The Environmental Impact Of Cops - A Paradox Of Climate Diplomacy
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Category: Environmental Law
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THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF COPS: A PARADOX
OF CLIMATE DIPLOMACY Bhumika Gupta, OP Jindal Global University Introduction Global climate conferences such as the United Nations Conference of the Parties (COP) are pivotal in shaping international climate policy and coordinating global action under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). These summits bring together thousands of delegates, including heads of state, diplomats, scientists, activists, and journalists, to negotiate climate targets and strengthen multilateral cooperation. However, despite their objective of mitigating global emissions, COPs themselves generate a significant environmental footprint. The paradox is striking because gatherings that aim to combat climate change often contribute substantially to it.
The logistical and infrastructural demands of hosting a COP, ranging from delegate travel and accommodation to venue energy use, food systems, and waste generation, lead to large quantities of greenhouse gas emissions. For instance, the COP26 summit held in Glasgow in 2021 emitted over 100,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent, with aviation accounting for the majority of the total footprint. 1 Such figures raise critical questions about the sustainability and legitimacy of these events, especially when the outcomes are framed as global commitments to emission reduction. Recognising this contradiction, the UNFCCC developed Sustainability Guidelines for COP Hosts to encourage greener logistics, carbon offsetting, and improved resource management. 2 However, these guidelines remain voluntary and largely unenforceable.
Consequently, many scholars and environmental policy experts argue that the carbon cost of climate diplomacy has yet to be adequately addressed within international environmental law. 3
1 UNFCCC, COP26 Sustainability Report (UNFCCC 2022) https://unfccc.int accessed 14 October 2025.
2 UNFCCC, Guidelines for Sustainability at United Nations Climate Change Conferences (UNFCCC 2021)
https://unfccc.int/topics/meetings/sustainability-guidelines accessed 14 October 2025.
3 Lavanya Rajamani, International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press 2021) 278.
This research paper critically examines the environmental impact of COPs, focusing on their major emission sources and the corresponding legal, policy, and ethical implications. It explores key aspects such as travel and transportation, venue infrastructure and energy use, accommodation and food systems, waste and material management, and governance and justice dimensions. In doing so, this research aims to highlight how the practice of climate governance itself must evolve to reflect the principles of sustainability and equity it seeks to promote. Unless the environmental externalities of global diplomacy are directly confronted and regulated, climate negotiations risk undermining both their moral authority and scientific credibility.
1. Travel & Transportation (Flights, Boats, Trains, Cars)
1.1 Aviation Emissions
Scale and Significance Aviation is among the most carbon-intensive modes of transport on a per-passenger-kilometre basis. In 2023, the aviation sector accounted for approximately 2. 5 % of global energy-related CO2 emissions. 4 Moreover, long-haul flights contribute disproportionately: a recent global aviation emissions inventory estimates that 43 % of CO2 from aviation arises from long-haul routes. 5 When delegates travel from distant countries such as India to Europe or the United States, the round-trip emissions per delegate frequently fall in the range of 2 to 5 tonnes CO2 equivalent, depending on distance, aircraft efficiency, routing, and load factors. 6 During COP26 in Glasgow, it has been reported that roughly 60 % of the conference’s carbon footprint was attributable to delegate aviation emissions.
7 International aviation emissions are reported separately from national emissions inventories under the UNFCCC framework, which means that host or participating states typically do not internalise the climate cost of delegate flights within their national targets. The global “bunker fuel” accounting regime ensures that aviation’s emissions are tracked, but they remain legally 4 International Energy Agency, Aviation (IEA, 2025) https://www. iea. org/energy-system/transport/aviation
5 R Teoh et al, ‘The high-resolution Global Aviation emissions Inventory’ ACP (2024)
https://acp.copernicus.org/articles/24/725
6 Carbon Footprint Ltd, ‘Flight Carbon Footprint Calculator’ (Carbon Footprint, 2024)
https://www.carbonfootprint.com/calculator.aspx
7 Erin Vera, ‘Was Your Flight to COP Really Necessary?’ (Transport & Environment, 30 November 2022)
https://www.transportenvironment.org/articles/was-your-flight-to-cop-reallynecessary?utm_source=chatgpt.com distinct from national emissions commitments.8 Given that COPs attract thousands of delegates, repeated flights from all continents accumulate to tens of thousands of tonnes of CO2 emissions, often eclipsing the emissions from venue energy use, catering, and waste.
1.1.1 Private Jets and First-Class Travel
The use of private and first-class air travel by world leaders and corporate delegates at COPs significantly amplifies aviation-related emissions. Private jets emit up to 14 times more CO2 per passenger than commercial flights and around 50 times more than trains. 9 During COP26 (Glasgow, 2021), over 400 private jets reportedly transported participants, generating about 13,000 tonnes of CO2. 10 This practice drew global criticism for hypocrisy, as climate negotiators arrived at a conference dedicated to emission reduction using the most polluting form of transport. Beyond optics, such elite travel reinforces inequality, since delegates from developing countries often struggle to afford commercial flights while wealthier participants travel in luxury.
The absence of binding regulations or reporting obligations for private jet emissions highlights a serious accountability gap within international climate governance.
1.2 Alternative Transport Modes
Because aviation dominates for long distances, alternative modes are attractive in theory, but fraught in practice.
