ALURU KONDAYYA AND ORS. v. SINGARAJU RAMA RAO AND ORS.

Citation: [1966] 1 S.C.R. 842; 1965 INSC 184

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR , K.N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH, S.M. SIKRI

Judgment date: 1965-09-20

Case summary

1965 INSC 184. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1965-09-20. ALURU KONDAYYA AND ORS. v. SINGARAJU RAMA RAO AND ORS. Read the judgment and case details...

Judgment text

844 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1966] I S. C. R. ALURU KONDA YYA AND ORS. A v. SINGARAJU RAMA RAO AND ORS. Sep/ember 20, 1965 [P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J. , K. N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYAT· B t:LLAH, J. C. SHAH ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ. ] Madras Es;ates Land Act (I of 1908), s. 3(2) (d), Explanation I, 11' am~ndcd by Act 18 of 1936 and Act (2 of 1945)-Estatc-Grcmt of a named v1Jiage-Jj can be presumed to be of a whole village. Jn the village of ChaJJayapalarn, there were six inams, namely, the c Challayapalam Shro1rien1 and five minor inams but there was no infonna-tion as to when the inams were crealed and by v-·hom. In t\\·o suits, one tiled by the shrotrietruiars, against the tenants for a declaration that the tenant' did not have occupancy rights in the lands in their occupation. and the other. by the tenants for a declaration that they had occupancy rights, the qucsr1on arO! Je whether the slzrotrien1 was an "cstale" vtithin the meaning of s.

3(2)(d) of the Madras Es1atcs Land Act, 1908, as amended by Act 18 of 1936. The trial court held, on a review of the evidence, that the D grant was of the whole village within the meaning of the section and that the tenan:s h,1d occup•D"Y righlS. On appeal, 1he High Court hdd that the evidence on record was inconclusive, that the onus of p'. ·o,·ing that the grant was of an estate lay upon the tenants, and th:1t, since the tenanlo; had failed 10 discharge the onus, the question should be decided again,t the IOll&llts. In the appeal to this Court by the tenants, the question \Vas : if there was no evidence justifying an infere;icc that the grant wao; of a whole village, whe1her explanation I lo s. 3(2)( lands in the village were granted on service or other tenure, or were reserved for communal purposes before the grant of the village.

In expressing in the cases of Rama Ran(') and Ramadhan Che11iar(') the view that the burden lay uoon the tenants to prove that the grant was of an estate, it was assumed by the Mad-as Hi~h Court that this Court had rendered a considered 3 decision in the District Rowd of Tanjore's ca,c( ) that the onus of proving that a grant of land is a grant of an estate lies upon the tenant. But it appears that no such decision was given by 1 the Court in that case. In the District Board of Tanjore's cme( ) the defendant who had taken a lease for three years of a piece of land belonging to the District Board claimed that he had acquired permanent occupancy rights under s. 6 of the Madras Estates Land Act, because after the expiry of the period of the lease the Board had not resumed possession. It was the Board's case that after expiry of the period of the lease. the Board had taken possession of the land and had brought it under cultivation.

The Subordinate Jud~e held that the land did not constitute an estate within the mea-ning of s. 3(2)(d). The Hi~h Court disagreed with that view. In appeal to this Court Mahajan, J. , on (I) A. l. R. t957 A. P. 63. (2) A. l. R. t958 Mad. 104. (3) A. l. R. 1953 S. C. 446. KONDAYYA v. RAMA RAO (Shah,/. ) ssg. a review of the evidence opined that the grant was not of a named village, the grant being in terms of areas and not of a named village, and that there were two grants neither of which could be called a grant of a village. Chandrashekhara Aiyar, J.

, observed that there were two personal grants under one parvangi to two different persons, and it could not be said that there was a grant of a whole village or of a named village, smaller areas having been carved out therefrom prior to the date of the grant on service or other tenure, and the remaining part still being recognised and treated as a revenue unit with a nomenclature of its own, It is abundantly clear that the Court decided the case on evidence and did not place reliance on the onus of proof. It is true that Mahajan, J. , in his judgment has recorded that : "It was conceded by . the learned counsel for the respondent that the burden of proving that certain lands constitute an "Estate" is upon the party who sets up the contention'', and Chandra~ekhara Aiyar, J. , observed that: • "A small area of 5 acres and 40 cents was granted under the same grant in favour of Chinna Appu Moopan.

