreat from the Court’s historic role as guardian of the federal balance, exemplified in S. R. Bommai v. Union of India. 52 From a separation-of-powers perspective, this judicial restraint arguably collapses constitutional pluralism into administrative uniformity.

It is also argued that such deference risks transforming the judiciary from “a constitutional sentinel into an instrument of central consolidation. ” VI.

CONCLUSION

In 2019, the abrogation of Article 370 was a defining moment in India’s constitutional evolution. It symbolized not only the restructured organization of a State but a change in the spirit of Indian federalism itself. The paper indicates that the abolishment of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir is a clear turning point in terms of asymmetrical pluralism to centralised uniformity, a process that has restructured the relationship between the Union and its constituent entities. Historically, asymmetrical federalism was a tool of conciliation, in order to allow the Indian Union to absorb into itself different political and cultural identities without losing their uniqueness. This principle, as shown in Chapters 2 and 4, was based on the pragmatic vision of the framers and embodied in Articles 370, 371A-I, and the Fifth and Sixth Schedules.

52 Supra note 8.

However, in August 2019, through C.O. 272 and C.O. 273, which were politically justified by Parliament, effectively wrecked the most observable manifestation of this asymmetry. The 2024 Supreme Court decision allowing the abrogation was an additional step toward solidifying this change. The logic of the Court, including the perception of Article 370 as a transitional political system, is a change in jurisprudential approach to the previous jurisprudence of Prem Nath Kaul and Santosh Gupta, which had acknowledged negotiated federalism as constitutional. The Court allowed executive convenience to override historical consent, creating an example of coercive federalism, in which the power of the Union overrides the autonomy of the States. This erosion of asymmetrical federalism embodies three interlinked consequences:

1. Strengthened centralisation, the Union consolidates its power through interpretive and

legislative machinery;

2. Democratic deficit, when regional consent and participatory dialogue are replaced by

unilateral action; and

3. Doctrinal Narrowing as judicial restraint substitutes constitutional pluralism.

The abrogation of Article 370, in a way, represents the peak of structural and symbolic reduction of cooperative federalism in India. Although the constitutional system is supported by the centralising trend of recent years, the stability of the Indian constitutional system remains based on negotiability and flexibility. The permanence of state-nations such as India, does not reside in uniformity but in controlled asymmetry, in the capacity of the Union to tolerate difference without viewing this as a sign of disunity.53 To re-establish this principle, it is necessary to consciously revert to negotiated federalism, based on constitutional dialogue between the Centre and the States. The loss of the autonomy of J&K should not be used as a precedent to undermine other special provisions. Instead, it

53 Alfred Stepan, Juan Linz & Yogendra Yadav, Crafting State-Nations: India and Other Multinational

Democracies (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2011).

must trigger a more profound reconsideration of how asymmetry can be reanimated as a means of inclusion, specifically in borderlands and localities with special socio-cultural identities. The balance that the framers envisioned in the federal system was not hierarchical but rather dynamic. The accommodation and the principle of differentiation integration of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and the acceptance by Nehru were all based on dialogue, consent, and joint rule. The modern problem is to renew this ethos in a politics that has grown more and more characterized by majoritarian centralism. In conclusion, the abrogation of Article 370 has been enacted to alter the constitutional paradigm of India, replacing the spirit of pluralistic accommodation with uniformity in governance. However, the Indian Constitution's resilience is in its potential for adaptation.

The policymakers, jurists, and scholars have to place once again the spirit of cooperative asymmetry, not just an exception, but its guiding principle in Indian federalism. India, with its intense integration, should recognize that constitutional incorporation is effected not through the blurring of differences but through their deliberate inclusion. Indian federalism's future, however, is not contingent upon the centralization of authority but upon the revival of faith, communication, and mutual assent among its constituent elements.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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