AMBIKA PRASAD MISHRA ETC. v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. ETC

Citation: [1980] 3 S.C.R. 1159

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, P.N. BHAGWATI, V.R. KRISHNA IYER, V.D. TULZAPURKAR, A.P. SEN

Case summary

Consequent on the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, this court repelled the challenges to land reform laws as violative of fundamental rights ia State of Bihar v. 31A, Shri Mridul's contention• can be dismissed as without merit.

Judgment text

AMBIKA PRASAD MISHRA ETC. v. STATE OF U. P. AND ORS. ETC. May 9, 1980 [Y. V. CliANDRACHUD, C. J. , P. N. BHAGWATI, V. R. KRlsHNA IYBR, B· V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND A. P. SEN, JJ. ] .. Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960-Con. rtitu- • tional Validity-Jlalue of stare decisi. f. -vis-a-vis judicial review. Dismissing ! he appeals and the Writ Petitions, the Court· HEID : (1). -It is fundamental that the nation's Constitution is not kept in constant uncertainty by judicial review every season because it paralyses, by perennial suspense, all legislative and administrative action on vit. al issues deteind by the brooding interest of forensic blow-up. This, if permitted, may well be a kind of judicial destabilisation of Stare action too dangerous to be indulged in save where national crisis of great moment to the life, liberty and safety of this country and its millions are at stake, or the basic direction of th'e nation itoelf o· is in peril of a shake up.

The decision in Kesavananda Bharati's case, therefore. upholding the vir'es of Article 3lA in unequivocal terms binds the conrt on the simple score of stare decisi~ and the constitutional ground of Article 141•. Further, fatal flaws silenced by ea. rlier rulings cannot survive after d'eath because a decision does not lose its authority "merely because it was badly argu'ed, inad&quately considered and fallaciously reasoned". And none of the... , misfortunes can be imputed to Bharati's case. [1164 C-0, 1165 C-DJ E (2). The sweep of Article 3lA is wide and indubitably embra= legislation on land ceilings. Equitable distribution of lands, annihilation of monopoly of ownership by imposition of oeiling and regeneration of the rural economy by diverre plaaning and strategies a. re covered by the armour of Article 3IA. Article 3IA repulses, therefore, all invasions on ceiling legislation armed with Articles 14, 19 and 31. [1165 D-B, 1166 D-B] F Raniit Singh and Ors. v. State of Puniab and Ors.

[1965] I S. C. R. 82, State of '- Kera/a and Anr. v. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (W... Wng) Co. Ltd. ' Etc. [1974) I S. C. R. 671, reiterated. (3). The decision in Maneka Gandhfs case is no universal nostrum or curoall. Nor can it be applicable to the land reform law which is in another donmin of comtitutional jurisprudence and quite apart from personal liberty in Article 21. G· To contend that land reform law, if unreasonable violates Article 21 as expanllYcly constnled in Maneka Gantlhf• case is incorrect. [1168 E-OJ (4). Secti tective net the present Act and, broadly speaking, the antiseptic effect of that Article is sufficient to immunise the Act against invalidation to the extent stated therein. The extreme argument that Art. 31 A itself is void as violative of the basic ·structure of the ~onstitution 1)as been negatived by my learned brother, Bhagwati, J. in a kindred group of cases of Andhra Pradesh. II The amulet of Art.

31A is, therefore, potent, so far as it goes, but beyond its ambit it is still possible, as counsel have endeavoured to . , spin out some sound argument to nullify· one section or the other. Surely, the legislature cannot run amok in the blind belief that Art. 31A is omnipotent. We will examine the alleged infirmities in due course. It is significant that even apart from the many decisions upholding Art. 31A, Golak Nath's case(') decided by a Bench of 11 Judges, while holding that the Constitution (First Amendment) Act exceeded the constituent power still categorically declared that the said amendment and a few other like amendments would be held good based on the doctrine of prospective over-rnling. The result, for our, • purpose, is that even Golak Nath's case has held Art. 31A valid The " note struck by later cases. reversing Golaknath does not militate against the vires of Art. 31A.