1.2.1 Sea Travel
Sea transport has been championed as a lower-carbon alternative, Greta Thunberg’s 2019 transatlantic sailing captured public imagination as a symbolic gesture.11 However, scaling sea transport for large delegations is impractical: voyages are slow, capacity is limited, and operational schedules are inflexible. Moreover, many ships rely on heavy fuel oil or bunker fuels, emitting sulphur oxides, black carbon, and particulate matter, thus reducing the net
8 UNFCCC, ‘Emissions from International Transport (Bunker Fuels)’
https://unfccc.int/topics/mitigation/workstreams/emissions-from-international-transport-bunker-fuels 9 Transport & Environment, ‘Private jets: can the super-rich supercharge zero-emission aviation?’ (27 May 2021) https://www.transportenvironment.org/articles/private-jets-can-the-super-rich-supercharge-zero-emissionaviation
10 BBC News, ‘Article Title’ (BBC, 3 November 2021) https://www.bbc.com/news/59135899
11 Associated Press, “Greta Thunberg Arrives in Lisbon After Three-Week Voyage from US” The Guardian (3 December 2019) https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/dec/03/greta-thunberg-arrives-in-lisboncop25-after-three-week-voyage-from-us climate benefit in many cases. Cruise ships, in particular, are notorious for high emissions per passenger. Thus, while sea travel may offer a niche alternative for symbolic journeys or small delegations, it is not a feasible primary transport mode for full COP attendance.
1.2.2 Rail & Ground Transport
For intra-regional legs especially in regions with advanced rail infrastructure, rail offers a much lower emission alternative. For example, in Europe, high-speed trains (including Eurostar) often emit one-tenth to one-third the CO2 per passenger-kilometre compared to aviation (depending on electricity’s carbon intensity). 12 For internal travel in host or neighbouring countries, delegates commonly use buses, cars, or domestic flights. The emissions of these “last-mile” journeys, while smaller per leg, accumulate, especially when many delegates are shuttled daily. Because ground transport is generally less carbon-intensive for short legs, prioritising efficient public transit, electric buses, and consolidated shuttle services helps reduce this component.
However, none of these alternatives can substitute for the long intercontinental haul that forms the core of the COP travel footprint and the options are even more constrained for participants from the Global South.
1.3 International Legal & Policy Regime
1.3.1 ICAO & the CORSIA Mechanism
The principal international framework governing aviation emissions is the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA). CORSIA seeks to stabilise global aviation emissions at 2019 levels by requiring airlines that exceed this baseline to purchase carbon offsets. The scheme is divided into three stages: two voluntary phases (2021–2023 and 2024–2026), followed by a mandatory phase beginning in 2027.13 However, its initial voluntary design and numerous exemptions where states must opt in greatly limit its effectiveness and coverage.14 Critics contend that CORSIA is insufficiently stringent. It focuses on offsetting rather than in- 12 Hannah Ritchie et al, ‘Travel: CO2 emissions by mode of transport’ (Our World in Data, 23 May 2024) https://ourworldindata.org/travel-carbon-footprint
13 ICAO, CORSIA
Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (ICAO, 2023) https://www.icao.int/CORSIA
14 ICAO, CORSIA Implementation Phases and Participation Data (ICAO 2023)
https://aviationbenefits.org/environmental-efficiency/climate-action/market-based-measures/corsia sector emission reductions, excludes domestic aviation, and relies heavily on carbon markets whose environmental integrity is often questioned.15 Major emitters such as China, India, Russia, and Brazil have not fully joined the scheme, which limits its coverage to about 35% of global aviation emissions.16 Since CORSIA does not require airlines to adopt cleaner technology or use sustainable aviation fuel, it is widely criticised as a form of greenwashing rather than a genuine decarbonisation measure.17
1.3.2 Regional Policies & SAF Mandates
Beyond the ICAO regime, several regional frameworks particularly within the European Union have introduced additional aviation climate measures such as Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) mandates, carbon pricing, and proposed aviation taxes aimed at internalising the sector’s environmental costs.18 These mechanisms reflect growing recognition that global schemes alone are inadequate and that region-specific regulations may be necessary to accelerate decarbonisation. SAF, produced from renewable bio-feedstocks or synthetic sources, can reportedly reduce life-cycle emissions by up to 80 per cent when produced sustainably.19 However, such regional measures remain fragmented and unevenly implemented, and their full potential and challenges including cost, supply limitations, and technological scalability will be examined in detail in a later section of this paper.
1.3.3 Equity & Global South Concerns
A core tension is equity: stricter aviation regulations (taxes, mandates) may disproportionately burden delegates from distant or low-income countries, constraining their ability to participate meaningfully in global climate diplomacy. Developing nations argue for differentiated commitments, financial support, or exemptions to preserve equity in participation. Thus, any reform must balance emissions reduction with fair access to climate negotiations by
15 Transport & Environment, Why ICAO and CORSIA Cannot Deliver on Climate (T&E 2019)
https://www.transportenvironment.org/articles/why-icao-and-corsia-cannot-deliver-climate
16 Climate Action Tracker, ‘Aviation
Policies and Action’ (2024) https://climateactiontracker.org/sectors/aviation/policies-action 17 J Depledge, ‘Transparency and Accountability in Climate Governance’ (2020) Climate Policy 20(8) 1002.
