Sri Swapan Kumar Deb v. The State of Tripura and 6 Ors.

Court: High Court of Tripura

Bench: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE,HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH

Judgment date: 2024-05-22

Case summary

High Court of Tripura judgment dated 2024-05-22. Sri Swapan Kumar Deb v. The State of Tripura and 6 Ors. Read the judgment and case details on LawSphereX.

Judgment text

HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA AGARTALA W. P. (C)(PIL) 5/2021 Sri Bhaskar Debbarma, son of late Priya Ranjan Debbarma, resident of Dhaleswar Road No. 7, Agartala, P. O. Dhaleswar, P. S. East Agartala, District- West Tripura, PIN - 799007. …. Petitioner(s) Versus 1. The State of Tripura, represented by the Chief Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Tripura, having his office at New Secretariat Complex, Gorkhabasti, P. O. -Kunjaban, P. S. -East Agartala, Sub-Division-Agartala, Dist. West Tripura. 2. The Director General of Police, Government of Tripura, having his office at Police Head Quarter, Fire Brigade Chowmuhani, Agartala, P. O. -Agartala, District-West Tripura, PIN-799001. 3. The Superintendent of Police, West Tripura, having his office at Police Head Quarter, Fire Brigade Chowmuhani, Agartala, P. O. -Agartala, District - West Tripura, PIN - 799001. 4. The Principal Secretary, Department of Home, New Secretariat Building, Gorkhabasti, P. O.

Kunjaban, District-West Tripura, Pin - 799001. 5. Shri Shailesh Kumar Yadav, D. M. & Collector, Government of Tripura, having his office at Office of DM & Collector, Mantri Bari Road, Agartala, West Tripura, Pin - 799001. 6. State Executive Committee of Tripura State Disaster Management Authority, represented by its Chairman having his office at New Secretariat Complex, Gorkhabasti, P. O. -Kunjaban, P. S. -East Agartala, Sub-Division- Agartala, Dist. West Tripura. 7. The Chairman, State Executive Committee, having his office at New Secretariat Complex, Gorkhabasti, P. Ο. -Kunjaban, PS- East Agartala, Sub- Division- Agartala, District- West Tripura 8. The Chief Secretary, Government of Tripura, having his office at New Secretariat Complex, Gorkhabasti, P. O. - Kunjaban, P. S. -East Agartala, Sub- Division-Agartala, Dist. West Tripura. 9.

The Officer-In-Charge, West Agartala Police Station, having his office at West Agartala Police Station, Post Office Chowmuhani, Agartala, West Tripura, Pin - 799001. …. Respondent(s) For Petitioner (s) : Ms. R. Guha, Advocate Mr. M. Debnath, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. SS Dey, Advocate General Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik, Sr. Advocate Ms. A. Chakraborty, Advocate Mr. E. L. Darlong, Advocate W. P. (C) 346/2021 Sri Sarvadanad Jha, son of late Sudhir Chandra Jha, resident of village- Gualabasti, Khejur Bagan, near High Court of Tripura, P. O Kunjaban, P. S. New Capital Complex, Sub-Division- Sadar, District- West Tripura. …. Petitioner(s) - Versus - 1. The State of Tripura, represented by the Chief Secretary, General Administration (Personnel & Training) Department, Government of Tripura, having his office at Secretariat Building, PO- Kunjaban, PS- New Capital Complex, Sub-Division- Sadar, District- West Tripura, PIN-799006. 2.

The Chief Secretary, General Administration (Personnel & Training) Department, having his office at Secretariat Building, PO- Kunjaban, PS- New Capital Complex, Sub-Division- Sadar, District- West Tripura, PIN- 799006. 3. The Director General of Police, Government of Tripura, having his office at Fire Brigade Chowmuhani, P. O- Agartala P. S-West Agartala, Sub-Division- Sadar, District- West Tripura, PIN-799001. 4. The District Magistrate, West Tripura, having his office at Office Lane, P. O- Agartala P. S-West Agartala, Sub-Division-Sadar, District- West Tripura, PIN- 799001. 5. The Superintendent of Police, West Tripura District, having his office at Fire Brigade Chowmuhani, P. O- Agartala P. S-West Agartala, Sub-Division- Sadar, District- West Tripura, PIN-799001. 6. The Officer-in-Charge, West Agartala Police Station, P. O-Agartala, P. S-West Agartala, Sub-Division- Sadar, District- West Tripura, PIN-799001... …Official Respondents 7.

Sri Sailesh Kumar Yadav, son of not known holding the post of District Magistrate, West Tripura Agartala, having his office at Office Lane, P. O- Agartala P. S-West Agartala, Sub-Division- Sadar, District- West Tripura, PIN- 799001 …Private Respondent For Petitioner (s) : Mr. Somik Deb, Sr. Advocate Mr. P. Chakraborty, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. SS Dey, Advocate General Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik, Sr. Advocate Ms. A. Chakraborty, Advocate Mr. E. L. Darlong, Advocate W. P. (C) 350/2021 Sri Swapan Kumar Deb, S/O- Lt. Dr. Bimal Kanta Deb, resident of Dhaleshwar, Kalyani, P. S- East Agartala, Agartala, West Tripura, Pin-799004 …. Petitioner(s) Versus 1. The State of Tripura, to be represented by the Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Tripura, New Secretariat Building, New Capital Complex, Kunjaban, Agartala, West Tripura, Pin-799006. 2.

The Chief Secretary & Chairman, State Executive Committee, office of the Chief Secretary, Government of Tripura, New Secretariat Building, New Capital Complex, Kunjaban, Agartala, West Tripura, Pin 799006 3. The Director General of Police, Government of Tripura, office of the DGP, Akhaura Road, Agartala, West Tripura 4. The Superintendent of Police, West Tripura, Government of Tripura, office of the SP, West Tripura, Akhaura Road, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN- 799001. 5. The Officers in Charge, West Agartala Police Station / West Agartala Women Police Station, Govt. of Tripura, Agartala, West Tripura. 6. The District Magistrate & Collector, West Tripura District, Government of Tripura, office of the DM & Collector, West Tripura, Agartala, Office Lane, Agartala, Pin-799001 7. Dr. Shailesh Kumar Yadav, IAS, the then DM & Collector, West Tripura District, (Notice to be served through the O/o the Chief Secretary, Govt.

of Tripura, New Secretariat Building, New Capital Complex, Kunjaban, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN 799006) … Respondent(s) For Petitioner (s) : Mr. P. Roy Barman, Sr. Advocate Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. SS Dey, Advocate General Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik, Sr. Advocate Ms. A. Chakraborty, Advocate Mr. E. L. Darlong, Advocate Date of hearing : 21. 02. 2024 Date of delivery of Judgment & order : 22. 05. 2024 Whether fit for reporting : Yes HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. APARESH KUMAR SINGH HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH Judgment & Order (Arindam Lodh,J) In this batch of writ petitions, the petitioners have criticized the action of the District Magistrate & Collector, West Tripura, Agartala, Sri Sailesh Kumar Yadav, the respondents no. 4 and 7 in WP(C) No. 346/2021 and respondents no. 6 and 7 in WP(C) No. 350/2021(here-in-after referred to as D. M.

, West Tripura, for convenience) in discharge of his official duty during Covid-19/Pandemic period and tried to stamp his role as an abuse of power compelling the present petitioners to file the present writ petitions claiming compensation. For the sake of convenience, all the writ petitions are taken up and heard together since common questions of law and facts are involved and have been disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The reliefs sought for in the above three writ petitions are separately reproduced hereunder: “W. P.