Suffice it to say that in the Kesavananda Bharti's case(') Article 31A was challenged as beyond the amendatory power of Parliament and, therefore, invalid. But, after listening to the marathon erudition from eminent counsel, a 13 Judges Bench cf this Court upheld the vires of Article 3lA in unequivocal terms. That decision binds, on the simple score of stare decisis and the' constitutional ground of Art. 1. 41. · Every now discovery or argumentative novelty cannot undo or compel reconsideration of a binding precedent. In thls view, other submissions sparkling with creative ingenuity and presented with hlgh-presswe advocacy, cannot persuade us to re-open, what was laid down for the guidance of the nation as a solemri preposion by the epic Fundamental Rights case. From Kameshwar Singh(') and Golak Nath (supra) through Kesava11anda (supra) and Kanan Devan(') to Gwalior Rayons(•) and after Art.

' 31A: has stood judicial scrutiny although, as s~ earlier, we do not base the conclusion on Art. 31A. Even so, it is fundamental that the nation's Constitution is not kept in constant uncertainty by judicial review every season beciime it paralyses, by perennial suspense, all legislative and administrathe action on vital issues deterred by the brooding threat of forensic blowup. Thls, if permitted, may well be a kind of judicial destabilisatioll. I of State action too dangerous to be indulged in save where national I crisis of great moment to the life, liberty and safety of this country and its millions are at stake, qr the basic direction of the nation itself is in peril of a shakeup. It is surely wrong to prove Justice Roberts of 6 the United States Supreme Court right when he said( ). (1) [1967] 2 S. C. R. 762. (2) [19731 Supp. SCR. !. (3) AIR 1952 SC 252. (4) Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd. v. State ofKera/a & Anr. [1973]' 1. S. C. R. , 356. (5) Kera/av.

Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (W•g) Co. Ltd. etc. [1974] I SCR. (6) Smith v. All wright 321 US 649, 669 and 670 (1944). AMBIKA PRASAD v. U. P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, l. ) 1165 "The reason for my concern is that the imtant decision, overruling that announced about nine years ago, tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket good for this day and train only...... It is regrettable that in an era marked by • doubt and confusion, an era whose greatest need is stead- ... fastness of thcmght and purpose, this Court which has been looked to as exhibiting consistency in adjudication, and a • steadiness which would hold the balance even in the face ' of temporary ebbs and fiows of opinion. should now itself become the breeder of fresh doubt and confusion in the public mind as to the stability of our institutions".

It is wise to remember that fatal fiaws silenced by earlier rulings 'Cannot survive after death because a decision does not lose its authority "merely because it was badly argued, inadequately considered and fallaciously reasoned". (1) And none of these misfo'rtunes can be imputed to Bharti:s case (supra). For these reasoos, we proceed to consider the contentions of counsel on the clear assumption that Art. 31A is good. Its sweep is wide and indubitably embraces legislation on land ceilings. Long years ago, in ,Ranjh v. State,(') a Constitution Bench, speaking through Hidayatullall, J. , dwelt oa the wide amplitude of Art. 3lA, referred to Precedents of this Court on agrarian reform vis a vis Art. 3lA and concluded that equitable clistribution of lands, annihilatign of monopoly of ownership by imposition of ceiling and regeneration of the rural economy by diverse planning and strategies are covered by the armour of Art. 3lA.

We may qnote a part : The scheme of rural development today envisages not only equitable distribution of land so that there is no undue imbalance in society resulting in a landless class on the one hand and a concentration of land in the hands of a few on the other, but envisages also the raising of econ<>mic standards and bettering rural health and social conditions. Provisions for the assignment of lands to village Panchayat for the use of the general community, or for hospitals, schools, manure pits, talll! ing grounds etc. which (sic) enure for the benefit of rural population must be considered to be an essential part of the redistribution of holdings ,and open lands to which no objection is apparently taken. If agrarian reforms are to succeed, more distribu- R (1) Salmond 'Jurisprudence' p. 21S(llth edition). (2) (1965]1 SCR 82. ' tion of lands to the landless is not enough.

