ALAMGIR ALAM v. THE DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT UNION OF INDIA

Court: High Court of Jharkhand

Bench: HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

Judgment date: 2026-05-06

Case summary

High Court of Jharkhand judgment dated 2026-05-06. ALAMGIR ALAM v. THE DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT UNION OF INDIA. Read the judgment and case details on...

Judgment text

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Cr. Revision No. 208 of 2025 ----- Alamgir Alam, aged about 75 years, son of late Sanaul Haque, resident of Sector-2, Dhurwa, PO Dhurwa, PS Jagarnathpur, District Ranchi, 834002. … … Petitioner Versus The Directorate of Enforcement, Union of India represented through the Assistant Director, Ranchi Zonal Office, Plot No. 1502/B, Airport Road, Hinoo, PO Hinoo, PS Doranda, District Ranchi, Jharkhand 834002. … … Respondent With Cr. Revision No. 120 of 2026 Alamgir Alam, aged about 74 years, son of late Sanaul Haque, resident of Sector-2, Dhurwa, PO Dhurwa, PS Jagarnathpur, District Ranchi, (Jharkhand) … … Petitioner Versus The Directorate of Enforcement, Union of India represented through Assistant Director, Ranchi Zonal Office, Plot No. 1502/B, Airport Road, Hinoo, PO Doranda, PS Doranda, District Ranchi (Jharkhand) … … Respondent ------ CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD ------- For the Petitioner(s) : Mr.

Samir Saurabh, Advocate; Ms. Preeti Kumari, Advocate; Mrs. Divya, Advocate Ms. Isha Kaushik,Advocate; Mr. Vishal Kumar, Advocate For the Respondent(s) : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate; Mr. Zohab Hussain, Advocate (Through V. C. ) Mr. Saurabh Kumar,Advocate; Mr. Pranjal Tripathi, Advocate ------th th C. A. V. on:8 April, 2026 Pronounced on: 6 May, 2026 1. Since these matters are interlinked and, as such, both are heard together and being disposed of by a common order. 2. Both of these Criminal Revision petitions have been filed under sections 438 & 442 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. 3. Criminal Revision No. 208 of 2025 is directed against the order dated 03. 12. 2024 passed by the Special Judge, PML Act, Ranchi in M. C. A. No. 2964 of 2024, arising out of ECIR-02/2023 by which discharge petition filed by the petitioner for the offence under section 3 punishable under section 4 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002(in short PMLA, 2002) has been rejected. 4.

Criminal Revision No. 120 of 2026 is directed against the order dated 07. 12. 2024 passed by the learned Special Judge, PML Act, Ranchi in connection with ECIR Case No. 02 of 2023 registered for the offence under sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, whereby and whereunder, the charge has been framed against the petitioner. Factual Matrix: 7. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the instant petitions which require to be enumerated herein, read as under: (i) An ECIR bearing No. ECIR/RNSZO/16/2020 was registered on 17. 09. 2020 and investigation under the provisions of Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) was initiated on the basis of FIR bearing No. 13 of 2019 dated 13. 11. 2019 registered by the ACB Jamshedpur for the offence under section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption,2018 and on completion of investigation charge-sheet No. 01/2020 dated 11. 01.

2020 was filed by ACB Jamshedpur against Suresh Prasad Verma and Alok Ranjan under section 7(b) of the P. C Act, 2018 for the offence under section 120B and 201 of IPC which are scheduled offences under Part-A, Paragraph No. 1 of PML Act, 2002. (ii) During investigation upon Veerendra Kumar Ram and his close associates, several searches were conducted on 21-02-2023 at various places across India and it was found that part of the Proceeds of crime acquired in the form of taking commission/bribe in lieu of allotment of tenders by Veerendra Kumar Ram, Chief Engineer in Rural Works Department, Jharkhand was getting routed by a Delhi based CA Mukesh Mittal to the bank accounts of family members of Veerendra Kumar Ram with the help of bank accounts of Mukesh Mittal's employees/relatives.

It is also alleged that Veerendra Kumar Ram used to give cash to his CA Mukesh Mittal who with the help of entry providers used to make entries in the bank accounts of his employees and relatives and then such fund was transferred by him into the bank accounts of Rajkumari (Wife of Veerendra Ram) and his father Shri Genda Ram. (iii) It is also alleged that some bank accounts were opened in Delhi on the basis of forged documents. Therefore, information related to the same was shared with the Delhi Police under Section 66(2) of the PMLA. Further on the basis of the said information an FIR No. 22/2023 was registered by Economic Offence Wing (EOW), Delhi on 03. 03. 2023 against (1) Shri Veerendra Kumar Ram, (ii) Mukesh Mittal, and (iii) unknown others under Sections 419, 420, 465, 466, 468, 471, 473, 474, 476, 484, and 120 B of IPC, 1860, and Section 7 and 5 of Specified Bank Notes(Cessation of Liabilities) Act, 2017.

In light of the additional facts emerging out of the investigation, FIR No. 22/2023 registered by EOW, Delhi was merged with the investigation of present ECIR/RNSZO/16/2020 dated 17- 09-2020. (iv) A prosecution complaint vide ECIR Case Number 02/2023 under Section 45 of PMLA, 2002 was filed before the Learned Special Court (PMLA), Ranchi 21. 04. 2023 against Veerendra Kumar Ram, Alok Ranjan, Rajkumari and Genda Ram and the cognizance of the same was taken by the Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi on 29-04-2023. (v) Further, a supplementary prosecution complaint vide ECIR Case Number 02/2023 under Section 45 of PMLA, 2002 was filed before the Learned Special Court (PMLA), Ranchi on 20. 08. 2023 against Veerendra Kumar Ram, Alok Ranjan, Rajkumari, Genda Ram, Mukesh Mittal, Tara Chand, Neeraj Mittal, Ram Prakash Bhatia, Harish Yadav and Hirdya Nand Tiwari and the cognizance of the same is taken on 22. 08. 2023.