(C) (PIL) 05 of 2021:- (i) Admit the instant writ petition filed for interest of public at general; (ii) Issue Rule NISI; (iii) A Rule be issued out of and under the seal of this Hon’ble Court commanding the Respondents and each one of them to show cause why a writ of or in the nature of Mandamus shall not be issued, mandating the Respondents to restore law and order in the State of Tripura through proper adjudication of law in the Department of police and as well in home and administration; (iv) A Rule be issued out of and under the seal of this Hon’ble Court commanding the Respondents and each one of them to show cause why a writ of or in the nature of Prohibition shall not be issued, against Respondent no.

5, Sri Shailesh Kumar Yadav, IAS, DM & Collector, Agartala, West Tripura, prohibiting him from such act of abusing his power; (v) A Rule be issued out of and under the seal of this Hon’ble Court commanding the Respondents and each one of them to show cause why a writ of or in the nature of Certiorari shall not be issued, calling for all the Orders and/or Records and/or Documents and/or Notifications passed in regard to Disaster Management Act, 2005 and/or Epidemic Act, 1897 and/or The Epidemic Diseases (Amendment) Ordinance, 2020 and/or any other Order in relation in Lockdown, night curfew or any other Order passed to manage the Pandemic situation; (vi) A Rule be issued out of and under the seal of this Hon’ble Court commanding the Respondents and each one of them to show cause as to why a writ of or in the nature of Quo Warranto shall not be issued, that what authority did Respondent No.

5 had to misuse and abuse his official authority exceeding all the humane boundaries of decency and morality; (vii) A Rule be issued out of and under the seal of this Hon’ble Court commanding the Respondents and each one of them to show cause why a writ of or in the nature of Mandamus shall not be issued, directing the other Respondents to take appropriate action against Respondent No. 5 and the members of his team who accompanied Respondent No. 5 and carried out his illegal orders with full knowledge and ill intentions; (viii) A Rule be issued out of and under the seal of this Hon’ble Court commanding the Respondents and each one of them to show cause why a writ of or in the nature of Mandamus shall not be issued, directing the Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 and 6 to 9 directing to take appropriate criminal action against the Respondent No.

5; (ix) Cost and incidental of this petition be borne by the Respondents; (x) Pass any other Order(s) and/or directions may be passed as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper;” “W. P. (C) 350 of 2021:- (i) Issue Rule upon the Respondents to show cause as to why a Writ in the nature of Mandamus and/or any other order/orders shall not be issued whereby directing the Respondents to treat the written complaint, dated, 27. 04. 2021, lodged by the Petitioner as FIR under the appropriate provisions of law. (Annexure- 6 to the writ petition). (ii) Issue Rule upon the Respondents to show cause as to why a Writ in the nature of Mandamus and/or any other order/orders shall not be issued whereby directing the Respondents to compensate the Petitioner & other members of the marriage party by paying Rs. 50 lakhs as public law remedy for wrongful restrain and illegal detention of the Petitioner and other members of the marriage party in the intervening night of 26. 04. 2021-27. 04.

2021 in violation of right to privacy, right to life and health and right to liberty guaranteed under Aritle-19 & 21 of the Constitution of India. (iii) Issue Rule upon the Respondents to show cause as to why a Writ in the nature of Mandamus and/or any other order/orders shall not be issued whereby direct judicial enquiry by any sitting District Judge of the State of Tripura to conduct inquiry regarding the illegal storming of the Manikya Court marriage hall by the Respondent No 7 and others on 26. 04. 2011 and atrocities committed by the Respondent No 7 and others in the marriage hall. (iv) Issue Rule upon the Respondents to show cause as to why a Writ in the nature of Mandamus and/or any other order/orders shall not be issued whereby direct the Respondents Nos 1 & 2 to take necessary step for initiation of departmental proceeding against the Respondent No-7, Dr. Shailesh Kumar Yadav, for misconduct.

(v) Issue Rule upon the Respondents to show cause as to why a Writ in the nature of Mandamus and/or any other order/orders shall not be issued whereby quashing & cancelling the FIR, dated, 28. 04. 2021, registered vide 2021WAG076, U/s- 188 of IPC & Section-51 of Disaster Management Act, 2005. ” “W. P. (C) 346 of 2021:-i. Issue Rule, calling upon the respondents and each one of them, to show cause as to why a Writ of Certiorari and/or in the nature thereof, shall not be issued for directing the respondents, to transmit the records, relevant to the subject matter of this writ petition, for rendering substantive and conscionable justice to the petitioner; ii. Issue Rule, calling upon the State respondents and each one of them, to show cause as to why a Writ of Mandamus and/or in the nature thereof, shall not be issued, for mandating/directing them, to take appropriate punitive & legal action, against the respondent No.

7 & his escort team members, including a direction for arresting the respondent No. 7 & his escort team members, initiating a departmental proceeding against them, to monitor the investigation from time to time, in connection with the criminal case, instituted by the petitioner, against the gruesome incident that had happened on 26. 04. 2021 (detailed supra), and for directing the official respondents, to take appropriate measures, in connection therewith; iii. In the Ad-interim, and thereafter, in the Interim, after hearing the parties, an Order, in terms of Relief ii. supra; iv. Call for the records appertaining to this petition; v. After hearing the parties, be pleased to make the Rule Absolute in terms of i, to iii above; vi. Costs of and incidental to this proceeding;” 3. Background facts: We have observed at the opening paragraph of this judgment that all the above three writ petitions are premised on seminal and identical facts and circumstances. 3. 1.

A marriage ceremony was organized at night on 26. 04. 2021 at Agartala city‟s two well-known marriage halls, namely, „Golap Bagan‟ and „Manikya Court‟ situated adjacent to each other. During the solemnization of marriage, suddenly the D. M. , West Tripura, raided the two aforesaid marriage halls at about 11:00 p. m. to 11:15 p. m. and allegedly disrupted the performance of the marriage ceremony most illegally, and unauthoratively abused his power in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant holding such a responsible post. It is alleged that the D. M. , West Tripura misbehaved with the civilians, bride and groom, their parents and guests who participated to bless the couples. During such raid, the D. M. , West Tripura, chocked the neck of the invitees and threw filthy languages towards them and subsequently, under his direction, the police personnel caused arrest of the invitees, family members, both bride and groom along with women and children.

The entire incident was allegedly videographed and was made viral through social media. Thereafter, the petitioners filed complaints before the appropriate authorities to take punitive action against the said D. M. , West Tripura. 3. 2. Since the incident was highlighted broadly, the State Government had constituted a Committee to inquire into the aspect and to submit its report. In course of inquiry, the State Government by its order dated 02. 05. 2021 relieved said D. M. , West Tripura from his post. Thereafter, WP(C)(PIL) 05 of 2021 along with W. P(C) 346 of 2021 were filed before this court. On 03. 05. 2021, a Division Bench of this court took up both the matters, and after seeking some further instructions had passed the following order: “Looking to the sensitivity of the issues involved, we had heard the cases in camera where the advocates appearing for the parties and the parties themselves were allowed to remain present.

As a culmination of the discussion that took place in camera, we are prima facie of the view that the issues require for the consideration. However, we must make it clear that in these petitions, there are several prayers, many of which we are not inclined to entertain. For example, the request is made by both the petitioners for action against not only the District Magistrate but his team, who had visited the marriage halls. We are not inclined to consider any action against any of the team members of the District Magistrate since they were merely carrying out the orders issued to them by their superior. Even if there is any lacuna in issuing such orders or exceeding of the jurisdiction by the authority, this support staff cannot be made answerable for their actions.