18 European Commission, Reducing Emissions from Aviation (European Commission 2024)
https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/transport-decarbonisation/reducing-emissions-aviation_en
19 1 International Air Transport Association (IATA), Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) (IATA, 2025)
https://www.iata.org/en/programs/sustainability/sustainable-aviation-fuels/ underrepresented nations.
1.4 Reform Proposals and Legal Recommendations
Reducing the climate footprint of COP-related travel requires an integrated approach that combines technological innovation, regulatory reform, and equity-based policy design. The first priority should be to move beyond offsetting and ensure direct emission reductions within the aviation sector. This can be achieved through mandatory targets for airlines to improve fleet efficiency, adopt low-emission technologies, and increase the use of Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF). Governments and international bodies should support this transition by offering financial incentives, research funding, and blending mandates that make SAF production commercially viable and scalable. At the governance level, the UNFCCC and ICAO should jointly establish a framework for transparent accounting of travel emissions, with host nations required to publish independent audits of delegate transport footprints.
Such audits would improve credibility and allow benchmarking across conferences. Similarly, the CORSIA mechanism must be strengthened through stricter offset quality standards, independent verification, and greater participation from major emitting states. To address inequality, reforms should incorporate the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR). A global “Sustainable Participation Fund” could subsidise lowcarbon travel or offset costs for delegates from developing nations. Additionally, hosting regional pre-COP meetings or creating rotating COP hubs across continents could reduce longhaul travel while maintaining inclusive participation. Ultimately, aligning climate diplomacy with its own sustainability goals is essential to preserving its legitimacy.
Institutionalising these reforms would ensure that COPs exemplify the very decarbonisation commitments they advocate.
2. Venue Infrastructure and Energy Use
COP venues operate as high-energy ecosystems. Lighting, cooling, and digital infrastructure run continuously, making them major emission sources during each summit.20 At COP28 in
20 UNFCCC, COP26 Sustainability Report (2022) https://unfccc.int
Dubai, desert conditions made heavy air-conditioning unavoidable, relying mostly on natural gas from the national grid. The venue consumed the daily energy of a small town. In contrast, COP21 in Paris sought to lower its footprint through partial renewable sourcing and ISO 20121 standards for sustainable event management.21 While this reduced some impact, dependence on France’s fossil-based grid persisted. Venues built to advance sustainability remain among the largest temporary energy consumers, each day generating megawatt-hours of consumption and thousands of kilograms of carbon emissions.
2.1 Legal and Policy Frameworks
Several frameworks aim to improve event sustainability but remain voluntary. ISO 20121 sets standards for sustainable event management without penalties for non-compliance.22 LEED certification rates buildings for energy performance, yet COP venues are not required to comply. UNFCCC sustainability guidelines provide recommendations but lack binding force. In India, the Energy Conservation Building Code (ECBC) defines minimum efficiency standards for commercial structures, but enforcement remains weak and excludes temporary venues.23 The result is a system that promotes best practices without requiring them. If the spaces meant to plan climate action still rely on fossil energy, sustainability remains an unfinished goal.
2.2 Critical Evaluation
Across COPs, the same frameworks that promise sustainability enable greenwashing. Organisers depend on voluntary standards to appear compliant without verification. IISO
20121 and LEED credentials sound authoritative but lack mandatory audits. UNFCCC
guidelines encourage best practices without requiring enforcement. For instance, COP26 in Glasgow received ISO 20121 certification for event sustainability management. While it improved waste management and energy tracking, post-event 21 UNFCCC, COP21 Sustainability Report (2016) https://unfccc.int accessed 12 October 2025. 5 ISO, ISO 20121: Event Sustainability Management Systems (International Organization for Standardization 2012) https://www.iso.org accessed 14 October 2025. 6 ISO, ISO 20121: Event Sustainability Management Systems (International Organization for Standardization 2012) https://www.iso.org 22 ISO, ISO 20121: Event Sustainability Management Systems (International Organization for Standardization
2012) https://www.iso.org
23 6 ISO, ISO 20121: Event Sustainability Management Systems (International Organization for Standardization
2012) https://www.iso.org
assessments revealed limited independent verification and no mandatory reporting of carbon offsets. This shows that even certified events require stronger oversight to ensure that compliance leads to measurable environmental outcomes. This dynamic turns sustainability into a phenomenon experts call “sustainability theatre.” Venues display “carbon neutral” branding yet rely on fossil electricity and paper offsets. The issue is not the absence of standards but their unenforceable nature. Without binding mechanisms, hosts prioritise appearances over measurable impact. If negotiation halls depend on fossil energy, the legitimacy of those commitments weakens. Real progress requires enforceable regulation and verified results.
3. Accommodation and Hospitality
Outside the conference halls, hospitality and accommodation add another layer of emissions. Luxury hotels operate continuously, with lighting, air-conditioning, and kitchens running around the clock. Laundry services alone consume thousands of litres of water daily, making comfort energy-intensive. At COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, residents reported drops in water pressure as hotels filled pools and maintained constant laundry use. 24 In Paris, COP21 organisers encouraged delegates to choose green-certified hotels and local homestays, though few complied. Economic disparities also influence environmental impact: smaller delegations from developing countries often cannot afford official hotels and travel longer distances, reinforcing inequities even within the sustainability discourse. Regulation remains limited. The UNEP Guidelines on Sustainable Hospitality exist but remain non-binding.