(vi) During further course of investigation searches were conducted on 06-05-2024, 07-05-2024, 08-05-2024, 09-05-2024, 10-05-2024 and 24-05-2024 under section 17 of the PMLA, 2002 in the premises of Sanjeev Kumar Lal, Jahangir Alam, Munna Singh, Kuldip Kumar Minz, Vikash Kumar, Raj Kumar Toppo, Ajay Tirkey,Rajiv Kumar Singh, Amit Kumar and Santosh Kumar at various places. As a result of the search, huge cash was recovered and seized from the residential premises of Jahangir Alam situated at Flat No. 1A, Sir Syed Residency, Kumhartoli, Ranchi. (vii) Further, huge cash have been recovered and seized from the residential premises of Munna Singh situated at Flat No. 1A, Kashmiri Gali, PP Compound, Ranchi. Munna Singh stated that he used to collect cash from the engineers/contractors on the instruction of Sanjeev Lal. Searches were also conducted at the residences of Rajiv Kumar, Santosh Kumar, Rajkumar Toppo, Ajay Tirkey and Amit Kumar.

(vii) Accordingly, on 07-05-2024 Sanjeev Kumar Lal and Jahangir Alam were arrested for the commission of the offence under sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA, 2002. (viii) Alamgir Alam being the minister of Department of Rural Works (RWD) and all the departments under it, he is at the top in the syndicate of commission collection. Sanjeev Kumar Lal used to collect the share of 1. 35 % of minister Alamgir Alam on his behalf from Asst. Engineers/Executive Engineers via Chief Engineers. Accordingly, Sanjeev Kumar Lal has instructed departmental engineers to hand over the petitioner's commission to Munna Singh and/or his brother Santosh Kumar alias Rinku Singh. Further Munna Singh has stated that he has collected a total of Rs. 53 crores of commission from such engineers/contractors and handed over Rs. 50 crores approx, to Sanjeev Lal through Jahangir Alam. (ix) Thus, the same amount of POC was acquired by the petitioner through Sanjeev Kumar Lal, out of this Rs. 53 crores, an amount of Rs.

35 crores approx, was seized during the search proceedings. Further, it is alleged that the petitioner also acquired a commission amount of Rs. 3 crores from Veerendra Kumar Ram through one engineer of the department and same transaction was also assisted by Sanjeev Kumar Lal in September 2022. It is also alleged that the petitioner is found to be directly indulged and actually involved in possession and concealment of at least Rs. 35 crores of the Proceeds of Crime through Sanjeev Kumar Lal and he has also been found to be directly indulged and actually involved in acquisition and concealment of at least Rs. 56 crores of the proceeds of crime. (x) Accordingly, Sanjeev Kumar Lal has instructed departmental engineers to hand over the petitioner's commission to Munna Singh and/or his brother Santosh Kumar alias Rinku Singh. Further Munna Singh has stated that he has collected a total of Rs. 53 crores of commission from such engineers/contractors and handed over Rs. 50 crores approx.

to Sanjeev Lal through Jahangir Alam. Thus, the same amount was acquired by the petitioner through Sanjeev Kumar Lal, out of this Rs. 53 crores, an amount of Rs. 35 crores approx. was seized during the search proceedings. (xi) Further, it has been alleged that the petitioner also acquired a commission amount of Rs. 3 crores from Veerendra Kumar Ram through one engineer of the department and same transaction was also assisted by Sanjeev Kumar Lal in September 2022. (xii) It is also alleged that the petitioner is found to be directly indulged and actually involved in possession and concealment of at least Rs 35 crores of the Proceeds of Crime through Sanjeev Kumar Lal and he has also been found to be directly indulged and actually involved in acquisition and concealment of at least Rs. 56 crores of the Proceeds of Crime.

(xiii) A supplementary prosecution complaint vide ECIR Case Number 02/2023 under Section 45 of PMLA, 2002 is filed before the Learned Special Court (PMLA), Ranchi on 04. 07. 2024 against Veerendra Kumar Ram, Alok Ranjan, Rajkumari, Genda Ram, Mukesh Mittal, Tara Chand, Neeraj Mittal, Ram Prakash Bhatia, Harish Yadav, Hirdya Nand Tiwari, Alamgir Alam, the present petitioner, Sanjeev Kumar Lal and Jahangir Alam and the cognizance of the same is taken on 12. 07. 2024. (xiv) Thereafter, the present petitioner preferred Misc. Cri. Application No. 2190 of 2024 for grant of bail but the same was rejected vide order dated 09. 08. 2024 by the court of learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-XVIII-cum Special Judge, PML Act, Ranchi. (xv) Consequent thereto present petitioner has preferred bail application being B. A. No. 9548 of 2024 before this Court but vide order dated 11. 07. 2025 the said application was rejected by this Court.

(xvi) Subsequent to filing of said ECIR/ Complaint, the learned Special Judge, PML, Act, Ranchi, vide an order dated 12. 07. 2024, has been pleased to take cognizance of offences defined under Section 3 of PML Act, 2002 and punishable under Section 4 of the said Act against the aforesaid accused persons including the present petitioner and directed for issuance of summon to the petitioner. (xvii) Thereafter, the petitioner filed a discharge petition praying for discharge as there was no sufficient ground for proceeding against the petitioner under Section 3 of the PMLA, 2002 and punishable under Section 4 of the Act, 2002. (xviii) It is the case of the petitioner that the learned Special Judge, PML Act, Ranchi without appreciating the materials available on record, has rejected the discharge petition preferred by the petitioner vide order dated 03. 12. 2024 and vide order dated 07. 12.

2024 has framed the charge for the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA against the petitioner. (xix) Being aggrieved with the aforesaid orders dated 03. 12. 2024 and 07. 12. 2024 the instant revision applications have been preferred by the present petitioner. Arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner: 8. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner(s) has submitted that the learned Special Judge, PML Act, Ranchi has failed to appreciate that the prosecution has not produced material whichwould show that the petitioner has in any manner dealt with “proceeds of crime”. 9. It is further stated that the said case instituted against Suresh Prasad Verma, a Junior Engineer, for accepting illegal gratification of Rs. 10,000/- for which Jamshedpur P. S. Case No. 13 of 2019 was registered and there is no allegation against the petitioner in the said case. 10.

