AHER RAJA K.HIMA v. THE STATE OF SAURASHTRA
Citation: [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1285; 1955 INSC 81
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR , VIVIAN BOSE, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
Judgment date:
Case summary
1955 INSC 81. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1955-12-22. AHER RAJA K.HIMA v. THE STATE OF SAURASHTRA. Read the judgment and case details on LawSphereX.
Judgment text
2S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPO~TS 1285 report of the Income-tax Investigation Commission dated the 26th August 1952 and the assessment orders of the Income-Tax Officer for the y. ears . 1940-41, 1941"42 and 1943-44 to 1948-49, and that a writ of prohibition do i$sue against the resP,ondents restrain- ing them from implementing the findings. of the In- vestigation Commission with r~g;μ-~ to the year 1942-43. The respondents do pay the peritioners' costs of their petition. AHER RAJA K. HIMA v. THE STATE OF SAURASHTRA- [VIVIAN BosE, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and CHA:NDRASEKHARA Arr AR JJ l Appeal against Acqu#tal.... -Scqpe of-PoU}ers of Court-Guiding principles-Code . of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 417 Pel"' BosE and OitANDRAsEKHARA A1YAll JJ, (VENKATARAMA AYYAR J. dissenting).
It is well settled that the High' Court should not set aside an order of acquittal under s, 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure simply because it differs from the trial Court as to the appreciation of the evidence ; there must be substantial and com- pelling reasons for doing so. · Whete the trial Court takes a reason- able view of the facts of the case, interference is not justifiable un- less there are really· strong reasons for holding otherwise. Amar Singh v; State of Punjab ([1953] S. C. R. 418) and Surajpal Singh v. State ( f19521 S. C. R. 193), referred t,o. The accused in a criminal case must be given the benefit of every reasonable doubt and, therefore when he offers a reasonable expla- nation of his conduct, althougl;i he cannot prove it, that explanation should ordinarily be accepted unless the circumstances indicate that it is false. Conseq11ently,. in a case where an accused person, charged under ss.
302 and 447 of the lndian Penal Code, repudiated his confession at the earliest opportunity as having been made under Police threats administered to l>im at night while in, jail custody and there was evidence to show that the Police had access to hiru there, and there was nothing to displace his statement that he was threatened by them, the finding of the Sessions Judge that the t:onfession was not voluntary in character was fair and reasonaok and in the absence of auy compellihg reason the High Court shotild not have set aside the order of acquittal. 1955 M- Ct. Mulhiah and 2 others ·v. The' Commission. , of ltu:of/14-tax, Madras and another Jaganlladhadas J. 1955 Decmiher 22. 1955 Ahtr Raja Khima v. The State of Saurashlra 1286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955] As the evidence otherwise was insufficient to warrant a convic- tion the accused was acquitted. Per VENKATARAMA AYYAR J. This is not a case in which the Supreme Court should interfere under Art. 136 of the Constitution.
The Consti. tution by specifically providing for an appeal on facts under Art. 134( 1) intended to exclude it under Art, 136 and like the Privy Council this Court will not function as a further Court of ap- peal on facts in criminal Cases. The fact that the appeal in the High Court was one against an order of acquittal makes no difference as the powers of an appellate Court are the same in all appeals, whether -against acquittal or against conviction. Pritam Singh v. The State ([1950] S. C. R. 453), Shea Swarup v. King-Emperor ([19341 L. R. 61 I. A. 398) and Nur Mohammad v. Emperor (A. LR. 1945 P. C. 151), relied on. The expression "compelling reasons" used in Surajpal Singh's case should be read only in the context of that case and should not be treated as a rigid formula so as to restrict the powers of the Court, or the right of appeal conferred on the State by s.
417 of the Code or to place a judgment of acquittal in a l'osition of vantage and give the accused a protection which the law does not afford to them. Such a formula can be of use only as guiding principle for the appel- late Courts in determining questions of fact. Surajpal Singh v. The State ([1952] S. C. R. 193), considered. Consequently, the findings arrived at by the High Court were not open to review by this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution and as there was evidence apart from the retracted confession to support the view it had taken on merits, the appeal must be diSmissed. CRIMINAL . APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 64 of 1955. On appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 27th February 1954 of the Saurashtra High Court at Rajkot in Criminal Appeal No. 108 of 1953 arising out of the judgment and order dated the 5th March 1953 of the Court of Sessions Judge, Halar Division in Sessions Case No. 26 of 1952. V. N. Sethi, for the appellant. R.
Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent. 1955. December 22. BoSE J. -The only question in this whether the High Court had in mind the appeal is principles - • ' 2S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1287 we have enunciated about interference under section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code when it allowed the appeal field by the State against the acquittal of the appellant. It is, in our opinion, well settled that it is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence; there must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial Court was wrong: Amar Singh v. State of Punjab( 1 ); and if the trial Court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference under section 417 is not justifiable unless there are really strong reasons for reversing that view: Surajpal Singh v. State( 2 ). The appellant was prosecuted under sections 302 and 447 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of Aher Jetha Sida.
It is not necessary at the moment to set out the facts. It is enough to say that the High Court based its conviction on a retracted con- fession plus certain circumstances which the learned Judges regarded as corroborative. , The learned Sessions Judge excluded the confession on the ground that it was neither voluntary nor true. The learned Judge's reasoning about its falsity is weak. We do not think there is material on which a positive finding about its falsity can be reached but when he savs that he is not satisfied that it was made voluntarily . we find it impossible to hold that that is a view which a judicial mind acting fairly could not reasonably rea~h. Th·e facts about that are as follows. The offence was committed during the night of the 18th/19th May 1952. The police were informed on the 19th morning at 9-30. The police station was only 4 miles distant and they started investigation immediately. The appellant was arrested on the 20th.
He says in his examination under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, that three other persons were also arrested but were later released. They are Bhura, Dewayat and Kana. The investigating officer was not examined, so he could not be asked . about this and the point could not be developed further. But the appellant did cross-examine some of the prosecution witnesses (I) [1953] S. C. R. 4-18, 4-23. (2) [1952] S. C. R. 193, 201. 1955 Aker Raja Khimo. v. The State of Saurashtra Bose]. 1955 Aher Raja Khima v. The State of i. Saurashtra Bose]. 1288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955] \ about this and elicited contradictory replies. Kana, P. W. 4, said- "! was not arrested. Dewayat, Barat Lakhman- singh was arrested first ...... All the three of us were released the same evening. We were not put under arrest at all". Dewayat, P. W. 5, denied that either he or any of the others were arrested and Maya, P. W. 15, said the same thing but Meraman, P. W. 11, insisted that Dewayat was arrested.
In the absence of the Sub- Inspector it is difficult to say definitely that the appellant is wrong. It is evident that the others were at least suspected, especially as one of the points made against the appellant is that he was seen sharpening an axe on the evening of the murder and Meraman, P. W. 11, says that not only was the appellant sharp- ening an axe but so was Dewayat. If this was a matter of suspicion against the appellant it must equally have been so against Dewayat and accord- 'ingly there is nothing improbable in the appellant's statement about these other arrests; and as the Sub- Inspector was not there to clear up the matter it is only fair to accept what the appellant says. The appellant was sent to a Magistrate at 8 p. m. on the 21st for the recording of a confession but the Magistrate did not record it till the 3rd of June. He was examined as P. W. 21 and explained that he gave the appellant ten days for reflection.
The length of time is unusual but no objection about· its fairness to the accused could reasonably have been raised had it not been for the fact that the judicial lock-up is in charge of a police guard which is under the direct control, orders and supervision of the very Sub- Inspector who had conducted the investigation and had earlier suspected and, according to the accused, actually arrested three other persons; and two of them are now called as prosecution witnesses to depose against the appellant about a matter on which the prosecution lay great importance, namely the sharp- ening of an exe. The danger that they might exag- gerate their stories or give false evidence in their anxiety to avert further suspicion from themselves is 2S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1289 one that cannot be overlooked. But apart from that. This is the description of the judicial lock-up which the Magistrate who re- corded the confession (P. W.
