A.V. PAPAYYA SASTRY AND ORS. v. GOVERNMENT OF A.P. AND ORS

Citation: [2007] 3 S.C.R. 603

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: C.K. THAKKER, LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA

Case summary

A.V. PAPAYYA SASTRY AND ORS. v. GOVERNMENT OF A.P. AND ORS.pdf

Judgment text

A. V. PAPAYYA SASTRY AND ORS. }· \! GOVERNMENT OF A. P. AND ORS. MARCH 7, 2007 [C. K. THAKKERAND LOKESHWARSINGH PANTA, JJ. ] . A Constitution of India-Article 136-Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976-Section 34-Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Section 4(/)-Competent authority under Ceiling Act declaring land owners as 'non-surplus land owners' on basis oftheir declarations stating that advance possession of their surplus lands were taken over in a Land Acquisition proceeding-Land Acquisition Proceeding re-initiated thereafter-Exercise ofrevisional powers by State on the ground offalse declarations by the land owners-High Court allowing writ Petitions of the land owners on the ground that the powers were exercised by the State beyond reasonable time-Supreme Court dismissing the Special Leave Petition of the State- High Court recalling its earlier order noticing fraud by the land owners after ......

considering a report of an investigating agency-Correctness of-Held, judgment or order of a Court obtained by fraud is a nullity and non-est in law-On facts, ! and owners committed fraud in collusion with State officers and filed false declarations under the Ceiling Act-Hence, exercise of revisional powers by the State upheld. Appellants-land-owners filed declarations under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 stating that the possession of their lands was handed over to respondent-port Trust authorities in Land Acquisition proceedings before the appointed date; and that they had no surplus lands. 1.. On the basis of their declarations, competent authority under the Ceiling Act passed an order declaring the appellants as 'non-surplus land holders'.

When a notification under section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 came to be issued for acquisition ofthe lands ofthe appellants, the competent authority under the Ceiling Act issued a notice to the appellants as to why revisional powers should not be exercised under section 34 of the Ceiling Act and the - -+ •. , order of the competent authority should not be set aside on the ground that they had filed - a false declaration and that title to the lands was still with the appellants since the Land Acquisition proceedings were not completed by the appointed day. ~1 The appellants filed a writ petition before High Court to direct the State to complete the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act and pass an award. During the pendency of the writ petition, the State allowed the revision under section 34 of the Ceiling Act. The appellants filed another Writ Petition. The High Court allowed both the writ Petitions.

The High Court directed the State authorities to complete the Land Acquisition Proceedings and held that the exercise of revisional power under the Ceiling Act after a long period was illegal. Writ Appeals filed by the State were dismissed by the High Court. A. The Special Leave Petitions filed by the State were also dismissed by this Court.

The State, thereafter, filed recall applications before the High Court contending that a fraud was committed by the appellants by making false declarations by not showing the lands as surplus lands; and that the possession of the land was never handed over to the port Trust since the land Acquisition proceedings were not concluded by the appointed day of the Ceiling Act The State further contended that the High Court earlier ordered an inquiry by the Central Bureau of Investigation to investigate the matter; that the CBI gave a report revealing that the appellants committed a fraud in collusion with the officers of the Port Trust and those acting under the Ceiling Act; and that the CBI report was not considered by the High Court while hearing the Writ Appeals. The High Court allowed the recalling applications.

In appeal to this Court, the appellants contended that they handed over advance possession of their lands to the Port Trust Authorities; that the exercise of revisional powers under section 34 of the Ceiling Act by the State after thirteen years is wholly unwarranted and this has been upheld by the High court and this Court; that, after the dismissal of the Special Leave ,,. _ Petition of the State by this Court, the High court erred in entertaining recall , ~ applications and grant relief; that such an exercise of power is unlawful and abuse of process of law. The respondents contended that the possession of the lands was legally with the appellants since the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act were not finalised; and that the appellants filed a false declaration before the "" competent authority of the Ceiling Act stating that they had no surplus land on the appointed day. Dismissing the appeals, the Court A. V. PAPAYYASASTRYv. GOVERNMENTOFA. P. 605 HELD: I. I.

