ASHOK KUMAR v. DELHI ADMINISTRATION & ORS

Citation: [1982] 3 S.C.R. 707

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: A.P. SEN, E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, R.B. MISRA

Judgment text

• ASHOK KUMAR v. DELHI ADMINSTRATION & ORS. May 5, 1982 (A. P. SBN, E. S. VBNl:ATARAMIAH AND R. B. MISRA, JJ. ] National Security Act 1980, S1. 3 lllld 8 and Con11itution of India 1950 Article 22(5). Detention Ord1r-Period ofdetention-Specijkation of-Wheth K kuMAil. μ, bilLHi ADMINistRATION (Sen, J. ) 711 ·· furnish sufficient nexus for forming the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and further . they were vague, irrelevant and Jacking in particulars. We are afraid, none of these contentions can prevail. There is no substance in the contenti. on that there was denial • of the constitutional imperatives of Art. 22(5) read with s. 8 of the 8 Act, because there was unexplained delay of two days in furnishing the grounds of detention and it was imperative that the detenu should be furnished with the ground's of detention along· with the order of detention. It is said that delay even for a day, if it remains . ,. ,,,. : unexplained'.

means deprivation of liberty guaranteed under Art. 21,. and this is impermissible except according to procedure established by law. The contention that the constitutional safeguards in Art. ..... _ 22(5) were not complied with merely because the detenu was not 'simultaneously' furnished with the grounds of detention along with the order of detention and was thereby deprived of the right of being afforded 'the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention' as enjoined by Art. 22(5) read with with s. 8 of the Act, cannot be accepted. T. l!. e language of Art 22(5). itself provides that where a person is detained in. pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order · shall, "as soon as may be", com- · municate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the o~der. Sub-s. (I) of s.

8 of the Act which is in cdnformity with Art. 22(5) provides that when a person is ·• detained in pursuance of a detention ordet made under sub-s. (I) or sub-s'. (2) of s. 3 of the Act, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, but ordinarily not later than five days and in 4 , exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, ~••~t later than ten days from . the date of detention, communicate to • him the grounds on which the order . bas l! een made. Parliament ~ bas thus by law defined the words "as soon as may be" occurring in Art. 22(5) as meaning normally a period of five days. The matter is no longer res integra. Cbandrachud, C. J. in 1 A. K. Roy v. Union of India(') observed : "This argument overlooks that the primary require- • men! of s. 8(1) is that the authority making the order of . (1) [1982) 1 s. c. c. 271. I sVPREMI! COVl!. t Rlll>oiti's (198~1 3s. c. i.

detention shall communicate the grounds of detention to the detenu "as soon as may be". The normal rule therefore is that-the grounds of detention must be communicated to the detenu without avoidable delay. It is only in order to meet the practical exigencies of adminislrative affairs that the detaining authority is permitted to communicate the grounds of detention not later than five days ordinarily and not later than 10 days if there are exceptional circumstances. If there are any such ·circumstances, the detaining authority is required by s. 8(1) to . record its reason in · writing. We do not think that this provision is open to any objection. " Under our constitutional system, therefore, it is not the law 1 that no person shall be detained in pursuance of an order made under a law providing for preventive detention without being informed of the grounds for such detention. The law is that the detaining authority ·must, as soon as may be, i. e.

as soon as practicable, communicate to the detenu the gfOUDdS OD Which the order of detention has been made. That period has been specified by s. 8 of the Act to mean a period ranging from five to ten days depending upon the facts and circu111stances ofeach case. Admittedly, the detenu here was served with the grounds of detention within a period of two days i. e. within the period allowed by s. 8 of the Act and that was "as soon as practic! lble". This is not a case where the ~etenu alleges that his detention was for non-existent grounds. Nor does he attribute any· mala ftdes on the part of the]detaining authority in making the order. The order of detention is therefore not . ,rendered invalid merely because ,.. > the grounds of detention were furi4shed two days later. ~_,. . ' I I We find it difficult to conceive of any discernible principle for the second submission. It is submitted by learned counsel appearing for the detenu that the right to make a representation under Art.

22(5) 0f the Constitution read with s. 8 of the Act means what it implies, "the right to make an effeQtive representation". · It is urged tbft unless ! \le period of detention is specified; there can be no ifneaningful representation inasmuch as the detenu had not only the right of making a representation against the order for bis detention but also the period of detention. On this hypothesis, the contention is that the impugned order of detention is rendered invalid. ' The ASilot tcUMAR v. bllLHiAbMiNISTRATION {Sen, J. \ 'I~ entire submission rests on the following observations of Chandrachud, ' C. J. in A. K. Roys case, supra : "We should have. thought that it would have been wrong to fix a minimum period of detention, regardless of the nature and ser. iousness of the grounds of detention. The fact that a person can be detained· for the maximum period of 12 months do.