21) gives us: "A police guard is on 24 hours duty at the Bhan- wad Judicial lock-up. The prisoner is so placed within the compound wall that he can see the police all the 24 hours through the bars and can talk. These police officers are under the police Sub-Inspector. A peon is working as warder. He stays there on duty by day. At night he is not there. Clerk Jailor does. not remain present there. The police lock-up is within· the jail itself. Inside the jail gate is the police lock-up. The police can go into the police lock-up when they choose". Now the appellant repudiated his confession at the earliest opportunity. He told the Committing Court on 12-12-1952 in a written statement that- "After my arrest by the police I was sent to jail. At night time the police, having arrived at the jail, threatened me to make confession before Court as they directed. The police frightened me with beating if I did not confess.
As a result of which through fright, I have made a false confession as directed by the police and which I now deny". And in his examination under section 342, Criminal Procedure Cod. e, he said- "I have made the confession because the police were threatening to beat me in the jail. He repeated these statements in the Sessions Court. He said he was beaten at the time of his arrest and then after he had been sent to the jail he said- "I was daily threatened. They said 'confess the offiehce of murder. We shall get you on remand. You will live as an importent man'. On the morning of the 3rd date, they took me to a big police officer after administering extraordinary threats. Only now I come to know that he is the Magistrate". Now it may be possible to take two views of this statement but there are two important factnrs in every criminal trial that weigh heavily in favour of an accused person: one is that the accused is entitled 1955 Aher Raja Khima v. Tm State of Saurashtra Bose. ].
1955 Aker Raja Khima v, The State of Saurashtra BOse J. 1290 ·sUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955] to the benefit of every reasonable doubt and the other, an off-shoot of the same principle, that when an accused person offers a reasonable explanation of his conduct, then, even though he cannot prove his assertions, they should ordinarily be accepted unless the circumstances indicate that they are false. What the appellant said in this case is not impossible ; such things do happen and it is understandable that the police, frustrated in their endeavour to find the cul- prit among three other persons, should make an all out endeavour to make sure of the fourth. We do not say that that happened here.
But that it might have happened is obvious, and when the police absent themselves from the witness box and forestall attempts at cross-examination, we find it impossible to hold that a judge acting judicially, and bearing in mind the important principles that we have outlined above, can be said to have reached an unreasonable or an unfair conclusion when he deduces from these circumstances that there is a reasonable probability that the appellant's story is true and that therefore the confession was not voluntary. The only reason that the learn . C. 151. , 2S. C. R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1307 The fundamental objection to regarding the expres- sion "compelling reasons" as a rigid formula govern- ing the decision of an appeal under section 417 is that it puts a judgment of acquittal, however rendered, in a position of vantage which the law did not accord to it, and throws around the accused who gets an order of acquittal in the trial court a protec- tion which the law did not intend to give him. In my judgment, this is a situation in which great mis- chief must result, and the interests of the public must suffer. If the expression "compelling reasons" does not impose a restriction on the powers of a court hearing an appeal under section 417, and if its true scope is to guide it in arriving at a decision, the question whether this Court can interfere with that decision on the ground that it is erroneous presents no diffi- culty.
The decision would then be one on a question of fact depending upon the appreciation of evidence, and this court cannot, on the principles. enunciated in Pritam Singh v. The State( 1 ) interfere with it. This position is, in fact, concluded by the decisions in Sheo Swarup v. King-Emperor( 2 ) and Nur Mohammad v. Em;>eror(3). In Shea Swarup v. King-Emperor(2), the Sessions Judge had characterised the prosecution witnesses as liars, and disbelieving their evidence had acquitted the accused. On appeal, the High Court reviewed the evidence, and differing from the trial court as to the weight to be attached to it, convicted the accused.
Declining to interfere with this judg- ment, the Privy Council observed that even though there was no express mention in the judgment of the High Court that it had considered all the particulars which an appellate court should consider in deciding an appeal, there was "no reason to think that the High Court had failed to take all proper matters into consideration in arriving at their . conclusions of fact". In Nur Mohammad v. Emperor(3), the judgment of the High Court did not disclose that it had considered the matters mentioned by Lord Russell at page 404 (I) [1950] S. C. R. 453. (2) [1934] L. R. 61 I. A. 398. (3) A. I. R. 1945 P. C. 151. - 28-85 S. C. India/59. 1955 -+- Aker Raja Khima y. The State of Sauroshtra Venkataratna Ayyar J. 1955 AMT Raja Khima v. Th! Stattof f:Jaurashlra VenkalaTama A. J1ar J, 1308 - _:SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955] in Sheo Swarup v •. King-Emperor(').