At the time when the entire country is facing an extremely difficult situation of managing corona virus spread, we would certainly not send signals to the foot soldiers that carrying out the orders of their superiors can expose them to inquiries. The learned Advocate General during the discussions in the camera had clarified that he was not defending any of the actions of the District Magistrate, nevertheless, he was of the opinion that the incident as is projected in the video clips available in the social media does not bring out the correct facts and that it would not be correct to attach the blame for the unfortunate incident on the District Magistrate.

However, prima facie, he did not dispute the language used by the District Magistrate during the incident which in our prima facie opinion was inappropriate, that the District Magistrate did tear away a copy of the permission granted by him for conducting the marriage ceremony when it was shown to him by one of the members of the family and that he had also used strong derogatory words against the police officials, who according to him, were liable to enforce the lockdown guidelines and curfew timings which according to him, they had deliberately failed to do in the present case. At this ex parte stage, however, we would refrain from making any definitive or conclusive observations with respect to the misdeeds or demeanor of either the District Magistrate or the family members and guests present at the marriage hall. Going by the press reports, we have noticed that the District Magistrate has made public statements on more occasions than one about the alleged incident.

We would request him not to go public with respect to the said incident till further orders. Learned Advocate General requested that publication of any news in relation to the present Court proceedings may be prevented. His apprehension is that certain quarters may deliberately sensationalize the issue. We are not inclined to issue any such general gag order. Freedom of press is a valuable fundamental right and relates to the right of the people of excess to information. Such right cannot be lightly curtailed. We, however, assure learned Advocate General of two things. One, no amount of sensationalization of the issue from any quarter would hamper our judgment and secondly, if any instance of any publication which is either contemptuous or is defamatory is brought to our notice, the same can always be dealt with on case to case basis. In any case, we expect the media to be responsible and publish the news as truthfully as the events have taken place.

Issue notice to the respondents, returnable for 05. 05. 2021. Learned counsel, Ms. Ayantika Chakraborty waived notice on behalf of the official respondents in both the petitions. By way of interim measures following directions are issued: (i) We are of the strong prima facie view that in order to conduct an impartial fact finding inquiry regarding the incident and the role played by the D. M. ; which is absolutely imperative; it would be essential that he is shifted out of Agartala. Any such inquiry would necessarily require recording of statements of witnesses. It would be difficult for many witnesses to come forward and to give truthful account of the incident if the D. M. is retained at Agartala. We would strongly request the learned Advocate General to take instructions from the Government on this aspect of the matter and revert back to the Court on the next date of hearing with necessary instructions.

(ii) The District Magistrate shall not make any public statements in any form including to media be it electronic, print or social media in relation to the incident of the night of 26th April, 2021 and the subsequent inquiry which is pending against him. (iii)Until further orders, the inquiry instituted against the District Magistrate shall not proceed further (iv) The District Magistrate shall also place on record any order of suspending the license of the marriage halls if he has passed after 26th of April, 2021 incident. (v) The petitioners as well as the learned Advocate General shall supply the information and documents as provided in the earlier part of this order. ” 3. 3. From the order dated 03. 05. 2021, it is reflected that the Division Bench though curtailed some actions of the D. M. ,West Tripura, but, at the same time had ordered that the inquiry initiated against the District Magistrate vide order dated 02. 05.

2021 shall not proceed further until the next order of the Court. In that meanwhile, another writ petition being W. P(C) 346 of 2021 was filed by the priest engaged for solemnization of marriage, who was allegedly assaulted by the D. M. , West Tripura. Again the matters were taken up by the Division Bench on 05. 05. 2021, and on that date, the Division Bench had expanded the inquiry committee by including a retired District Judge and directed the said committee to conduct a detailed inquiry and make specific report in that respect. 3. 4. After conducting detailed inquiry, the inquiry committee had submitted its report on 26. 05. 2021 and after going through the findings/observations of the inquiry committee, the same Division Bench by its order dated 02. 06. 2021 directed the inquiry committee to carry out further inquiry into the incident and submit its report. However, the inquiry committee did not carry out any further inquiry. Accordingly, vide order dated 20. 08.

2021, the Court had appointed Sri Bamdeb Majumder, a former District Judge of the State Judiciary as one-man Committee to carry out further inquiry. The Order dated 20. 08. 2021 is as under: “We have no option but to supersede this committee and constitute a new committee which shall carry out further inquiries from the stage the existing committee has reached. We, therefore, appoint Sri Bamdeb Majumder, a former District Judge as one-man committee, who shall carry out further inquiries and submit a further report. It is clarified that the materials already collected by the present inquiry committee and the reports submitted shall form part of the record and the newly constituted one-man inquiry committee shall conduct further inquiry in continuation of the inquiry so far conducted. ” 3. 5. After conclusion of the inquiry, report was submitted by Sri Bamdeb Majumder, before this court on 04. 10. 2021, and the same was accepted by this court. On 03. 03.

2023 when the matters were taken up, CDs had been displayed in the open court in presence of learned counsel appearing for the parties, and thereafter, this court had observed certain acts allegedly committed by the D. M. , West Tripura on the alleged date, time and place, which are reflected in the Order dated 30. 03. 2023, appeared to be the kind of behavior not befitting to the dignity and integrity to the post. After such display, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the D. M. , West Tripura questioned the video clippings as regards its admissibility and authenticity. However, this court had directed the D. M. , West Tripura to file his explanation by way of an affidavit in that respect, which was subsequently submitted by him on 25. 04. 2023 denying the contents and completely disputing the genuinity and veracity of the said video-footages/clippings. 3. 6.

From the prayers made by the petitioners in the writ petitions, it is evident that the petitioners had sought for taking appropriate criminal action against the D. M. , West Tripura and his team who visited the marriage hall and allegedly involved in the entire episode as discussed here-in-above. 4. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties at length. We have also gone through all the documents relating to the instant matter. 5. Submissions on behalf of the petitioners in WP(C) No. 350/2021: Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in W. P. (C) 350 of 2021 submitted that the restrictions of Covid situation had been strictly maintained by all the invitees and the family members during solemnization of the marriage. It was further submitted by learned senior counsel that the permission for the marriage issued by the D. M. , West Tripura during Corona Night Curfew was in force from 10. 00 p. m. to 5. 00 a. m.

and despite issuance of such permission in the night at about 11. 20 p. m. the D. M. , West Tripura, escorted with more than 100 persons of armed force and reporters, visited the marriage hall and caused havoc rampage in the marriage hall by humiliating, abusing and assaulting both the male and female members present in the marriage and even the children were not spared. It was further submitted by learned senior counsel that the D. M. , West Tripura violating the mandates of Statute also harassed the female members and the children in the said marriage hall. Learned senior counsel further submitted that the D. M. , West Tripura had deliberately torn the permission paper issued by himself infront of all when the same was shown to him by the father of the bride. Learned senior counsel also has pressed upon the CDs which were displayed in the open court, which according to learned senior cousnel clearly demonstrates the vindictive act of the D. M.

, West Tripura on the alleged date, time and place of the incident. It was further submitted by learned senior counsel that the Inquiry Report gave a clear finding that the marriage ceremony was being carried out in strict compliance of the terms and conditions of the Corona restrictions. Learned senior counsel has further argued that since there was violation of human rights and fundamental rights as regards the petitioners, hence, the petitioners are entitled to be compensated adequately. Learned senior counsel also has argued that the report of the fact-finding committee was never challenged by the D. M. , West Tripura and that the D. M. , West Tripura has exceeded his jurisdiction. To add to the above submissions, Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel argued that the action taken by the District Magistrate could not be stated to be in „good faith‟ as enshrined under Section 73 of the Disaster Management Act. Mr.

