The Indian Constitution In Relation To The Anti- Defection Law

Author: LawSphereX

Category: Constitutional & Human Rights

Published: 2026-08-23T21:22:31.885159+00:00

Updated: 2026-08-26T17:05:40.827+00:00

THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION IN RELATION TO THE ANTI-

DEFECTION LAW

Pratigya Kumari, B.A. LL.B., KIIT School of Law, Bhubaneshwar, Odisha

ABSTRACT

Although anti-defection laws have been adopted by a significant number of States in recent decades, little attention has been paid by the literature on party unity in democratic legislatures to comprehending the circumstances that give rise to the adoption of such restrictive measures on elected deputies’ mobility. The issue of party loyalty and floor-crossing has been a longstanding concern in India’s political landscape as well. In response to this, the Indian government has introduced the Anti-Defection Law, which aims to curb the practice of legislators switching allegiances for personal or political gain. The Anti-Defection Law in India, enacted in 1985 through the 52nd Amendment to the Constitution, aims to curb political defections and maintain the stability of parliamentary democracy.

This research paper examines the law’s historical context, its key provisions, and its impact on political behaviour and party dynamics. Political defections continue despite the law’s intended prevention of opportunistic moves by elected representatives, casting doubt on its effectiveness. The study examines a number of defection-influencing issues, such as political corruption and the attraction of ministerial positions, and it also evaluates criticisms of the way it restricts dissent and legislative independence. Incidents of defections after the introduction of the Tenth Schedule through the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act have also been discussed after going through several case reports. Incidents of defections after the introduction of the Tenth Schedule through the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act have also been discussed after going through several case reports.

Secondary sources such as books, blogs, news reports, research articles and journals have been used to draw up conclusions for this paper. Keywords: Anti-defection, Tenth Schedule, Constitution, Elected Representatives

INTRODUCTION

The dictionary definition of the term defection suggests that the word originated from the Latin word "defectio," which means "an act of abandonment of a person or a cause to which such a person is bound by reasons of allegiance or duty, or to which he has fully attached himself. " It also indicates revolt, dissent, and rebellion by a person or a party. Defection, therefore, refers to the process of giving up one thing and withdrawing from a cause, party, or program. When someone completes the process because they have abandoned a cause, a relationship, or a program, they are referred to as defectors. Thus, defection is the act of someone giving up or renouncing their commitment or allegiance.

1 This phenomenon is commonly referred to as "floor crossing," and it originated in the British House of Commons when an elected official would switch sides and cross the floor, going from the government to the opposition or vice versa. In a House of Parliament, political parties are assigned seats and sides. When any member of Parliament switches his political party, he changes his position, physically crossing the floor to move to the other side of the chamber, hence the phrase "crossing the floor. " The phenomenon of defections has not spared Indian politics; in fact, the history of defections in India dates back to the Central Legislature era, when the late Shri Shyam Lal Nehru, a member of that body, switched his allegiance from the Congress Party to the British side.

To cite another example, in 1937, Shri Hafiz Mohammed Ibrabim, who was elected to the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly on the Muslim League ticket, defected to the Congress. In the final years of the 1960s, the phenomenon of changing political parties for non-ideological reasons engulfed Indian governance. 2 Before 1962, there was a majority of Congress-ruled states. The1960s witnessed the rise of other political parties, marking the beginning of coalition era. Congress started losing its majority and required help from other parties. MLAs from the Congress started joining these smaller political parties and several others from these smaller parties joined Congress. This had a huge impact on the stability of the government; leading to criminalisation in politics and increase in corrupt practices. In February 1967, when the general elections took place, mass

1 G.C. MALHOTRA, ANTI-DEFECTION LAW IN INDIA AND THE COMMONWEALTH 3 (11th ed. 2005).

2 Sumit Vashishtha & Dr. Bhoomanna Reddy, A Critical Analysis of Anti-Defection Laws in India, 9 IJLS 70, 71 (2023).

defection was witnessed. Approximately 550/ 3500 members elected to legislative assemblies were defected from their parent parties, and some politicians crossed the floor more than once. Gaya Lal, an MLA from Haryana is a prime example of this. He had switched between United Front and Congress four times over a span of mere fifteen days. 3 This incident is the reason behind the famous saying “Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram”, often used in the context of defections. After the general elections, Congress formed the government at the Centre. However, its majority in the Lok Sabha decreased to 283 from 361. It lost control of seven state governments during the year due to MLAs switching political allegiances. The Y. B. Chavan Committee was established as the nation’s first line of response against defection. The then Home Minister, Y. B. Chavan, headed the committee.