Nevertheless, the Privy Council dismissed the appeal observing: "In the present case the High Court judgment shows that they have been at pains to deal in detail . with the reasons given by the Sessions Judge for dis- ( 1 believing the group of witnesses, the. Patwari ·and the ' other three alleged eye-witnesses. . They have dealt in detail with them, showing on the face of their judgment .. that there is no necessity to presume in this ___ ~ case that they have not done their duty .... " _ • These decisions are authorities ·for the position that when in an appeal under section 417 tlie court considers . the evidence and comes to its own conclu- sion, the findings recorded . by it are not, even when they result in a reversal of the order of acquittal; open to interference in . special appeal.
· Different considerations would - have arisen if the law had pm· vided a further appeal on facts against those orders of reversal, in which -case the appreciation of the evi- dence by the- ·appellate court would be . a . matter open to review in the superior court. That, as already stated, would be ·the position in an appeal under arti- cles 132(1) and 134(1) (a) and (b), but where, as in ihe present, no ·appeal on facts is provided, . the de- cision of the ·. High Court is not open to review by this court urider . article 136 on the ground that there were no: compelling reasons for the learned Juoges to reverse an· order of acquittal. · This is sufficient to entail the dismissal of this appeal. But, having gone through the evidence, 'I am of. opinion that even . on the merits the decision .... of the High ,Court is correct. The evidence against ihe . appellant is wholly circumstantial, and consists . _ mainly of (1) the existence of a strong motive, (2) , the conduct . : of . the .
appellant on ·the day when the murder was committed, (3) the . recovery . of a blood- stained axe : and. a false beard at the. instance of the / appellant, and (4) ·. a confession. made by·him br.. -;_ • fore_- the Magistrate, _· P. W. 21, on 3-6-1952. · Taking"-- . the above items seriatim it is the ·case of :therprosc- · ·cution. ·that the appellant was living . on: terms of inti- \ (1) [1934] L. R. 61 I. A: 398. °\. ~- '- 2S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1309 macy with Sunder, and as she was to be taken on the 19th May 1952 to Kalawad to join her husband, he wanted to do away with him .. hTe appelant admit- ted that he had illicit connection with Sunder for some years, and the Sessions Judge also found, bas- ing himself on the prosecution evidence, that the appellant was very much agitated on the night of the 18th.
A number of witnesses deposed that they saw him on 18-5-1952 at Shiva sharpening his axe, and that when questioned, he stated that he was going to offer a green coconut to Mahadevji, "an expression" say the learned Judges "which in common parlance means sacrifice of a head". The appellant denied that he went to Shiva on the 18th, but his statement was disbelieved by the Sessions Judge who was impressed by the quality and num- ber of the prosecution witnesses, and both the courts have concurred in accepting their evidence on this point. As for the recovery of the axe, the appellant ad- mitted it, but he stated in his examination under section 342 that there was no blood on it when he showed it to the police. The Sessions Judge was not prepared to accept this statement and observed: "Accused admits that this is his axe. In light of chemical analysis, there is no doubt that there were stains of human blood on the axe. It is also men- tioned in the Panchnama, Ex.
21 itself that the Panch had suspected that there were marks of human blood _ on this axe". But all the same, he discounted the value of this evi- dence, because according to him, in view of certain circumstances "the presence of human blood on the axe is by no means conclusive", and that "at best it r;::ises a suspicion against the accused". Those circums- tances are t):u-ee: Firstly, the panch who witnessed the recovery at Katkora belonged to Kalawad, and the criticism is that a local panch ought to have been got to witness the same. The learned Judges of the High Court did not think JT':Kh of this criticistr. as the recovery at Katkora had to be amde in purst'' 1ce 0£ the statment given by the appellant at Kaia. vad, 1955 Aher Raja Khima v. The State of Saurashtra Venkatarama Ayyar]. 1955 Aber Raja Khima v. The State of Savrashtra V tnkatarama Ayyar J.
