BABULAL BADRIPRASAD VARMA v. SURAT MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS

Citation: [2008] 7 S.C.R. 564

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: S.B. SINHA, V.S. SIRPURKAR

Case summary

BABULAL BADRIPRASAD VARMA v. SURAT MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS.pdf

Judgment text

[2008] 7 S. C. R. 564 BABULAL BADRIPRASAD VARMA II. SURAT MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 3203 of 2008) MAY 02, 2008 (S. B. SINHA AND V. S. SIRPURKAR, JJ. ) Town Planning : Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Rules, 1979: r.

26 - Land acquired for a road widening project - Rea/location of plots as per Scheme - Two plots of landlord acquired one being under tenancy - Notice given to landlord as also to tenant - Tenant not pursuing the matter - After final allotment of plots tenant claiming that he was not served with notice of final allotments of plots - Held : Rule 26 does not I ~ contemplate individual notice - Tenant did not oppose the draft Scheme - Even if the tenant had a claim, he would be deemed to have waived the same - He has lost his right to enforce the same against the State in a public forum - He may pursue his claim only against the landlord wherein, for certain purposes, State or the authorities may be impleaded as party - Waiver - Estoppel - Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976- Ss. 52, 67,68, 81 and 82.

1 Town Planning Planning authority - 'Vesting' of land in it on acquisition • for public purpose and enabling it to create third party interest vis-a-vis for purpose of re-allotment of plots - Distinction between - Explained. Respondent No. 4 was the owner of Plot Nos. 17/7 and 17/8, the latter being under tenancy of the appellant. • ,,. _ In order to acquire the said plots under a road widening CORPORATION & ORS. project of the Town Planning Scheme, notices were issued to the appellant and respondent noA. The appellant though objected thereto, but did not pursue his case further and, despite public notice, did not file any objection to re-allotment of plots. Ultimately, respondent no. 4 was allotted final plot no. 157 and some portion of plot no. 17/8 was merged in final plot no. 165 owned by respondent no. 3. In the process of implementing the Scheme, respondent No. 1 first served notices u/s.

67 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976; and thereafter another notice u/s 68 of the Act on respondent No. 4 but he did not respond. Validity of the second notice was challenged by the appellant in a writ petition before the High Court contending, inter alia, that the purpoted final allotments of plot nos. 165 and 157 in favour of respondent nos. 3 and 4, respectively, were made without issuing any notice as envisaged u/ss 52 and 53 .. ,. ' of the Act. The writ petition as also the intra-court appeal having been dismissed, the tenant filed the instant appeal. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. 1 A Town Planning Scheme, envisages calling for objection from the persons concerned for three purposes : (i) in regard to draft scheme; (ii) lodging of any claim for payment of compensation; and (iii) participation in the matter of allotment of final plots.

A person interested ~ in continuing to keep possession over a property and/or to claim a part of the amount of compensation must lay } his claim before the appropriate authority at the appropriate stage. [para 15 and 22] [578-C, D; 580-A, B] 1. 2 The appellant did not oppose the draft scheme and accepted that the State had a right to do so. Existence of a public purpose and increase in the valuation of the ~ property was admitted. There exists a distinction in the "" action of the planning authority as regards vesting of property in it and one so as to enable it to create a third party interest vis-a-vis for the purpose of re-allotment thereof. In the former case, the vesting of the land may be held to be an act of acquisition, whereas in the latter, it would be distribution of certain benefits having regard to the purpose sought to be achieved by a statute involving town planning.

While the proceedings relating to allotment of final plot were in progress, the appellant even did not file any objection thereto. If he intended to claim any interest in a portion of plot No. 17/8 either for the purpose of obtaining compensation or to continue to have its possession, it was obligatory on him to participate in the proceedings. If in absence of any such claim filed by the appellant, the authorities have proceeded to finalise allotment of final plots in favour of the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 it is too late in the day to claim reopening of the entire scheme. [para 20-22 and 27] [581-D, E, F; 579-F, G; 580-B] State of Gujarat v Shanti/al Mangaldas & Ors. 1969 (3) SCR 341 - referred to. 2. 1 Requirements in regard to the manner of service of notice vary from statute to statute. Unlike r.

21 of the Bombay Town Planning Rules, 1955 wherein special notice is required, Rule 26 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Rules 1979 does not contemplate service of individual notice. It prescribes service of notice in Form H. It furthermore provides that any person entitled to claim damages in terms of Section 82 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 should communicate the details of his claim to the Town Planning Officer. Section 81 of the Act enables the State to transfer of right from original to final plot or extinction of such right. [para 15-16 and 26) [581-B; 578-A, B, CJ Sureschandra C. Mehta v. State of Karnataka and Others 1994 Supp (2) SCC 511; West Bengal Housing Board etc. Brijendra Prasad Gupta and Others, etc. AIR 1997 SC 2745 relied on. BABULAL SADRIPRASAD VARMA v. SURAT MUNICIPAL 567 CORPORATION & ORS. Mansukhlal Jadavji Darji and Ors. Vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and Ors.