The panel suggested prohibiting legislators who defected from holding ministerial positions for a year, or until they were able to secure their own reelection. Additionally, it recommended a smaller Council of Ministers for the federal government as well as the states. The committee supported political parties cooperating to develop a code of conduct that would effectively tackle disruptions. 4 Following the Fourth General Elections, in the brief time between March 1967 and February 1968, the Indian political scene was marked by multiple instances of legislators in several States switching parties, according to the Chavan Committee Report (1969). In just these 12 months, there were at least 438 defections out of the approximately 542 incidents that happened during the two decades between the First and the Fourth General Elections.

During this time, 157 of the 376 elected Independents joined different parties. The fact that 116 of the 210 legislators from different States who defected were included in the Councils of Ministers, demonstrated clearly that the allure of office played a significant role in their decisions to do so. 5 Despite the committee’s report, no substantial law was made to tackle the scourge of political defection. 3Vibhor Relhan, The Anti-Defection Law Explained,

THE

PRS

BLOG

(Dec. 6, 2017), https://prsindia.org/theprsblog/the-anti-defection-law-explained.

4 Chakshu Roy, Explained: In Maharashtra Drama, The Key Legal Provision- Anti-Defection Law, THE PRS

BLOG (Nov. 24, 2019), https://prsindia.org/articles-by-prs-team/explained-in-maharashtra-drama-the-key-legalprovision-%E2%80%94-anti-defection-law.

5 MALHOTRA, supra note 1, at 5.

In 1973, Indira Gandhi’s Home Minister Uma Shankar Dikshit made a legislative attempt to find a solution to political defections, but to no avail. In 1977, the first ever national non- Congress government led by Morarji Desai was formed. Shanti Bhushan, Minister for Law and Justice in the Janata Party of Morarji Desai made the second attempt but he too failed. 6 This government was driven out of power due to the defection of six parliamentarians. Following his party’s overwhelming victory in the 1984 general elections, Rajiv Gandhi introduced the anti-defection bill in Parliament. He emphasized that the bill was essential for "cleaning our public life" and maintaining political stability. 7 The bill was debated extensively and received unanimous approval from both houses of Parliament, reflecting a collective recognition of the need for reform.

“It is better for us to tread cautiously than to make serious errors and repent for them later... We have been waiting seven years to have this Bill and a lot of damage has been done. This Bill should have come yesterday, it should have come last year, it should have come seven years ago... This Bill is the first step towards cleaning our public life. ”8 -Rajiv Gandhi

ANTI-DEFECTION LAWS AROUND THE WORLD

Different names for the phenomenon of legislators defecting or changing parties—such as "floor-crossing," "carpet-crossing," "party-hopping," "dispute," and "waka-jumping"—are used in different regions of the Commonwealth. Defections have occasionally put the very stability of the government in jeopardy in certain nations, while in others they are not a concern at all. Each nation has its own way of dealing with such defections in State politics. Consequently, although some nations handle defections through established conventions, customs, and legislative norms and processes, others have created laws and regulations to address the issue.9

6 Roy, supra note 4.

7 Anti-Defection Law (India), WIKIPEDIA (Sept. 10, 2024, 12:10 PM), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antidefection_law_(India). 8 Abhishek Dey, India’s Anti-Defection Law Didn’t Stop Power Politics. It Just Moved from Farmhouse to Resort, THE PRINT, (July 17, 2022, 10:38 AM), https://theprint.in/past-forward/indias-anti-defection-law-didnt-stoppower-politics-it-just-moved-from-farmhouse-to-resort/1041656/.

9 MALHOTRA, supra note 1, at 15.

The United Kingdom, one of the 17 Parliaments, does not have any law to deal with defections. It does not bar its members from changing their party affiliations. The defecting member is not even required to resign from his office. Conventions govern seating in the House of Commons. When a member defects, he is seated separately from party members. One of the prominent Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom, Winston Churchill’s political career was marked by repeated instances of floor crossing. At first, he was a part of the Conservative Party but shifted to the Liberal Party in 1904. He remained a Liberal from 1904 to 1922, when he contested the elections. Similarly in Australia and Canada, there are no prohibition-legal or constitutionalagainst the practice of defection.

