B. SHAH v. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, COIMBATORE & ORS.
Citation: [1978] 1 S.C.R. 701; 1977 INSC 199
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: V.R. KRISHNA IYER , JASWANT SINGH
Judgment date:
Case summary
1977 INSC 199. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1977-10-12. B. SHAH v. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, COIMBATORE & ORS. Read the judgment and case...
Judgment text
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1978] 1 s. c:R. B. SHAH v. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, COIMBATORE & ORS. October 12, 1977 [V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ. ] Interpretation of social security legislation for women-Duty of the court. Right to payn1ent of maternity benefit~Connotation of the term "week" in sub. ss. (1) and (3) of s. 5 read with ss. 2(1), 3(n) and 4 of the Maternity Benefits Act (Act Lill of 1961). Whether computation of the maternity benefits prescribed by the Act has to be made taking a week as si1;11ifying a cycle of' seven days including a Sunday or a cycle of seven days minus a Sunday which is a wageless day-Paragraphs I and 2 of Art. 4 of Convention 103 of Maternity Protection Convention (Revisecf) 1952 adopted by the General Conference of the International Labour Organisation. Respondent No. 2 working in "Mount Stuart Estate" belonging to the appellant was allowed leave of absence on maternity leave.
After her delivery, the appellant paid her on account of maternity benefit an amount equivalent to what she would have earned on the basis of her average daily wages in 72 working days falling within 12 weeks of the maternity period excluding 12 Sundays being wageless holidays which fell during the period of the respondent's actual absence immediately preceding and including the day of her delivery and the 6 weeks immediately following that day. The claifu for the benefit of the entire period of 12 weeks, that is, for 84 days on the plea that a week consisted of 7 days having been refused, the respo@ent moved the Labour Court, Coimba~ tore, which by its order dated February 26, 1969, allowed the said claim. The appe11ant moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the decision of the Labour Court. The single Judge of the High Court allowed the petition holding that 12 weeks for which maternity benefit is provided for in sub-section (3) of s.
5 of the Act must be taken to mean 12 weeks of work and the computation of the benefit had to be made with reference to the actual days on which the woman would have worked but for her inability. Aggrieved by this decision, the respondent filed an appeal under cl. 15· of the Letters Patent ' and the Division Bench set aside the orders of the single Judge. Dismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court, HELD: (1) In interpreting provisio11. s of beneficial pieces of legislation which is intended to achieve the object of doing social justice to woman workers employed in the plantations and which squarely fall within the purview of Article 42 of the Constitution, the beneficient rule of construction which would enable the woman worker not only to subsist but also to make up her dissipated energy, nurse her child, preserve her efficiency as a worker and maintain the level of her previous efficiency and output has to be adopted by the Court. [708 H, 709 A-Bl f (2) The provisions of s.
5 of the Maternity Benefits Act make it clear that a woman \Vorker who expects a child is entitled to maternity benefit fOr a maximum period of 12 weeks which is split up into two petiods viz. , pre-natal and post-natal. The first one is the pre-natal or ante-natal period is limited to the period of woman's actual absence extending upto 6 weeks immediately preceding and including the day on which her delivery occurs and the second one which is post-natal compulsory period consists of 6 weeks immediately following the day of delivery. The Act does not contain any deftnitiori of the word "week". It has to be understood in its ordina'ry dictionary me tus, or is likely to cause her miscarriage or otherwise to adversely affect her health.
(4) The period referred to in sub-section (3) shall be- (a) the period of one month immediately preceding the period of_ six weeks, before the date of her expected delivery; (b) any period during the said period of six weeks for which the pregnant woman does not avail of leave of absence under section 6". Section 5 of the Act which confers right to payment of maternity benefit on a woman worker provisions:- "5. Right to payment of maternity benefit. - (1) Subject to tho provisions of this Act, every woman shall be entitled to, and her employer shall be liable for, the payment of maternity benefit at the rate of the averag:: daily wage for the period of her actual absence immediately preceding and including the day of her delivery and for the six weeks immediately following that day. EXPLANATION. -For the purpooe of this sub-section the average daily wage means the average of the woman's V.
:alles payable to her for the days on which she has worked dunng the period of three calendar months immediately preceding the date from which she absents herself on account of maternity, or one rupe•o a day, whichever is higher. 706 SUPREME COURT REl'ORTS [1978] 1 S. C. R. (2) No woman shall be entitled to maternitv benefit un-less she has actually worked in an establishmen"t of the employer from whom she claims maternity benefit, for a period of not less than one hundred and sixty days in the twelve months immediately preceding the date of her expected delivery. Provided that the qualifying period of one hundred and sixty days aforesaid shall not apply to a woman who has immigrated into the State of Assam and was pregnant at the time of the immigration. ExPLANATION.
