ANIMIREDDY VENKATA RAMANA & ORS. v. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, H.C. OF A.P

Citation: [2008] 3 S.C.R. 1078

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: S.B. SINHA, H.S. BEDI

Case summary

ANIMIREDDY VENKATA RAMANA & ORS. v. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, H.C. OF A.P.pdf

Judgment text

[2008] 3 S. C. R. 1078 ANIMIREDDY VENKATA RAMANA & ORS. v. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, H. C. OF A. P. (Criminal Appeal No. 917 of 2006) MARCH 5, 2008 (S. B. SINHA AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ) Penal Code, 1860: s.

302 rlw 149 - Two persons assaulted by a number of accused in a bus in the night - One of victims died - Acquittal by trial court - Conviction by High Court of nine accused and acquittal of others giving them benefit ofdoubt- HELD: Maxim · 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus' not applicable in India - Giving benefit of doubt to some accused itself would not be sufficient to extend same benefit to main accused who took part iri a brutal murder of their arch enemy - Trial court has r-not believed injured witness at all - He may be an interested · witness, but there is no reason as to why he would falsely implicate the accused, motive of crime being unrebutted - Without taking recourse to right methodology of appreciation of evidence no court should infer that a prosecution witness is wholly untrustworthy only because his evidence has not been corroborated - Evidence - Testimony of injured and interested witness. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.

378 - High Court recording conviction in appeal against acquittal.. :.. HELD: Whether a matter deserves interference by appellate court depends upon fact situation of each case - Non-consideration of material facts and consideration of irrelevant facts would invite interference with judgment of trial court - On facts, very serious infirmities both in regard to legal propositions as also appreciation of evidence were noticed in judgment of trial court - There is no reason to take any , f PROSECUTOR, H. C. OF AP. exception to finding of conviction· recorded by High Court. s.

162 - Telephonic intimation of offence of murder - Police rushing to scene of occurrence - FIR recorded later - General Diary not produced in Court - HELD: When an information is received by an officer-in-charge of a police station, he is expected to reach place of occurrence as early as possible - On facts, it cannot be said that information received by police on telephone was of such a nature and contained such details which would amount to an FIR so as to attract provisions of s. 162 - Non-production of General Diary in such a case cannot be a ground for disbelieving entire prosecution case. Criminal Trial: Conduct of accused - Accused persons absconding for long time - On their arrest some of them making confessions leading to recoveries and also producing their clothes containing blood stains - Effect of - Evidence Act, 1872 s. 27. Legal Maxim - 'Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus' - HELD: Not applicable in India.

The appellants alongwith others were prosecuted for causing injuries to PW-1 and death of his father. The prosecution case was that due to a land dispute, a few criminal cases, Gram Panchayat elections and collection of money for fire victims, there was enmity between the complainant side and the accused persons. On 23. 06. 1998, PWs 1 and 2, their father and other family members went to the town to attend a court case. The accused were also present in the court. While other family members returned to the village after attending the court, PW-1 and his father stayed back. They boarded a bus at 9. 30 p. m. for their village. When the bus reached a road junction at about 10. 30 p. m. , A-1 exhorted other accused sitting in the bus to kill the father of PW-1. All the accused- appellants and A-10 inflicted several injuries to PW-1 and his father. The latter died in the bus. PWs 3 and 4, the conductor and the driver, respectively, of the bus and other passengers fled away.

PW-1 cried for help, whereupon PWs 3 and 4 returned back and took the bus to the village of PW-1, which was dest! nation of the bus. PW-3 informed the Depot Manager. The officers of the Transport Department reached the village at 1 a. m. by another bus. PW-1 was taken to the hospital in the town in the said bus leaving the dead body of his father in the village. The trial court did not rely upon the testimony of eye-witnesses and acquitted all the accused of the charges. It also held that the First Information Report was hit by Section 162 Cr. P. C. On appeal by the State, the High Court convicted the nine appellants as also A-10, who later died, of the charge of murder of the deceased and 0 acquitted the remaining accused of all the charges.