10 The relevant statute, which was approved by the Bangladeshi Parliament in 1980, stipulates, among other things, that a member of Parliament must resign from the political party he ran for office in order to keep his seat. The law in Belize, which went into effect in January 2001, states that crossing the floor results in one’s termination as a member. 11 Following the election and formation of a coalition government in 1999, the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act 2001 was approved in New Zealand, where floor- crossing is known as "waka-jumping". The Act became effective on December 22, 2001. According to this Act, a member’s seat in Parliament becomes vacant, among other things, if he no longer holds a parliamentary position with the political party for which he was elected. Being a transitory law, it automatically expired in 2005, when the general elections were scheduled.

In Pakistan as well, there is a law against defection where there have been several instances of the same. Article 63A of Pakistan’s Constitution specifies the reasons for defection for which a member of a House’s parliamentary party may be removed from office. Article 63 A of the Pakistani Constitution also states, inter alia, that a member of a parliamentary party will be disqualified if he votes in the House against any directives issued by the party in question regarding the election of the Prime Minister or the Chief Minister, a Vote of Confidence or No-Confidence, or a Money Bill. This provision is very similar to the provision specified in the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India. 12 According to Article 99(13) of the Constitution of Sri Lanka, a member loses their seat in the Legislature after one month has passed since they ceased to be a member of their political party

10 Id. at 16.

11 Id. at 17.

12 Id. at 18.

or independent group, whether through resignation, expulsion, or other means.13

TENTH SCHEDULE AND ITS APPLICATION

Article 101 to 104 are mentioned under the heading Disqualifications of Members in the Constitution of India. Under Article 102(2), a person will be disqualified from being a member of Parliament if he is disqualified under the Tenth Schedule. The Tenth Schedule basically lays down the following rules:

1. Disqualification Criteria: Para 2 states that a Member of Parliament (MP) or Member

of Legislative Assembly (MLA) is disqualified under specific conditions: • Voluntary resignation from their party affiliation. • Voting against or abstaining from voting contrary to any direction issued by their party without prior permission. 14 In 1998, a case emerged from Bihar where internal conflicts within the ruling party led to dissent among its members. Mahachandra Prasad Singh, a member of the Legislative Council of Bihar was involved in a faction that sought to change the leadership of the then Chief Minister. Disqualification proceedings were initiated by the Chairman of the Bihar Legislative Council against Singh and other members, based on allegations of defection. It was claimed that these members had voluntarily resigned from their party or acted against their party whip.

Singh contended that he had not done so and that the procedures that were being followed were flawed. The Supreme Court was faced with the challenge to determine what constituted “voluntarily giving up” party membership. 15 The Supreme Court held that the conclusion reached by the Legislative Council Chairman—that he renounced his membership in the party to which he belonged—could not have been reached in a reasonable or possible manner. 16

2. Procedure for Disqualification: If any member is deemed to have defected under

paragraph 2(1)(b) of the Schedule, they can be disqualified upon decision by the Speaker or Chairman of the House concerned. This is provided in Para 6 of the

13 Id.

14 INDIA CONST. Tenth Schedule para 2.

15 Mahachandra Prasad Singh v. Chairman, Bihar Legislative Council, (2004) 8 S.C.C. 747.

16 M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 63 (8th ed. 2018).

Schedule. Para 7 initially barred judicial review of disqualification cases stating that no Court shall have any jurisdiction over matters of defection of a Member of Parliament.17 It was contradictory to the power of judicial review conferred upon the High Courts and the Supreme Court.18 This was later deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992).

3. Exceptions and Exemptions: There are provisions allowing certain exceptions,

particularly regarding mergers and splits. This rule is set down in Para 3 of the Tenth Schedule. When a split happens, at least one-third of the members need to decide whether they want to quit or break away. However, in case of a merger, the decision needs to be made by not less than two-thirds of the party members. Para 3 was intended to allow some flexibility for party members to realign without facing disqualification. The 91st Amendment Act of 2003 removed Paragraph 3 from the Tenth Schedule. This amendment was enacted to tighten the provisions of the Anti-Defection Law and eliminate loopholes that allowed for opportunistic behaviour among legislators. The removal meant that splits no longer provided protection against disqualification, thereby reinforcing party discipline. The Supreme Court interpreted paragraph 3 in Rajendra Singh Rana v.