No international rule compels hotels to meet efficiency standards. In India, the ECBC and Star Rating System apply to commercial buildings but are inconsistently enforced. Comfort for a few comes at the cost of high resource use and inequitable access. The sustainability message loses credibility when the very events promoting environmental responsibility rely on excess consumption. 24 The Guardian, ‘COP27: Local Residents Complain of Water Shortages as Delegates Flock to Hotels’ (The Guardian, 14 November 2022) https://www. theguardian. com/environment
3.1 Food Systems and Catering Practices
Food choices at COPs expose the gap between sustainability rhetoric and reality. At COP26 in Glasgow, organisers labelled each dish with its carbon footprint: a beef burger produced 3. 3 kilograms of carbon dioxide, while a vegan haggis generated 0. 6 kilograms. 25 Despite the data, high-emission meals remained on the menu. Delegates questioned why a summit devoted to climate action served beef and dairy products. At COP28 in Dubai, catering contracts included imported luxury foods and offered few plantbased options, prioritising comfort over sustainability. Most COPs import ingredients to meet international standards, increasing emissions from transport. Buffet-style catering leaves vast amounts of uneaten food, rarely composted or redistributed, wasting water, energy, and carbon. Existing frameworks recognise sustainable food practices but fail to enforce them.
The EU’s Green Public Procurement (GPP) rules and UNEP guidelines provide voluntary recommendations. India’s Food Safety and Standards Authority (FSSAI) regulates safety and waste but not emissions or sourcing. No binding rule requires local sourcing or waste reporting. Each COP repeats the same cycle: high-emission menus followed by sustainability claims. Food becomes symbolic rather than transformative.
3.2 Reform
Reform requires enforceable rules backed by legal accountability. Real progress depends on binding commitments and independent verification. First, ISO 20121 or an equivalent certification should be mandatory for all COP venues, including measurable standards for energy and water efficiency. Second, each summit must undergo independent sustainability audits assessing emissions, waste, and energy use, with publicly available reports. Third, delegate hotels should obtain eco-certification and publish verified sustainability data. Fourth, catering contracts must include plant-based meal quotas and daily food waste tracking. Fifth, reforms should ensure equity Global South delegates need financial support and access to affordable, sustainable lodging. Finally, sustainability obligations must be embedded in the UNFCCC framework.
Host nations should report compliance before and after each conference. This can be achieved by amending the UNFCCC
25 Sky News, ‘COP26 Menu Highlights Food Emissions’ (Sky News, 8 November 2021) https://news.sky.com
Host Country Agreement to make sustainability compliance a hosting condition. Monitoring through the UNFCCC’s transparency framework would ensure that sustainability reporting holds the same status as emission targets. True climate leadership begins in the spaces where commitments are made. When those spaces operate with accountability and clean energy, sustainability becomes more than rhetoric and becomes a global standard.
4 Waste & Materials
The Environmental Hypocrisy of Climate Conferences Climate conferences like the COPs are global symbols of sustainability yet ironically, they leave behind massive waste trails. These summits, often hailed as our last hope for the planet, temporarily transform host cities into sprawling "eco-villages" that generate more garbage in two weeks than some small towns do in a year.
4.1 Plastics
The Visible Waste Plastics form the most visible waste stream of climate conferences. COP26 in Glasgow (2021) generated approximately 141,510 kilograms of venue waste around 3. 7 kilograms per person with only 59 per cent recycled. 26 The remainder, primarily single-use plastics, was sent to landfill despite sustainability pledges. Plastic bottles, cutlery, and name badges remain ubiquitous at such summits, revealing the dependence on disposable convenience even at gatherings intended to promote environmental restraint. The Basel Convention’s 2019 Plastic Waste Amendments, effective from 1 January 2021, now require Prior Informed Consent for the transboundary movement of most mixed plastic waste. 27 Domestically, India’s Plastic Waste Management (Amendment) Rules 2022 prohibit identified single-use plastic products and establish Extended Producer Responsibility for packaging.
28 Yet these frameworks are seldom applied to international events such as COPs, which continue to showcase ‘green’ 26 UNFCCC, 'COP26 Sustainability Report' (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2021) 18. 27 Basel Convention Secretariat, 'Plastic Waste Amendments – Overview' (Basel Convention, adopted 2019, entered into force 1 January 2021).
28 Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (India), 'Plastic Waste Management (Amendment)
Rules 2022' (Government of India 2022). branding while generating tonnes of plastic refuse.
4.2 Banners, Carpets and Stalls
If plastics are the most visible pollutants, temporary event materials constitute the hidden bulk of waste. The COP26 Sustainability Report disclosed that approximately 10,341 tones of material, PVC carpets, polyester banners, modular stalls, and wooden stages were transported to the site. 29 Organisers claimed that 96 per cent of this material originated from reused stock, yet the scale of throughput demonstrates the inherent unsustainability of such temporary infrastructures. PVC and polyester are particularly challenging to recycle, often ending up in landfills or incineration plants. The ISO 20121 Sustainable Event Management Standard, revised in 2024, mandates audited disclosure of material and waste data to enhance accountability.
