AJIT SINGH & ANR. v. JIT RAM & ANR

Citation: [2008] 13 S.C.R. 555

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: TARUN CHATTERJEE, AFTAB ALAM

Case summary

AJIT SINGH & ANR. v. JIT RAM & ANR.pdf

Judgment text

[2008] 13 S. C. R 555 --i AJIT SINGH & ANR. v. JIT RAM & ANR. (Civil Appeal No. 5680 of 2008} SEPTEMBER 16, 2008 ) -~ building. In that view of the matter, it would be appropriate for us to refer to the aforesaid consideration by this Court in the afore" said decision which crystallised the question as under : "(1) The words "for his own use" as occurring in Section ) 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act must receive a wide, liberal • and useful meaning rather than a strict or narrow construction. (2) The expression - landlord requires for "his own use" is not confined in its meaning to actual physical user by the landlord personally. The requirement not only of the landlord himself but also of the normal "emanations" of the landlord is included therein. All the cases and circumstances in which actual physical occupation or user by someone else, would amount to occupation or user by the landlord himself, cannot -- . , be exhaustively enumerated.

It will depend on variety of factors such as interrelationship and · interdependence - economic or otherwise, between the landlord and such person in the background of social, socio-religious and local customs and obligations of the society or region to which they belong. (3) The tests to be applied are : (i) whether the requirement pleaded and proved may properly be . regarded as the landlord's own requirement; and, (ii) whether on the facts and in the circumstances of a given case, actual occupation and user by a person other than the landlord would be deemed by the landlord as "his own" occupation or user. The answer would, in its turn, depend on (i) the nature and degree of relationship. and/or dependence between the landlord pleading the requirement as "his own" and ----,; the person who would actually use the premises; (ii) the circumstances in which the ciaim arises and is put forward; and (iii) the intrinsic tenability of the Claim.

The court on being satisfied of the reasonability and genuineness of claim, as distinguished from a mere ruse to get rid of the tenant, will uphold the landlord's claim. (4) While casting its judicial verdict, the court shall adopt \ • a practical and meaningful approach guided by the realities of life. . (5) In the present case, the requirement of the landlord of the suit premises for user as office of his chartered accountant son is the requirement of landlord "for his own use" within the meaning of Section 13(3)(a)(ii). " 10. This judgment is the answer to the question posed before us. Here also, the requirement is made for the son who is admittedly the owner of the shop room and also tt\e landlord, 1 after the said shop was, by a family partition dated 26 h of Au- .... gust, 1998, given to the son who also became the landlord after family partition and also he became the owner of the said shop by such family partition. 11.

From the aforesaid decision of this Court, it is therefore, clear that this Court has laid down authoritatively that a non-residential premises, if required by a son for user by him would cover the requirement of words used in the Section, i. e. "for his own use" in reference to a landlord. Therefore, if "his own use" has been interpreted by this Court in the above-said \> manner, then the requirements as laid down in Section 13(3)(a)(ii)(b) and (c) of the Act has to be interpreted in the same manner to hold that (a) the son of the landlord has to plead in the eviction petition that, (b) he is not occupying in the urban area. concerned for the purpose of his business any other such building or rented land as the case may be; and (c) he has not vacated such a building or rented land without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Rent Act, in the urban area con- ycerned. 12. In the present case, it was pleaded and proved that "--+ [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.

] the said shop was required for the use of the son and, therefore, the pleadings of the son in regard to the aforesaid requirement, being mandatory, were satisfied, otherwise it would make the requirement laid down under the said provisions nugatory ). in view of the interpretation given by this Court in the aforesaid " decision, with which we are in full agreement. 13. Applying the principles as laid down by the aforesaid decision namely, Joginder Pal (Supra) which also deals with commercial premises, as in the present case, we are of the view that a plain reading of Section 13(3)(a)(ii) (a) to (c) in conjunction with Section 13(3)(a)(iv)(a) &(b) of the Rent Act, would make it ample clear when the said shop is being got vacated on the ground of user for the son of the landlord, then in the eviction petition, the son (appellant No. 1) must plead that he was not occupying any other building and that he had not va- --~ cated such a building without sufficient cause.

It is well settled that while interpreting a provision of a statute, the same has to be interpreted taking into consideration the other provisions of the same statute. In the aforesaid decision, namely, Joginder Pal (Supra), this Court has clearly laid down that a balanced interpretation has to be given in regard to the rent legislation and the provisions itself contemplate a case in regard to user of non-residential building by a professional and the statute itself lays down requirement in that regard within the same requirements will have to be read in regard to shop required to ~ be used by the son of the landlord for business purpose. Accordingly, we are of the view that the impugned decision of the High Court is in direct conflict with the Judgment of this Court in Joginder Singh's case (supra) and therefore, the said Judgment cannot be sustained. 14. There is another aspect of this matter.

While making an interpretation of Section 13 of the Act, the High Court did not ~--- deal with Section 13 of the Rent Act completely but it dealt with only that part of Section 13 which deals with residential building only and has not dealt with portion of Section 13, which deals with non-residential building. It is true that while reversing the order of eviction passed by the Appellate Authority, the High Court in the impugned order had also taken note of the decision in Joginder Pal's case (supra), but in view of our discussions made herein above, the ratio of the aforesaid decision was not applied in the present case. There is yet another angle in which the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of eviction passed by the Appellate Authority which was the final court of fact.

The Appellate Authority while directing eviction to the respondents considered the oral and documentary evidence on record and also the pleadings of the parties and then came to a finding that the appellants had successfully averred and proved their case of personal requirement as made out by them under Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act. It is true that the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction could have interfered with such findings of fact arrived at by the Appellate Authority, ifthe High Court had found that the findings of the Appellate Authority on the question of bonafide requirement were either perverse or arbitrary.

On a close examination of the impugned order of the High Court, we do not find any ground to hold that the findings of fact, regarding the bonafide requirement of the appellants, were perverse or arbitrary or the pleadings made by the appellants in their eviction petition could be said to be not in conformity with the requirement of Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act. Therefore, we are also of the view that the High Court was in error in interfering with the order of eviction passed by the Appellate Authority on the ground of bonafide requirement. 15. At this stage, an argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents may be considered. The learned counsel for the respondents relied on a decision of this Court in Hasmat Rai &Anr. Vs.

Raghunath Prasad [(1981) 3 SCC 103] and contended that a portion of the demised premises may also be used as a residential premises, which cannot be considered to be a commercial premises for the purpose of evicting the tenant under Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act. We are unable to accept this submission of the learned counsel for the respondents, for the simple reasons, first, the decision in Hasmat Rai's case (supra) was based on M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 which confers on the authority to pass order of eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement on different wording from the words used in East Punjab Urban J. .. Rent Registration Act, 1949. Furthermore, it may be reiterated that in order to obtain an order of eviction under Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act, the landlord has to prove, as noted herein earlier, that he required the said shop for his own use and the said shop was a non-residential building.

In this case, admittedly the said shop is used for commercial purposes and therefore there was no question of the said shop being used as residential purposes or being used for a portion of residential purposes for residential use. That being the position, the aforesaid decision, in our view, is clearly distinguishable. Accordingly, the above decision of this court is of no help to the re- ---"' 0 spondents. 16. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court is hereby set aside and the order of the Appellate Authority is restored and the eviction petition filed by the appellants stands allowed. -17. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the facts that the respondents are using the said shop for commercial purposes and have been carrying on business in the same, we grant the respondents 9 months' time to vacate the same, subject to filing the usual undertaking in this Court within two weeks from this date.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. D. G. Appeal allowed.