Swami Prasad Maurya (above) to hold that the Tenth Schedule’s scheme of Articles 102 and 191 does not permit the question of split or merger to be determined independently from a motion before the Speaker seeking the disqualification of a member or members in question, nor does the Speaker have the authority to determine whether a political party has split or merged as contemplated by paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. However, loopholes exist, and abuses have been reported, leading to recommendations for further reforms.

PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVATIONS BEHIND POLITICAL DEFECTION

Political defection, or switching political parties, is a complex phenomenon that is driven by a range of psychological factors. Understanding these rationales sheds light on why politicians

17 CONST., supra note 14.

18 JAIN, supra note 16

sometimes choose to cross the floor, often with grave consequences for the integrity of democracy and for political order. Some of the key psychological motivations for political defection are stated below.

1. Self-Interest and Opportunism: Motivations of personal gain, such as pursuit of

power, financial benefits, or better career opportunities are enough of persuade the members of Parliament to carry out defection. In some cases, as soon as the polticians come to know that their parent party is losing support, they switch to another political party because they anticipate greater success there.19 This self-serving behaviour often reflects a lack of commitment to ideological principles.

2. Desire for Autonomy: A handful of others make the switch looking to gain even more

political freedom. Party leaders or the internal politics involved may stifle their beliefs, leading them to search for a climate in which they can operate on their own accord or alongside people who share their morals or belief system. This aspiration can be cast in moral terms; defectors believe they are maintaining correct democratic values, abandoning parties that misrepresent their principles.

3. Response to internal party dynamics: Factors such as factionalism, lack of transparency,

arbitrary decision-making by a party’s apparatchiks, etc. make members defect. The structures of a party that are perceived as undemocratic or dominated by one leader make other members feel insecure about their political futures and therefore may opt out for parties that can offer stability and openings for them.

4. Social norms and peer influence: Peer’s behaviour also influences defections. A

politician may feel compelled to defect if he can see others defecting and getting away with it. Social proof that might reduce the perceived risks associated with defection and make such acts appear to be acceptable within the political spectrum.

5. Fear of Political Repercussions: Politicians may defect in fear of political raids or

investigations by the powers that be. The fear of losing the spotlight can make them switch as a means of self-protection from potential backlash.

19 The Menace of Political Defections, DECCAN HERALD, Feb. 12, 2024.

6. Ideological Alignment: Though most of the defections are for opportunistic means,

some are induced for serious ideological changes. Politicians may feel that their beliefs no longer match the party to which they originally belonged and start looking for parties who better reflect their values. This motivation may be posed as a matter of principle for democracy and justice.

IMPACT

Anti-defection law was introduced through the 52nd Amendment of the Constitution of India in the year 1985 to eradicate horse trading or switching parties by the elected person. Now, numerous consequences are seen both as negative and positive. Positive Impacts

1. Stability in Governance: It provides for a more stable government by checking the

propensity of legislators to change parties. When politicians choose to switch parties, it leads to an unrest in the political scenario. Continuous leaving and joining of parties may lead to ambiguity. Suppose, the total number of seats in a House of Parliament is

100. A political party A wins with 67 seats. Another party B attains the rest 33 seats.

Now, B decides to buy 20 MPs of A. So, B has 53 seats while A remains with 47 seats. B achieves the majority mark. Hence, there is a political uncertainty regarding which

party will form the government. This also plays with the sentiments of the people who cast their votes and elect their representatives by believing in their political ideology.

2. Party Discipline: The first moral concern that inevitably comes to the mind in cases of

defection is whether the person is loyal to his people being represented or not if they do not prove loyal to their political party. The law pushing disqualification for defection encourages party loyalty among legislators, maintaining party cohesion and discipline through not straying away from electing representatives that are in tune with the agenda of a political party.

3. Reduction in Corruption: Anti-defection law tries to curb corruption and develop a

cleaner political environment by preventing lawmakers from being induced by the prospect of material gains or office sureties. When there are cases of political defections, they are always characterized by quid pro quo deals, whereby legislative

members are promised ministerial positions or material inducements for their loyalty. It is in such a system that political allegiance becomes a commodity that can be bought and sold, which further goes against democratic institutions. For example, during times of political uncertainty, legislators are willing to switch sides with promises from both the party and the opposition parties. In times of defection, irregular elections take place to decide upon which party will form the government. The costs or non-developmental spending of these elections are from the taxes paid by the citizens. The citizens are the real victims. Hence, there is a need for these anti-defection laws to curb such corruption.

