AMERANDRA PRATAP SINGH v. TEJ BAHADUR PRAJAPATI AND ORS

Citation: [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. 42

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: R.C. LAHOTI, ASHOK BHAN

Judgment text

AMERANDRA PRATAP SINGH v. TEJ BAHADUR PRAJAPATI AND ORS. NOVEMBER 21, 2003 [R. C. LAHOTI AND ASHOK BHAN, JJ. ] Limitation Act, 1963-Section 25; Article 65-0rissa Merged States' (Laws) Act, 1950-Section 7-The Orissa Scheduled Areas Transfer of Immovable Property (By Schedule Tribes) Regulations, 195~Paras 2(j), 3, 3A, JD-_Transfer ofimmovable property ofa tribal in a tribal area- Non-tribal claiming title in suit land by adverse possession-Validity of- Held not valid-Object of 1950 Act and 1956 Regulations is to see and ensure that non-tribals do not usurp tribal lands-Thus adverse possession by a non-tribal from a tribal is prohibited-The tribal lands vest with the State and so the Limitation Act does not apply so long as the lands were in possession ofthe tribals-Remanded backto trial court with directions- Constitution of India-Article 244, Fifth Schedule.

Interpretation of Statutes : Legislative intent-Ascertaining of-Dictionary meaning-Use of- Held, the meaning should take colour from the context ofthe legislation for effectuating the legislative intent. Precedent-Held, a judicial decision cannot be read by implying or by assigning an assumed intention to the Judges and inferring a proposition of law not specifically laid down. Prior to 1962, C and P, who are scheduled tribes, were holding a piece of agricultural land situated in a tribal area. In 1962, they transferred their right and interest in 0. 75 decimals of the land in favour of one MSM, who is also a scheduled tribe. On 7. 4. 1964, MSM sold 0. 40 decimals of the land to one RM, a non-tribal, after obtaining permission from the competent authority. In 1965, the appellantplaintiff purchased 0. 195 decimals of the land from RM. In 1968, when the appellant proposed to raist> construction on the suit land, he was obstructed in doing so by the owner ofthe adjoining land.

RM executed A. P. SINGH v. T. B. PRAJAPATI 43 a deed of rectification in favour of the appellant on noticing an error in description of the suit property in the map attached to the sale deed executed in 1965. During the course ofdemarcation proceedings, it was found that respondent no. I, a non-triba! , had encroached upon some portion of the suit land belonging to the appellant. The appellant filed a suit for declaration of title, recovery of possession and issuan·ce of preventive injunction against the respondent-defendants. The respondents claimed possession of the suit land by way of adverse possession over the suit land since they were in possession for a period of more than 12 years. The trial court decreed the suit. In appeal, the High Court held in favour of the respondents on the ground of adverse possession. Allowing the appeal and remanding the matter to the trial court with certain directions, the Court HELD : I. I. Tribal areas have their own problems.

Tribals are historically weaker sections of the society. They need the protection of the laws as they are gullible and fall prey to the tactics of unscrupulous people and are susceptible to exploitation on account of their innocence, poverty and backwardness exten_ding over centuries. The Constitution of India and the laws made thereunder treat tribals and tribal areas separately wherever needed. The tribals need to be settled, need to be taken care of by the protective arm of the law, and be saved from falling prey to unscrupulous device so that they may prosper and by an evolutionary process join the mainstream of the society. The process would be slow, yet it has to be initiated and kept moving.

The object sought to be achieved by the Orissa Merged State (Laws) Act, 1950 and the Orissa Scheduled Areas Transfer of Immovable Property (By Scheduled Tribes) Regulations, 1956 is to see that a member of an aboriginal tribe indefeatably continues to own the property which he acquires and every process known to law by which title in immovable property is extinguished in one person to vest in another person, should remain so confined in its operation in relation to tribals that the immovable property of one tribal may come to vest in another tribal . , but the title in immovable property vesting in any tribal must not come to vest in a non-tribal. This is to see and·ensure that non-tribals cio not succeed in making inroads amongst the tribals by acquiring property .. and developing roots in the habitat of tribals. (57-D-GJ t . 2.

Clause (f) of para 2 oft956 Regulations have chosen to assign an extended meaning to the expression 'transfer of immovable property' so as to include within its meaning not only such methods of testamentary disposition as are known to result in transferring an interest in immovable property, but also any 'dealing' with such property as would have the effect of causing or resulting in the transfer of interest in immovable property, is included therein. The expression has to be assigned a very wide meaning. Any transaction or dealing with immovable property which would have the effect of extinguishing title, possession or right to possess such property in a tribal and vesting the same in a non-tribal, would be included within the meaning of 'transfer of immovable property'. (56-D-E; 60-A-BJ Sanjay Dinkar Asarkar v. S1ate of Maharashtra & Anr. , (1986) 1 SCC 83; Pandey Orson v. Ram Chander Sahu & Ors. , (1992) Supp. 2 SCC 77; Manchegowda v. State of .