It is further submitted that the petitioner is not an accused in the schedule offence and has no role to play in the offence as alleged in FIR No. 13/2019 and FIR No. 22/2023 and the case against the petitioner accused being beneficiary of a syndicate has been manufactured based on false and fabricated statements and documents and the charges against him are politically motivated and based on suspicion rather than concrete evidence. 11. It is further submitted that the petitioner accused is not named in the first supplementary prosecution complaint vide ECIR No. 02/2023 which was filed against other co-accused persons and second supplementary prosecution complaint in which petitioner herein has been arrayed as an accused by the ED. 12. It is further submitted that Section 197 of Cr. P. C.

provides that when any public servant is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence, except with previous sanction of the competent authority. 13. It has been contended that in terms of section 5 and 8 of PMLA, 2002 the provisions relating to attachment of the property, which has been seized under section 17 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The Adjudicating Authority pass the order of attachment if it has reason to believe that any person has committed an offence under section 3 of PMLA, 2002 or is in possession of Proceed of Crime. In the instant case neither any provisional attachment order has been passed under section 5 of PMLA nor any attachment proceeding is pending against the petitioner relating to Proceed of Crime.

In such situation continuation of instant proceeding relating to money laundering is abuse of the process against the petitioner and he is liable to be discharged only on this ground alone. 14. It has further been submitted that the section 8 of PMLA, 2002, no prayer has been made by the complainant to attach the seized cash amount, knowing fully well that the recovery of cash not comes under the definition of Money Laundering. 15. It is further submitted that nothing incriminating was recovered from the petitioner or his family members and he is in no way connected to the proceeds of crime. There is a complete lack of evidence demonstrating any link or association between the petitioner and the proceeds of crime and no money trail has been identified that implicates the petitioner. 16. It is further submitted that there is no predicate offence established against the petitioner under the P. C. Act.

The prosecution has failed to present any evidence that would substantiate the charge of money laundering u/s 3 of the PMLA and without a predicate offence, there is no established source of the proceeds of crime and the very basis for alleging money laundering i. e. 3 is absent. The lack of a formal charge against the petitioner for a scheduled offence renders the invocation of Section 3 of the PMLA legally untenable and unsustainable and the charge of money laundering cannot be legally maintained. 17. It is further submitted that none of the witnesses in their statements recorded u/s 50 of PMLA have provided any details regarding how the proceeds of crime were laundered by the petitioner, either directly or indirectly. The statements recorded by the prosecuting agency, which allege that the petitioner received 1.

35% commission u/s 50 of PMLA, 2002, fail to satisfy the requirements of Section 3 of the PMLA, 2002, these statements are made by individuals who themselves are in the role of co-accused in this case. The statements are unsupported by any substantive evidence, they are inadmissible and cannot be used against the petitioner accused. The statements of co-accused persons recorded u/s 50 of the PMLA are not an admissible piece of evidence and these statements can only be used to corroborate other evidence that the prosecution might have. There is no other evidence in the possession of prosecuting agency to lend corroboration to the statements being relied upon. 18. There is no documentary evidence on record direct or indirect which establish that the petitioner had received commission of Rs. 3 Crore on one instance in September, 2002 and charges cannot be framed without any material evidence or recovery to support the allegations against the petitioner.

There is no evidence linking the present petitioner with the alleged proceeds of crime. 19. It is further submitted that the alleged documents seized from the premises of Jahangir Alam pertaining to Sanjeev Kumar Lal including several torn pages of few diaries and notes with abbreviations cannot be read as evidence against the petitioner. The code names written on the torn pages cannot be connected with the petitioner by any means and those code words are based on the respondent agency’s assumptions and manipulations. 20. It is further submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the foundation facts regarding the involvement of the petitioner in any process or activity related to the proceeds of crime, therefore, no presumption u/s 24 of the PMLA, 2002 can be triggered against the petitioner.

The entire prosecution complaint is without any iota of evidence or credible allegation supported by any proof to show that the petitioner accused was deliberately assisting in any activity related to money laundering directly or indirectly. 21. In support of his contentions, he relied upon the observation made in the matter of Director of Enforcement vs. Bibhu Prasad Acgharya and Others, MANU/SC/1176/2024. 22. It has further been contended that the learned court below has also not considered the fact that after institution of ECIR on 17. 9. 2020 investigation was started by the opposite party and in course of that it transpired that Mukesh Mittal was involved in transfer of fund of Veerendra Kumar Ram into the bank accounts of Rajkumar and Genda Ram for which an information under section 66(2) of PMLA was given by Joint Director, Directorate of Enforcement, to the Commissioner of Police, Delhi for which an FIR vide Economic Offence Wing PS, case no.

22/2003 was registered by Economic Offence Wing (EOW), Delhi on 03. 03. 2023 against (1) Veerendra Kumar Ram, (ii) Mukesh Mittal, and (iii) unknown others under Sections 419, 420, 465, 466, 468, 471, 473, 474, 476, 484, and 120 (B) of IPC, 1860, and Section 7 and 5 of Specified Bank Notes (Cessation of Liabilities) Act, 2017. The said case although registered after ECIR case but the same has been treated as a predicate offence of the instant case. In the said FIR also, there is no allegation against the petitioner and none of the transaction as alleged in the said FIR is remotely related with the petitioner. 23. It is stated that after registration of the ECIR investigation was conducted and it was found that Rs. 2.

67 Crores seized by Anti- Corruption Bureau, Jamshedpur from the premises of Alok Ranjan was actually belongs to Veerendra Kumar Ram, Chief Engineer Rural Works Department and, accordingly a complaint under section 45 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred as PMLA, 2002) was filed on 21. 04. 2023 before the Learned Special Judge, P. M. L. Act, 2002, Ranchi,with the allegation that Veerendra Kumar Ram and his family members have acquired movable and immovable property amounting to Rs. 39,28,82,578/-, in which cognizance was taken on 29. 04. 2023 for the offence defined u/s 3 punishable u/s 4 of PMLA, 2002 against Veerendra Kumar Ram and three others and further a supplementary complaint was filed against Veerendra Kumar Ram and nine others on 20. 08. 2023 with the allegation that Mukesh Mittal is involved in Proceeds of Crime worth of Rs. 35,77,117. 94/-. 24. It is stated that till the submission of complaint dated- 21. 04.