-For the purpose of calculating under this sub-section, the days on which a woman has actually worked in the establishment, the days for which she has been laid off during the period of twelve months immediately preceding the date of her expected delivery shall be taken into account. (3) The maximum period for which any woman shall be entitled to maternity benefit shall be twelve weeks, that is to say, six weeks up to and including the day of her delivery and six weeks immediately following that day : Provided that where a woman dks during this period, the maternitiy benefit shall be payable only for the days up to and including the day of her death. Provided further that where a woman, having deli'.
'ered of a child, dies during her delivery or during the period of six weeks immediately following the date of her delivery, leaving behind in either case the child, the employer shall be liable for the maternity benefit for the entire period of six weeks immediately following the day of her delivery but if the child also dies during the said period, then, for the days upto and including the day of the death of th•e child. " Section 6 of the Act which deals with notice of claim for maternity benefit and payment thereof is to the following effect :- "6. Notice of claim for maternity honefit and payment thereof.
-(1) Any woman employed in an establishment and entitled to maternity benefit under the provisions Qf this Act may give notice in writing in such form as may be prescribed, to her employer, stating that her maternity benefit and any other amount to which she may be entitled under this A\'t may be paid to h·~r or to such person as she may no_mi-nate in the notice and that she will not work in any establishment during the period for which she receives maternity benefit. (2) In the case of a woman who is pregnant, such notice ff shall state the date from which she wia be absent from work, not being a date earlier than six weeks from the date of her expected delivery. B. SHAH v. LABOUR COURT (Jaswant Singh, J. ) 707 (3) Any woman who has not given the notice when she was pregnant may give such notice as soon as possible after the delivery.
( 4) On receipt of the notice, the employer shall permit such woman to absent herself from the establishment until the expiry of six weeks after the day of her delivery. (5) The ·amount of maternity benefit for the period preceding the date of her expected delivery shall be paid in advance by the employer to the woman on production of such proof as may be prescribed that the woman is pregnant, and the amount due for the subsequent P''riod shall be paid by the employer to the woman within forty-eight hours of production of such proof as may be prescribed that the woman has been delivered of a child. ( 6) The failure to give notice under this section shall not disentitle a woman to maternity benefit or any other amount under this Act if she is oth•=rwisc entitled to such benefit or amount and in any such case, an Inspector nby either of his own motion or on an application made to him by the woman, order the payment of such benefit of amount I> within such period as may be specifi.
ed in the order''. The provisions of section 5 of the Act quoted above make it clear that a woman worker who expects a child is entitled to maternity benefit for a maximum period of twelve weeks which is split up into two periods viz. pre-natal and post-natal. The first one i. e. pre-natal or ante-natal period is limited to the period of woman's actual absence extending upto six weeks immediaoely preceding and including the day on which her delivery occurs and the second one which is post-natal compulsory period consists of six weeks immediately following the day of delive1y The benefit has to be calculated for the aforesaid two periods on the basis of the average daily wage. According to the Explanation appended to section 5 ( 1) of the Act, the average ..
daily wage has to be compubed taking into consideration the average F' of the woman's wages payable to her for the days on which she has worked during the period of three calendar months immediately preceding th•: date from which_ she absents herself on account of maternity, or one rupee a day, whichever is higher. For fixing the average daily wage, it has therefore first to be ascertained whether the wages with were paid or were payable to the woman was for 'time work' or for 'piece work'. It has next to be ascertained as to what were ·the cash wages paid or payable to her in terms of the definition contained_ in section 3(n) of the Act for the days on which she worked during the period of thre•e calendar months immediately preceding the date of delivery, reckoned according to the British calendar month. The total wages thus worked out are to be divided by the number of days in the aforesaid three calendar months in order to arrive at the average daily wage.
After thus finding out the average daily wage, the liability of the employer in respect of the maternity benefit has to be calculated in terms of section 5 of the Act for both pre-natal and post-natal period indicatei above. The real though difficult question that calls for determination by us is as to wbat is the connotation of the term "week" occurring in sub-sections (I) and ( 3) of section 5 of the Act and whether the computation of the maternity benefit prescribed by lb~ Act for the aforesaid two periods has to be made taking a "week" as signifying a cycle of seven days including a Sunday or a cycle of seven days minus a Sunday which is said to be a wageless day. As the Act does not contain any definition of the word "week", it has to be understood in its ordinary dictionary sense.