Deb, learned senior counsel further argued that due to the act of the District Magistrate, the petitioners had suffered harassment where right to life and personal liberty of the petitioners guaranteed under Article-21 of the Constitution of India had been violated, and, as such, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners urged this court to grant adequate compensation in favour of the petitioners. 6. Submissions on behalf of the respondents-State and respondent- DM: 6. 1. The State-respondents as well as respondent- D. M. , West Tripura have submitted their counter affidavits. Learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents-State has not disputed the factual contentions of the writ petitions, on the contrary, learned Advocate General has disputed the admissibility of the CD. Added to it, learned Advocate General has further submitted that at the prevailing situation of Corona, the D. M.

, West Tripura had performed his duties diligently to safeguard the State from further spreading of pandemic. The D. M. , West Tripura had taken a strict view to disperse the gathering, and thus, he had not committed any offence. 6. 2. On the other hand by filing counter affidavit, respondent- D. M. , West Tripura had denied all the allegations/contentions brought forth in the writ petitions. Learned senior counsel Mr. Kar Bhowmik, appearing for the respondent- D. M. , West Tripura has submitted that on reaching the spot when the D. M. , West Tripura found gathering of more than 100 persons being unmasked he with bona fide intention decided to disperse off the unlawful gathering, but, no person was touched or hit and no religious sentiment was hurt. It was further submitted by learned senior counsel that the D. M. , West Tripura was duty bound to follow the restrictions imposed during Corona night curfew.

Learned senior counsel further submitted that the intention of the respondent- D. M. , West Tripura was only to enforce the law embodied in Section 144 Cr. P. C. & the Disaster Management Act, 2005 which were in force at that relevant point of time and no legal action can be imposed upon him. It was further submitted by learned senior counsel that the actions taken by the D. M. , West Tripura were on good faith and as such he is liable to be protected under Section 73 of the Disaster Management Act. 6. 3. Furthermore, the D. M. , West Tripura, by filing affidavit-in-opposition contended that at that relevant point of time prohibition under Section 144 Cr. P. C. was in force within the AMC area, and the permission given by him was valid only till 10 p. m. In the affidavit-in-opposition the District Magistrate had denied the other allegations. He has also submitted that since after the incident or raid in the alleged night, the D. M.

, West Tripura had lodged complaint against the petitioners before the concerned police station. 6. 4. In the affidavit-in-opposition, the respondent- D. M. , West Tripura, in para 22 had asserted that „the marriage party at Golap Bagan was being performed with a large number of invitees in violation of the orders, attended the marriage. The organizer of marriage not only violated the order in force U/s 144 CrPC by conducting the gathering beyond 10 pm but also violated the marriage permission passed under the Disaster Management Act by inviting and gathering more than 50 persons in total from 7 pm onward continuing till the DM visited the spot‟. Further, the respondent- D. M. , West Tripura had asserted that all actions taken by the respondent were actions taken in “Good Faith” and as such the respondent is liable to be protected under Section 73 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005. 7. Analysis on factual and legal aspects: 7. 1.

In the above backdrops of the facts, it is relatable to mention that regarding the said incident, a PIL had been filed followed by two other writ petitions wherein the prayers/reliefs sought for are same and identical. 7. 2. At the very inception, the State Government had forthwith relieved Dr. Sailesh Kumar Yadav from his post as D. M. , West Tripura, and formed an inquiry committee. Thereafter, when the writ petitions were heard on 03. 05. 2021, this court considering the sensitivity of the prevailing situation at that relevant time refrained from entertaining all the prayers made by the petitioners in the writ petitions and also refrained from making definite or conclusive observation against the alleged acts and deeds of the concerned District Magistrate. What this court had done was that it passed an order of inclusion of a District Judge in the said Committee. After inquiry the said Committee submitted its report.

However, being dis-satisfied with the report of the said inquiry committee, this court vide order dated 20. 08. 2021 had superseded the said committee by way of constituting a one man Committee by one former District Judge to make an inquisitorial inquiry who had submitted report on 04. 10. 2021 before this court. On 20. 12. 2021 in pursuance of an interlocutory application filed by the State-respondents, this court permitted the State to provide suitable posting to the concerned Magistrate to any appropriate place other than West Tripura District. 7. 3. Noticeably, on the basis of the complaint made by the petitioners, the concerned police station had registered FIR against the respondent-DM. The respondent-DM also had lodged complaints against some persons including the petitioners in WP(C) 346 of 2021 and WP(C) 350 of 2021. It was submitted at the time of hearing that the proceedings have been in seisin.

In view of this, the prayers made in WP(C)(PIL) 5 of 2021, WP(C) 346 of 2021 and WP(C) 350 of 2021, as regards the registration of the complaints lodged by the petitioners in WP(C) 346 of 2021 and WP(C) 350 of 2021, have already meted out, and no further order is necessary as because criminal proceedings are pending before the criminal courts of competent jurisdiction. After prolonged submissions of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and after perusal of the orders, this court is now confined to only with the debatable question, as to whether the petitioners are entitled to get any compensation for infringement of their constitutional rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 7. 4. At the outset, if we go through the permission issued by the D. M. , West Tripura dated 23. 04. 2021, it would conclusively be seen that the permission for the said marriage was issued by him on 23. 04.

2021 under Disaster Management Act, 2005, with certain terms and conditions to be followed adhering to the lockdown measures, and the said order was valid only for the solemnization of the marriage on 26. 04. 2021, but no time limit was mentioned by the District Magistrate in the said order for accomplishment of the marriage on 26. 04. 2021. With reference to that, the restrictions under Section 144 Cr. P. C. with regards the Corona Night Curfew issued vide Order dated 22. 04. 2021 by the District Magistrate, Government of Tripura, demonstrates that the Corona Night Curfew was imposed between 10 p. m. to 05. 00 a. m. every day within AMC area w. e. f. 22. 04. 201 to 01. 05. 2021. As per the submissions of learned counsel for the writ petitioners, the mishap took place at around 11. 20 p. m.

wherein the District Magistrate by tearing his own order dispersed the invitees and family members from the marriage hall without completion of the marriage, which curtailed the rights of the writ petitioners. 7. 5. The permission was issued by the District Magistrate on 23. 04. 2021 under Disaster Management Act. Pertinently, prior to issuance of the order dated 23. 04. 2021, the Government of Tripura had issued an order dated 20. 04. 2021 putting some restrictions on Corona Night Curfew under Section 22(2)(h) of the Disaster Management Act, 2005. In the said order it was clearly mentioned that the violators shall be prosecuted as per Section 51 to 60 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005 besides Section 188 of the IPC. Thus, it would be relevant to look at Sections 51 to 60 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005, which read as under:- “51. Punishment for obstruction, etc.

—Whoever, without reasonable cause— (a) obstructs any officer or employee of the Central Government or the State Government, or a person authorised by the National Authority or State Authority or District Authority in the discharge of his functions under this Act; or (b) refuses to comply with any direction given by or on behalf of the Central Government or the State Government or the National Executive Committee or the State Executive Committee or the District Authority under this Act, shall on conviction be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine, or with both, and if such obstruction or refusal to comply with directions results in loss of lives or imminent danger thereof, shall on conviction be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years. 52. Punishment for false claim.

—Whoever knowingly makes a claim which he knows or has reason to believe to be false for obtaining any relief, assistance, repair, reconstruction or other benefits consequent to disaster from any officer of the Central Government, the State Government, the National Authority, the State Authority or the District Authority, shall, on conviction be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, and also with fine. 53. Punishment for misappropriation of money or materials, etc. —Whoever, being entrusted with any money or materials, or otherwise being, in custody of, or dominion over, any money or goods, meant for providing relief in any threatening disaster situation or disaster, misappropriates or appropriates for his own use or disposes of such money or materials or any part thereof or wilfully compels any other person so to do, shall on conviction be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, and also with fine. 54.