2023 and supplementary complaint dated-20. 08. 2023 no involvement of the petitioner was surfaced even after recording of the statement of Veerendra Kumar Ram. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that no case of Money Laundering as defined under section 3 and punishable under section 4 of the PMLA, 2002 is made out against the petitioner and as such he is liable to discharge from the instant case. Arguments advanced on behalf of the Respondent: 26. Ld. Counsel for respondent-E. D. has opposed the prayer for discharge and submitted that there are ample evidence against the petitioner regarding his involvement in the offence of money laundering. 27. It is submitted that a total of 18 searches were conducted u/s 17 of PMLA in Ranchi, at the premises of Sanjeev Kumar Lal, Jahangir Alam, some Engineers and other persons on different dates. As a result of the search huge amount of cash to the tune of Rs. 37.

55 Crore, digital devices, records and various incriminating documents were recovered which gave details with regard to the various individuals involved in the process of generation and distribution of proceeds of crime. 28. Sanjeev Kumar Lal during his ED Custody interrogation also stated that the commission in the range of 3 to 4% of the total tender amount is collected in cash by the Asst. Engineers/Executive Engineers of the respective departments. He further stated that he used to collect the share of 1. 35 % of minister Alamgir Alam on his behalf from Asst. Engineers/Executive Engineers via Chief Engineers. He further stated that first of all, the Asst. Engineers/Executive Engineers used to inform him regarding handing over the share of Alamgir Alam and they requested Sanjeev Kumar Lal to send some person to collect cash i. e. commission.

Thereafter, Sanjeev Kumar Lal used to instruct Munna Singh who was his close friend, and/or his brother (Santosh Kumar) to collect cash from the said engineers. Sanjeev Kumar Lal further instructed Jahangir Alam to stand near Abhinandan Marriage Hall, near Rani Hospital and Deendayal Nagar, Ranchi with his Aprilia scooter bearing Registration No. JH01ES8402, where Rinku alias Santosh Kumar (brother of Munna Singh) handed over bags filled with currency/note bundles, and after receiving those bags, he used to park the said bags beneath bed and almirah at his Flat No. IA, Sir Syed Residency, Kumhartoli, Ranchi safely. Thus, it is ascertained that Sanjeev Kumar Lal takes care of the collection of commission on behalf of Minister Alamgir Alam. 29.

Statements of various Chief Engineers/Engineers of RWD, JSRRDA and RDSD were recorded u/s 50 of PMLA, 2002 wherein they have inter alia stated that commission is collected by the engineers/officials from contractors/companies/firms against tender allocation in the RWD, JSRRDA and RDSD departments. The commission of 3% of the total amount mentioned in LOA (Letter of Acceptance) is fixed for tender allotment, the distribution of which among the Ministers, bureaucrats, engineers and other officials is as under: (a) 1. 35%- Minister, Alamgir Alam (through his PS Sanjeev Kumar Lal) (b) 1. 65%-Top bureaucrats and other engineers/officials 30. They also stated that the collection of commission for minister Alamgir Alam has been done by Sanjeev Kumar Lal through his person/agent and for other persons the commission has been collected by Chief Engineer, JSRRDA himself and, through his selected persons. 31.

It has been contended that the co-accused Veerendra Kumar Ram during his statement made u/s 50 of PMLA stated that in one of the instances crores of commission were handed over to the co-accused Sanjeev Kumar Lal, PS of the present petitioner, in September 2022. 32. The petitioner Alamgir Alam is Minister of (i) Department of Rural Works (RWD), (ii) Department of Panchayati Raj and (iii) Department of Rural Development (RDD) Jharkhand State Rural Road Development Authority (JSRRDA) and Rural Development Special Division (RDSD) are the part of the Department of Rural Works (RWD). RWD, JSRRDA and RDSD constructs the roads and bridges in the state of Jharkhand, for which tenders are floated by these departments, against which 3% commission has been collected. He being the minister of these departments, is all in all and at the top echelon in the syndicate of commission collection.

He has pressurized and compelled the Chief Engineer under his portfolio to collect commission and give him his share through his PS Sanjeev Kumar Lal. 33. It has further been contended that he has instructed Sanjeev Kumar Lal to collect his 1. 35% share in total commission which is 3% of total tender value accordingly, Sanjeev Kumar Lal has instructed departmental engineers to hand over the commission part of Alamgir Alam to Munna Singh and/or his brother Santosh Kumar alias Rinku Singh. Further Munna Singh has stated that he has collected a total of Rs. 53 crores of commission from such engineers/contractors and handed over Rs. 50 crores approx to Sanjeev Lal through Jahangir Alam. Thus, the same amount of POC was acquired by Alamgir Alam through Sanjeev Kumar Lal, out of this Rs. 53 crores, an amount of Rs. 35 crores approx. was seized during the search proceeding. 34.

It has been contended that it is ascertained from the statement of Veerendra Kumar Ram and Sanjeev Kumar Lal that Alamgir Alam also acquired a commission amount of Rs. 3 crores from Veerendra Kumar Ram through one engineer of the department and same transaction was also assisted by Sanjeev Kumar Lal in September 2022. 35. Thus, the petitioner Alamgir Alam is found to be directly indulged and actually involved in possession and concealment of at least Rs 35 crores of the Proceeds of Crime through Sanjeev Kumar Lal and he has also found to be directly indulged and actually involved in acquisition and concealment of at least Rs. 56 crores of the Proceeds of Crime. 36. It is further argued by the prosecution that the misdeeds of the accused may not be covered u/s 197 Cr. P. C. as its operation has to be limited to those duties which are discharged in course of official duty and collection of commission or bribe can’t be considered as official duty of the petitioner.

In order to substantiate this limb of argument the learned counsel for respondent ED has relied upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India rendered in the case of Shadakshari vs State of Karnatka& others, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 42. 37. Learned counsel for the Opposite Party-ED, on the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that it is, therefore, not a fit case where the impugned orders to be interfered with. Analysis 38. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and has also gone through the finding recorded by the learned trial Court in the impugned orders as also the counter affidavit. 39. In the background of the factual aspect as referred hereinabove in the preceding paragraphs, the issues which require consideration are that: (i) Whether the orders dated 03. 12. 2024 and 07. 12. 2024 by which the application for discharge filed by the petitioner has been dismissed and charges have been framed respectively, can be said to suffer from an error?