In the instant appeal it was contended for the appellants that the High Court failed to take into consideration the parameters of appeal against acquittal and as in the instant case two views were reasonably possible, the Judgment of the High Court was unsustainable in law. It was further submitted that the High Court wrongly relied upon the evidence of the prosecution witnesses whose testimonies were found to be doubtful by the trial court. Dismissing the appeal the Court HELD: 1. 1 There cannot be any dispute in regard to the legal proposition that an appellate court while entertaining an appeal from a judgment of acquittal would not ordinarily interfere therewith, if two views are possible. Which matter deserves interference at the hands of the appellate court would depend upon the fact situation of each case. Legal proposition must be applied having regard to the fact of each case. In the instant case, very PROSECUTOR, H.. C. OF A. P.

serious infirmities both in regard to the legal propositions as also appreciation of evidence have been noticed in the judgment of the trial court. Non-consideration of material facts and consideration of irrelevant facts would be factors which would invite an interference with the judgment of acquittal. [para 42] [1104-H; 1105-A-B] Mahadeo Laxman Sarane & Anr v. State of Maharashtra 2007 (7)SCALE 137; State of Madhya Pradesh 2007 (4) SCALE 181 - relied on. 2. 1 A court in the process of appreciation of evidence may rely on a statement of a witness or may not. It may even accept the evidence of a witness in part. But without taking recourse to the right methodology of appreciation of evidence, no court of law should jump to the conclusion that a prosecution witness is wholly untrustworthy only because his evidence has not been corroborated by other witnesses. The trial Judge found that both ocular as also circumstantial evidence did not corroborate the testimony of PW-1.

No reason has been stated. To what extent, the medical evidence is in variance with the ocular evidence has also not been discussed. In the instant case, certain basic facts are not disputed: the deceased died in the bus at about 10. 30 p. m. on 23. 06. 1998 while traveling to his village from the town; PW-1 also sustained injuries in the said incident; the victims were taken to their house in the same bus; PW-1 informed about the incident to PW-2, another son of the deceased; the conductor of the bus ·sent information to the Depot Manager of the State Road Transport Corporation; the officers of the Corporation reached the place on another bus at 1 a. m. , wherein PW- 1 was shifted to the hospital in the town; on receiving the information, police also reached there. [para 9-10, 21 and 30-31] [1100-B, C; 1091-F-H; 1092-B, E; 1096-C-D] 2. 2 As regards the trial court doubting the presence of witnesses, it is to be noted that accused No. 1 was a Sarpanch of the village. Accused No.

2 is a FairPrice Shop dealer. Accused No. 3 was also admittedly a well-known person. It is also not denied and disputed that other accused were also related to him. In view of the fact that such an incident had taken place, indisputably it would immediatoly be known to the villagers. Those who hold some respectable position in the village and particularly those who are concerned with the administration of Panchayat were expected to be present. [para 13] [1093-E-G] 2. 3 The Sessions Judge, relied upon the evidence of PW-3 the conductor, to discredit the evidence of PWs 6 and 7 inter alia on the premise that they are interested witnesses. Statements of PWs 3 and 4, the conductor and driver respectively, cannot be taken to be sacrosanct for the purpose of disbelieving other witnesses. The statement of PW-3 evidently was recorded on the next day after he reached the Depot at about 3 p. m. Even then he did not say that one of the passengers had died.

No undue importance can be given to a sentence made therein so as to lead a conclusion that the entire prosecution case is vitiated in law. There were some independent witnesses. They, for obvious reasons, came forward to depose in favour of the prosecution. The High Court has rightly noticed that PWs 3 and 4 tried to save their own skin. They never informed about the particulars of the . _ . incident. They only stated that there had been commotion. They did not disclose any details about the incident. On the aforementioned premise the High Court observed that they might have been desisted from giving the particulars expecting that there may be a trouble to them if the names of the accused are disclosed. Their behaviour, keeping in view the present societal condition, cannot be said to be wholly unnatural. [para 20, 27] [1096-A, B; 1097-E, F, G] \ would be carried by which accused. No accused would openly display them.

The observations of the learned Sessions Judge, therefore, that the accused were not seen prior to the occurrence anywhere in the Tuni town or the bus stand till they were alleged to have been seen in the bus, are perverse. It cannot be a ground for discrediting their otherwise truthful witness. The learned Trial Judge accepted in one part of the judgment that an injured witness should be given credit but in the next sentence he stated: ~ "But in this case his evidence does not inspire confidence. " ' No specific reason has been assigned in respect of the said statement. 30. A court in the process of its job of appreciation of evidence may rely on a statement of a witness or may not. It may even accept the evidence of a witness in part. But without taking recourse to tha right methodology of appreciation of evidence, no court of law should jump to the conclusion that a t prosecution witness is wholly untrustworthy only because his evidence has not been corroborated by other witnesses.

... 31. The learned Judge found that both ocular as also circumstantial evidence did not corroborate the testimony of PW-1. Why he said so has not been stated. To what extent, the medical evidence is in variance with the ocular evidence has also not been discussed. 32. Lacerated wounds were not only caused by assault with sticks but also when a person falls down on a hard surface. r PW-1 was found in an injured condition in between two rows of seats. He was dragged like his father. 33. We may, however, notice that in his statement before PW-10 Dr. K. Indira Surya Kumari has stated that he had been assaulted with stick and other sharp cutting weapons. Even if this part of the evidence is ignored, still then there are enough explanations available on record to suggest as to how lacerated wound could have been caused to him. ... " 34. The learned Sessions Judge opined that the bus might not have been stopped near the place of occurrence.