30 Judicial initiatives offer further guidance: in June 2025, the Kerala High Court prohibited single-use plastics at public events and directed the installation of water kiosks and reusable serviceware, citing constitutional duties to protect the environment. 31
4.3 Food Waste and E-Waste
Beyond plastics and infrastructure, food and electronic waste add quieter yet significant layers of pollution. At COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh (2022), lavish catering reportedly resulted in substantial quantities of discarded food, even as the event took place in a region grappling with food insecurity. 32 The Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that global food loss and waste generate up to 10 per cent of total greenhouse gas emissions. 33Meanwhile, translation headsets, routers, and audiovisual systems used at COPs are often replaced annually, contributing to growing electronic waste. India’s E-Waste (Management) Rules 2022 impose obligations on producers to ensure channelisation of e-waste to registered recyclers through an Extended Producer Responsibility framework.
34 However, no equivalent international instrument governs electronic waste generated by global summits, leaving this stream largely unmonitored. 29UNFCCC (n 1) 18–19. 30 International Organization for Standardization, 'ISO 20121: Sustainable Event Management – Requirements with Guidance for Use' (ISO 2024). 31 'Suo Motu v State of Kerala' (Ker HC 17 June 2025) (order banning single-use plastics at events and directing installation of water kiosks).
32 UNFCCC, 'COP27 Official Sustainability Report' (UNFCCC 2023).
33 Food and Agriculture Organization, 'Food Loss and Waste Factsheet' (FAO 2023).
34 Central Pollution Control Board (India), 'E-Waste (Management) Rules 2022
Guidelines' (CPCB 2022).
4.4 Legal and Policy Frameworks
Together, these waste streams expose a need for integrated regulation. Internationally, the Basel Convention and ISO 20121 establish frameworks for responsible material management. At the national level, India’s Plastic Waste Management and E-Waste Rules operationalize Extended Producer Responsibility for plastics and electronics, providing enforceable templates. Judicial activism, exemplified by the Kerala High Court’s 2025 decision, underscores that sustainable event management can be mandated as a legal duty rather than a voluntary pledge. For climate conferences to maintain credibility, sustainability must move from performance to practice: auditing, transparent reporting, and binding waste-prevention standards should form the baseline rather than the aspiration. The material story of climate summits can no longer be treated as incidental.
Plastics are the visible residue of convenience; banners, carpets and stalls form the unseen mass; and the digital layer, if left ungoverned, risks becoming the new frontier of waste. The good news is that the tools already exist: Basel’s PIC regime for plastic waste, national EPR systems for plastics and electronics, and an updated ISO scaffold for auditable event sustainability. The bad news is that these tools are too often optional or post-hoc. Conferences that set the world’s climate compass must first clean up their own material geography: measure it, avoid it, and disclose it. Only then will the world’s most visible sustainability rituals become credible acts.
5 The Indian involvement in COPs
A chance and a challenge.
The active engagement of India in the Conference of Parties (COPs) under the UNFCCC has had both systemic and strategic opportunities and challenges. Copps have also allowed India to consolidate its international profile and diplomatic bargaining on the opportunity side. Through its regular support of developmental vulnerabilities particularly associated with monsoon dependency, agriculture and energy transitions, India has taken the advantage of these international forums to emphasize on the internal challenges of development. This way of negotiations helps India to express its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and the claims of climate justice in the international arena.35
35 India’s Approach and Position on Climate Change Governance (Maritime India,
2024) https://maritimeindia.org/indias-approach-and-position-on-climate-change-governance/ accessed 14 October 2025.
Second is in access to finance, technology transfer and capacity building. Green Climate Fund and Technology Mechanism are some of the mechanisms of the COP that allow developing countries to request financial and technological aid. Even the progressive domestic policy in India, like the growth of renewable energy and the new environmental policy, can be used to benefit India to strengthen its credibility and increase its eligibility to this kind of international assistance. Moreover, the COP participation of India helps in the domestic signaling and norm diffusion. The high profile world conferences are the drivers of national awareness which has enhanced political will and stimulated subnational governments to implement measures that are climatefriendly. This participation is also one way of being a docket of Indian leadership in the Global South.
Likewise, cross country dialogue when learning and benchmarking during COPs is used to give India a chance at perfecting its domestic environmental and regulatory frameworks by adopting best practices in climate change adaptation and mitigation. These advantages notwithstanding, there are still more important limitations. Massive involvement costs a significant amount of resources and logistics because India will have to spend money on the travel, accommodation, and infrastructure of large groups. To hold such events in the country means it comes with huge costs on security, transport, translation, and hospitality. Ironically, the environmental footprint of these conferences is also quite big, considering the emissions and waste produced by international travel and event organization.
Another challenge that India experiences is that the institutional capacity is not homogenous in its states and thus implementing the commitments made as a result of COPs uniformly is not easily achievable. Whereas policy statements can be grandiose, the absence of implementation, and bureaucratic sluggishness are usually detrimental to development. Sustainable hosting is further complicated by the local ecological limitations of the prospective host cities, including water shortage, and energy deficit. Lastly, the international environmental obligation versus the national developmental requirements often leads to the equity and justice dilemma particularly in areas like coal, heavy industry and agriculture.