Possession of land was never with the land owners and was not given to Port Trust authorities. Neither the land owners nor the port Trust authorities were in actual or physical possession of land, but it was occupied by tenants and disputes were also going on between the tenants and land owners. Therefore, the basis on which the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling proceeded to decide the matter was non-existent and non-est. Even if the statement of land owners and Port Trust authorities is believed and it is held that actual and physical possession ofland was handed over by land-owners and taken over by Port Trust authorities, it does not . A change the legal position. It was not the case of the land-owners themselves that proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act were finalised and award was passed.

The provisions of the Ceiling Act, therefore would apply to the land and the competent authority under the Ceiling Act was wholly wrong in excluding the land said to have been in possession of the Port Trust. [Paras 17 and 18) [614-C-D, F] 1. 2. The State Government was right in exercising revisional jurisdiction under section 34 ofthe Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. It cannot be said that the power had not been exercised within a reasonable period. The subsequent development shows that some ofthe officers ofthe respondents were parties to fraud said to have been committed by land owners. [Para 19) [614-G; 615-A) State ofGujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha (1969) 2 SCC 187, referred to. 1. 3. Ifany judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be said to be a judgment or order in law. A judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the Court, Tribunal or Authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of law.

Such a judgment, decree or order - by the first Court or by the final Court - has to be treated as nullity by every Court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any Court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings. (Paras 21 and 22) (615-A, E, F; 616-A) Lazaras Estates Ltd v. Beasley, (1956) 1 ALL ER 341: (1956) 1 QB 702: (1956) 2 WLR 502, referred to. Duchess ofKings/one, Smith's Leading Cases (13th Edn. ) referred to. -4 .. 1. 3. Fraud may be defined as an act ofdeliberate deception with the design ofsecuring some unfair or undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of another. In fraud one at the loss of another. Even most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personem.

The principle of 'finality of litigation' cannot be stretched to the extent of an absurdity that it can be utilized as an engine of oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants. ! Para 2611616-FI S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by Lrs. v. Jagannath (dead) by Lrs. & Ors. , (199411 SCC l: JT (1994) 6 SC 331; Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. (1996] 5 SCC 550; JT (1996) 7 SC 135; United India Insurance Co. Ltd v. Rajendra Singh & Ors. , 1200013 SCC 581 and JT (2000) 3 SC 151, referred to. Lazarus Estates and Smith v. East El/oe Rural District Council (1956) AC 336: (195611 ALL ER 855: (1956) 2 WLR 888, referred to. 1. 4. Once it is established that an order of a Court was obtained by a successful party by plasticising or playing fraud, it is vitiated. Such order cannot be held legal, valid or in consonance with law. It is non-existent and non est and cannot be allowed to stand. This is the fundamental principle of law and needs no further elaboration.

Therefore, it has been said that a judgment, decree or order obtained by fraud has to be treated as nullity, whether by the court of first instance or by the final court. And it has to be treated as non est by every Court, superior or inferior. ! Para 3911622-F-GI Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm & Anr. v. K. Santhakumaran & Ors. , (1998] 7 SCC 386: JT (1998) 6 SC 396; Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kera/a & Anr. , 120001 6 SCC 359: JT (2000) 9 SC llO and Shanmugavel Nadar v. State of TN. & Anr. , (20021 8 SCC 361: JT 120021 7 SCC 568, referred to. 1. 5. The non-obstante clause of Article 136 of the Constitution of India are of overriding effect and clearly indicate the intention of the Framers of the Constitution that it is a special jurisdiction and a residuary power unfettered by any statute or other provisions of Chapter IV of Part V of the Constitution. It is extraordinary in its amplitude. Its limit, when it chases injustice, is the sky.

