A. SATYANARAYANA REDDY AND ORS. v. THE PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, GUNTUR & ORS

Citation: [2008] 7 S.C.R. 105

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: S.B. SINHA, V.S. SIRPURKAR

Case summary

A. SATYANARAYANA REDDY AND ORS. v. THE PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, GUNTUR & ORS.pdf

Judgment text

[2008) 7 S. C. R. 105 ,:_ y A. SATYANARAYANA REDDY AND ORS. v. THE PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, GUNTUR & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 3053 of 2008) • • . Construction Corporation v. Pritam Singh Gill & Ors. [(1973) 1 S. C. R. 40]. 10. Mr. R. Sundravardhan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, would contend that in view of the definition of workman as contained in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the workman having opted for voluntary retirement ceased to be the workman of the State and thus the proceedings under ir Section 33C(2) of the Act wais rightly held to be not maintainable. " Apart from relying on A. K. Bindal (supra), reliance has also ,A • been placed by Mr. Sundravardhan on a decision of the Bombay r High Court in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. PAL VRS Employees Welfare Association & Anr. [2002 (1) LLJ 527]. 11.

Section 2(s) of the Act defines a workman to mean : "2(s) "workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of \.. employment be express or implied, and for the purposes f'of any proceeding und13r this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, ..... discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person - ....

(i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45of1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature. " 12. A literal meaning given to the said provision would indicate that the workmen have ceased to enjoy the protection conferred upon them under the said Act. 13. Would the workmen continue to be workmen for the purpose of filing an application under Section 33C(2) of the Act · is the question. 14. Before embarking on the said question, we may notice that the contention of Mr.

Sundravardhan before us was that all the legal dues have been paid to the workmen. We are not concerned with the merit of the matter; maintainability of the application under Section 33C(2) being in issue. 15. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that ordinarily upon opting for a voluntary retirement under a Scheme framed in that behalf, the workmen would cease to have any claim against the management. However, the same prima facie in our opinionwould not mean that a statutory right of opting for lay off compensation, unless expressly waived, may continue to · remain within the realm of legal right, so as to enforce the same ·before a forum constituted under the Act. The Bombay High Court in Premier Automobiles Ltd. (supra) as also this Court in A. K.

Bindal (supra) proceeded on the basis that an employee having received the amount of compensation without any demur whatsoever would be estopped and precluded from raising any · other orfurther claim stating: -f_• ''The employees accepted VRS with their eyes open without making any kind of protest regarding their past rights based upon revision of pay scale from 1. 1. 1992. " The said decision moreover proceeded on the basis that when the parties enter into a transaction known as "golden handshake", the jural relationship between the employer and ). the employee comes to an end. It was opined: "After the amount is paid and the employee ceases to be under the employment of the company or the undertaking, he leaves with all his rights and there is no question of his again agitating for any kind of his past rights with his erstwhile employer including making any claim with regard to enhancement of pay scale for an earlier period.

If the employee is still permitted to raise a grievance regarding enhancement of pay scale from a retrospective date, even after he has opted for Voluntary Retirement Scheme and has accepted the amount paid to him, the whole purpose of introducing the Scheme would be totally frustrated. " The claim of the appellants in A. K. Bindal (supra) was based on the revision in the scale of pay. It was in that context, the aforementioned observations were made. 16. The question which fell for consideration before the Bombay High Court was as to whether the employees having opted for the Voluntary Retirement Scheme can still ask for ~ benefits under a settlement which were overlapping with each ,, ' other. What was sought to be enforced in the said proceeding was the terms of a settlement. The Bombay High Court held: "The terms and conditions of the said Scheme are clear enough which show that the employees who opted for Voluntary Retirement Scheme were to be considered as ...

relieved from services of the Company within a week from the date of their letter of acceptance. According to the said Scheme, it would come into force with effect from ,,_ r December 20, 1991 and stood open till January 27, 1992. " The said decision, thus, was rendered in different fact situation. In Vijay Kumar & Ors. v. Whirlpool of India Ltd. & Ors. [(2008) 1 SCC 199], the Division Bench, inter alia, followed A. K. _,( Bindar (supra). 17. The decision of this Court in National Buildings Construction Corporation (supra) was not noticed in the aforementioned decision. The question which arose for , consideration therein was as to whether a workman even after an order of discharge could maintain an application under Section 33C(2) of the Act claiming lay off compensation, in response whereto this Court held: "In U. P. Electric Supply Co. v. R. K. Shukla [AIR 1970 SC 237] this Court approvingly referred to a passage from ,~ the judgment in Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co.

Ltd. (supra}, already reproduced by us, in which, inter alia, it was emphasized that Labour Court had jurisdiction to entertain a clai. m in respect of an existing right arising from the relationship of an industrial workman and his employer. Again in R. B. Bansilal Abhirchand Mills Co. (P) Ltd. v. The Labour Court, Nagpur [AIR 1972 S. C. 451] this Court, after a review of its previous decisions, upheld the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain application for lay-off compensation under s. 33C observing that such ,. , ' jurisdiction could not be ousted by a mere plea denying the workman's claim to computation of the benefit in terms of money, adding that the Labour Court had to go into the question and determine whether on the facts it had jurisdiction to make the computation. " Noticing a large number of decisions of the High Courts on the said subject, this Court held: "In order to remove this repugnancy s.

33C(2) must be so construed as to take within its fold a workman, who was employed during the period in respect of which he claims relief, even though he is 110 longer employe9 at the time of the application. In other words the term "workman" as used in s. 33C(2) includes all persons whose claim, requiring computation under this sub-section, is in respect of an existing right arising from his relationship as an industrial workman with his employer. By adopting this construction alone can we advance the remedy and suppress the mischief in accordance with the purpose and object of inserting s. 33C in the Act. " 18. The right of the workman to claim payment of lay off compensation is not denied or disputed. If the said claim has no nexus with the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, in our opinion, in a given case, like the present one, it is possible to hold that a proceeding under Section :33C(2) of the Act would be maintainable.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the question being one of some importance! should be considered by the larger Bench as there exists an apparent conflict in the said decisions of National Buildings Construction Corporation (supra) and AK Bindal (supra). We direct accordingly. Let the records be placed before the Hon'ble the ·chief Justice of India for passing appropriate orders. S. K. S. Referred to larger Bench. I •