There must be a proper planning of rural economy and conditions and a body like the village: panchayat is best designed to promote rural welfare than, individual owners of small portions of lands. Further the village panch:ayat is an authority for purposes of part Ill as was conceded before us and it has the protection of Art. 31A because of this character even if the taking over of Sham/at deb amounts to acquisition. . . . . . . The setting of a body or agricultural artisans (such • ' as the village caJ11"lller, the village blacksmith, the village tanner, ferrier, wheelwright, barber, washerman etc. ) is a part of rural planning and can be comprehended in a scheme of agrarian reforms. It is a trite saying that India lives in villages and a scheme to make villages self-sufficient cannot but be regarded as part of the larger reforms which consolidation of hpldings, fixing of ceiling on lands, distribution of surplus lands and utilising of vacant and waste lands contemplate.

(') This review has been reinforced by the later pronouncement of a Constitution Bench in the Gwalior Rayon Case,(') emphatically expressing support for the conceptual sweep of agrarian reform vis-a-vis Art. 3lA. ~e proposition, therefore, is invuln:erable that Art. 31A repulses all invasion on "ceiling legislation" (armed with Arts. 14, 19 and 31). The· professed goal of the legislation is to maximise surplus lands for working out distributive justice and rural dev vent activities which defeat the statutory purpose, to provide for invalidation of such actions. When the alienations are invalidated because they are made after a statutory date. fixed with a purpose, • there is sense in this prohibition. Otherwise, all the Jaruis would have " been transferred ancl little would have been left by way of surplus. Let us read the text of s. 5 (6) which is alleged to be bad ~ing overinclusive or otherwise anomalous. The argument, rather hard to follow and too subtle for the pragmatic of.

agrarian law, may be clearer when the provision is unfurled. Section 5(6) runs thus: Tu determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenure-holder, any transfer of land made after the twenty-fourth day of January, 1971, which but for the transfer would have been declared surplus land under this Act, shall be ignored and not taken into account : Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply ·to : (a) a transfer in favour of any person(including Government) referred to in sub-section(2); (b) a transfer proved to ·the satisfaction of the prescribed authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument not being a beiiami transaction or for immediate or ' deferred benefit of the tenure-holder or other mem- . bers of the family. ' \ There is no blanket ban here but only qualified invalidation of certain sinister assignments etc.

Counsel weaves gossamer webs which break on mere judicial touch when he argues that transfer 'in good faith and for adequate consideration' have been unconstitutionally exempted. The bizarre submission is that 'adequate consideration' is an arl! itrary test. We reject it without more discussion. . The second limb of ·the submission is that while s. (6) ilirects the authority to ignore certain transfers it does not void it. The further spin-off adroitly presented by counsel is that the provision violates the second proviso to Art. 31. It is a little too baffling to follow and we dis- ~iss the submislrlon as hollow. The provision in s. 5 (6), when read Jn the light of the Provisos, is fair and valid..

Couusel's further argument is to quote his own words that "the impugned provisions do not establish a reasonable ·procedure" because: "The expression 'in good faith' is over-inclusive and takes within its sweep situations which are not only very different but which may not have any nexus or legitimate relationship with the objects and purposes of the ceiling law ..... " We are hardly impressed by it and find no substance on it. There is no question of morality or constitutionality even if the clause may be a little over-drawn. On the contrary, it is legislative folly not to preserve, by appropriate preventives and enacted contraceptives, the 'surplus' reservoir of land without seepage or spill-over. It is legal engineering, not moral abandonment. Indeed, the higher morality or social legitimacy of the law requires a wise legislature to prescribe transfers, lest the surplus pool be drained off by a rush of transactions. Maybe, individual hardship may happen, very sad in some instances.

But every great cause claims human martyrs ! Poor consolation for the victim but yet a necessary step if the large owners are not to play the vanishing trick or resort to manipulated alienations ! After all, this ban comes into force only on a well-recognised date, not from an arbitrary retro-active past. We cannot discover anything which is morally wrong or constitutionally anathematic in such an embargo. Article 19(1) (f) is not absolute in operation and is subject, under Art. 19(6), to reasonable · restrictions such as the one contained in s. 5 (6). We do not th. ink there is merit in the triple submissions spun by Shri Mridul. Even on the merits, the transfers have been right! y ignored, the vendees who are the grandsons have been held to be not bona fide I transferees for adequate consideration; and the findings are of fact and concurrent. We over-rule the grounds of grievance as unsustainable. In sum, without reliance on Art.