Punishment for false warning. —Whoever makes or circulates a false alarm or warning as to disaster or its severity or magnitude, leading to panic, shall on conviction, be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year or with fine. 55. Offences by Departments of the Government. — (1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by any Department of the Government, the head of the Department shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly unless he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a Department of the Government and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any officer, other than the head of the Department, such officer shall be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. 56. Failure of officer in duty or his connivance at the contravention of the provisions of this Act. — Any officer, on whom any duty has been imposed by or under this Act and who ceases or refuses to perform or withdraws himself from the duties of his office shall, unless he has obtained the express written permission of his official superior or has other lawful excuse for so doing, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine. 57.

Penalty for contravention of any order regarding requisitioning. —If any person contravenes any order made under section 65, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine or with both. 58. Offence by companies. —(1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company or body corporate, every person who at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company, for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the contravention and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act, if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, and it is proved that the offence was committed with the consent or connivance of or is attributable to any neglect on the part of any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also, be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation. —For the purpose of this section— (a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and (b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm. 59. Previous sanction for prosecution.

—No prosecution for offences punishable under sections 55 and 56 shall be instituted except with the previous sanction of the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, or of any officer authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by such Government. 60. Cognizance of offences. —No court shall take cognizance of an offence under this Act except on a complaint made by— (a) the National Authority, the State Authority, the Central Government, the State Government, the District Authority or any other authority or officer authorised in this behalf by that Authority or Government, as the case may be; or (b) any person who has given notice of not less than thirty days in the manner prescribed, of the alleged offence and his intention to make a complaint to the National Authority, the State Authority, the Central Government, the State Government, the District Authority or any other authority or officer authorised as aforesaid.

” Further, Section 188 of the IPC, reads as under: “188. Disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant.

Whoever, knowing that, by an order promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, he is directed to abstain from a certain act, or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management, disobeys such direction, shall, if such disobedience causes or tends to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury, to any persons lawfully employed, be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, or with both; and if such disobedience causes or tends to cause danger to human life, health or safety, or causes or tends to cause a riot or affray, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. Explanation.

—It is not necessary that the offender should intend to produce harm, or contemplate his disobedience as likely to produce harm. It is sufficient that he knows of the order which he disobeys, and that his disobedience produces, or is likely to produce, harm. ” 7. 6. Here, complaint was lodged by some local inhabitants which forced the D. M. , West Tripura to come to the marriage hall and with regard to the said incident, the District Magistrate on 28. 04. 2021 lodged an FIR with the Superintendent of Police, West Agartala with notation “Violation of order under Section 144 Cr. P. C. ” and requested the SP, West to register a case under relevant sections of IPC and Disaster Management Act. Section 144 Cr. P. C. reads as under: “144. Power to issue order in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger.

(1) In cases where, in the opinion of a District Magistrate, a Sub-divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, there is sufficient ground for proceeding under this section and immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable, such Magistrate may, by a written order stating the material facts of the case and served in the manner provided by section 134, direct any person to abstain from a certain act or to take certain order with respect to certain property in his possession or under his management, if such Magistrate considers that such direction is likely to prevent, or tends to prevent, obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health or safety or a disturbance of the public tranquillity, or a riot, or an affray.

(2) An order under this section may, in cases of emergency or in cases where the circumstances do not admit of the serving in due time of a notice upon the person against whom the order is directed, be passed ex parte. (3) An order under this section may be directed to a particular individual, or to persons residing in a particular place or area, or to the public generally when frequenting or visiting a particular place or area. (4) No order under this section shall remain in force for more than two months from the making thereof: Provided that, if the State Government considers it necessary so to do for preventing danger to human life, health or safety or for preventing a riot or any affray, it may, by notification, direct that an order made by a Magistrate under this section shall remain in force for such further period not exceeding six months from the date on which the order made by the Magistrate would have, but for such order, expired, as it may specify in the said notification.

(5) Any Magistrate may, either on his own motion or on the application of any person aggrieved, rescind or alter any order made under this section, by himself or any Magistrate subordinate to him or by his predecessor-in-office. (6) The State Government may, either on its own motion or on the application of any person aggrieved, rescind or alter any order made by it under the proviso to sub-section (4). (7) Where an application under sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) is received, the Magistrate, or the State Government, as the case may be, shall afford to the applicant an early opportunity of appearing before him or it, either in person or by pleader and showing cause against the order; and if the Magistrate or the State Government, as the case may be, rejects the application wholly or in part, he or it shall record in writing the reasons for so doing. ” 7. 7.

Section 188 of the IPC prescribes punishment for disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant, which reads as under: “188.

Disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant: Whoever, knowing that, by an order promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, he is directed to abstain from a certain act, or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management disobeys such direction, shall, if such disobedience causes or tends to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury, to any persons lawfully employed, be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, or with both; and if such disobedience causes or tends to cause danger to human life, health or safety, or causes or tends to cause a riot or affray, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.

Explanation:- It is not necessary that the offender should intend to produce harm, or contemplate his disobedience as likely to produce harm. It is sufficient that he knows the order which he disobeys, and that his disobedience produces, or is likely to produce, harm”. Section 144 Cr. P. C. prohibits public gatherings in a given jurisdiction. This statutory provision empowers the District Magistrate to impose the said law during anticipated emergencies. 7. 8. In the counter affidavit, the District Magistrate has averred that he has done all the actions in “Good Faith” against the writ petitioners as enumerated under Section 73 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005. Section 73 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005, reads as under: “73. Action taken in good faith.

—No suit or prosecution or other proceeding shall lie in any court against the Central Government or the National Authority or the State Government or the State Authority or the District Authority or local authority or any officer or employee of the Central Government or the National Authority or the State Government or the State Authority or the District Authority or local authority or any person working for on behalf of such Government or authority in respect of any work done or purported to have been done or intended to be done in good faith by such authority or Government or such officer or employee or such person under the provisions of this Act or the rules or regulations made thereunder. ” 8. It is now required to look into the Order dated 30. 03. 2023 passed by this court wherein this Court after displaying the CD in presence of learned counsel for the parties had identified certain acts committed by the District Magistrate, which are as under: “1. He [Mr.

Shailesh Kumar Yadav] entered into the premises of a functional hall where marriage is being performed with the permission orders of DM & Collector with force by more than 20 persons including his personal staffs and also police personnel along with photographers during COVID-19 period without following COVID protocol. 2. He has physically slapped with his right hand on the left hand of the on duty police officer in uniform in an offensive manner. 3. He took the photographs of the police officer without his permission. 4. He used derogatory words against the police officer saying “Bloody” “Sala”. 5. He walked into the dining area of functional hall and made chaos in the dining hall and scattered the persons who were taking their meal and evacuated the dining area. 6. He entered into the room in which the bride was accompanied by other ladies, where they were getting ready for the wedding preparation and disrespectfully cleared the room. 7.

He also entered into the marriage pandal (Wedding stage) and physically beat the priest ( ). He entered into the room where the bride groom was getting ready and has physically necked him out from room. 8. He went towards the ceremonial dais and entered into an argument with an elderly lady appears to be the head of the family and also a person who was with her and he necked him out from the stage and the another person who was standing along with him, he throttled his neck with both hands and pushed him aside. 9. He also directed the police who were accompanied with him to arrest and take all the persons who were therein the marriage more particularly, all the family members to the custody. 10. Physically handled the person who was in "green" colour dress, necked him and directed the police to arrest him and that person was arrested upon his instruction and subsequently, the gentleman was forwarded to the police station in the police jeep. 11.