es not 'place upon· the detaining authority the obligation to direct that he shall be detained for the maximum period. The detaining authority can always exercise its discretion regarding the length of the period of detention. " The majority decision in A. K. Roys case, supra, as pronounced by Cbandrachud, C. J. is not an authqrity for the proposition that there is a duty cast on the detaining authority while making an order of detention under sub-s. (I) or (2) to specify the period of detention. The learned Chief Justice made the aforesaid observations while. repelling the contention advanced by. learned counsel for·tbe petitioner thats. 13 of the Act was violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 21 read ~with Art. 14 as it results in arbitrariness in . governmental action in the matter of life ai;id liberty of a citizen. The challenge to the validity of s. 13 of the Act was that it provides for a uniform period of.

detention of 12 •• · ' months in all cases, regardless of the nature and seriousness of the grounds on the basis of which the order of detention is passed. In repelling the contention, the learned Chief Justice obsel,'Ved that • ·there was no substance in jthat grievance because, any law of pre-· ventivt detention has to provide for the maximum period of detention, just as any punitive law like the Penal Code has to provide for the maximum sente'! ce which can be imposed for any offence. In upholding the validity of s. 13 the learned Chief Justice observed : "We should have thought that it would have been wrong to fix a minimum. period of detention, r&gardfoss of the grounds of detention';. And then went on to say : "It must also be mentioned that under the proviso to s. 13, the appropriate government bas the power to revoke or modify the order of c:)etention at any earlier point of time. " , 114 StiPR~ME coukt il. Bl>Ok'tS [198~i 3 s. c. r..

It would thus· be clear that the Court was there concerned · with the validity of s. 13 of the Act and it is not proper to build up an argument or by reading out of context just a sentence or two. There is no doubt in our mind that the Court has not laid down / that the detaining authority making an order of detention under sub-s. (! ) or sub,s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act or the authority approving of the same, must specify the period of detention in the order; It i. s plain from a t'eading of s. 3 of the Act that there is an obvious fallacy underlying the submission that the detaining authority bad the duty to specify the period of detention. It will be • noticed that sub-s. (! ) ofs.. 3 stops with the words "make an order directing that such person be detained", and does not go further and prescribe that the detainiQg authority shall also specify the period of detention. Otherwise, there should have been the following wbrds added at the end of this .

"sub-section "and shall specify the : . ' period of such detention". What is true of sub-s. (! ) of s. 3 is · aho true of sub-s. (2) thereof. It is not permissible for the courts, by a process of judicial construction, to· alter . or vary. the term~ of a section. Under the scheme of the Act, the period of deten. tion must necessarily v. ary according to the exigencies of each case i. e. the nature of the prejudicial activity complained of. It is not that the period of detention must in ,all circ. umstances extend to the maximum period of 12 months as laid down in s. 13 of the Act. The most crucial question on which the decision must turn is whether the activities of the . detenu fall within the donlain of 'public > order' or 'law and order'.

The contention is that the grounds of detention, served on the de tenu are not connected with 'maintmance of 'public order' but they relate to 'maintenance of Jaw and order' and therefore the impugned order ·of detention purported to have been' passed by the detaining authority in exercise of his powers under sub-s. (2) of s; 3 of the Act is liable to be struck down. It is urged that the facts alleged in the grounds of detention tend to. show that he is engaged in criminal activities and it is an apparent nullification of the judicial process if, in every. case where there is a failure of the prosecution to proceed with. a trial or wbere the case ends with an order of discharge or acquittal, the Executive could fall back on its power of detention because the verdict of the Court goes against it. Put differently, the contention is that resort cannot be had to the Act to direct preventive detention of a person under sub-s. (2) of s.

3 of the Act for the Act is not a law for the Asiloie ltUi. iAR v. bilLJti ADMINiStRATION (Seu, J. ) 115 preventive·detention of gangsters and notorious bad characters. The • detention here, it is said, is not so much for the "maintenance of public order" but as a measure for the past criminal activities of the detenu. It is further urged that the grounds of detention have no rational connection with the object mentioned in the Act for whi~a person i;nay be detained. Further, that there is no sufficient • nexus between the preventive action and the past activities of the . detenu which are not proximate in point of time but are too re~ote. There is no substance in any of these contentions aclvanced. The true distinction between the areas of 'public order' and 'Jaw and order' lies not in the nature or quality of the Act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction between the two concepts of 'law and order' and 'public order' is a fine.

one but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping. Acts slmilar in nature hilt committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals_cmly and therefore touch the problem of · law and order, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. It is the 'potentiality of the act to. disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. That test is clearly fulfilled in the facts and circum· stances of the present case. Those who are responsible for the national security or for the maintenance of public order. must be the sole judges of what the • national security or public order requires. Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The object is not to punish ............... a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it ,.....

and to prevent him ·from doing. J. ustification for such detention i is suspicion or reasonable probability and not . criminal conviction which can only be warranted by legal evidence. It follows that any preventive measures, even if they involve some restraint or har<! ship upon ipdividuals, do not partake in an¥ way of the nature of punish· meat, but are taken by way of precaution to prevent mischief to the State. It is a matter pf grave concern that in urbanised areas like cities and towns and particularly iμ the metropolitan city of Delhi the law and order situation is wotseaing everyday and the use of knives/and firearms haS given rise to a new violence. There is constant struggle to control the criminal activities of the persons engaged in such organised crimes for the maintenance of public SUPREME cotm. t RE. POkts ! 19&2) 3 s. C. ft.. order.