(1992) 1 SCC 384; Jaswantsingh Mathurasingh and Anr. vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and Ors. (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 5; Manekla/Chhotalal & Ors. Vs. M. G. Makwana and Ors. (1967) 3 SCR 65; and Bhikhubhai Vithalbhai Patel and Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat and Anr 2008(4) SCALE 278 - referred to. 2. 2 Whether irrespective of Rule 26 of the Rules which prescribes for issuance of a general public notice, any special notice upon the appellant was required to be served by the State or by the authority cannot be. gone into by this Court for the first time. Validity of Rule 26 of the Rules was not questioned nor was it claimed to be ultra vires s. 52 of the Act. Assuming that it was obligatory on the part of the State to serve a special notice up~n the appellant, non-compliance thereof vis-a-vis the conduct ' ~ of the appellant himself would be of no consequence. [para 21 and 23] [579-G, H; 580-A, E, F] 3.

The appellant, through his conduct, has waived his right to an equitable remedy in the instarit case as he did not file objections for re-allotment nor did he participC\te in the proceedings following acquisition instituted by the authorities under the Act. Such conduct precludes and operates as estoppel against him with r~spect to asserting a right over a portion of the acquired • land in a situation where the scheme in question has attained finality following as a result of the appellant's ' inaction. A person may waive a right either expressly or by necessary implication. He may in a given case disentitle himself from obtaining an equitable relief particularly when he allows a thing to come to an irreversible situation. Therefore, appellant has waived benefit of the .. . ,,. notice provided under the Act and Rules in which no _,, public interest are involved. [para 24, 32, 33 and 351. [580-F, 583-E, F; 584-A; 586-F; 588-D, E] Manak Lal v. Dr.

Prem Chand AIR 1957 SC 425; The· Director of Inspection of Income Tax (Investigation), New Delhi and Another v. Pooran Mal & Sons and Anr (1975) 4 SCC 568; Krishna Bahadur v. Puma Theatre (2004) 8 SCC 229; Bank of India v. 0. P Swarnakar (2003) 2 SCC 72; and Ramdev Food Products Pvt. Ltd. V Arivindbhai Rambhai Patel and Ors. 2006 (8) SCALE 63 - relied on. Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 16(2), 4th edition, para 907 - referred to. 4. It is not a case where the State by its acts of . omissions and commissions was unjustly enriching itself. It was a dispute between two private parties as regards the right to obtain final allotment; the principles underlying the same are not in dispute. What is in dispute is the distribution of quantum thereof between two competing claimants, viz. , landlord and tenant.

Though it cannot be said that under no circumstances the appellant was entitled to allotment of a portion of the property or ~ mandatory compensation in lieu thereof from the landlord, but, he has lost his right to enforce the same in a public law forum. He has no enforceable claim against the State at this juncture. He may pursue his claim only against res-pondent No. 4 in an appropriate proceedings wherein for certain purposes the State or the authorities may also be impleaded as a party. [para 31] [582-H; 583-A, B, C] State of Gujarat v. Shanti/al Manga/das &Ors. [1969 (3) SCR 341 - referred to. CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3203 of 2008. From the Judgment and Order dated 27. 12. 2006 of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in LPA No. 1611/2006 in SCA No. 7092/2001. .. U. U. Lalit, Sumita Hazarika for the Appellant. Prashant G. Desai, Tejas Patel and S. C. Patel for the CORPORATION & ORS. [S. S. SINHA, J. ] Respondent No. 1. Shivangi (for Ms.

Hemantika Wabi) for the State. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ··-"- .. S. B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted. r 2. Interpretation and/ or application of the provisions of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 (for short "the Act") and the Rules framed thereunder known as the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban DevelopmentRules, 1979 (for short "the Rules") is in question in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 27. 12. 2006 passed by Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1611of2006 arising out of a judgment and order dated 23. 11. 2006 passed by a learned Single Judge of the said Court in SCA No. 7092 of 2001. 3. Before embarking upon the issue involved in this appeal, we may notice the admitted fact of the ma"tter. The Government of Gujarat in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Section 65 of the Act made a scheme in respect of the town of Umra, Surat on 1. 06. 1999. Plot Nos.