He torned the permission order into pieces which is given by himself for performing the wedding and thrown it expressing disrespect towards the persons surrounding in the marriage ceremony. 12. Overall duty of the officer was in such a manner which was unwarranted. When there was strict COVID-19 protocol, it is not understood as to how the D. M. & Collector could entered into the wedding premises with a group of approximatly 30 persons without he himself following COVID protocol. 13. He entered into the premises without assistance of any woman police personnel since, it is well known that he is entering into a marriage function, where women, children and men would be available. 14. Instead of creating chaos in the function hall and stopped performing of marriage, he could have verified and permitted the wedding with the permitted number of persons. ” 9. To controvert the argument regarding admissibility of the CD, as argued by learned senior Counsel Mr. Kar Bhowmik, Ms. R.

Guha, learned counsel appearing in W. P. (C) (PIL) has submitted that Section 65A of the Indian Evidence Act provides a special provision for electronic records to be considered as evidence, while Section 65B of the Act governs their admissibility through a deeming fiction. Accordingly, when electronic records are submitted as evidence in the court, they are treated as "documents" under the Evidence Act, subject to the conditions specified in Section 65B(4). Ms. Guha, learned counsel has submitted that the entire act and activities of the District Magistrate were videographed by the invitees and reporters in their mobiles or other electronic gazette and the same footages had been collected from those sources. Further, learned counsel submitted that the act and commission of the District Magistrate on the alleged date were aired on various news channels/news papers and other social sites, and the same were not disputed or questioned or challenged by the District Magistrate.

Learned counsel further submitted that the pictures recorded in the videos were collected by the petitioners and stored in a compact disc without any editing or manipulation, and hence, the said electronic evidence is admissible as per law. Learned counsel for the petitioner Ms. Guha, further submitted that when the Hon‟ble Court had evolved/recorded some of the act and activities of the District Magistrate by displaying the CDs in open court, learned senior counsel defending the District Magistrate did not oppose the same and prior to that the recording/findings of the Hon‟ble Court after displaying the CDs was also not put under challenge by learned senior counsel for the District Magistrate. In the above circumstances, those documents in the form of CDs should not be questioned as inadmissible in the light of the provision embodied in Section 65-B of the Evidence Act. In support of her contentions, Ms.

Guha, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal and others, reported in (2020) 7 SCC 1 and Shafhi Mohammad vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, reported in (2018) 2 SCC 801). We have meticulously gone through the cited judgments. 9. 1. We have the advantage to take note of the judgment and the principles laid down by a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme court in Anvar P. V. v. P. K. Basheer and Others, reported in (2014) 10 SCC 473 where question was raised as regards admissibility of a document in the form of CD by the defence, and it was held that Section 65-B is a complete code in itself for the admissibility of electronic evidence and shall not be affected by other provisions of the Evidence Act. In Anvar P. V.

(supra) it has also be held that “…if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act, the same is admissible in evidence, without compliance with the conditions in Section 65-B of the Evidence Act. ” Justice Nariman clarified that this dictum should be read by omitting the words “under Section 62 of the Evidence Act. ” This is because Section 65-B is a complete code for electronic evidence and shall supersede other provisions such as Section 62. 9. 2. In Shafhi Mohammad (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court while dealing with the standard of proof, authenticity and admissibility of electronic evidence, in paras 20 to 30, has held as under:- “20.

An apprehension was expressed on the question of applicability of conditions under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act to the effect that if a statement was given in evidence, a certificate was required in terms of the said provision from a person occupying a responsible position in relation to operation of the relevant device or the management of relevant activities. It was submitted that if the electronic evidence was relevant and produced by a person who was not in custody of the device from which the electronic document was generated, requirement of such certificate could not be mandatory. It was submitted that Section 65B of the Evidence Act was a procedural provision to prove relevant admissible evidence and was intended to supplement the law on the point by declaring that any information in an electronic record, covered by the said provision, was to be deemed to be a document and admissible in any proceedings without further proof of the original.

This provision could not be read in derogation of the existing law on admissibility of electronic evidence. 21. We have been taken through certain decisions which may be referred to. In Ram Singh and Others v. Col. Ram Singh, 1985 (Supp) SCC 611, a Three-Judge Bench considered the said issue. English Judgments in R. v. Maqsud Ali, (1965) 2 All ER 464, and R. v. Robson, (1972) 2 ALL ER 699, and American Law as noted in American Jurisprudence 2d (Vol. 29) page 494, were cited with approval to the effect that it will be wrong to deny to the law of evidence advantages to be gained by new techniques and new devices, provided the accuracy of the recording can be proved. Such evidence should always be regarded with some caution and assessed in the light of all the circumstances of each case. Electronic evidence was held to be admissible subject to safeguards adopted by the Court about the authenticity of the same.

In the case of tape-recording it was observed that voice of the speaker must be duly identified, accuracy of the statement was required to be proved by the maker of the record, possibility of tampering was required to be ruled out. Reliability of the piece of evidence is certainly a matter to be determined in the facts and circumstances of a fact situation. However, threshold admissibility of an electronic evidence cannot be ruled out on any technicality if the same was relevant. 22. In Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, (2010) 4 SCC 329, the same principle was reiterated. This Court observed that new techniques and devices are order of the day. Though such devices are susceptible to tampering, no exhaustive rule could be laid down by which the admission of such evidence may be judged. Standard of proof of its authenticity and accuracy has to be more stringent than other documentary evidence. 23. In Tomaso Bruno and Anr. v.

State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178, a Three-Judge Bench observed that advancement of information technology and scientific temper must pervade the method of investigation. Electronic evidence was relevant to establish facts. Scientific and electronic evidence can be a great help to an investigating agency. Reference was made to the decisions of this Court in Mohd. Ajmal Amir Kasab v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 1 and State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600. 24. We may, however, also refer to judgment of this Court in Anvar P. V. v. P. K. Basheer and Others, (2014) 10 SCC 473, delivered by a Three-Judge Bench. In the said judgment in para 24 it was observed that electronic evidence by way of primary evidence was covered by Section 62 of the Evidence Act to which procedure of Section 65B of the Evidence Act was not admissible.

However, for the secondary evidence, procedure of Section 65B of the Evidence Act was required to be followed and a contrary view taken in Navjot Sandh (supra) that secondary evidence of electronic record could be covered under Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act, was not correct. There are, however, observations in para 14 to the effect that electronic record can be proved only as per Section 65B of the Evidence Act. 25. Though in view of Three-Judge Bench judgments in Tomaso Bruno and Ram Singh (supra), it can be safely held that electronic evidence is admissible and provisions under Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act are by way of a clarification and are procedural provisions.

If the electronic evidence is authentic and relevant the same can certainly be admitted subject to the Court being satisfied about its authenticity and procedure for its admissibility may depend on fact situation such as whether the person producing such evidence is in a position to furnish certificate under Section 65B(h). 26. Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act, 1872 cannot be held to be a complete code on the subject. In Anvar P. V. (supra), this Court in para 24 clarified that primary evidence of electronic record was not covered under Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act. Primary evidence is the document produced before Court and the expression “document” is defined in Section 3 of the Evidence Act to mean any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter. 27.