It is difficult to appreciate the argument that the detention • here is with a view to punish the detenu for a series of crimes that he is alleged to have committed, but which the law enforcement agency is not. able to substantiate. There is no reason why the Executive cannot take recourse to its power of preventive dete. ntion in t1w,se cases where the Court is genuinely satisfied that no prosecution could possibly succeed against the detenu because he is a dangerous person who has overawed witnesses or against whom no obe is prepared to depose. · The prejudicial activities of the detcnu leading to public disorder, as revealed in the grounds of detention, consist of a consistent course of criminal record. 'Although the criminal activities of the detenu in the past pertained mostly to breaches of law and order, they have now taken a turn for the worse. From the facts alleged it appears that the detenu has taken to a life of crime and become anotorious character.

His main activities are ,theft, robbery and snatching of ornaments by the use of knives and firearms. The area of operation is limited to South Delhi, such as Greater Kailash, Kalkaji and Lajpat Nagar.. A perusal of the F. I. Rs. shows that the petitioner is a person of desperate and dangerous character. This is not a case of a single activity directed against a single individuals. There have been a series of criminal activities on the parCof the. detenu and his associates during a span of four years which have made him a menace to the society. It is true that they are facing trial or the matters are still nnder investigation. That only shows that they are such dangerous · characters that peopie are afraid of • giving evidence against them. To bring out the gravity of the crimes committed by t! \e deteou, we would just mention four instances. On November 19, 1979 Smt.

Anupam Chander of B-5/10, Safdarjang Enclave reported that she was robbed of her gold-chain near East·· of Kailasb and on investigation the petitioner along with bis associates was arrested for this high-handed robbery am! . there is a case registered against them which is pending trial. Just a month after i. e. on December 11, 1979, one Munna of Lajpat Nagar reported that he was robbed of his wrist-watch and cash by three persons who were travelling 'in a three-wheeler. On investigation, the petitioner and his associate Rajendra Kumar were arrested and the police recovered the stolen property. They are facing trial in these cases. On July 18, 1981, ASHOK KUMAR v. DELHI· ADMINISTRATION (Sen: J. ) 717 Kumari G. Radha reported that she bad been robbed of her gold· cbain and a pair of tops in Lajpat Nagar at the point ofknife by • persons in the age group -Of 2(/22 years. On investigation, the petitioner and his associate Rajendra ·Kumar were arrested and the entire booty was recovered.

The case is still under investigation. It appears that the detenu was enlarged on bail and two days after i. e. on July :W, 1981, he w~s again arrested on the. report of Smt. Ozha that slie was robbed of her gold-chain near Shanti Bazar, Khokha Market, Lajpat Nagar by two persons ill the age group of 21-25 years at the point of knife. On investigation, the petitioner and his companign Rajendra Kumar were arrested and she identified them to be the culprits and the booty was recovered from thein. c, The case is under investigation. There have been similar incident¥ of a like nature. What essentially is a problem relating to law and order may due to sudden sporadic and inlermittent acts of physical violence on innocent victims in the metropolitan· city of Delhi result in serious public disorder.

It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular act of violence creating disorder that distingui~hes it as an act affecting public order from that concerning law and order. Some offences primarily 'injure specific individuals and only secondarily the public interest, while others directly injure the public interest and affect individuals only remotely. The question is of (the survival of the society and the problem is the method of control. Whenever there is an armed hold-up by gangsters in an exclusive residential area like Greater Kailash, Kalkaji or Lajpat Nagar and persons are • deprived of their belongings like a car, wrist-watch or cash, or ladies relieved of their gold-chain. s or ornaments at the point of knife or revolver, they become victims of organised crime. There is very little that the police can do about it except to keep a constant • vigil over the movements of such persons.

The particular acts enumerated in the grounds of detention clearly show that the acti· v1ties of the detenu cover a wide field and fall within the contours of the concept of public order. The contention that the facts alleged in the grounds of detention did not furnish sufficient nexus for forming the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and further that they were vague, irrelevant or lacking in particulars, cannot be accepted. bare perusal . of the grounds of detention along, with the particulars 718 SURRBMB cOURT REPORTS (1882] 3 s. c. R. ' of the 36 cases furnished in the accompanying chart, shows that the A grounds furnished were not vague or irrelevant or Jacking in parti· culars or were not adequate or sufficient for the subjective satisfactipn of the detaining authority. i In the result, the petition must fail and is dismissed. • B N. V. K.. Petition dlsmisied. ' - •