Why, how and where an offence is committed cannot be a subject matter of guess. The fact that the accused persons had a motive also stands unrebutted. It is not the case of the accused that the matter relating to the Sessions Case in which the deceased and other relatives were facing trial was not fixed in the court of Tuni on that day. The date admittedly was fixed for commitment of the trial to a Court of Sessions. For one reason or the other it ~ was adjourned. If taking advantage of the said situation as also in view of th«~ fact that they were travelling in the same bus and the bus was passing through a lonely place, Accused No. 1 gave +- exhortation to kill the deceased resulting in the death of the deceased and sufferance of injur\es by PW-1, it cannot be said to be absurd on the face of it. The question posed as to why the accused had chosen the said occasion is not for a court of law to answer.

A sweeping statement has been made by the learned Sessions Judge that presence of prosecution witnesses in the •· bus is highly doubtful. It was not to be readily inferred. The learned Sessions Judge found: "... The presence of PWs in the bus is highly doubtful. The overt acts attributed to particular accused causing . particular injuries to the deceased and PW1 is discrepant from one witness to other. The medical evidence is in variance with the evid. ence of PW 1, 5, 6 and 7 as to the nature of the injuries and also as to the nature of the weapons used for causing injuries to PW1 and the . , I deceased. The evidence as to the arrest and seizure of lilt' material objects is arbitrary. None of the witnesses have stated that there was sufficient light for them to witness the occurrence. It is only in court for the first time an attempt to prove that there was light is made by PWs 1, 5, 7 but that was also falsified by the evidence of PWs 3 and 4. At any rate it is doubtful.

None of the witnesses amongst PWs 5, 6 and 7 thought of giving report to VAO who is residing just opposite to the house of PW~1. Above all, the ~ " evidence of PWs 3 and 4 and also the circumstances admit that a report was recorded from PW1 earlier than Ex. P. 2 but that is not produced. The general diary sought for-by the accused has not been produced. The explanation for non-production of the same is not convincing ... " 35. We have not seen much discussions on the part of the learned Judge in his judgment to discredit the arrest of the accused persons and seizure of material objects. Why such I- • evidence was termed arbitrary is beyond any comprehension . So far as sufficiency of the light for identification of the witnesses to identify the accused is concerned, suffice it to say that they belonged to the same village. They have been fighting litigations for years.

It is too much to say that even in that situation the identity of the accused persons would not be known to the prosecution witnesses. All the passengers were sitting in their respective seats for a long time. They boarded the bus at the same place. Their destinations were same. The High Court, in ~ our opinion, has rightly noticed that as the deceased and the accused persons were sitting just behind the seat of the conductor where a light was on, it was possible for the prosecution witnesses to identify the accused persons committing the offence. 36. Non-production of the general diary by itself cannot be ground for disbelieving the entire prosecution case particularly when apart from a solitary statement made by PW-3 in his note, no other evidence has been brought on records to show that ·~· statement of any witness had been recorded under Section 161 ·~ of the Code. It will bear . repetition to state that apart from recording the statements by the investigating officers, viz.

, PWs 16, 17 and 18 who had no role to play in the matter of lodging the First Information Report. Some statements were recorded by the Deputy Superintendent of Police. 37. In Dharmendrasinh Alias Mansing Ratansinh (supra), this Court opined that when the evidence of a witness is found to be natural, the same should be believed. .... 38. In the aforementioned situation, the High Court, in our view, rightly recorded: "35. When attack is made by several persons simultaneously, it is impossible for any person to say the particulars regarding the nature of weapon, which person was attacked by the accused and which part of the body they caused injuries. The witnesses tried their best to describe the specific overt acts and the places, parts of • • the body on which the injuries were caused and the nature of weapons used.

Simply because the witnesses failed to give parrot-like version describing everything in a minute manner the argument that the evidence cannot be believed is a far fetched argument and on the pretext of not giving those details by the witnesses though observed the attack cannot be thrown out and due weight has to be given to the evidence of witnesses, if their evidence is truthful and f acceptable. Therefore, the trial court went by giving the ~ reasons beyond the imagination of the witnesses, arrived ~ at its own conclusions with a view to give the benefit of doubt to the accused. Simply because PW-1 is also an accused in the other case, his presence cannot be disputed and when he received injuries in the incident, his evidence is brushed aside on the ground that his evidence did not corroborate the evidence of PWs 5 to 7. Simply because there was enmity between the accused and the prosecution party, it cannot be said that an injured witness ~ is also speaking all the lies.