The term “electronic record” is defined in Section 2(t) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 as follows: “2. (1)(i) “Electronic record” means data, record or data generated, image or sound stored, received or sent in an electronic form or micro film or computer generated micro fiche. ” 28. The expression “data” is defined in Section 2(o) of the Information Technology Act as follows: “2(1)(o) “Data” means a representation of information, knowledge, facts, concepts or instructions which are being prepared or have been prepared in a formalised manner, and is intended to be processed, is being processed or has been processed in a computer system or computer network, and may be in any form (including computer printouts magnetic or optical storage media, punched cards, punched tapes) or stored internally in the memory of the computer. ” 29.

The applicability of procedural requirement under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act of furnishing certificate is to be applied only when such electronic evidence is produced by a person who is in a position to produce such certificate being in control of the said device and not of the opposite party. In a case where electronic evidence is produced by a party who is not in possession of a device, applicability of Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act cannot be held to be excluded. In such case, procedure under the said Sections can certainly be invoked. If this is not so permitted, it will be denial of justice to the person who is in possession of authentic evidence/witness but on account of manner of proving, such document is kept out of consideration by the court in absence of certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, which party producing cannot possibly secure. Thus, requirement of certificate under Section 65B(h) is not always mandatory. 30.

Accordingly, we clarify the legal position on the subject on the admissibility of the electronic evidence, especially by a party who is not in possession of device from which the document is produced. Such party cannot be required to produce certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act. The applicability of requirement of certificate being procedural can be relaxed by Court wherever interest of justice so justifies. ” 9. 3. Pertinently, Anvar P. V. (supra), was a judgment of three- Hon‟ble Judges of the Supreme Court and Shafhi Mohammad (supra) was a two-Judge Bench decision, where a different view has been taken than that of the view of Anvar P. V. (supra). While in Anvar P.

V(supra), the three- Judge Bench of the Supreme Court categorically held that fulfillments of the essential conditions embodied in Section 65-B of the Evidence Act is a condition precedent, in Shafhi Mohammad (supra), the two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that whenever the interest of justice required, the requirement of a certificate could be done away with under Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act. Thereafter, the case of Arjun Panditrao (supra) came up before another Division Bench of the Supreme Court when the said Bench faced with these two conflicting decisions, and since the two-Judge Bench in Shafhi Mohammad (supra), had taken a contrary view than that of the view taken by the three-Judge Bench in Anvar P. V.

(supra), the Bench made reference to the larger bench of the Supreme Court forming an opinion that the decision of the two-Judge Bench in Shafhi Mohammad (supra) might need re-consideration by a Bench of a larger strength and also for dealing with the interpretation of Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. On such reference, the larger Bench being constituted (by three Hon‟ble Judges) and while taking into consideration in both its earlier decisions in Shafhi Mohammad (supra) and Anvar P. V. (supra), the larger Bench had taken note of various provisions of Information & Technology Act, 2000 alongwith Section 65-B and 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act, and in the ultimate analysis, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao (supra) held that the law laid down in Shafhi Mohammad (supra) was incorrect. It is reiterated that certificate under Section 65-B(4) is a condition precedent and has correctly held in Anvar P. V. (supra) and incorrectly “clarified” in Shafhi Mohammad (supra).

It was further held that oral evidence in place of such certificate would not suffice as Section 65-B(4) is a mandatory requirement of law and declared the decision in Shafhi Mohammad (supra), Tomaso Bruno and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 178, as per in curiam. 9. 4. While interpreting the various provisions of Information & Technology Act, 2000 and Section 65-B and 62 and 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act, the Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao (supra) at paras 46, 51, 60, 61, 73, 73. 1. , 73. 2, 73. 3 and 73. 4, had observed and held in the manner as under: “46. Resultantly, the judgment dated 03. 04. 2018 of a Division Bench of this Court reported as (2018) 5 SCC 311, in following the law incorrectly laid down in Shafhi Mohammed (supra), must also be, and is hereby, overruled. 51.

On an application of the aforesaid maxims to the present case, it is clear that though Section 65B(4) is mandatory, yet, on the facts of this case, the Respondents, having done everything possible to obtain the necessary certificate, which was to be given by a third-party over whom the Respondents had no control, must be relieved of the mandatory obligation contained in the said sub-section. 60. It may also be seen that the person who gives this certificate can be anyone out of several persons who occupy a ‘responsible official position’ in relation to the operation of the relevant device, as also the person who may otherwise be in the ‘management of relevant activities’ spoken of in Sub-section (4) of Section 65B.

Considering that such certificate may also be given long after the electronic record has actually been produced by the computer, Section 65B (4) makes it clear that it is sufficient that such person gives the requisite certificate to the “best of his knowledge and belief” (Obviously, the word “and” between knowledge and belief in Section 65B(4) must be read as “or”, as a person cannot testify to the best of his knowledge and belief at the same time). 61. We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way of electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar P. V. (supra), and incorrectly “clarified” in Shafhi Mohammed (supra). Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law. Indeed, the hallowed principle in Taylor v. Taylor (1876) 1 Ch.

D 426, which has been followed in a number of the judgments of this Court, can also be applied. Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act clearly states that secondary evidence is admissible only if lead in the manner stated and not otherwise. To hold otherwise would render Section 65B(4) otiose. 73. The reference is thus answered by stating that: 73. 1. Anvar P. V. (supra), as clarified by us hereinabove, is the law declared by this Court on Section 65B of the Evidence Act. The judgment in Tomaso Bruno (supra), being per in curiam, does not lay down the law correctly. Also, the judgment in SLP (Crl. ) No. 9431 of 2011 reported as Shafhi Mohammad (supra) and the judgment dated 03. 04. 2018 reported as (2018) 5 SCC 311, do not lay down the law correctly and are therefore overruled. 73. 2. The clarification referred to above is that the required certificate under Section 65B(4) is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced.

This can be done by the owner of a laptop computer, computer tablet or even a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box and proving that the concerned device, on which the original information is first stored, is owned and/or operated by him. In cases where the “computer” happens to be a part of a “computer system” or “computer network” and it becomes impossible to physically bring such system or network to the Court, then the only means of providing information contained in such electronic record can be in accordance with Section 65B(1), together with the requisite certificate under Section 65B(4). The last sentence in Anvar P. V. (supra) which reads as “…if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act…” is thus clarified; it is to be read without the words “under Section 62 of the Evidence Act,…” With this clarification, the law stated in paragraph 24 of Anvar P. V. (supra) does not need to be revisited. 73. 3.

The general directions issued in paragraph 64 of this judgment shall hereafter be followed by courts that deal with electronic evidence, to ensure their preservation, and production of certificate at the appropriate stage. These directions shall apply in all proceedings, till rules and directions under Section 67 C of the Information Technology Act and data retention conditions are formulated for compliance by telecom and internet service providers. 73. 4. Appropriate rules and directions should be framed in exercise of the Information Technology Act, by exercising powers such as in Section 67C, and also framing suitable rules for the retention of data involved in trial of offences, their segregation, rules of chain of custody, stamping and record maintenance, for the entire duration of trials and appeals, and also in regard to preservation of the meta data to avoid corruption.

Likewise, appropriate rules for preservation, retrieval and production of electronic record, should be framed as indicated earlier, after considering the report of the Committee constituted by the Chief Justice’s Conference in April, 2016. ” 10. Having perused the aforesaid analysis of various aspects relating to interpretation made by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao (supra), the submissions advanced by Ms. Guha, learned counsel for the petitioner in W. P. (C) (PIL) 5 of 2021, is hereby repealed holding that the certification for adducing electronic evidence is a condition precedent and compliance of requirements of Section 65-B and 65-B(4) is mandatory in nature and cannot in any way be diluted. 11. In the instant case, the Judges in the Court only directed the Registry to display the CDs as produced by the petitioners. It was not a trial. The court never asked any of the stakeholders who are parties to the CDs and/or part and parcel of the preparation of the said CDs.