If this conclusion is correct-and nothing satisfactory has been urged on the side of the respon- • dents why such an inference is not open on the entries found in the Inam Register, the 1st respondent should fail, as the burden is on him to establish that what was originally granted was an 'estate'. " But these observations are not susceptible of the meaning that when it is proved that an inam is expressed to be of a named village, the presumption under Explanation ( 1) does not arise. Both the learned Judges were of the view that there was no grant which could be regarded as a ·grant of a whole village or a named village, and on that view the true effect of the Explanation did not fall to be determined. The concession before the Cou! t by counsel was only that when a person alleged that certain land was an estate, the burden of proving that case lay upon him.

The second view minimi:res the operation of the statutory presumption which is expressly enacted by the legislature to arise ' on proof that the grant is of a named village. In terms the II Explanation provides that the grant of an area as a named village shall be deemed to be a grant of an estate. If the clause pres-cribes the condition on which the presumption arises, the onus. would be discharged by the presumption on proof that the grant was of a named village. Adoption of the second view is likely to give rise to some anomalous situations of which the present set of cases is a good illustration. For instance, if the inamdar as well as the tenant sue for relief in respect of their respective cases, the application of this rule would require the Court to adopt the somewhat unusual course of dismissing the cross actions, when evidence does not justify a positive inference in favour of either party. In Varada BhavafU. lrayana Rao v.

State of Andhr:i Prad~s/1 1 and others( ), this Court expressed its preference for the second view. That was a case in which the appellant held a major part of certain villages covered by five inam grants. The Inam Commissioner had granted fresh inam title deeds in con-firmation of the original grants. The Special Officer appointed by the Madras Government under s. 2 of the Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 decided that the I) inam lands covered by the fresh inams were "Estates" within s. 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, and recom- • mended fair and equitable rates of rent for th~ ryori lands in this estate. Subsequently the Government of Madras by a notifica-tion in the Gazette fixed rates of rent in accordance with this recommendation. The inamdar instituted an action in the Civil Court for a declaration that the grnnt was not of an estate within the meaning of s. 3 (2) ( d) of the Madras fatale; Land Act.

The Trial Court upheld the contention, but the High Court in appeal reversed that deeisio. :. In appeal to the Supreme Court it was contended that there were no materials on the record to prove that the original grant was of a whole village or of a village by name, and as the State had failed to discha,ge the burden of proving that the land constituted an estate, the action must be decreed. This Court held that the grant which was later confirmed by the title deed was of a named village, but on proof merely that the inam grant was of a named village, a presumption -did not arise that it formed an estate, for the legislature had not created any special presumption either way. The question of the onus of proof it was said had to be adjudged in the light or ss. I 0 I, 102 and I 03 of the Evidence Act, and applyi:ig that principle if the plaintiff failed to prove his claim that land was not an estate, the appeal should stand dismissed.

The Court in that case regarded the judgment in the District Board of Tanjore's case(') as not decisive of the question, and proceeded to hold (I) [t964] 2 S. C. R. Sul. (2) A. l. R. 1953 S. C. 446. KONDAYYA v. RAMA RAO (Shah,!. ) 861 on two grounds that the legislature had not provided for raising a presumption either way. First, that the "language used in Explanation ( 1) indicated that the conclusion that the area was an "estate" can be drawn even where the whole of the village was not included in the grant, only if it appeared that the portion not included had already been gifted and was therefore lost to the tenure," and the other that when adding the Explanation in 1945, the Legislature did not think fit to make any change in s. 23 of the Act. But as already observed, the language used by the Legislature in enacting Explanation (1) to s. 3(2) (d) expressly directs a presumption to be raised.