4. Recognition to political parties: Political parties were not mentioned under the

Constitution before the 52nd Amendment. They were thus formally introduced into the terminology with this amendment, recognizing parties as integral parts of India’s democratic framework. This recognition underscored the importance that political parties play in citizen representation and in governance overall. Negative Impacts

1. Erosion of Legislative Independence: Critics argue that it restricts legislators’ ability

to act according to their conscience or constituents’ interests, effectively turning them into mere agents of their parties. The fundamental responsibility of an MP is to study and decide on bills, budgets, and policy; if they are not allowed to make their own decisions, then what would be the motivation to study the various policy options and their effects? An MP would essentially become a voting machine for the party, counting on them to support or oppose any vote.20

2. Exploitation of Loopholes: Instances have been reported where political parties

exploit provisions related to mergers and splits, leading to unethical practices that undermine the law’s intent. In 2019, several MLAs from the Goa Legislative Assembly switched parties, with some defecting from the Congress to the BJP. The anti-defection provisions were circumvented as some legislators did not formally resign but instead abstained from voting during critical moments, leading to government changes without

20 Madhavan, supra note 26.

triggering disqualification proceedings. This situation illustrated how loopholes in the law could be exploited to undermine party loyalty.21

3. Partisan Decision-Making: The role of the Presiding Officer in adjudicating defection

cases has raised concerns about potential biases and lack of impartiality. The Speaker is many times part of the political party in question. Another criticism on this is that he may not have the required legal knowledge and experience to adjudicate on these cases. In fact, two Speakers of the Lok Sabha, Rabi Ray (1991) and Shivraj Patil (1993), have acknowledged their own reservations about their qualifications to decide instances involving defections. Speaker Shivraj Patil stated, “The advantages in giving these cases to the judiciary are many. The Speaker or the Chairman may or may not be endowed with legal acumen and proficiency in law. It is more apt to have the cases decided by the Supreme Court or high court judges”.22

4. Violation of freedom of speech and expression: Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian

Constitution guarantees the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. The anti-defection law is said to violate this fundamental right. The Supreme Court ruled that these provisions did not violate the fundamental rights of legislators. It also stated that in the greater national interest, freedom of speech can be curtailed.23 It was argued that freedom of expression, conscience, and dissent are all incompatible with the anti-defection law. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the act is meant to deal with unprincipled defections that aren’t covered by intellectual liberty, freedom of conscience, or the right to dissent. Because of this, even though there are certain unintended consequences to this rule, it is essential in today’s world while handling political matters.24

INCIDENTS OF DEFECTION AFTER INTRODUCTION OF TENTH SCHEDULE

Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992): The Anti-Defection Law was challenged in landmark Supreme Court case, which was the result of disputes over the disqualification

21 Ziya Us Salam, Anti-Defection Law Ridden with Loopholes, Prone to Misuse, FRONTLINE. THE HINDU

(Mar. 11, 2021, 06:00 AM), https://frontline.thehindu.com/cover-story/anti-defection-law-ridden-with-loopholesindia-poaching-mps-mlas/article34037127.ece.

22 LAXMIKANT, supra note 28, at 599.

23 JAIN, supra note 16.

24 Aditya Mehrotra, Case Analysis of Kihoto Hollohon V. Zachilhu and Others with Close Reference to Anti- Defection Law, MANUPATRA ARTICLES MANU/SC/0753/1992 (July. 6, 2022).

of certain members of the Nagaland Legislative Assembly under the Anti-Defection Law. Several petitioners, among them Kihoto Hollohan, challenged the validity of the Tenth Schedule, contending that it violated legislators’ freedom of speech and expression and the basic structure of the Constitution. The principle question was whether the powers granted to the Speaker or Chairman of a legislative body under the Tenth Schedule to disqualify members were constitutionally valid and whether those powers violated the basic structure of the Constitution. The Court upheld the law but ruled that decisions made by the Speaker regarding disqualifications could be subject to judicial review. This ensured that even though Speakers enjoy significant power, they can be held accountable for their decisions. It struck down para 7 of the Tenth Schedule as unconstitutional.