So, the CDs have not been duly proved by the statutorily recognized methods as specified in Sections 65-A or 65-B of the Evidence Act. In the instant case, this court had not adopted any methods to safeguard the authenticity or genuinity of the CDs. 12. The word “if” makes well of difference. It suggests that prior to the admission of electronic evidence or “documents” thereof, the same must be satisfied with its authenticity and accuracy. Furthermore, in Tomaso Bruna (supra), the Supreme Court was very categoric to hold that procedure for its admissibility may depend on fact situation. One of such situations would be that the person concerned who produces such evidence should be in a position to furnish certificate under Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act. In this case, CDs displayed were produced by the petitioners and naturally, they are not the persons who are eligible to furnish certificate. Moreso, we have noticed that Ms.

Guha, learned counsel, has candidly submitted that those CDs were collected from social media and internet. In this fact situation, we are unable to satisfy the authenticity and accuracy of the CDs. 13. As we have said earlier that the paramount contentions advanced by the petitioners in the writ petitions are common in nature, and therefore, separate narration of facts and grounds raised are not required. The pristine question remains as to whether the petitioners are entitled to get any compensation for infringement of their constitutional rights to life and personal liberty, as envisaged under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 14. Onto this issue, learned senior counsel Mr. Roy Barman, has placed his reliance upon the decisions of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in S. Nambi Narayan vs. Siby Mathews and ors. reported in (2018) 10 SCC 804; Nilabati Behera (Smt) alias Lalita Behera (through the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee) vs. State of Orissa and ors.

, reported in (1993) 2 SCC 746; D. K. Basu vs. State of W. B. , reported in (1997) SCC 416. 14. 1. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court while discussing the remedy of compensation, in paragraphs 41, 42 and 43 of S. Nambi Narayan (supra) has observed thus:- “41. In Sube Singh v. State of Haryana [(2006)3SCC178] , the three-Judge Bench, after referring to the earlier decisions, has opined:- “38. It is thus now well settled that the award of compensation against the State is an appropriate and effective remedy for redress of an established infringement of a fundamental right under Article 21, by a public servant. The quantum of compensation will, however, depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

Award of such compensation (by way of public law remedy) will not come in the way of the aggrieved person claiming additional compensation in a civil court, in the enforcement of the private law remedy in tort, nor come in the way of the criminal court ordering compensation under Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ” 42. In Hardeep Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2012)1 SCC 748], the Court was dealing with the issue of delayed trial and the humiliation faced by the appellant therein. A Division Bench of the High Court in intra-court appeal had granted compensation of Rs. 70,000/-. This Court, while dealing with the quantum of compensation, highlighted the suffering and humiliation caused to the appellant and enhanced the compensation. 42. In the instant case, keeping in view the report of the CBI and the judgment rendered by this Court in K.

Chandrasekhar [(1998)5 SCC 223], suitable compensation has to be awarded, without any trace of doubt, to compensate the suffering, anxiety and the treatment by which the quintessence of life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution withers away. We think it appropriate to direct the State of Kerala to pay a sum of Rs. 50 lakhs towards compensation to the appellant and, accordingly, it is so ordered. The said amount shall be paid within eight weeks by the State. We hasten to clarify that the appellant, if so advised, may proceed with the civil suit wherein he has claimed more compensation. We have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the suit. ” 14. 2. Further, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court while discussing the remedy of compensation, in paragraphs 41, 42 and 43 of S. Nambi Narayan (supra) has observed thus:- “21.

We may also refer to Article 9(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 which indicates that an enforceable right to compensation is not alien to the concept of enforcement of a guaranteed right. Article 9(5) reads as under:- "Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation. " 22. The above discussion indicates the principles on which the Court's power under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution is exercised to award monetary compensation for contravention of a fundamental right. This was indicated in Rudul Sah and certain further observations therein adverted to earlier, which may tend to minimise the effect of the principle indicated therein, do not really detract from that principle. This is how the decisions of this Court in Rudul Sah and others in that line have to be understood and Kasturilal distinguished therefrom.

We have considered this question at some length in view of the doubt raised, at times, about the propriety of awarding compensation in such proceedings, instead of directing the claimant to resort to the ordinary process of recovery of damages by recourse to an action in tort. In the present case, on the finding reached, it is a clear case for award of compensation to the petitioner for the custodial death of her son. ” 14. 3. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in D. K. Basu (supra), in paragraphs 44, 45 and 54, has observed as under: “44. The claim in public law for compensation for unconstitutional deprivation of fundamental right to life and liberty, the protection of which is guaranteed under the Constitution, is a claim based on strict liability and is in addition to the claim available in private law for damages of tortious acts of the public servants. Public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings.

Award of compensation for established infringement of the indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitutions is remedy available in public law since the purpose of public law is not only to civilise public power but also to assure the citizens that they live under a legal system wherein their rights and interests shall be protected and preserved. Grant of compensation in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India for the established violation or the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21, is an exercise of the Courts under the public law jurisdiction for penalising the wrong door and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which failed in the discharge of its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. 45.

The old doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved to the remedies available in civil law limits the role of the courts too much, as the protector and custodian of the indefeasible rights of the citizens. The courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the court and the law are for the people and expected to respond to their aspirations. A Court of law cannot close its consciousness and aliveness to stark realities. Mere punishment of the offender cannot give much solace to the family of the victim - civil action for damage is a long drawn and cumber some judicial process. Monetary compensation for redressal by the Court finding the infringement of the indefeasible right to life of the citizen is, therefore, useful and at times perhaps the only effective remedy to apply balm to the wounds of the family members of the deceased victim. Who may have been the bread winner of the family.

xxx Thus, to sum up, it is now a well accepted proposition in most of the jurisdictions, that monetary or pecuniary compensation is an appropriate and indeed an effective and sometimes perhaps the only suitable remedy for redressal of the established infringement of the fundamental right to life of a citizen by the public servants and the State is vicariously liable for their acts. The claim of the citizen is based on the principle of strict liability to which the defence of sovereign immunity is nor available and the citizen must revive the amount of compensation from the State, which shall have the right to be indemnified by the wrong doer. In the assessment of compensation, the emphasis has to be on the compensatory and not on punitive element.

The objective is to apply balm to the wounds and not to punish the transgressor or the offender, as awarding appropriate punishment for the offender, as awarding appropriate punishment for the offence (irrespective of compensation) must be left to the criminal courts in which the offender is prosecuted, which the State, in law, is duty bound to do, That award of compensation in the public law jurisdiction is also without prejudice to any other action like civil suit for damages which is lawfully available to the victim or the heirs of the deceased victim with respect to the same matter for the tortious act committed by the functionaries of the State. The quantum of compensation will. of course, depend upon the peculiar facts of each case and no strait jacket formula can be evolved in that behalf.

The relief to redress the wrong for the established invasion of the fundamental rights of the citizen, under the public law jurisdiction is, in addition to the traditional remedies and not it derrogation of them. The amount of compensation as awarded by the Court and paid by the State to redress The wrong done, may in a given case, be adjusted against any amount which may be awarded to the claimant by way of damages in a civil suit. ” 15. The order dated 23. 04. 2021 issued by the D. M. , West Tripura itself shows that the D. M. , West Tripura had restricted the number of guests shall be limited within 50. Further, from the show-cause notice issued by the D. M. , West Tripura dated 27. 04. 2021 and also from the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the D. M. , West Tripura, it is seen that there was presence of about 100 persons in the Golap Bagan Marriage Hall, but the petitioners nowhere in their additional affidavits had denied or disputed the allegations of the D. M.

, West Tripura in regards the number of invitees in

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