31A, Shri Mridul's contention• can be dismissed as without merit. We will now consider the mini-arguments of the other counselsome of them do merit serious consideration by the court - and even where direct relief does not flow from the judicial process, State action to avoid anomalies may well be called ·for in the light of genuine hardships. Shri Veda Vyas, appearing in W. P. No. 228 of 1979 and SLP No. 2599 of 1978, pleaded powerfully for gender justice and sex equity because, according to his reading, the Act had a built-in masculine bias in the definition of 'family unit' and allocation of ceiling on holdings, and therefore, perpetrated unconstitutional discrimination. Indeed, his case illU. Strated the anti-woman stance of the statute, he claimed. The submission is simple, the inference is inevitable but the invalidati6n does not follow even if Art. 31A is not pressed into service to silence Art. 14.

11 We will formulate the objections and examine their merits from i the constitutional perspective. Maybe, there is force in the broad generalisation that, notwithstanding all the boasts about the legendary glory of Indian womanhood in the days of yore and' the equal status and even martial valour of heroines in Indian history, our culture has sufiered a traumatic distortion, not merely due to feudalism and medievalism, but also due to British imperialism.

Indeed, the Freedom Struggle Jed by Mahatma Gandhi, the story of social reforms inspired by spiritual leaders like Swami Vivekananda and engineered by galaxy of great Indians like Raja Rammohan Roy, Swami Dayainanda I> Saraswati and Maharishi Karve and the brave chapter of participation in the Independence Movement by hundreds and thousands of womanpatriots who flung aside their unrree status and rose in revolt to overthrow the foreign yoke, brought back to Indian womanhood its lustrous status of equal partnership with Imjian manhood when the country decided to shape its destiny and enacted a Constitutioo in that behalf. Our legal culture and Corpus juris, partly a heritage of the past, do contain strands of discriminatiou to set right which oommissiou elaborately conducted enquiries and ·made a valuable report to the Central Government.

Shri Veda Vyas may lie right in making sweeping submissions only to this limited extent but when we reach the concrete statutory situation and tackle the specific provisions in the Act, his argumen~ misses the mark. A better appreciation of his contenti. on must be preceded by excerption of two definitions and consideration of the concepts they embody. Section 3(7) defines 'family' thus : 'family' in relation to a tenure-holder, means himself or herself and his wife or her husband, as the case may be (other than a judicially separated wife or husband), minor sons and minor daughters (other than married daughtersJ; This. definition is incomplete without contextually readings. 5(3) and so we quote the provision which, in the view of Shri Veda Vyas, R enwombs the vice of discrimination against women. Sec. 5(3) (a) & (b) & Explanation : Sec.

5(3) : Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (4), (5)" (6) and (7) the ceiling area for purposes of subsection (1 ) shall be (a) In the case of a tenure-holder having a family of not more than five members, 7. 30 hectares of irrigated ' land (including land held by other members of his • family) plus two additional hectares of irrigated land or such additional land which together with the • land held by him aggregates to two hectares, for • each of bis adult sons, who are either not themselves tenure holders or who hold less than two hectares of iirigated land, subject to a maximum of six hectares of such additional land; (b) in the case of a tenure-holder having family of more than five members, 7.

30 hectares of irrigated land (including land held by other members of bis family) , besides, each of the members exceeding five and for each of his adult sons who are not themselves tenureholders or who held less than two hectares of irrigated land, two additional hectares of irrigated land, or such additional land which together with, the land held by such adult son aggregates to two he -610 SCl/80 , . A "the valuation of plots allotted to a tenure-holder subject to deductions, if any, made on account of contributions to public purposes under this Act is equal to the valuation of plots originally held by him. , Provided that, except with the permission of the Director of Consolidation, the area of the holding or holdings allotted to a tenure-holder shall not differ from the area of his original holding or holdings by more then twenty five per cent • • of the latter.