36 Therefore, as long as India continues to reach out to COPs, the country improves its position globally, however, converting the pledges into actual results at home is quite a challenge. 36Brief Summary of ECBC | New & Renewable Energy Department India https://hareda. gov. in/brief-summaryof-ecbc/
5.1 Legal and Policy Frameworks of any country
Sustainable Conferencing Foundations.
The policy architecture of environmental and climate of India offers a good legal basis of advancing sustainability and hosting sustainable conferences. The next important tools reflect domestic structures that meet the goals of sustainable conferencing.
5.1.1 Energy Conservation Building Code (ECBC).
Section 14(p) of the Energy Conservation Act, 2001 gives the Central Government the authority to develop energy conservation requirements of buildings and its parts (the building and its components, respectively).37 This is the Energy Conservation Building Code (ECBC), first published in 2007 with an updated edible version being released in 2017. The most recent includes ECBC+ and Super-ECBC levels which promote greater efficiency by integrating renewables and allowing a flexible approach to compliance.38 Implementation of ECBC has however been haphazard. Notifying and implementing the Code has not been undertaken by many of the states and compliance at the local level is also very low since this would have been an ideal way of demonstrating at the domestic level how well the country can be safe in terms of energy use and carbon footprint.39
5.1.2 Plastic Waste and Single-Use Plastic Ban (2022).
The Plastic Waste Management (Amendment) Rules, 2021 and 2022 represent a significant policy difference with the introduction of banned single-use plastic (SUP) items starting 1 July
202240 and the introduction of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) of plastic packaging.
Although this has been the ambition, enforcement has been inconsistent and illegitimate trade in prohibited goods has persisted in the small towns and informal sectors.41 Critics observe that downstream users, especially small vendors, are disproportionately affected, and there are few 37India - Energy Conservation Building Code (ECBC) Global Buildings Performance Network https://library.gbpn.org/library/bc-detail-pages/india 38Srinivas S and others (eds), Implementing Energy Efficiency in Buildings (2015) https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/migration/in/ICEEB-2015_Compendium.pdf#page=67
39 NITI Aayog and others, “ROADMAP TO FAST TRACK ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
ENERGY CONSERVATION BUILDING CODE (ECBC) AT THE URBAN AND LOCAL LEVEL” (2017) https://www. niti. gov. in/sites/default/files/2025-07/Roadmap-to-Fast-Track-Adoption-and-Implementation-of- Energy-Conservation-Building-Code-ECBC-at-the-Urban-and-Local-levels. pdf? \ 40 Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, “Ban on Single Use Plastic in India: Step towards Clean India, Green India” (2022) https://static. pib. gov. in/WriteReadData/specificdocs/documents/2022/jul/doc20227169001. pdf 41 Parkinson L, “Update: India’s Ban on Single-Use Plastic Items | Food Packaging Forum” Food Packaging Forum (August 24, 2021) https://foodpackagingforum. org/news/update-indias-ban-on-single-use-plastic-items? options available besides plastics that would be affordable and legal to use in such events.
As an example, sustainable conferences may require biodegradable substances, good segregation, and certified disposal routes which are consistent with the national objectives of the environment. 42
5.1.3 The E-Waste (Management) Rules, 2022
On 1 April 2023, the new framework, the E-Waste (Management) Rules, 2022, which replaces the 2016 framework, was implemented, with the new rules extending the scope of e-waste regulation to cover such products as solar photovoltaic modules and printed circuit boards, with annual recycling targets on producers under the EPR mechanism.43 The informal recycling industry of India is however very problematic. Failure to integrate formal and informal systems, inadequate infrastructure, and legal ambiguities (particularly on certificate price limits) have hampered proper implementation. 10 Making sure that major conferences dispose of e-waste appropriately, through cooperation with accredited recyclers, can match the operations of events to legal requirements. 44
5.1.4 Food Waste, FSSAI Guidelines, and Solid Waste Management
Although there is no single national legislation in India that deals with food waste, the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) and the Solid Waste Management Rules (2016, 2018, 2021), have structures that, in a combination, refer to food and organic waste. They consist of the requirements to segregate sources, compost and convert waste to energy. 45 In the sphere of conferences, the organizers are advised to implement the policy of zero food waste, such as food donation and composting of waste on site. These practices are not only in line with the municipal waste policies but also a good example of sustainable conduct to set to the institutional meetings. 46 42 Ban on Single-Use Plastics in India https://www. cseindia. org/ban-on-single-use-plastics-in-india-11834?
43 Srivastava S and Sharma S, “E-Waste (Management) Rules, 2022 - An Analysis” (Lexology, January 19, 2023) https://www. lexology. com/library/detail. aspx? g=6f2172e8-da11-40c6-a08b-47dcda1a7a4a& 44 Jay Vyas, “Exposing Inequity & Injustice of India’s Single-Use Plastic Ban” Down to Earth (April 9, 2024) https://www. downtoearth. org. in/waste/exposing-inequity-injustice-of-india-s-single-use-plastic-ban-95476? 45 Strengthening E-Waste Management in India: New Regulations and CPCB Oversight | Blog | IndianNexus (Indian Nexus) https://www. indiannexus. com/blog/strengthening-e-waste-management-in-india-newregulations-and-cpcb-oversight? 46 “E-Waste Management Rules 2022: Issues and Solution for Environmental Protection,” vol 6 (2024) journalarticle https://www. ijfmr. com/papers/2024/1/13177. pdf? \
5.1.5 Supporting Frameworks and Climate Policies
The broader frameworks that supplement these sectoral regulations are the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) which was introduced in 2008 and integrates missions on sustainable habitats, renewable energy and water efficiency. The new NDCs of India (2022) also undertake a reduction in the intensity of emissions as well as an increase in the potential of non-fossil fuels.47 They all combine and support domestic alignment of India with international goals of sustainability and offer a policy support on hosting environmentally friendly conferences.