Such power, therefore, may be exercised by this Court whenever and wherever justice demands intervention by the highest Court of the country. Article 136 of the Constitution does not confer a right of appeal on any party. It confers discretion on this Court to grant leave to appeal in appropriate cases. In other words, the Constitution has not made the Supreme Court a regular Court of Appeal or a Court of Error. This Court only A. V. PAPAYYASASTRY v. GOVERNMENT OF A. P. [THAKKER, J. ] 607 intervenes where justice, equity and good conscience require such ... intervention. [Paras 43 and 44) (624-A-C, D] Baiganna v. Deputy Collector of Consolidation, (1978] 2 SCR 509: [1978] 2 sec 461, referred to. 1. 6. Keeping in view totality of facts and attending circumstances including serious allegations of fraud said to have been committed by the landowners in collusion with officers of the respondent-Port Trust and Government, report submitted by the Central Bureau of Investigation, prima ~ J.

facie, showing commission of fraud and initiation of criminal proceedings, etc. if the High Court was pleased to recall the earlier order by issuing directions to the authorities to pass an appropriate order afresh in accordance with law, it cannot be said that there is miscarriage of justice which calls for interference in exercise of discretionary and equitable jurisdiction of this Court. (Para 46) (624-G-H; 625-A] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 5097-5099 of 2004. From the Final Judgment and Order dated 6,~002 ofthe High Court of A. P. at Hyderabad in W. A. M. P. No. 1879/2001- in W. A. No. 109/1997 and W. A. M. P. No. 1880/2001 in W. A. No. 292/1998 and C. C. No. 1008/2001. K. K. Venugopal, Ankur, Y. Raja Gopala Rao and Y. Ramesh for the Appellants. Anoop G. Chaudhary, June Chaudha,ry, Manoj Saxena, Rajnish Kr. Singh, Rahul Shukla, T. V. George, K. V. Viswanathan, K. V. Venkataraman and V. Mohana, N. Annapoorani for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by C. K. THAKKER, J. I. All these appeals have been preferred by the appellants against common judgment and order passed in WAMP No. 1879 of200I in W. A. No. 109of1997, WAMP No. 1880 of2001 in W. A. No. 292 of 1998 and Contempt Case No. 1008 of 2001. By the said order, the High -. i Court recalled common judgment and order passed on April 27, 2000 in Writ ,, Appeal Nos. I09 of 1997 and 292 of 1998. A direction was also issued to the authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Ceiling Act') to complete proceedings within the stipulated period. 2. The case has a long and checkered history starting from early seventies of the last century. Appellants herein are the owners of land bearing Survey Nos. 3/1, 3/2 and 4 admeasuring 18 acres, 39 cents of Village Kancharapalem, District Visakhapatnam.

It was their case that Visakhapatnam Port Trust ('Port Trust' for short) wanted to acquire land for public purpose, namely, for construction of quarters for its employees. The Chairman of the Port Trust, therefore, sent a requisition letter to the District Collector, Visakhapatnam for acquiring land admeasuring 45 acres, 33 cents of Survey Nos. I, 2, 3 and 4 of Kancharapalem Village. Advance possession of the land of the appellants, bearing Survey Nos. 3/1, 3/2 and 4 admeasuring 18 acres, 39 cents was taken over by the Estate Manager of the Port Trust on August 29, 1972 by private negotiations. The State Authorities, thereafter, were requested by the Port Trust Authorities to take appropriate proceedings for acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. According to the appellants, in the statement recorded on August 29, 1972, Akella Suryanarayana Rao stated that he had handed onver possession of the land to the Estate Manager of the Port Trust. Mr.

Akella also stated that there was a dispute regarding land with tenant Koyya Gurumurthy Reddy under Andhra Pradesh Lands Tenancy Act. It was also the case of the appellants that the Port Trust deposited with the Government the amount of compensation payable to the owners of the land. The land acquisition proposals were approved by the Port Trust as also by the Government of India. 3. It was further case of the appellants that a preliminary notification under sub-section (I) of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was for the first time issued on August I0, 1973 but nothing further was done in the matter. The Ceiling Act came into force in the State of Andhra Pradesh on February 17, 1976. It, inter alia, covered the Visakhapatnam Urban Agglomeration.

The appellants filed their declarations taking the stand that possession of land had already been handed over to Port Trust Authorities even before the Act came into force and the provisions of the Ceiling Act, therefore, would not apply to such land. In the light of the above factual position and the case of the appellants, the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Visakhapatnam vide his order dated May 25, 1981 in C. C. No. 6143of1976 declared that the land-owners of Survey Nos. 3/1, 3/2 and 4 were 'non-surplus land holders'. Then the Government again issued notification under sub-section (I) of Section 4 of the Act on August 29, 1981. Urgency clause under Section 17(4) was not invoked since the • possession of land was already with the Port Trust Authorities. A declaration under Section 6 was issued on October 12, 1982. No award, however, was A. V. PAPAYYASASTRYv. GOVERNMENT OF AP. [THAKKER,J. ] 609 . ,.. passed. 4.