1310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955] and the police might have reasonably thought that the same panch should be present at both the places. As the Sessions Judge has accepted the evidence of the panch that there were blood stains at the time of the recovery of the axe, his criticism on this point lacks substance. Secondly, though the recovery was made on 21-5-1952, it was sent to the medical officer for report only on 27-5-1952, and the delay is sus- picious. It is difficult to follow this criticism. When once the conclusion is reached that there was blood on the axe when it was recovered, this criticism has no meaning unless it is intended to suggest that the police required some time to wash the blood which was on the axe at the time of its recovery and to sub- stitute human blood therefor.
There is nothing in the evidence to support a suggestion so grotesque, and as observed by the learned Judges, if the police wanted to substitute blood, they would not have taken so much time over it. Thirdly, in despatching the blood to the Chemical Analyst, the medical officer sent the parcel containing the blood scrapings to the railway station, not through his own peon or the compounder in the hospital but through the local police, and that, according to the Sessions Judge, is a suspicious circumstance. As the parcel was received intact by the Chemical Analyst at Bombay, it is difficult to see what the point of the criticism is. The Sessfons Judge himself observes: "I do not believe that the police have intercepted this parcel and they deliberately sent an axe with human blood. However, there is no doubt that the procedure adopted by the doctor is wrong, and JS capable of mischief".
It has not been explained and it is not possible to divine what that mischief could have been in this case. And who could have been the mischief-maker unless it be the police? The Sessions Judge stated that he did not believe the suggestion made against the police, but that nevertheless is the assumption under- lying his comment. "Anxious to wound, afraid to strike" would appropriately described the situation. The learned Judges disagreed with the reasoning of 2S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1311 the Sessions Judge, and held that as the appellant had admitted the recovery of the axe and as there was human blood on it at that time, it was clear and cogent evidence pointing to his guilt. I am unable to find any answer to this reasoning.
Pausing here, it will be seen that in discussing the question of the recovery of the blood-stained axe, as indeed throughout the judgment, the learned Sessions Judge has taken up an attitude of distrust towards the police for which it is difficult to find any justifi- cation in the evidence-an attitude which, I regret to say, is becoming a growing feature of judgments of subordinate Magistrates. When at the trial, it appears to the court that a police officer has, in the discharge of his duty, abused his position and acted oppressively, it is no doubt its clear duty to express its stern disapproval of his conduct. But it is equally its duty not to assume such conduct on the part of the officer gratuitously and as a matter of course, when there is, as in this case, no reasonable basis for it in the evidence or in the circumstances.
The pre- sumption that a person acts honestly applies as much in favour of a police officer as of other persons and it is not a judicial approach to distrust and suspect him without good grounds therefor. Such an attitude could do neither credit to the magistracy nor good to the public. It can only run down the prestige of the police administration. It is the case of the prosecution that the appellant unearthed a false beard, which he had buried under- neath a shami tree in Shiva, and that he had worn it at the time of the murder. The appellant did not deny the recovery, but stated that it was not he that had uncovered it but the jamadar. Both the courts below have accepted the version of the prosecution as true, but while the Sessions Judge held that it was not sufficient to implicate the appellant, the learned Judges held otherwise. P. W.
16 deposed that he saw the appellant at midnight on the 18th May on the outskirts of Kalawacl wearing a false beard, and the comme11t of the Sessions Judge on this evidence ·is: "I do not see how this evidence will prove the 1955· Ahtr Raja Khima v. Tiu Stale of SDUlashtra 1955 ~RajaKhif'lllJ .... Tl1' Stale of Saurashtra V mkalorama Ayyar]. 1312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955] prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. At best it will suffice to raise suspicion against the accused". But if the beard was discovered by the appellant, then surely it is a valuable link in the chain of evidence against him. Then we come to the confession made by the appel- lant to P. W. 21. The Magistrate has deposed that he had satisfied himself that it was voluntary, before he recorded it. The Sessions Judge did not discredit his testimony, but was of opinion that in view of certain circumstances the confession was not volun- tary.
Now, the facts relating to this matter are these: · The appellant was, as already stated, arrestetd on the 20th May and discoveries of the axe and the false beard were made through him, and on the 21st he was sent to the Magistrate with a letter that he desired to make a confession. The Magistrate has given evidence that he did not record the confession at once, as he wanted the appellant "to cool down'', and accordingly gave him ten days to reflect, and committed him to judicial lock-up. There is nothing improper in this, and indeed, it is a commendable precaution for ensuring that the confession was made voluntary. From 21-5-1952 to 3-6-1952 the appellant continued in judicial lock-up, and this is a circum- stance which normally should negative the possibility of there having been a threat or inducement.