5.2 Case Study
World Sustainable Development Summit (WSDS) by TERI The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), through the World Sustainable Development Summit (WSDS) which is an annual event, is the best domestic model of sustainable conferencing. The 2025 version, which has the theme of Partnerships to Accelerate Sustainable Development and Climate Solutions, is an event whereby global and national stakeholders will hold a discussion to address urgent environmental matters. 48 WSDS is a policy interface to the global climate forums and a green event management laboratory. Its meetings focus on lowcarbon effects, waste management, and sustainable infrastructure.
The summit held in India will not only decrease the number of travel emissions of domestic representatives but will also enable local facilities to show that they are ECBC-compliant, plastic waste free, and environmentally responsible in their waste. Smaller in size than the COP, WSDS demonstrates how the principles of sustainable conferencing may be incorporated into the a national events culture, providing an example of lessons that may be learnt by larger international conferences.
4. Achieving Sustainable Conferencing in India is challenging because of the following
reasons. Although there are progressive laws, there still are a few loopholes in implementation. The cost of hosting a large scale environmental conference is high in both financial and carbon terms in India where there would be large energy and water consumption. Cities such as Delhi have problems of water shortage and air quality, increasing sustainability concerns. ECBC is not 47 Sharma S and Sharma S, “India’s Climate Change Policy: Challenges and Recommendation” (Indian School of Public Policy -, May 21, 2024) https://www.ispp.org.in/indias-climate-change-policy-challenges-andrecommendations/?
48 “World Sustainable Development Summit - WSDS 2025” https://wsds.teriin.org/2025/?
always able to comply with the requirements of venues, and waste management systems are not developed. The necessity of the coordination of several authorities, including municipal, state, and central, also makes implementation more complicated. The mechanisms of monitoring and accountability are also very poor, with carbon accounting and environmental audit not being mostly required after a conference. More so there are equity trade-offs surrounding the issue when sustainability is raised at the expense of the smaller NGOs or youth involved. Lastly, the implementation of the green event protocols may be undermined or slowed down by bureaucracies and political interests. Policy change as an outcome of Environmental Conferences. In spite of these limitations, environmental conferences hold a huge potential in aiding the domestic policy reform in India.
First, they influence the agendas through pushing the environmental issues to mainstream politics. COP commitments have in the past led to national initiatives like revised NDCs or strengthened waste management policies. Second, it has a peer pressure effect on India to meet international standards in sustainable practices. Third, they facilitate institutional learning whereby officials engage with their global counterparts thereby increasing the future capacity to govern the environment. Legal and regulatory innovation is also a result of conferences because they push governments to reform building codes and procurement standards and waste regulations. Moreover, they mobilise the civil society and the private sector and create partnership and commitments that go beyond the conference itself.
With proper monitoring, such interactions would be able to bring global norms into the real environment in the country.
6. Legal Framework
under International Environmental Law Addressing the concerns highlighted above requires an understanding of the legal frameworks that regulate state conduct, diplomatic privileges, and accountability in climate governance. Regimes under international environmental law, diplomatic law, aviation regulation that shape the legal architecture surrounding the organization and environmental impact of climate conferences such as the COP are discussed below. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), established in 1992, legally mandates countries to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations at levels preventing harmful interference with the climate system.
The Kyoto Protocol introduced binding emission targets for industrialized nations, while the Paris Agreement (COP21) moved toward nationally determined contributions (NDCs) guided by principles of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities. 49 The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997 and entering into force in 2005, operationalized the UNFCCC by introducing legally binding emission reduction targets for developed (Annex I) countries. It established market-based mechanisms such as emissions trading, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and Joint Implementation (JI), enabling flexibility in achieving national targets while promoting sustainable development in developing countries.
50 The Paris Agreement, adopted at COP21 in 2015, marked a shift from the rigid, top-down targets of Kyoto to a system of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), through which all parties developed and developing countries commit to climate action according to their national capabilities and circumstances. It emphasizes global temperature goals, climate finance, technology transfer, and transparency frameworks to monitor progress. 51 Each COP meeting, as the supreme decision-making body under Article 7 of the UNFCCC, advances legal and regulatory agendas including adaptation funds, loss and damage frameworks, and review mechanisms. 52 Though these laws create obligations on states, there is no specific legal framework regulating the environmental cost of hosting COP meetings.
Instead, the UNFCCC Secretariat encourages actions to offset the carbon footprint of conferences such as funding reforestation projects, using renewable energy for venues, and promoting hybrid participation. 53 These sustainability measures, however, are advisory rather than mandatory.