That presumption arises when it is proved that a grant as an inam is expressed to be of a named village, the area which forms the subject-matter of the grant shall be deemed to be an estate. Raising of the presumption is not subject to any other conditions. The Legislature has by the non-obstante clause affirmed that such presumption shall be raised '. even if it appears that in the grant are not included certain lands • in the village which have before the grant of the named villago been granted on service or other tenure or have been reserved for communal purposes. The presumption, it is true, is not a con-clusive presumption : it is a presumption of law, and is rebuttable. It may be rebutted by proof of other facts, but not the facts mentioned in the non-obstante clause. Section 23 was added by s. 5 of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act 18 of 1936. It reads : "Where in any suit or proceeding it becomes neces- 1 licable only to cases arising under the un-amended Act.

Undoubtedly in cases arising under amended Act, the conditions on which the presumption will arise arc prescribed in the Explanation (I ) . The language used by the Legislature in the amended s. 23 c! early shows that the section was not intended to deal with cases arising under the Madras Estate. q Land Act as amended by Act 18 of 1936. Any reference in ... s. 23 to a presumption in respect of cases arising after cl. ( d) as recast by Act 18 of 1936 would have been wholly out of place. There were two presumptions which applied to different situations. In cases which arose before the Amending Act of 1936 the presumption under s. 23 applied : in cases which arose since the amendment of 1936 the presumption prescribed by the Explanation (I) applied. This is so, because the Explanation though enacted by Act 2 of 1945 has been brought into force since the date on which the amending Act of 1936 became operative. • ---·---- - -···--- - (I) L. R. 45. I. A. 2·l9. (2l L. n. 461. A. 123. (3) I.

LR. 44 Mad. 538. (4) L. R. 49 I. A. 286. KONDAYYA V. RAMA RAO (Shah,/. ) 863 In our view the following passage from the decision of the Madras High Court in Mantravadi Bhavanarayana and another v. • Merugu Venkatadu and others(') correctly interprets s. 3(2)(d): "It is now settled law that by reason of the amendment made in 1945, which added an explanation to section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act and numbered it as explanation 1, a grant constitutes an estate if it is expressed to be a named village irrespec-tive of the fact that some of the lands in the village had already been granted on inam or service grants, or were reserved for communal purposes. " We do not deem it necessary to decide whether the suit for a mere declaration that the tenants were not occupancy tenants at the instance of the shrotrlemdars, after determining the tenancy of some of the tenants was maintainable.

The High Court has dismissed the suit against defendants 1 to 10 who were served with notices to quit, but against whom the shrotriemdars did not claim a decree for possession. There is no appeal by the shrotriemdars • before us against defendants 1 to 10, and in any event on the view taken by us, the suit of the shrotriemdars must fail in its entirety. .. In Appeal No. 342 of 1961 the decision recorded by us on the principal question does not put an end to the litigation. The dispute arose between two rival claimants to the rights of occu· pancy of land. The respondent in this appeal claims that he is a transferee of the original tenant, and the appellant claims to have acquired the rights of occupancy from the shrotriemdar. In suit No. 93 of 1947, four substantive issues were raised, and the issues are discussed in paragraphs 106 to 120 of the judgment of the Trial Judge. The High Court did not separately deal with those issues, but decided Appeal No.

789 of 1950 on the view of the law which it declared in the principal appeal. We have disagreed with the High Court for reasons already set out and the other issues which have not been tried by the High Court have now to be tried. On the view taken by us Civil Appeal No. 341 of 1961 will be allowed, and the decree passed by the High Court set aside • and the decree passed by the Trial Court restored with costs throughout. In Civil Appeal No. 343 of 1961 also the decree passed by the High Court will be set aside and the suit decreed • (I} I. L. R. [1954] Mad. 116. " : ' with costs throughout. There will be one hearing fee in this A Court. • In Civil Appeal No. 342 of 1961 arising out of Appeal No. 789 of 1950 from suit No. 93 of 1947, the appeal will be ro-manded to the High Court with a direction that the question1 • which remain to be determined will be decided according to law. B No order as to costs in Appeal No. 342 of 1961. C. A. Nos. 341 and 343 allowed. C. A. No. 342 remanded.

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