(ii) Whether on the basis of the evidence which has been collected in course of investigation, prima facie case against the petitioner is made out or not? 40. Since both the issues are interlinked as such, they are taken up together. 41. This Court, before appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the parties deems it fit and proper to discuss herein some of the provisions of law as contained under the Act, 2002 with its object and intent. 42. The Act 2002 was enacted to address the urgent need to have a comprehensive legislation inter alia for preventing money-laundering, attachment of proceeds of crime, adjudication and confiscation thereof including vesting of it in the Central Government, setting up of agencies and mechanisms for coordinating measures for combating money laundering and also to prosecute the persons indulging in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime. 43.

It is, thus, evident that Act 2002 was enacted in order to answer the urgent requirement to have a comprehensive legislation inter alia for preventing money-laundering, attachment of proceeds of crime, adjudication and confiscation thereof for combating money-laundering and also to prosecute the persons indulging in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime. 44. It needs to refer herein the definition of “proceeds of crime” as provided under Section 2(1)(u) of the Act, 2002 which reads as under: “2 (1) (u) “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property 3[or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country] 4[or abroad]; [Explanation.

—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that "proceeds of crime" include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence;]” 45. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad. 46.

In the explanation it has been referred that for removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that "proceeds of crime" include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence. The aforesaid explanation has been inserted in the statute book by way of Act 23 of 2019.

It is, thus, evident that the reason for giving explanation under Section 2(1)(u) is by way of clarification to the effect that whether as per the substantive provision of Section 2(1)(u), the property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country but by way of explanation the proceeds of crime has been given broader implication by including property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence. 47.

The “property” has been defined under Section 2(1)(v) which means any property or assets of every description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible and includes deeds and instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such property or assets, wherever located. 48. The schedule has been defined under Section 2(1)(x) which means schedule to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The “scheduled offence” has been defined under Section 2(1)(y) which reads as under: “21(y) “scheduled offence” means— (i) the offences specified under Part A of the Schedule; or (ii) the offences specified under Part B of the Schedule if the total value involved in such offences is [one crore rupees] or more; or (iii) the offences specified under Part C of the Schedule. ” 49.

It is evident that the “scheduled offence” means the offences specified under Part A of the Schedule; or the offences specified under Part B of the Schedule if the total value involved in such offences is [one crore rupees] or more; or the offences specified under Part C of the Schedule. 50. The offence of money laundering has been defined under Section 3 of the Act, 2002, which reads as under: “3. Offence of money-laundering. —Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the [proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming] it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering. [Explanation.

— For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that,— (i) a person shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering if such person is found to have directly or indirectly attempted to indulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in one or more of the following processes or activities connected with proceeds of crime, namely:— (a) concealment; or (b) possession; or (c) acquisition; or (d) use; or (e) projecting as untainted property; or (f) claiming as untainted property, in any manner whatsoever; (ii) the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever. ]” 51.

It is evident from the aforesaid provision that “offence of money laundering” means whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering. 52. It is further evident that the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever. 53. The punishment for money laundering has been provided under Section 4 of the Act, 2002. 54.

The various provisions of the Act, 2002 along with interpretation of the definition of “proceeds of crime” has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. , (2022) SCC OnLine SC 929 wherein the Bench comprising of three Hon’ble Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has decided the issue by taking into consideration the object and intent of the Act, 2002. 55. It is evident that the purposes and objects of the 2002 Act for which it has been enacted, is not limited to punishment for offence of money laundering, but also to provide measures for prevention of money laundering. It is also to provide for attachment of proceeds of crime, which are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which may result in frustrating any proceeding relating to confiscation of such proceeds under the 2002 Act.

This Act is also to compel the banking companies, financial institutions and intermediaries to maintain records of the transactions, to furnish information of such transactions within the prescribed time in terms of Chapter IV of the 2002 Act. 56.

The predicate offence has been considered in the aforesaid judgment wherein by taking into consideration the explanation as inserted by way of Act 23 of 2019 under the definition of the “proceeds of crime” as contained under Section 2(1)(u), whereby and whereunder, it has been clarified for the purpose of removal of doubts that, the "proceeds of crime" include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence, meaning thereby, the words “any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence” will come under the fold of the proceeds of crime. 57. In the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors.

(supra) it has been held that the Authority under the 2002 Act, is to prosecute a person for offence of money-laundering only if it has reason to believe, which is required to be recorded in writing that the person is in possession of “proceeds of crime”. Only if that belief is further supported by tangible and credible evidence indicative of involvement of the person concerned in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime, action under the Act can be taken forward for attachment and confiscation of proceeds of crime and until vesting thereof in the Central Government, such process initiated would be a standalone process. 58. Now, after having discussed the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court on the issue of various provisions of the Act, 2002, this Court, is proceeding to discuss the principle governing discharge and framing of charge. 59.

Section 250 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNSS’ for brevity) provides for discharge in sessions cases, which reads as follows: “250. Discharge (1) The accused may prefer an application for discharge within a period of sixty days from the date of commitment of the case under section 232 (BNSS). (2) If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so. ” 60. Section 227 of Code of Criminal Procedure (‘CrPC’ for brevity) contemplates discharge by the Court of Session. The trial Judge is required to discharge the accused if the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. Section 250(2) BNSS corresponds to section 227 CrPC.

Section 250(1) BNSS stipulates a time limit of 60 days from the date of committal of the case within which an application for discharge should be filed by the accused. 61. Section 239 CrPC provides for discharge of accused in warrant cases instituted upon a police report. The power under section 239 Cr. P. C. is exercisable when Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless. Section 262(2) BNSS is similar to section 239 CrPC but section 262 BNSS provides an opportunity to the learned Magistrate to examine the accused either physically or through audio – video electronic means. Section 262(1) BNSS stipulates a time limit of 60 days from the date of supply of documents under section 230 BNSS within which an application should for discharge should be filed by the accused. 62. Section 245 Cr. P. C. deals with warrant cases instituted otherwise than on a police report. Section 245 CrPC corresponds to section 268 of BNSS. The power under section 245 (1) Cr. P. C.

is exercisable when the Magistrate considers that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted would warrant his conviction. The Magistrate has the power of discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case under section 245 (2) Cr. P. C. Sections 227 and 239 Cr. P. C. provide for discharge before the recording of evidence on the basis of the police report, the documents sent along with it and examination of the accused after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard. But the stage of discharge under section 245 Cr. P. C. , on the other hand, is reached only after the evidence referred in section 244 is taken. Despite the difference in the language of the provisions of sections 227, 239 and 245 Cr. P. C. and whichever provision may be applicable, the Court is required to see, at the time of framing of charge, that there is a prima facie case for proceeding against the accused.