6.1 Immunity and Movement
The Primacy of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) of 1961 is the foundational treaty 49 Paris Agreement (2015) https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf accessed 14 October 2025.
50 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 11 December
1997, entered into force 16 February 2005) 2303 UNTS 148.
51 Paris Agreement (adopted 12 December 2015, entered into force 4 November 2016) 3156 UNTS 3.
52 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 21
March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107, art 7.
53 UNFCCC, ‘Warsaw Climate Change Conference’
https://unfccc.int/process/conferences/pastconferences/warsaw-climate-change-conference-november- 2013/statements-and-resources/7 accessed 14 October 2025. governing diplomatic missions.54 It guarantees the effective functionality of diplomatic missions by granting diplomatic agents’ freedom of movement and immunity from the jurisdiction of the receiving State. This protection ensures uninterrupted international negotiation and communication, which is vital for complex, multi-lateral conferences like the COP.
This legal framework provides an effective pre-emption of national environmental controls. A host country cannot unilaterally impose regulatory measures that restrict the movement or means of transport used by accredited diplomatic agents for official purposes. While the VCDR permits a receiving State to require that the size of a mission be kept within "reasonable and normal" limits 55 , it generally prevents the host from imposing climate-based restrictions such as high carbon taxes or bans on certain high-emission vehicles on diplomatic agents. Thus, if a climate negotiation host were to impose a national environmental restriction that significantly impedes the travel of official delegates, it would risk being seen as incompatible with VCDR principles.
6.2 Exemption in International Aviation Regulation (ICAO/CORSIA)
Emissions from international aviation are primarily managed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a specialized UN agency. ICAO developed the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) to stabilize net emissions from the sector. CORSIA mandates monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) requirements for all international civil flights.56 However, a critical exemption exists for "State flights." In accordance with Article 3(b) of the Chicago Convention, State flights are defined as aircraft used in military, customs, and police services.57 Flights carrying diplomatic delegations on official government business, especially those involving high-level government officials and heads of state often fall under this
54 United Nations, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961)
https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf accessed 14 October 2025.
55 United Nations, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’ (1961) 55 The American Journal of
International Law 1064 https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf. 56 International Council on Clean Transportation, ‘ICAO’s CORSIA Scheme Provides a Weak Nudge for In- Sector Carbon Reductions’ (6 August 2018) https://theicct.org/icaos-corsia-scheme-provides-a-weak-nudge-forin-sector-carbon-reductions/ accessed 14 October 2025.
57 IATA, ‘An Airline Handbook on CORSIA’ (2019)
https://www. iata. org/contentassets/fb745460050c48089597a3ef1b9fe7a8/corsia-handbook. pdf accessed 14 October 2025. sovereign exclusion. These flights are explicitly exempt from CORSIA’s mandatory MRV and offsetting requirements. This exemption is profoundly problematic, as it directly impacts the most carbon-intensive segment of diplomatic travel. Analysis indicates that the use of private jets by high-level delegates constitutes the "least fuel-efficient and most carbon-intensive mode of transport" and exemplifies "carbon inequality". These State flights are excluded from ICAO’s regulated accounting, hence their emissions are often estimated or even underreported, compromising the integrity of the official COP footprint calculation.
Conclusion The paradox of the Conference of the Parties (COPs) lies at the heart of global climate diplomacy: events designed to curb greenhouse gas emissions often generate vast quantities of them. From aviation and accommodation to venue energy use and waste generation, COPs embody a troubling contradiction between climate ambition and operational reality. The carbon footprint of these summits often exceeding 100,000 tonnes of CO2 highlights how the practice of diplomacy itself remains environmentally unsustainable. While the UNFCCC’s Sustainability Guidelines and voluntary frameworks like ISO 20121 and CORSIA attempt to promote greener logistics, their non-binding nature renders them largely symbolic.
They encourage accountability without mandating it, resulting in what many scholars call “sustainability theatre” a performance of environmental responsibility that lacks enforceable substance. As a result, climate conferences risk undermining both their moral legitimacy and scientific credibility if they fail to practice what they preach. Legally, the problem is compounded by structural exemptions: diplomatic immunities under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) and state-flight exemptions under ICAO’s Chicago Convention prevent the imposition of strict environmental controls on delegates and official travel. This means that the most polluting aspects of climate diplomacy private jets, luxury accommodations, and energy-intensive venues often remain outside the reach of regulation or accountability.
To reconcile this contradiction, the future of climate diplomacy must rest on binding, transparent, and equitable sustainability standards. Reforms could include:
Mandatory sustainability audits for all COPs, verified by independent bodies. • Integration of ISO 20121 compliance into the UNFCCC Host Country Agreement as a precondition for hosting. • Strengthening CORSIA through universal participation, higher offset standards, and direct decarbonization targets. • Creating a Sustainable Participation Fund to ensure equity and accessibility for delegates from developing nations. • Promoting hybrid and regional COP formats to reduce long-haul travel emissions. Ultimately, the success of global climate governance depends not only on the commitments made at COPs but also on how those commitments are made. If the institutions leading the world’s climate response cannot embody sustainability in their own operations, they risk eroding the credibility of the very agenda they champion.
For COPs to truly lead the global transition toward sustainability, they must transform from high-emission negotiations into lowcarbon exemplars of the future they seek to create.