According to the appellants, the Chief Engineer of Port Trust in reply to a query by the Land Acquisition Officer, clarified vide his letter dated December 19, 1985 that actual and physical possession of the land was not taken by Port Trust as the tenant did not vacate possession of the land. It appears that in view of the above letter that physical possession of land was not with the Port Trust Authorities, the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Visakhapatnam referred the matter to the #'). Commissioner, Land Reforms and Urban Land Ceiling, Government ofAndhra Pradesh, Hyderabad in February, 1987 to take up the matter under Section 34 of the Ceiling Act in suo motu revision. The Collector, Visakhapatnam also vide his D. O. letter No. 433/78, dated June 27, 1987 requested the Commissioner to reopen the case and start enquiry.

On August 21, 1989, Chairman, Visakhapatnam Port Trust addressed a letter to the Commissioner, Land Reforms & Urban Land Ceiling, Government of A. P. categorically stating that land admeasuring 18 acres, 39 cents ofSurvey Nos. 311, 3/2 and 4 ofKancherapalem village had already been taken over by the Port Trust and there was no cause to reopen the case under Section 34 of the Ceiling Act. Once again, the Government approved the proposal for acquisition of land and notification under Section 4(I) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on May 17, 1991. 5. It appears that the proceedings for reopening of the case by invoking Section 34 of the Ceiling Act were initiated. On July 20, 1994, notice was issued to the owners to show cause as to why revisional powers should not be exercised and the order passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority under the Ceiling Act should not be set aside.

It was also stated in the notice that it was brought to the notice of the Government that title to the land was undisputedly with the declarants on the appointed day under 1- the Ceiling Act as the Land Acquisition Proceedings were not concluded by that date. As such land was required to be computed in the holdings of the declarants even if it was admitted by the Port Trust Authorities that they were in possession of the land in 1972. The land-owners submitted the reply to the notice. 6. Meanwhile, however, the land-owners filed a petition being Writ ---1 .. Petition No. 11754 of J994 praying therein that the High Court may direct the State Authorities to complete proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act and pass an award. During the pendency of the writ petition the revision was allowed by the State Government under Section 34 of the Ceiling Act on January 20, 1995 and the order passed by the Special Officer and Competent ,.

, Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Visakhapatnam declaring that the appellants had no surplus land had been set aside. The appellants, therefore, filed another petition, being Writ Petition No. 3102 of 1995 questioning the legality of the order passed in revision. The learned single Judge allowed both the petitions i. e. Writ Petition Nos. 11754 of 1994 and 3102 of 1995 and by order dated June 4, 1996 directed the authorities to complete Land Acquisition Proceedings and pass award within three months. The learned single Judge also held that the order under the Ceiling Act was passed by the Spedal J~ Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Visakhapatnam in 1981 while suo motu revisional powers were exercised in 1994-95 i. e. after thirteen years. Such action was, therefore, illegal, unlawful and unwarranted. Accordingly, the order passed in revision was set aside. Writ appeals filed by the State were dismissed.

A direction was issued by the Division Bench to fix market value on the basis of notification under Section 4( I) issued on May 17, 1991. Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 14860-14861 of 2000 filed by the State Autho;ities were dismissed by this Court on October 20, 2000. 7. The State Authorities, ther!! after, filed recall-applications on June 13, 200 I. In the recall applications, it was stated inter alia that fraud was committed by the land-owners and material facts were suppressed by them. It was -alleged that possession of land was never handed over to Port Trust Authorities, nor Port Trust Authorities received such possession of land and yet it was asserted by the owners that possession of land was given to Port Trust Authorities in 1972 which was not correct. It was only in Dece:mber, 1985 that the correct fact came to the knowledge ofthe State Authorities from a letter by the Chief Engineer of Port Trust.