17/7 and 17/8 were owned by Respondent No. 4 herein. Appellant was a tenant under the said respondent in respect of Plot No. 17/8 admeasuring 1067 sq. m. He used to run a business of marble and stone therein. A road widening project was proposed in terms of the said scheme. Notices r therefor were issued both to the appellant as also the respondent no. 4. Appellant objected thereto. He, however, did not pursue his case in regard to the proposal for widening of the road. For the said public purpose, viz. , widening of the road, ... -'/ 867 sq. m. of land was taken over leaving only 200 sq. m. of land. With a view to give effect to the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, proceedings were initiated for allotment of the said land in terms of the Act. 20% of the land was taken over without payment of any compensation. In respect . of the proceedings initiated for the purpose of re-allotment of the land, despite a public notice, the appellant did not file any objection.

He did not take any part in the proceedings therefor. Respondent No. 4 was allotted a final plot bearing No. 157 and the said 200 sq. m. of land of plot No. 17/8 has merged in final plot No. 165 owned by the respondent No. 3. The Scheme was notified in the year 1999. Respondent No. 1 herein which is the statutory agency in terms of the Act for the purpose of implementation of the Scheme issued a notice under Section 67 of the Act upon the respondent no. 4 on or about 15. 01. 2000. As he did not respond thereto, a notice under Section 68 of the Act was served on him on 31. 03. 2000 stating: "As per the said approved preliminary scheme the plot No. 157 is allotted to you. And, its pole demarcations were done by the town planning officer at site. The said Final Plot/ Original Plot is allotted in lieu of your No. 17/7, 17/8 paiki land. And, the said land is now vested in the Municipal Corporation from 1. 7. 1999, and is of the ownership of the Municipal Corporation.

Thereafter the notice below section 67 for the change in occupation was issued on 15. 1. 2000 to you. In spite of this you have not handed over the possession. Therefore, as per the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Rules, 1979 rule 33 the undersigned in exercise of powers conferred below section 68(1) and 8(2) of the Bombay Provincial Municipalities Act and below the section 68 notice under the Guj~rat Town Planning and Urban Development Act this is to inform you that as shown in the sketch on the reverse the premises marked should be vacated within 7 days from receipt of the notice and had over the possession to the Surat Municipal Corporation. If you fail .. .. to do so then on completion of the stipulated time limit as per the Rule 33 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Rules, 1979 the said land and the occupation CORPORATION & ORS. [S. S. SINHA, J.

) -t on the same will be summarily evicted and your occupation will be removed and if you obstruct/ interfere on it after taking away the possession you trespass then as provided under Rule 33 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Rules, 1979 the action as per the section 188 of the Indian Penal Code will be initiated against you 8 before the Criminal Court, pleased take note of the same. " r 5. The validity and/ or legality of the said notice was questioned by the appellant by filing a writ petition in the High Court of Gujarat inter alia contending that the purported final allotment of plot No. 165 in favour of the respondent no. 3 and allotment of final plot No. 157 in favour of the respondent no. 4 were made without issuing any notice as envisaged under Sections 52 and 53 of the Act. In the said writ petition, it was prayed: "8. On the facts and circumstances mentioned herein "'..

: above, the Petitioner prays to your Lordships that: (A) Be pleased to issue writ of Mandamus or writ in the nature of Mandamus or appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing and setting aside the impugned action of acquiring and demolishing the structures available on the land in question, i. e. , Original Plot No. 17/A - R. S. No. 17/P, situated at Umra, Surat. " 6. A learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the said writ petition inter alia opining that the interest of landlord and tenant being common and in absence of any inter se dispute ~· between them even if any portion of the land which remained in possession of the tenant was included in the Scheme, the proper remedy would be to claim compensation to that extent, holding: "18. It appears that in the said decision, the Apex Court while considering the scheme on the touch- stone of the ;. mandatory procedure to be followed by the authority under .

+ the Bombay Town Planning Rules, has given directions to provide alternative accommodation based on the earlier decision in case of Jaswantsingh Mathurasingh and upheld the scheme. Such is not the issue in the present case nor there is any complaint by the tenant that any special notice was not served or that the mandatory procedure for finalization of the scheme is not followed. Further, it appears that if the interest of the landlord and of the tenant is common and in absence of any inter se dispute between the landlord and tenant, even if any portion of the land \ which is in possession of the tenant is included in the scheme, the proper remedy for the tenant would be to claim for compensation to that extent and if such compensation is not received by him, he may resort to proper remedy available for recovery of the compensation to the extent of the area in his occupation.