It reinforced the principle that no authority is above judicial scrutiny in a democracy. This case emphasized the need for balance between party discipline and individual legislators’ rights, marking a critical moment in interpreting the law. • Rajasthan Assembly (2018): Sachin Pilot and 19 other Congress MLAs rose up in July

2020 to overthrow Ashok Gehlot’s leadership. They wanted to overthrow Gehlot’s

authority because they did not like how the administration was running. Due to the rebel MLAs’ repeated absences from Congress Legislature Party (CLP) meetings, the party leadership filed notices of disqualification against them in accordance with the Anti- Defection Law. The notices stated that their non-attendance was tantamount to "voluntarily giving up" party membership. The rebel MLAs took these letters of disqualification to the Rajasthan High Court, arguing that their non-attendance did not indicate that they wished to resign from the party. Their acts qualified as dissent and were protected by the freedom of speech and expression enjoyed by them. The intervention came from the Rajasthan High Court, compelling the Speaker to stay the disqualification proceedings till a final order was received on the issue.

This is one of the few cases where the court intervened before the Speaker came to any conclusion, thus challenging the balance of separation of powers and the power of the judiciary over legislative procedures. The Supreme Court subsequently ruled that judicial review could not take place before a decision by the Speaker, thus affirming the power of the Speaker while simultaneously asserting concerns about the political nature of such

decisions. • Karnataka Political Crisis (2019): On July 1, 2019, two Congress MLAs, Ramesh Jarkiholi and Anand Singh, submitted their resignations. This marked the beginning of a series of resignations that would destabilize the coalition government. More MLAs from JD(S) and Congress quit during the next few days, bringing the total number of legislators who left their positions to 17 (3 from JD(S) and 14 from Congress). Numerous MLAs left for Mumbai, where they received sanctuary from BJP officials. Following the resignations, Congress leadership and Chief Minister H. D. Kumaraswa my tried to persuade the rebel MLAs to revoke their resignations through negotiation. The government also offered cabinet positions to some potential defectors to retain their support. The Speaker of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly, K. R.

Ramesh Kumar, refused to accept the resignation, citing constitutional obligations to scrutinize them. Supreme Court intervened on July 12 to decree no action on the disqualification or resignation till a hearing on July 16. On July 23, 2019, Kumaraswamy sought a trust vote in the Assembly but failed to secure a majority, and finally resigned. The coalition government was reduced to 101 seats while the BJP held 105 seats. Following the collapse of the coalition, BJP leader B. S. Yediyurappa became the Chief Minister. 25 • Madhya Pradesh Political Crisis (2020): A political crisis started on March 5, 2020, when 22 MLAs (including Congress and other party members) and well-known Congress leader Jyotiraditya Scindia resigned from their posts. Many viewed this widespread resignation as a coup against Kamal Nath’s administration.

The BJP was allegedly "horse-trading" its MLAs, according to the Congress party. In response, Congress legislators were taken to resorts to prevent further defections and avoid poaching by the BJP. In the middle of the chaos, both sides petitioned the Supreme Court for a floor test to ascertain the Assembly’s majority. The Supreme Court mandated on March 19 that a floor test be carried out by March 20, 2020. On March 20, as the floor test approached, Kamal Nath resigned as Chief Minister after realizing he did not have enough support

25 Ralph Alex Arakal, The Karnataka Crisis Timeline: How Have Events Unfolded so Far, INDIAN EXPRESS

(July. 28, 2019, 17:07 PM), https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/bangalore/karnataka-political-crisislegislative-assembly-drama-full-timeline-vidhana-soudha-5845467/.

to prove his majority. Resignation came just hours ahead of the floor test as Kamal Nath resigned, and on March 21, 2020, all 22 rebel MLAs joined the BJP. Once again, Shivraj Singh Chouhan became a Chief Minister for the fourth time on March 23, marking a significant political shift in the state of Madhya Pradesh. • Keisham Meghachandra v. Hon’ble Speaker Manipur (2020): In the Manipur Legislative Assembly, where no party had won a clear majority in the March 2017 elections, the BJP and the Congress party each secured 28 seats. BJP was permitted to form a government with the support of some Congress MLAs. A number of applications were submitted to the Speaker seeking the disqualification of specific MLAs, including Keisham Meghachandra Singh, who had endorsed the BJP despite being elected on a Congress ticket.

The Speaker did not rule on these petitions in a timely manner, which resulted in legal challenges. 26 The Supreme Court ruled that if a Speaker fails to make a decision on disqualification petitions within a reasonable time frame, it is within the jurisdiction of the High Court or Supreme Court to direct the Speaker to make such determinations. This ruling emphasized that while Speakers have significant authority, their decisions are subject to judicial review. While the Supreme Court did not decide on the specific disqualification petitions themselves—maintaining that this was within the Speaker’s prerogative—it directed the Speaker to resolve these petitions within four weeks. • Maharashtra Political Crisis (2022): • Eknath Shinde and nearly 40 MLAs went to Surat, Gujarat, indicating dissatisfaction with Chief Minister Uddhav Thackeray’s leadership.