Hence, the order was taken in suo motu revision under Section 34 of the Ceiling Act. It was further stated that even if the Port Trust Authorities would be deemed to be in possession of land on the day the Ceiling Act came into force, Land Acquisition ) Proceedings were not concluded and no award was passed. The Po1t Trust Authorities, in the circumstances, would be in possession of the land for and on behalf of the land-owners and the land was required to be declared surplus and vacant under the Ceiling Act. 8. It was further averred that the High Court ordered inquiry by the \-- •/ Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and Mr. Y. Anil Kumar, ! PS, Superintendent of Police, CBI, Visakhapatnam submitted a detailed report in the High Court when the Writ Appeals were placed for hearing. Unfortunately, however, the attention of the Court was never invited to the said report which clearly A. V. PAPAYYASASTRYv. GOVERNMENT OF A. P. [THAKKER. J.

] 611 revealed that there was total fraud on the part of the land-owners in collusion yr with Port Trust Officers as also Officers acting under the Ceiling Act. It was, therefore, submitted that the orders passed by the Division Bench on April 27, 2000 was required to be recalled by directing the authorities under the Ceiling Act to conclude proceedings. 9. The High Court, after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and considering the records and proceedings including the report submitted by CBI, held that the case was of a fraud and by suppressing material facts, several orders were passed and actions were taken. In view of correct and true {.. -l. , facts and reports which clearly established that the authorities were misled, that proceedings were initiated to revise the order, dated May 25, 1981. The Court, therefore, held that the order dated April 27, 2004 passed by the Division Bench was required to be recalled and recall applications were allowed. I0.

The Court therefore passed the following order; "Considering all the aspects as stated above, we are of the considered view that the recall petitions have to be allowed. Accordingly we allow the recall petitions by setting aside the common judgment passed in the aforesaid writ appeals. We further direct that the proceedings under ULC Act have to be completed within a period of one month from the date of receipt of this order by the concerned authorities by giving opportunity to the petitioners and respondents herein to put forward their cases and after final decision is taken by the authorities under ULC Act, the further proceedings have to be initiated under Land Acquisition Act depending upon the result under the ULC Act. The proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act if initiated, compensation to be awarded to the respondents herein within a period of three months from the date of order of the authorities under the ULC Act.

The Land Acquisition Officer is also directed to consider the legal date of possession of the land taken by the VPT Authorities after conclusion of the enquiry under the ULC Act". 11. The appellants have challenged the aforesaid order of the High ·i Court. On August 5, 2002, notice was issued by this Court. Affidavits and counter affidavits were filed. On August 6, 2004, leave was granted and hearing was expedited and the matters were placed before us for final hearing. [2007] 3 S. C. R. 12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 13. Mr. K. K. Venugopal, Senior Advocate, appearing for the appeilants contended that the High Court committed an error in law in passing the impugned order.

It was clear from the evidence on record and various communications that before the proposal was submitted by the Port Trnst Authorities for acquisition of land for a public purpose (construction of quarters for its employees), advance possession of land had been taken over by Port Trust Authorities and land-owners were not in possession of 1he property. The said fact was noted by the Special Officer and Competent >~ Authority, Urband Land Ceiling, Visakhapatnam and an order was passed in May, 1981 that the appellants were 'not surplus land owners'. In or about 1985, however, there appeared to be encroachment over the land and some officers of the Port Trust, with a view to save their skin, wrote a letter on December 19, 1985 that the possession of land had not been handed over to Port Trust Authorities since tenants were occupying the land. The said statement was not corTt'ct and could not have been considered for initiating proceedings under the Ceiling Act.

It was also submitted by the counsel that suo motu power was sought to be exercised after a decade. As per settled law, revisional powers should be exercised within 'reasonable time'. By no stretch of imagination, more than ten years can be said to be 'reasonable time'. According to the learned counsel, learned single Judge was wholly justified in allowing both the writ petitions filed by the land-owners and in issuing directions, namely, (i) to complete land acquisition proceedings and pass award; and (ii) exercise ofrevisional powers after about thirteen years was wholly unwarranted. The said order was confirmed by the Division Bench in Writ Appeals. Special Leave Petitions were also dismissed by this Court. After dismissal of Special Leave Petitions, neither it was open to the authorities to make an application for recalling earlier orders as has been done in June, 200 I, nor it was permissible for the Court to grant such relief.