Karnataka, (1984) 3 SCR 502; Lingappa Pochanna Apppelwar v. State of Maharashtra, [1984) 2 SCR 224; Gamini Krishnayya v. Guraza Seshachalam, (1965) 1 SCR 195 and State ofMadhya Pradesh v. Babu Lal & Ors. , (1977) 2 SCC 435, referred to. Jagdish v. State ofMadhya Pradesh, AIR (1993) MP 132; Wajeram v. Kaniram, (1992) Revenue Nirnaya 270 and Dinesh Kumar and Anr. v. State ofMadhya Pradesh, (1995) Revenue Nirnaya 358, referred to. D (a minor) v. Bershire County Council, (1987) 1 All ER 20 (HL), referred to. 2. 1 The nature of the property; the nature of title vesting in the rightful owner, the kind of possession which the adverse possessor is exercising are all relevant factors which enter into consideration for c attracting applicability of the Doctrine of Adverse Possession. The right in the property ought to be one which is alienable and is capable of being acquired by the competitor. Adverse possession operates on an alienable right.

The right stands alienated by operation of law, for it was capable of being alienated voluntarily and is sought to be recognised by doctrine of adverse possession as having been alienated '· A. P. SINGH v. T. B. PRAJAPATI 45 I• involuntarily, by default and inaction on the part of the rightful claimant, who knows actually or constructively the wrongful acts of the competitor and yet sits idle. Such inaction or default in taking care of one's own rights over property is also capable of being called a manner of 'dealing' with one's property which results in extinguishing one's title in property and vesting thtt same iit the wrong doer in possession of property and thu~ _amounts to transfer of immovable property in the wider sense assignable in the context of social welfare legislation enacted with the ~bjec! of protecting a weaker section. (61-B-E) . . . , ·... ,1 .. - 2. 2. In the present case, the ultimate ownership of land vest in the State on the principle of eminent domain.

Tribals are conferred with a right to hold land, which right is inalienable in favour of non-tribals. It is clear that the law does not permit a right in immovable property vesting in a tribal to be transferred in favour of or acquired by a nontribal, unless permitted by the previous sanction of a competent authority. The definition of 'transfer of immovable property' has been coined in the widest possible terms. The definition makes a reference to all known modes of transferring right, title and interest in immovable property and to make the definition exhaustive, conspicuously employs the expression - 'any other dealing with such property', which would embrace within its sweep any other mode having an impact on right, title or interest of the holder, causing it to cease in one and vest or accrue in another.

The use of the word 'dealing' is suggestive of the legislative intent that not only a transfer as such but any dealing with such property (though such dealing may not, in law, amount to transfer) is sought to be included within the meaning of the expression. Such 'dealing' may be a voluntary act on the part of the tribal or may amount to a 'dealing' because of the default or inaction of the tribal as a result of his ignorance, poverty or backwardness, which shall be presumed to have existed when the property of the tribal is taken possession of or otherwise appropriated or sought to be appropriated by a non-tribal. In other words, a default or inaction on the part of a tribal which results in deprivation or deterioration of his rights over immovable property would amount to 'dealing' by him with such property, and hence a transfer of immovable property. It is so because a tribal is considered by the legislature not to be capable of protecting his own immovable property.

A provision has been made by para 3A of the 1956 regulations for evicting any unauthorised occupant, by way of trespass or otherwise, of any immovable property of the member of the Scheduled Tribe, the steps in regard to which may be taken by the tribal or by any person interested therein or even suo motu by the competent authority. The concept of locus standi loses its significance. The State is the custodian and trustee of the immovable property of tribals and is enjoined to see that the tribal remains in possession of such property. No period of limitation is prescribed by para 3A. The prescription of the period of 12 years in Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 becomes irrelevant so far as the tribal is concerned. The tribal need not file a civil suit which will be governed by a law of limitation; it is enough if he or anyone on his behalf moves the State or the State itself moves into action to protect him and restores his property to him.