In the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Third Edition), the word "week" has been described as meaning "the cycle of seven days, recognized in the calendar of the Jews and thence adopted in the calendars of Christian Mohammedan and various other peoples. A space of seven days, irrespective of the time from which it is reckoned. Seven days as a term for periodical pqyments (of wages, rent, or the like), or as a unit of reckoning for time of work or service. " In Webster's New World Dictionary (1962 Edition), the meaning of the word "wi,ek" is given as "a period of seven days, especially one beginning with Sunday and ending with Saturday; the hours or days of work in a seven-day period. " In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (Third Edition), it is stated that ( 1) "though a week usually means any consecutive seven days, it will sometimes be interpreted to mean the ordinary notion of a week reckoning from Sunday to Sunday and (2) probably, a week usually means seven clear days.
" A "week" according to Halsbury's Laws of England (Third Edition) Volume 37 at p. 84 is. strictly the time between midnight on Saturday and the same hour on th' next succeeding Saturday, but the , term is also applied to any period of seven successive days. Bearing in mind the above mentioned dictionary or popular meaning of the term "wrek", we think that in the context of sub-sections (1) and (3) of section 5 of the Act, the term has to be taken to signify a cycle of seven days including Sundays. The language in which the aforesaid sub-sections are couched also shows that the Legislature intended that computation of maternity benefit is to be made for the entire period of the woman worker's actual abS'Cnce i. e.
for all the days including Sundays which may be wageless holidays falling within that period and not only for intermittent periods of six days thereby excluding Sundays falling within that period for if it were not so, the Legislature instead of using the words "for the period of her actual absence immediately preceding and including the day of her delivery and for the six weeks immediately following that day" would have used the words "for the working days falling within the period of her actual absence immediately preceding and including the day of her delivery and the six weeks immediately following that day but excluding the wageless days". Again the word "period" occurring in section 5(1) of the Act is a strong word. It seems to emphasize, in our judgment, the continuorn running of time and Pecnrrence of the cycle of seven days. It has also to be borne in mind in this connection thatJ. n inter- B. SHAH v. LABOUR COURT (Jaswant Singh, J.
) 709 preting provisions of beneficial pieces of legislation like the one in hand which is intended to achieV'e the object of doing social justice to women work,ers employed in the plantations and which squarely fall within the purview of Article 42 of the Constitution, the beneficent rule of construction which would enable the woman worker not only to subsist but also to make up her dissipated energy, nurse her child, preserve her efficiency as a worker and maintain the level of her previous efficiency and output has to be adopted by the Court. The iuDerpretatiou placed by us on the phraseology of sub-sections (1) and (3) of section 5 of the Act appears to us to be in conformity not only with the legislative intendment but also with Paragraphs I and 2 of Article 4 of Convention No.
I 03 concerning Maternity Protection Convention (Revis,ed), 1952 adopted by the General Conference 9,f the International Labour Organisation which are extracted below for facility of reference :- "Article 4 : I. Whibe absent from work on maternity leave in accor-dance with the provisions of Article 3, the woman shall be entitled to receive cash and med'ical benefits. 2. The rates of cash benefit shall be fixed by national laws or regulations so as to ensure benefit sufficient for the full and healthy maintenance of herself and her child in accordanoe with a suitable standard of living.
" Thus we are of opinion that computation of maternity benefit has to be made for all the days including Sundays and rest days which may be wageless holidays comprised in the actual period of absence of tm woman extending upto six weeks preceding and including the day of delivery as also for all the days falling within the six weeks immediately following the day of delivery thereby ensuring that the woman worker gets for the said period not only the amount equalling 100 per rent of the wages which she was previously earning in terms of section 3(n) of the Act but also the benefit of the wages for all the Sundays and rest days falling within the aforesaid two periods which would ultimately be conducive to the inDerests of both the woman worker and her employer. In view of what we have stated above, we cannot uphold the view of the law expressed by th". ' Full Bench of Karala High Court in Malayalam Plantations Ltd. Cochin v. Inspector of Plantations Mundakayam & Ors.
(supra), In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. Although costs have to be paid by appellant to respondent No. 2 in terms of the Court's ord,er dated October 30, 1975, yet in view of the fact that the said respondent has not chosen to appear at the hearing of the case and Mr. K. N. Bhat has assisted lhe Court as amicus curiae, we direct the appellant to pay Rs. 1,000/- to Mr. Bhat as his fee. S. R. Appeal dismissed.
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