The main intention of granting a chance to the accused of making submissions as envisaged under sections 227 or 239 of Cr. P. C. is to assist the Court to determine whether it is required to proceed to conduct the trial. 63. The issue of discharge was the subject matter before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamilnadu, by Inspector of Police in Vigilance and Anti-Corruption v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709, wherein, at paragraphs no. 29, 32. 4, 33 and 34, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under:— “29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr. Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge.

It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out.

To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage. 32. 4. While passing the impugned orders [N. Suresh Rajan v. Inspector of Police, Criminal Revision Case (MD) No. 528 22 of 2009, order dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)], [State v. K. Ponmudi, (2007) 1 Mad LJ (Cri) 100], the court has not sifted the materials for the purpose of finding out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused but whether that would warrant a conviction. We are of the opinion that this was not the stage where the court should have appraised the evidence and discharged the accused as if it was passing an order of acquittal. Further, defect in investigation itself cannot be a ground for discharge.

In our opinion, the order impugned [N. Suresh Rajan v. Inspector of Police, Criminal Revision Case (MD) No. 528 of 2009, order dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)] suffers from grave error and calls for rectification. 33. Any observation made by us in this judgment is for the purpose of disposal of these appeals and shall have no bearing on the trial. The surviving respondents are directed to appear before the respective courts on 3-2-2014. The Court shall proceed with the trial from the stage of charge in accordance with law and make endeavour to dispose of the same expeditiously. 34. In the result, we allow these appeals and set aside the order of discharge with the aforesaid observations. 64. It is further settled position of law that defence on merit is not to be considered at the time of stage of framing of charge and that cannot be a ground of discharge. A reference may be made to the judgment as rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v.

Ashok Kumar Kashyap, (2021) 11 SCC 191. For ready reference, paragraph no. 11 of the said judgment is being quoted hereinbelow: — “11. While considering the legality of the impugned judgment [Ashok Kumar Kashyap v. State of Rajasthan, 2018 SCC OnLine Raj 3468] and order passed by the High Court, the law on the subject and few decisions of this Court are required to be referred to. 11. 1. In P. Vijayan [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488], this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 CrPC What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11. 2. In the recent decision of this Court in M. R. Hiremath [State of Karnataka v. M. R.

Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 109 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 380], one of us (D. Y. Chandrachud, J. ) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under : (SCC p. 526) “25. The High Court [M. R. Hiremath v. State, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 4970] ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 239 CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of T. N. v. N.

Suresh Rajan [State of T. N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721], adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held : (SCC pp. 721-22, para 29) ‘29. … At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage. ” 65.

Further, it is pertinent to mention here that power to discharge an accused was designed to prevent harassment to an innocent person by the arduous trial or the ordeal of prosecution. How that intention is to be achieved is reasonably clear in the section itself. The power has been entrusted to the Sessions Judge who brings to bear his knowledge and experience in criminal trials. Besides, he has the assistance of counsel for the accused and Public Prosecutor. He is required to hear both sides before framing any charge against the accused or for discharging him. If the Sessions Judge after hearing the parties frames a charge and also makes an order in support thereof, the law must be allowed to take its own course. Self-restraint on the part of the High Court should be the rule unless there is a glaring injustice which stares the court in the face. The opinion on any matter may differ depending upon the person who views it.

There may be as many opinions on a particular matter as there are courts but it is no ground for the High Court to interdict the trial. It would be better for the High Court to allow the trial to proceed. Reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment as rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715. 66. Further, the difference between the approach with which the Court should examine the matter in the discharge has been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460, in the following words: — “17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code.

Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the “record of the case” and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the Section exists, then the court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative.

Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code. 30. We have already noticed that the legislature in its wisdom has used the expression “there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence”. 67. This has an inbuilt element of presumption once the ingredients of an offence with reference to the allegations made are satisfied, the Court would not doubt the case of the prosecution unduly and extend its jurisdiction to quash the charge in haste. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa (1996) 4 SCC 659 referred to the meaning of the word “presume” while relying upon Black's Law Dictionary. It was defined to mean “to believe or accept upon probable evidence”; “to take as proved until evidence to the contrary is forthcoming”.

In other words, the truth of the matter has to come out when the prosecution evidence is led, the witnesses are cross-examined by the defence, the incriminating material and evidence is put to the accused in terms of Section 313 of the Code and then the accused is provided an opportunity to lead defence, if any. It is only upon completion of such steps that the trial concludes with the court forming its final opinion and delivering its judgment. Merely because there was a civil transaction between the parties would not by itself alter the status of the allegations constituting the criminal offence. ” 68. Thus, it is evident that the law regarding the approach to be adopted by the Court while considering an application for discharge of the accused person the Court has to form a definite opinion, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 69.

The Hon'ble Apex Court has further dealt with the proper basis for framing of charge in the case of Onkar Nath Mishra v. State (NCT of Delhi) wherein, at paragraphs 11, 12 and 14, it has been held as under: “11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out.

At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence. 12. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [(1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404], a three-Judge Bench of this Court had observed that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to apply its mind to the question whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As framing of charge affects a person's liberty substantially, need for proper consideration of material warranting such order was emphasised. 14. In a later decision in State of M. P. v. Mohanlal Soni [(2000) 6 SCC 338 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1110] this Court, referring to several previous decisions held that : (SCC p. 342, para 7) “7.

The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. ” The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Palwinder Singh v. Balvinder Singh, (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 850 has been pleased to hold that charges can also be framed on the basis of strong suspicion. Marshaling and appreciation of the evidence is not in the domain of the court at that point of time. 52. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 368, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the scope of Sections 227 and 228 CrPC. The principles which emerged therefrom have been taken note of in para 21 as under: “21.