To such itn action neither Article 65 nor section 27 of the Limitation Act would be attracted. Acquisition of title in favour of non-tribal by invoking the Doctrine of Adverse Possession over the immovable property belonging to a tribal, is prohibited by law and cannot be countensnced by the cou. rt. [61-G-H; 62-A-H; 63-A-B] 2. 3. The period upto 6. 4. 1964, during which the land belonged to the tribals, has to be excluded from calculating the period oflimitation. On 7. 4. 1964, the land having been sold by a tribal to a non-tribal with the previous permission of the sub-divisional officer, the possession of respondent no. 1 over the suit land on and from that date shall be treated as hostile. In the suit filed by the appellant in the year 1970, the period of limitation shall have to be calculated by referenc~ to Article 65 of the Limitation Act. By that time only a period of 6 years, i. e. between 1964 and 1970 had elapsed. The suit was not barred by ... limitation. (63-B-D) 2. 4.

A tribal may acquire title by adverse possession over the immovable property of another tribal by reference to para 7D of the 1956 Regulations read with Article 65 and section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963, but a non-tribal can neither prescribe nor a~quire title by adverse possession over the property belonging to tribal as the same is specifically prohibited by a special law promulgated by the State ·. ,;,\,,/ Legislature or the Governor in exercise of the power conferred in that regard by the Constitution of India. A general law cannot defeat the A. P. SINGH v. T. B. PRA. IAPATI 47 )• provisions of a special law to the extent to which they are in conflict, else an effort has to be made at reconciling the two provisions by homogeneous reading. (64-B-CI Madhavrao Waman Saundalgekar and Ors. v. Raghnath Venkatesh Deshpande and Ors. , AIR (1923) PC 205; Karimullakhan s/o Mohd Ishaakhan and Anr. v. Bhanupratapsingh, AIR 36 (1949) Nagpur, 265; Laxmi Gouda and Ors. v.

Dandasi Goura (deceased by LR) and Ors. , AIR (1992) Orissa 5 and Madhia Nayak v. Arjuna Pradhan and Ors. , 65 (1988) Cuttack Law Times 360, referred to. 3. 1. Dictionaries can be taken as safe guides for finding out meanings of such words as are not defined in the statute. However, dictionaries are not the final words on interpretation. The words take colour from the context and the setting in which they have been used. It is permissible to assign a meaning or a sense, restricted or wider than the one given in dictionaries, depending on the scheme of the legislation wherein the word has been used. The court would place such construetion on the meaning of the words as would enable the legislative intent being effectuated.

Where the object of the legislation is to prevent a mischief and to confer protection on the weaker sections of the society, the court would not hesitate in placing an extended meaning, even a stretched one, on the word, if in doing so the statute would succeed in attaining the object sought to be achieved. (56-F-H; 57-A] Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G. P. Singh, Eight Edition, 2001; Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, New Edition, 1983 and Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, referred to. 3. 2. A judicial decision is an authority for what it acually decides and not for what can be read into it by implication or by assigning an assumed intention to the Judges, and inferring from it a proposition of Jaw which the J~dges have not specifically laid down in the pronouncement. [63-H; 64-A] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 11483 of 1996. - Court as no interim relief was granted by the Court though it was prayed for by the plaintiff-appellant.

On these two aspects the case needs to be remanded to the trial court for the ends ofjustice and determination of appropriate relief. We propose to make suitable directions in this regard in the operative part of the judgment. The appeal is allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for decision in accordance with the following directions:- (1) The trial cou11 shall find if an undisputed or proved map of the land belonging to the plaintiff-appellant demarcating the area encroached upon by defendant-respondent No. I is available on record, and ifso, the same shall be accepted and made a part of the decree; if not, the trial court shall appoint an Advocate-Commissioner assisted by a person proficient in survey to draw up a map of the plaintiff-appellant's land and demarcate specifically therein the area encroached upon by defendant-respondent No. I.

(2) The trial court shall determine, after hearing the learned counsel for the patties and if necessary 1'y recording additional evidence, whether a decree for demolition of the construction, made by defendant-respondent No. I, and specific restoration of possession to the plaintiff-appellant, is called for. In the alternative, the trial court shall determine if, in spite ofthe encroachment having been proved, a decree for the award of suitable compensation in lieu of demolition and restoration of possession would be a more appropriate relief. (3) In the event of the trial court forming an opinion in favour of awarding compensation the same shall be assessed by reference to the date of this judgment. The payment of compensation, as quantified by the trial court, shall be a condition precedent for condoning the encroachment and A unauthorized construction ofthe defendant-respondent No. I.

The trial court shall dispose of the suit, consistently with the terms of this judgmen·t, expeditiously and in any case within a period of six inonths from the date of the communication of this judgment. B The costs incurred in the High Court and this Court shall be borne by defendant-respondent No. I. The costs incurred in the trial court shall be in the discretion of the trial court. B. S. Appeal allowed. . t~··