The truthfulness ofthe version given by such witnesses can be verified from the other circumstances whether their version. is truthful and acceptable in the circumstances placed by the prosecution. It cannot be brushed aside automatically simply on the ground that he is inimical to the accused. The accused are known persons and the prosecution witnesses and the accused belonging to the same village. Therefore, it is not impossible to the witnesses to identify the accused with little light. The trial Court admitted that usually there ""~ will be lights in the bus, but as PWs 3 and 4 said that there was no light at the time of occurrence, their version has been accepted. PWs 3 and 4 did not completely mention the particulars of the incident except saying that when there was a commotion they got down from the bus and after the incident they got into the bus.

They were not inclined to give the particulars regarding the weapons held by the accused, the number of persons got down from the ,. t- bus, the nature of injuries received by the deceased and PW-1, whether the accused ran away after the incident etc. Therefore, PWs 3 and 4 did not wholeheartedly come forward to give_ the complete version. They might have been desisted from giving the particulars by expecting --; that there may be a trouble to them if the names of the accused are given. They did not mention any special reason as to how A-1 to A-3 were only remembered and other accused could not be remembered when they were regularly going to the village and taking passengers from the village. Therefore, the trial Court accepting the evidence of PWs 3 and 4 and rejecting the evidence of PWs 1, 5, 6 and 7 is not appreciable and it is only to acquit the accused. " 39. We do not see any reason to take any exception to the said findings of the High Court. 40.

Although not argued but we may also take note of the fact that according to PW-1, he was assaulted and dragged by 0 Accused Nos. 11 to 24. They have been acquitted. That may rlead us to the conclusion that one part of the story implicating the appellants herein ·in the matter of assault to him is not exceptionable but then the accused formed a common intention/ common object at the spot. Such a large number of injuries both on the deceased as also PW-1 were not possible to be caused only by a handful of persons. It must have taken place within a few minutes. The entire incident was described by PWs 3 and 4 only. It was only when all the passengers fled away, they also fled away. They even did not notice the dead body or PW-1 in ~- ,, an injured condition. · 41. Furthermore, it is a well-settled principle of law that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not applicable in India. If the High court has given benefit of doubt to Accused Nos.

11 to 24, the same by itself may not be sufficient to extend the same benefit to the rnain accused who took part in a brutal murder of their arch enemy. 42. There cannot be any dispute in regard to the legal ' proposition that an appellate court while entertaining an appeal from a judgment of acquittal would not ordinarily interfere I therewith, if two views are possible. In our attempt to analyse .. - the judgment of the learned Trial Judge, we have noticed very serious infirmities therein both in regard to the legal propositions as also appreciation of evidence. Non-consideration of material ..... facts and consideration of irrelevant tacts would be factors which would invite an interference with the judgment of acquittal. ~ This Court recently in Mahadeo Laxman Sarane & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra [2007 (7) SCALE 137] held: "18. We have heard counsel for the parties at length.

We are conscious of the settled legal position that in an appeal against acquittal the l:ligh Court ought not to interfere with the order of acquittal if on the basis of the some evidence two views are reasonably possible - one in favour of the accused and the other against him. In such a case if the Trial Court takes a view in favour of the accused, the High -"\ Court ought not to interfere with the order of acquittal. ~ However, if the judgment of acquittal is perverse or highly unreasonable or the Trial Court records a finding of acquittal on the basis of irrelevant or inadmissible evidence, the High Court, if it reaches a conclusion that on the evidence on record it is not reasonably possible to take another view, it may be justified in setting aside the order of acquittal. We are of the view that in this case the High Court was justified in setting aside the order of .......... _ acquittal. " In Swami Prasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2007 (4) SCALE 181], this Court opined: "15.

However, it is equally true that the High Court while ~ entertaining an appeal against a judgment of acquittal would be entitled to consider the entire materials on records for the purpose of analyzing the evidence. There is a presumption that an accused is innocent, unless proved . rt- otherwise. When he is acquitted, the said presumption, becomes stronger. But it may not be correct to contend that despite overwhelming evidence available on records, A the appellate court would not interfere with a judgment of acquittal. {See Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka ~ 2007 (3) SCALE 90. }" 43. Which matter, therefore, deserves interference at the h'ands of the appellate court would depend upon the fact situation 8 of each case. Legal proposition must be applied having regard to the fact of each case. 44. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly. C R. P. Appeal dismissed. ..