But the Sessions Judge declined to attach any weight to it, because both the police lock-up and the judicial lock-up were situated in the same compound, sepa- rated by a distance of 20 feet, and were guarded by the same police officers, and though the judicial lock- up had its own warder and clerk jailor, they kept watch only during daytime, and therefore · even though the police could have had no access inside the lock-up, they had "every opportunity to threaten and bully the accused". The Sessions Judge accord- ingly held that the confession was not voluntary. On appeal, the learned Judges came to a different con- clusion. They considered that the possibility of threats having been uttered through the bars was to remote and unsubstantial to form the basis for any - , 2 S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1313 conclusion, and that all the circumstances indicated that the confession was voluntary. These are the salient pojnts that emerge out of the evidence.
The position may be thus summed up: (1) No special weight attaches to the findings of the Sessions Judge on the ground that they are based on the evidence of witnesses whom he had the ad- vantage of seeing in the box, and believed. The oral evidence was all on the side of the prosecution, and . that was substantially accepted by the Sessions Judge. His judgment is based on the probabilities of the case, and of them, the learned Judges were at least as competent to judge, as he. (2) The finding of the Sessions Judge in so far as it related to the recovery of bloodstained axe was clearly erroneous, as it did not follow on his reason- ing. (3) As regards the confession, the conclusion of the Sessions Judge rests on nothing tangible, and is largely coloured by a general distrust of the police, not based on evidence or justified by the circum- stances.
(4) The learned Judges were of the opinion that even excluding the confession, the other evidence in the case was sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellant. (5) All the four assessors were of the opinion that the appellant was guilty. Now, returning to the two questions which have formed the basis of the preceding discussion, (1) what is it that the High Court has to do in exercise of its powers under section 417, having regard to the find- ings reached by it and set out above, and how does the doctrine of "compelling reasons" bear upon it? (2) What are the grounqs on which we can interfere with its decision? A court hearing an appeal under section 417 might be confronted with three possibili- ties: (i) It might come to the same conclusion as the trial court on the questions in issue, in which case, of course, it should dismiss the appeal; (ii) It might consider that the evidence was not clear and conclu- .
si;e one way or the other, in which case its duty 1~55 Airer Raja Khima v. Thi 5'. taJIOf Saurashtra V nikatarama AJJar J. 1955 Aher Ra. fa Khima v. The State of SauraJhtra Venkatarama 4,_,. ,. J. 1314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955] as an appellate court would be not to interfere with the judgment appealed agaimt; and (iii) it might come to a conclusion on an appreciation of the evidence opposite to that reached by the court of first instance, in which case it would clearly be its duty in exercise of its powers under section 417 to set aside the order of acquittal. Wherein does the theory of "compelling reasons" come in the scheme? There is no need for it in the second category, because even apart from it, the same result must, as already stated, follow on the principles applicable to all courts of appeal. Then, there remains the third category of cases.
If the High Court comes to the conclusion on an appreciation of the evidence that the appellant is guilty, has it, nevertheless, to confirm the order of acquittal on the basis of this theory? Surely not, as that would render the right . conferred by sectio•1 417 illusory. Thm, the doctrine of "compelling reasons" would appear to have use only as a guide to the appellate court in determining questions of fact. It has no independent value as bearing on its powers under section 417. If that is the true position, it follows on the princi- ples laid down in Sheo Swarup v. King-Emperor(') and Nier Mohammad v. Emperor(') and in Pritam Singh v. The State(•) that this Court cannot interfere with the orde. rs passed under section 417 merely on the ground that the findings of fact were not justified, having regard to the doctrine of "compelling reasons". In my opinion, this appeal ought to be dismissed. ORDER. Bv THE CouRT. -ln accordance with the Judgment of the majority this Appeal is allowed.
The convic- tion and sentence are set aside and the Appellant is acquitted. II) [1934] L·R. 61I. A. 398. (2) A. LR· 1945P. C•151. (3) [1950] S. C. R. 453. ' • ;
Source: Supreme Court eSCR. Dataset: Dattam Labs, CC BY 4.0. Text extracted automatically; compare with the source PDF for layout and accuracy.