On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge: (i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc.

However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence.

For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. 70. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of M. E. Shivalingamurthy v. CBI, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 768, the above principles have been reiterated in para 17, 18, 28 to 31 and the Hon'ble supreme court has explained as to how the matters of grave suspicion are to be dealt with. The aforesaid paragraphs are being quoted as under: “17. This is an area covered by a large body of case law. We refer to a recent judgment which has referred to the earlier decisions viz. P.

Vijayan v. State of Kerala and discern the following principles: 17. 1. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge would be empowered to discharge the accused. 17. 2. The trial Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the instance of the prosecution. 17. 3. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the police or the documents produced before the Court. 17. 4. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, “cannot show that the accused committed offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial”. 17. 5.

It is open to the accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the grave suspicion. 17. 6. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons. 17. 7. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution, has to be accepted as true. 17. 8. There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a charge and refusing to discharge the accused. 18. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged under Section 227 CrPC (see State of J&K v. Sudershan Chakkar).

The expression, “the record of the case”, used in Section 227 CrPC, is to be understood as the documents and the articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. At the stage of framing of the charge, the submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the police (see State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi). 28. It is here that again it becomes necessary that we remind ourselves of the contours of the jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC.

The principle established is to take the materials produced by the prosecution, both in the form of oral statements and also documentary material, and act upon it without it been subjected to questioning through cross-examination and everything assumed in favour of the prosecution, if a scenario emerges where no offence, as alleged, is made out against the accused, it, undoubtedly, would ensure to the benefit of the accused warranting the trial court to discharge the accused. 29. It is not open to the accused to rely on the material by way of defence and persuade the court to discharge him. 30. However, what is the meaning of the expression “materials on the basis of which grave suspicion is aroused in the mind of the court's”, which is not explained away? Can the accused explain away the material only with reference to the materials produced by the prosecution? Can the accused rely upon material which he chooses to produce at the stage? 31.

In view of the decisions of this Court that the accused can only rely on the materials which are produced by the prosecution, it must be understood that the grave suspicion, if it is established on the materials, should be explained away only in terms of the materials made available by the prosecution. No doubt, the accused may appeal to the broad probabilities to the case to persuade the court to discharge him. ” 71. It has been further held in the case of Asim Shariff v. National Investigation Agency, (2019) 7 SCC 148, that mini trial is not expected by the trial court for the purpose of marshalling the evidence on record at the time of framing of charge, wherein, it has been held at paragraph no. 18 of the said judgment as under:— “18.

Taking note of the exposition of law on the subject laid down by this Court, it is settled that the Judge while considering the question of framing charge under Section 227 CrPC in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the material placed before the court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the charge; by and large if two views are possible and one of them giving rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion against the accused, the trial Judge will be justified in discharging him.

It is thus clear that while examining the discharge application filed under Section 227 CrPC, it is expected from the trial Judge to exercise its judicial mind to determine as to whether a case for trial has been made out or not. It is true that in such proceedings, the court is not supposed to hold a mini trial by marshalling the evidence on record. ” 72. In the case of Asim Shariff v. NIA, (supra), it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the words ‘not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused’ clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts.

At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. 73.

Thus, from aforesaid legal propositions it can be safely inferred that if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so and if, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the trial Court shall frame the charge. However, the defence of the accused cannot be looked into at the stage of discharge. The accused has no right to produce any document at that stage. The application for discharge has to be considered on the premise that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true. 74.

Thus, at the time of considering an application for discharge, the Court is required to consider the limited extent to find out whether there is prima facie evidence against the accused to believe that he has committed any offence as alleged by the prosecution; if prima facie evidence is available against the accused, then there cannot be an order of discharge. 75. Therefore, the stage of discharge is a stage prior to framing of the charge and once the Court rejects the discharge application, it would proceed to framing of charge.

At the stage of discharge, the Judge has merely to sift and weigh the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the prosecution or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame the charge against him and after that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge and, if not, he will discharge the accused. 76. While exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 77.

It is considered view that at this stage of the instant case, the Court was only required to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not because at the stage of framing of the charge and / or considering the discharge application, the mini trial is not permissible. 78. It requires to refer herein that the purpose of framing a charge is to provide the accused with detailed information about the allegations against him. Framing of proper charge is one of the basic requirements of a fair trial. Charge is of great significance in a criminal trial as it helps not only the accused in knowing the accusation against him but also helps him in the preparation of his defence. 79. In a criminal trial the charge is the foundation of the accusation and every care must be taken to see that it is not only properly framed.

At the initial stage of framing a charge, the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce are not to be considered meticulously. 80. It is settled position of law that the accused is entitled in law to know with precision what is the law on which they are put to trial. Charges are framed against the accused only when the Court finds that the accused is not entitled to discharge under the relevant provision of CrPC/BNSS. 81. In Sessions case the Court shall frame a charge in writing against the accused when the Court is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence as can be seen from Section 252 of the BNSS. In warrant cases, a charge shall be framed when a prima facie case has been made out against the accused as is evident from sections 263 and 269 of BNSS. 82. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in State of Maharastra vs.

Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 has been pleased to hold that if the Court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused had committed the offence. It was further held that at the stage of framing of charge the Court cannot look into the probative value of the materials on record. 83. Further, while considering the question of framing a charge, the Court has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the materials for the limited purpose for finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. In exercising the power, the Court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution. 84.

The test to determine a prima facie case against the accused would naturally depend on the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down the rule of universal application and if the material placed before the Court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in framing the charge and proceeding with the trial. 85. In Kanti Bhadra Shah vs. State of West Bengal, (2000) 1 SCC 722, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that whenever the trial Court decides to frame charges, it is not necessary to record reasons or to do discuss evidence in detail. 86. In State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that at the stage of framing of charge, evidence cannot be gone into meticulously.

It was held that it is immaterial whether the case is based on direct or circumstantial evidence and a charge can be framed if there are materials showing possibility about commission of the offence by the accused as against certainty. 87. It needs to refer herein that Sections 215 and 464 CrPC ensure that technicalities do not defeat justice. Both the sections lay that irregularity or error in framing a charge is not fatal unless the accused is able to show that prejudice is caused to him as result of such irregularity or omission. The object of section 238 BNSS is to prevent failure of justice on account of irregularity in framing of charge. 88.

