A. S. KRISHNA v. STATE OF MADRAS.
Citation: [1957] 1 S.C.R. 399; 1956 INSC 74
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: SUDHI RANJAN DAS , NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, S.K. DAS
Judgment date:
Case summary
1956 INSC 74. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1956-11-28. A. S. KRISHNA v. STATE OF MADRAS. Read the judgment and case details on LawSphereX.
Judgment text
S. C. R.. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 399 A. S. KRISHNA t!. STATE OF MADRAS. (with connected appeals) (S. R. DAS C. J. , BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA and S. K. DAs, JJ. ) Madras Prohibition Act, 1937 (Mad. X of 1937), ss. 4(1), 4(2), 28, 29, 30, 31, 32-Constitutional validity-Legislative competency- Pith and substance of the legislation-The Government of India Act, 1935 (26 Geo. 5 & 1 Edw. 8 Ch. 2), s. 107(1), Sch. 7 List II, Entry 31-Constitution of India, Art. 14. The appellants were charged before the Presidency Magistrate for offences under the Madras Prohibition Act, 1937 and when the cases were taken up for trial they raised the contentions that ss. 4(2) and 28 to 32 of the Act are void under s. 107(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, because they are repugnant to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and also because they are repugnant to Art. 14 of the Constitution of India.
On their application, the Magistrate referred the questions for the opinion of the High Court under s. 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court having answered the questions against the appellants they preferred the present appeal under Art. 136. Held, that the Madras Prohibition Act, 1937, is both in form and in substance a law relating to intoxicating liquors and that the presumptions in s. 4(2) and the provisions relating to search, seizure and arrest in ss. 28 to 32 of the Act have no operation apart from offences created by the Act and are wholly ancillary to the exercise of the legislative power under Entry 31 in List II, Sch. 7 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Accordingly the Act is in its entirety a law within the exclusive competence of the Pro- vincial Legislature and the question of repugnancy under s. 107(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, does not arise.
When a law is impugned on the ground that it is ultra vires the powers of the legislature which enacted it, what has to be ascertained is the true character of the legislation. To do that, one must hav~ regard to the enactment as a whole, to its objects and to the scope and effect of its provisions. If on such e)famina- tion it is found that the legislation is in substance one on a matter assigned to the legislature, then it must be held to be valid in its entirety, even though it might incidentally trench on matters which are beyond its competence. It would be quite an erroneous approach to the question to view such a statute not as an organic whole, but as a mere collection of sections, then disintegrate it into parts, examine under what heads of legislation those parts 1956 November, 28. 1956 A. S. Krishna v. State of Madras 400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1957] would severally fall, and by that process determine \vhat portions thereof are intra vires, and what are not.
Subrahrnanyan Chettiar v. · Muthustvanzi Goundan, (1940) F. C. R. 188, Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. The Bank of Commerce Ltd. (1940) L. R. 74 I. A. 23 and Lakhi Narayan Das v. The Province of Bihm· (1949) F. C. R. 693, relied on, Held fm·ther, that the presumptions in s. 4(2) of the Act do not offend the requirements as to equality before law or the equal protection of laws under Art. 14, as they have to be raised against all persons against who1n the facts tnentioncd therein are estab~ lishe ion is only prima facie evidence, and the party is permitted to produce such testimony as will show the truth concern- ing the possession of the slips. Furthermore, it is within the established power of the state to prescribe the evidence which is to be received in the courts of its own government. " (1) 192 U. S. 585 ; 48 L. Ed. 575. S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 413 In Robert Hawes v.
State of Georgia( 1 ), the question arose with reference to a statute of the State of Georgia, which had made it an offence to knowingly permit persons to locate in premises apparatus for distilling and manufacturing prohibited liquors. It also enacted a presumption that when such apparatus was found in a place, the person in occupation thereof shall be presumed to have knowingly permitted the location of the apparatus. The question was whether this pre- sumption was repugnant to the due process clause. In holding that it was not, the Court observed : "Distilling spirits is not an ordinary incident of a farm, and, in a prohibition state, has illicit character and purpose, an<l certainly is not so silent and obscure · in use that one who rented a farm upon which it was or had been conducted would probably be ignorant of it. On ~he contrary, it may be presumed that one on such a farm, or one who occupies it, will know what there is upon it.
It is not arbitrary for the state to act upon the presumption and erect it into evidence of knowledge ; not peremptory, of course, but subject to explanation, and affording the means of explanation. " It is therefore clear that even on the application of the due process clause, the presumptions iaid down in s. 4(2) cannot be ftruck down as unconstitutional. We should adp that the construction which the appellants seek to put on s. 4(2) that a person in possession of liquor could under that section, be presumed to have ·committed an offence under s. 4(1) (g) or that a person who is in possession of materials, implement or appa- ratus could be presumed to have committed offences under s. 4( 1) (a) and (j) is not correct. In our opinion, the matters mentioned in s. 4(2) should be read distri- butively in relation to the offences mentioned in s. 4(1). Possession of liquor, for example, is an offence under s. 4(1) (a)~ The presumption in s.
4(2) is that if it is found in the possession of a person, he should be presumed to have committed the offence under s. 4(1) (a), unless he could give satisfactory explanation therefor, as for example, that it must have been foisted in the place without his knowledge. Likewise, it would be an (1) 258 U. S. I; 66. L. Ed. 431. 1956 A. S. Krishna v. State of Madras Venkatarama AyyarJ. 1956 A. S. Erishna v. State of Madras Venkalarama Ayy"' ], November, 29. 414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1957J offence under s. 4(1)(g) to be in possession of materials, still, implement or apparatus whatsoever for the tapping of toddy or the manufacture of liquor. Under s. 4(2)(a), if a person is found to be in possession of materials or other things mentioned in the sub-section,. there is a presumption that he has committed an offence under s. 4(1)(g), but it is open to him to account satisfactorily therefor. The contention, therefore, that there is no reasonable relation between the .
presumption and the offence is, in our opinion, based on a misreading of the section. Both the contentions urged on behalf of the appel- lants having failed, these appeals are dismissed. Appeal dismissed. MOHAMMAD GHOUSE ti. STATE OF ANDHRA [S. R. DAS C. J. , BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA and S. K. DAs, JJ. J Government - Servant-Judicial Officer-DiscipHnary Proceed- ings-Enquiry into charges-Jurisdiction of the High Court-Order of suspension pending final orders by the Government-Power of the High Court-Constitution of India, Art. 311-. Madras Civil Services ( ClaSJification, Control and Appeal) Rules, rr. 13, 17(e)-Madras Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceed in gs Tribunal) Rules, 1948- And hra Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1953, r. 4(1) (a). The appellant was at the relevant dates posted as Subordinate Judge at Masulipatam and Amalapuram.
Charges were made against him of bribery and serious irregularities in the discharge of official duties, and they were enquire<l into by one of the judges of the Madras High Court who sent his reports on August 20, 1953, and November 10, 1953. On the basis of the reports the High Court decided on January 25, 1954, that the appellant should be dismissed from service on the charge of bribery and ren1oved from service on the charge of irregularities, and on January 28, 1954, placed hi1n on suspension until further orders. The appellant moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Con~ . stitution of lndia for quashing the order of suspension on the grmJnd (1) that under r. 4(1)(a) of the Andhra Civil Services (Dis· ciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1953, an enquiry into the·
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