" When land is contributed for public purposes compensation is paid in that behalf, and in the event of illegal or unjust orders passed, appellate and revisory remedies are also provided. On such exchange or transfer taking place, pursuant to the finalisation of the consolidation scheme, the holding, upto the ceiling available to the tenureholder, will he converted into the new allotment under the consolidation scheme. Thus, we see no basis injustice nor gross arbitrariness in the continuance of the land reforms proceedings even when con- . D solidation proceedings are under way. . We are not all impressed with counsel's citation of the rnling in Agricultural & Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. State of UP and Others,('), particularly because there has been a significant amendme'nt to s. 5 subsequent thereto. The law as it stood then was laid down by this Court in the above case;. but precisely because of that decision an explanation has been added to s.

5 of the Consolidation Act which reads thus : Explanation:- For the purposes of sub~section(2) a proceeding under the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 or an uncontested proceeding under Sections 134 to 137 of the U. P. Zamindari . Abohtion and Land Reforms Act, 195(}, shall not be deemed to be a proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest, in any land. - The view of, the Allahabad High Court in Kshetrapal Singh v. State of U. P. (2) (H. C. ) is correct, and in effect negatives the submission of Shri Arvind Kumar that there should be a stay of ceiling proceedings pending completion of consolidation proceedings. The head note in Kshetrc1pal Singh's case (Supra) brings out the ratio and for brevity's sake, we quote it; By adding the Explanation after sub-section(2) of Sec- · tion 5 of the Act a legal fiction has been created. What is (1) [1974] I S. C. R. 253, (2) [1975] R. D. 366. AMBIKA PRASAD v. U. P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.

) 1179 -Otherwise a proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land is deemed not to be such a proceeding. That is the clear legislative intent behind the Explanation. Ordinarily an Explanation is intended to explain the scope of the main section and is not expected to enlarge or narrow • down its scope but where the legislative intent clearly and " unambiguously indicates an intention to do so, effect must be given to ihe legislative intent notwithstanding the fact that • ( the legislature named that provision as an Explanation. A feeble submission was made that there was time-wise arbitra- · riness vitiating the statute in that various provisions in the Act . ~ were brought into force on random dates without any rhyme or reason, thus violating, from the temporaly angle, Art. 14. It is true that neither the legislature nor the Government as its delegate can fix fanciiul dates for effectuation of provisions affecting the rights of citizens.

Even so, a larger latitude is allowed to the State to notify the date on which a particular provision may come into effect. Many imponderables may weigh with the State in choosing the· date and when challenge is made years later, the factors which induced the choice of such dates may be buried under the debris of time. Parties cannot take advantage of this handicap and aucfacionsly challenge every date of coming into force of every provision as . capriciously picked ant. In the present case, s. 6(1) (g) has been "T' brought into force on 8. 6. 73, s. 6(3) on 10. 10. 75, s. 3(4) on 15. 8. 72, s. 16 on 1. 7. 73 and s. (1) (e) on 24. 1. 71. This last date which was perhaps the one which gave the learned Advocate General some puzzlement was chosen because on that date the election manifesto of the · o;ngress Party in all · the States announced a revised agrarian policy and that party was in power at the Union level , and in most of the States.

·Although a mere election manifesto \ cannot be the basis for fixation of a date, here the significance . is deeper in that it was virtually the announcement of the political government of its pledge to the people that the agrarian polil:y would be revised accordingly. The other dates mentioned above do not create any problem being rationally related to the daie of a preceding ordinance or the date of introduction of the bill. The details are not necessary except to encumber this judgment. f. --f We would emphasise that the brief of the State when meeting'constitutional challenges on the ground of arbitrariness must be a complete coverage, including an explanation for the date of enforcement of the provision impugned. Court and counsel call'llot dig up materials to explain fossil dates when long years later an enterprising litigant chooses to challenge. 1180 . 5lJPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S. C. R..

A few other minor infirmities' were faintly mentioned but not argued at all or seriously, such as, for instance, the contention that s. 38B of the Act which understandably excludes res judicata is challenged as violative of the basis structure of the Constitution and otherwise exceeds legislative competence. We do not think there is need to. dilate on every little point articulated by one or other of the numerous advocates who justify their writ petitions or civil appeals by formal expression of futile submissions. • We dismiss all the appeals and all the writ petitions and all the • special leave petitions with costs one set in al! the cases together which we quantify as Rs. 5,000/-. S. R. Appeals and Petitions dismissed_