In judging a question of prejudice, as of guilt, the Court must act with a broader vision and look to the substance and not to the technicalities, and its main concern should be to see whether the accused had a fair trial, whether he knew what he was being tried for, whether the main facts sought to be established against him were explained to him fairly and clearly and whether he had a full and fair chance to defend himself. 89. In State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Paras Nathi Singh, 2009 INSC 669, the Hon’ble Supreme Court after considering the language of Section 464 Cr. P. C. held that the burden is on the accused to show that a failure of justice has been occasioned on account of error, omission or irregularity of the charge. 90. Thus, framing of charge is not a mere empty formality. Every endeavour must be made in a criminal trial to ensure that appropriate charge is framed against the accused.

Even though mere omission, error or irregularity in framing charges does not ipso facto vitiate trial, the accused should be made fully aware of the specific accusations against him in order to defend himself properly. Apart from safeguarding the interests of the accused, framing of proper charge also ensures that the interests of the victims and the society at large are safeguarded and no guilty person goes unpunished only on account of error in framing the charge. 91. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in DipakbhaiJagdhishchandra Patel vs. State of Gujarat, (2009) 16 SCC 547 has been pleased to hold that: “21. At the stage of framing the charge in accordance with the principles which have been laid down by this Court, what the Court is expected to do is, it does not act as a mere post office. The Court must indeed sift the material before it. The material to be sifted would be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution.

The sifting of material before the Court is not to be meticulous in the sense that Court dons the mantle of the trial Judge hearing arguments after the entire evidence has been adduced after a full fledged trial and the question is not whether the prosecution has made out the case for the conviction of the accused. All that is required is, the Court must be satisfied that with the materials available, a case is made our for the accused to stand trial. A strong suspicion suffices. However, a strong suspicion must be founded on some material. ” 92. Thus, from the aforesaid judicial pronouncements, it is evident that at the stage of framing charges, trial court is not to examine and assess in detail the material placed on record by the prosecution nor is it for the court to consider the sufficiency of the materials to establish the offence alleged against the accused persons.

Marshalling of facts and appreciation of evidence at the time of framing of charge is not in the domain of the court. Charge can be framed even on the basis of strong suspicion founded upon materials before the court which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged against the accused. 93. It needs to refer herein that ingredients of offences should be seen in the material produced before the court for framing of charges and duty of court at the stage of framing of charges is to see whether the ingredients of offences are available in the material produced before the court. Contradictions in the statements of witnesses or sufficiency or truthfulness of the material placed before the court cannot be examined at the stage of framing of the charge. For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence.

Court has to consider material only with a view to find out if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offense and not for the purpose of arriving at a definite conclusion. “Presume‟ means if on the basis of materials on record, court can come to the conclusion that commission of the offense is a probable consequence, then a case for framing of charge exists. 94. Thus, it is well settled that at the time of framing of charge, meticulous examination of evidence is not required, however the evidence can be sifted or weighed at least for the purpose of recording a satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out for framing charge to proceed in the case. Further the trial Court is not required to discuss the evidence for the purpose of conducting a trial but the discussion of the materials on record is required to reflect the application of judicial mind for finding that a prima-facie case is made out against the petitioner. 95.

It is settled connotation of law that at the stage of framing of charge, the probable defence of the accused is not to be considered and the materials, which are relevant for consideration, are the allegations made in the First Information Report/complaint, the statement of the witnesses recorded in course of investigation, the documents on which the prosecution relies and the report of investigation submitted by the prosecuting agency. The probative value of the defence is to be tested at the stage of trial and not at the stage of framing of charge and at the stage of framing of charge minute scrutiny of the evidence is not to be made and even on a very strong suspicion, charges can be framed. 96. Further, it is settled position of law that at the stage of framing the charge, the trial Court is not required to meticulously examine and marshal the material available on record as to whether there is sufficient material against the accused which would ultimately result in conviction.

The Court is prima facie required to consider whether there is sufficient material against the accused to presume the commission of the offence. Even strong suspicion about commission of offence is sufficient for framing the charge, the guilt or innocence of the accused has to be determined at the time of conclusion of the trial after evidence is adduced and not at the stage of framing the charge and, therefore, at the stage of framing the charge, the Court is not required to undertake an elaborate inquiry for the purpose of sifting and weighing the material. 97. Recently, the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohd. Maqbool Magrey, (2022) 12 SCC 657 has elaborately discussed the issue of framing of charge and has held at paragraph-27 which reads as under: “27. Thus from the aforesaid, it is evident that the trial court is enjoined with the duty to apply its mind at the time of framing of charge and should not act as a mere post office.

The endorsement on the charge-sheet presented by the police as it is without applying its mind and without recording brief reasons in support of its opinion is not countenanced by law. However, the material which is required to be evaluated by the court at the time of framing charge should be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting of such material is not to be so meticulous as would render the exercise a mini trial to find out the guilt or otherwise of the accused. All that is required at this stage is that the court must be satisfied that the evidence collected by the prosecution is sufficient to presume that the accused has committed an offence. Even a strong suspicion would suffice.

Undoubtedly, apart from the material that is placed before the court by the prosecution in the shape of final report in terms of Section 173 CrPC, the court may also rely upon any other evidence or material which is of sterling quality and has direct bearing on the charge laid before it by the prosecution. ” 98. Thus, from aforesaid legal propositions it can be safely inferred that if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so and if, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the trial Court shall frame the charge. 99.

Therefore, the stage of discharge is a stage prior to framing of the charge and once the Court rejects the discharge application, it would proceed for framing of charge. At the stage of discharge, the Judge has merely to sift and weigh the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the prosecution or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame the charge against him and after that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge and, if not, he will discharge the accused. 100.

While exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 101. It is the considered view that at this stage of the instant case, the Court was only required to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not because at the stage of framing of the charge and

Source: High Court of Jharkhand. Dataset: Dattam Labs. CC BY 4.0. Text extracted automatically; compare with the source PDF for layout and accuracy.