It was also submitted that the Division Bench, while dealing with Writ Appeals took note of the fact that the land was 'agricultural land' and was having fruit bearing trees i. e. a garden land. The said finding had not been disturbed even by this Court in SLPs. The Division Bench ought to have taken into account that fact as well. By not doing so, an illegality had been committed and the order deserves to be set aside. 14. The learned counsel for the State Authorities as also Port Trust Authorities supported the order passed by the High Court and action of recalling ofthe order dated April 27, 2000. It was submitted that the authorities A. V. PAPAYYASASTRYv. GOVERNMENT OF A. P. [THAKKER.. I. ] 613 proceeded on the basis that advance possession of the land was given by land-owners to Port Trust Authorities in August, 1972. But the statement was not correct and the authorities were misled.

The order passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority under the Ceiling Act declaring that the owners did not possess surplus land was founded on the above statement that the land-owners were not in possession of land, which was false. But even otherwise, the order passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority was not in consonance with law inasmuch as even if the owners were not in possession of land, proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act were not finalized. The legal position is that the ownership of the land-owners continued and in the eye of law, Port Trust Authorities remained in possession for and on behalf of the land-owners. It was, therefore, incumbent on Special Officer and Competent Authority under the Ceiling Act to declare land to be excess and surplus under the Ceiling Act so that appropriate consequential action could be taken. No such action, however, was taken.

Moreover, it was made clear by the Chief Engineer, Port Trust vide his letter dated December 19, 1985 that actual and physical possession of land was never taken by Port Trust Authorities as it remained with tenants and disputes were going on. The matter, therefore, required detailed investigation. 15. The CBI made an enquiry and the report was submitted by the Police Inspector which rev. ealed startling facts. From the report, it is clear that fraud was committed by the land owners in collusion with officers of the respondents. Criminal proceedings were also initiated and they are pending. It was, therefore, submitted that the High Court was right in recalling its earlier order. 16.

Regarding non-applicability of the provisions of the Ceiling Act as the land being garden land and hence agricultural land under the Ceiling Act, it was submitted that it was never the case of the land-owners when proceedings under the Ceiling Act had been initiated that the Act would not apply because the land was used for agriculture. The sole ground put forward by the land- owners was that possession of land had already been given to Port Trust Authorities and hence the Ceiling Act had no application. It was, therefore, submitted that the appeals deserve to be dismissed and the impugned order calls for no interference. 17. Having given anxious consideration to the rival contentions of the parties, in our opinion, no case has been made out by the appellants for interference with the order passed by the High Court allowing the applications and recalling earlier order. The High Court has considered the matter in detail.

The case of land- owners was that advance possession was taken over by Port Trust Authorities in August, 1972. The subsequent facts and letter by Chief Engineer of Port Trust in 1985 clearly revealed that it was not so. Possession of land was never with the land owners and was not given to Port Trust Authorities. From the record it is clear that neither the land-owners nor the Port Trust Authorities were in actual or physical possession of land, but it was occupied by tenants and disputes were also going on between the tenants and land owners. Therefore, the basis on which the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling proceeded to decide the matter F , was non-existent and non est. 18.

In our opinion, the learned counsel for the respondents are also right in submitting that even if the statement of land-owners and Port Trust Authorities is believed and it is held that actual and physical possession of land was handed over by land-owners and taken over by Port Trust Authorities, it does not change the legal position. It was not the case of land-o~ ners themselves that proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act were finadzed and award was passed. From the record, it is clear that no notification under the Land Acquisition Act was issued in 1972. Such notifications were issued subsequently in the years 1973, 1981, 1991 and 1996. At more than one occasion, notifications were issued only because the proceedings wer ~ the matter one way or the other.

Therefore, as and when the matter will be considered by the authorities in pursuance of the directions of the High Court, it will be decided on its own merits without being inhibited by the observations made by us in this judgment. 48. For the foregoing reasons, the appeals deserve to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed with costs. B. S. Appeals dismissed. . -( ..