This was interpreted as an effort to strengthen their position and to overthrow the incumbent chief minister. After a No-Confidence Motion, which clearly established that he no longer enjoyed a majority, on June 29, 2022, Chief Minister Uddhav Thackeray resigned. After Thackeray’s resignation, Eknath Shinde was sworn in as Chief Minister along with Devendra Fadnavis of BJP as Deputy Chief Minister. This marked the end of the 31-month-long MVA government. Counter to Shinde’s revolt, the Shiv Sena filed disqualification petitions against 16 MLAs supporting Shinde. The Deputy Speaker of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly issued notices 26Mukesh Kumar Suman, Keisham Meghachandra Singh Vs The Hon’ble Speaker Manipur Legislative Assembly: Case Summary, MUKESH SUMAN (Feb. 5, 2024), https://mukeshsuman.

com/keisham-meghachandra-singh-vsthe-honble-speaker-manipur-legislative-assembly-case-summary/.

concerning these petitions, stating violation of the Anti-Defection Law. The rebel MLAs challenged these disqualification notices in court, arguing that their actions were legitimate dissent rather than defection. The Supreme Court was thus concerned to adjudicate many of these aspects of political turmoil, including the validity of the floor test ordered by the Governor. The Supreme Court held that though the actions of then-Governor Bhagat Singh Koshyari and Assembly Speaker Rahul Narwekar were not in accordance with law, it could not restore the government led by Uddhav Thackeray as he had resigned voluntarily before a floor test.

CONCLUSION

The anti-defection law in India, introduced through the 52nd Amendment to the Constitution in 1985, has been a subject of ongoing debate and scrutiny since its inception. This research paper has provided a comprehensive analysis of the key aspects of the anti-defection law, its objectives, its implementation, and the challenges it has faced over the years. The primary purpose of the anti-defection law was to combat the issue of political defections, which had become a significant problem in the Indian political landscape in the 1970s, characterized by the infamous "Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram" phenomenon. The law was intended to ensure stability in government and prevent the practice of elected representatives switching political allegiances for personal or financial gain.

However, as the research has shown, the implementation of the anti-defection law has been fraught with complexities and controversies. The broad interpretation of the law by the Speakers of the legislative bodies, who have often been accused of partisanship, has led to concerns about the law’s efficacy in achieving its intended goals. Moreover, the law has been criticized for undermining the fundamental principles of democracy, such as the freedom of speech and the right of elected representatives to vote according to their conscience. While it has had some success in curbing the practice of political defections, its implementation has raised significant concerns about the preservation of democratic principles. Going forward, it is crucial that the law is reviewed and amended to strike a better balance between the need for political stability and the protection of individual

freedoms and democratic rights. Several efforts were made to draw out the loopholes that exist in the anti-defection law. Some of these efforts include the Dinesh Goswami Committee which suggested that disqualification should be limited to instances where an elected member voluntarily gives up their membership or votes contrary to party directives only in specific motions. This aimed to provide a clearer framework for disqualification and reduce arbitrary decisions. 27 Other committees which suggested many such reforms are the Jeevan Reddy Committee and the Halim Committee. A number of political and non-political organisations and bodies have developed a list of

recommendations that must be put into practice in order to provide a clearer and more appropriate framework to the disqualification process of Members of Parliament on grounds of defection. The Election Commission, not the Speaker, should have the authority to decide matters pertaining to political party members’ disqualification, as the Dinesh Goswami Committee also recommended. The clause indicating that mergers would not result in disqualification ought to be eliminated. The tenth article should grant voters the ability to petition for the disqualification of defection members. A thorough definition of "voluntarily giving up membership" in a political party is necessary.

The tenth schedule should explicitly outline the expelled members’ position and include any restrictions, such as forbidding them from joining another political party or having any profit-generating position inside the government. 28

27 Anti-Defection Law: Features, Limitations and Reforms, CIVILS DAILY (Aug. 7, 2024),

https://www.civilsdaily.com/story/anti-defection-law/.

28 Dr. Vinod Patidar, Anti-Defection Law: A Critical Reappraisal, 5(9) JETIR 100, 106-107 (2018).