At least on ground that the tenant is in occupation, it would not be a case for interference with the scheme which is sanctioned and made a part of the statute. Suffice it to say that the tenant will be at liberty to resort to appropriate proceedings ,. against the landlord for the inter se rights and also for ) - Gujarat v. Shanti/al Manga/das & Ors. (1969 (3) SCR 341 ], opined that when a development is made, the owner of the property gets much more than what would have he got, if the same remained undeveloped in the process as by reason thereof he gets the benefit of living in a developed town having good Jo. town planning. -+ 28. Section 67 of the Act provides that all lands required by the appropriate authority shall, unless it is otherwise determined in such scheme, vest absolutely in the appropriate authority free from all encumbrances with effect from the date on which the preliminary scheme comes into force.

What would be the quantum of payment of compensation therefor is also provided in Section 82 of the Act. It is in the aforementioned situation, a claim is to be made before the authority whenever a notice in Form H is published. If a claim is not filed, the person, who is said to be injuriously affected, does so at its own peril. Had such a claim been filed, the authority before making final allotment could have considered the competing claims wherefor large number of factors were required to be taken into consideration, viz. , the location of the land, the area of the land, the nature of right, etc. 29. When a statute makes an elaborate provision as regards the formalities required to be undergone at every stage by the local authority, the State Government and other authorities concerned in preparing and making the final Town Planning Scheme, the same should be considered to be exhaustively. [See Manek/a/ Chhotalal & Ors. v. M. G Makwana & Ors.

((1967) 3 SCR 65] In Maneklal Chhotalal (supra), it was held: "49. Therefore, having due regard to the substantive and procedural aspects, we are satisfied that the Act imposes only reasonable restrictions, in which case, it is saved under Article 19(5) of the Constitution. The considerations referred to above will also show that the grievance of the petitioners that Article 14 is violated, is also not ~ acceptable. " [See also Bhikhubhai Vithlabhai Patel & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Anr 2008 (4) SCALE 278] 30. We are, however, not oblivious that in a given situation, a question may also arise as to whether the restrictions imposed by a statute are reasonable or not. 31. It is not a case where the State by its acts of omissions i and commissions was unjustly enriching itself. It was a dispute between two private parties as regards the right to obtain final allotment; the principles underlying the same are not in dispute.

What is in dispute is the distribution of quantum thereof between two competing claimants. viz.. landlord and tenant. We do not mean to say that under no circumstances the appellant was entitled to allotment of a portion of the property or mandatory :,compensation in lieu thereof from the landlord. But, we intend to emphasise that he has lost his right to enforce the same in public law forum. He has no enforceable claim against the State at this juncture. He may pursue his claim only against the respondent No. 4 in an appropriate proceedings wherein for certain purposes the State or the authorities may also be impleaded as a party. Even if he had a claim he would be deemed to have waived the same for the reasons stated hereinafter. 32. It is not in dispute that: "~ (a) Appellant although filed an objection with regard to the draft scheme, did not choose to pursue it.

(b) He did not file objections for re-allotment and did not participate in the proceedings following acquisition instituted by the authorities under the Act. In view of the above, the issue is whether it was open to him to assert his purported right to special notice in respect of the final allotment in the instant case given the fact • that he did not pursue his objections to the draft t scheme and subsequently did not object/participate during the proceedings for re-allotment. 33. It has been noticed by us hereinbefore that under Rule 26 of the Rules applicable in the instant case, as distinguished from the Bombay Rules (wherein special notice is required), no ' ,. special notice is mandatorily required to be served. Assuming, 1 however, that it was obligatory for the State to issue notice to the appellant, the question is whether the principle of waiver -..

precludes him from claiming equitable relief in this case due to his earlier conduct which allowed the entire process of acquisition and allotment to become final. We are of the opinion that even if he had any such right, he waived the same. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 16(2), 4th edition, para 907, it is stated: "The expression 'waiver' may, in law, bear different meanings. The primary meaning has been said to be the abandonment of a right in such a way that the other party is entitled to plead the abandonment by way of confession and avoidance if the right is thereafter asserted, and is either express or implied from conduct. It may arise from a party making an election, for example whether or not to exercise a contractual right. ..

Waiver may also be by virtue of equitable or promissory estoppel; unlike waiver arising from an election, no question arises of any particular knowledge on the part of the person making the representation, and the estoppel may be suspensory only... Where the waiver is not express, it may be implied from conduct which is inconsistent with the continuance of the right, without the need for writing or for consideration moving from, or detriment to, the party who benefits by the waiver, but mere acts of indulgence will not amount to waiver; nor may a party benefit from the waiver unless he has altered his position in reliance on it" As early as 1957, the concept of waiver was articulated in case involving the late assertion of a claim regarding improper constitution of a Tribunal in Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand [AIR 1957 SC 425] in the following terms: "It is true that waiver cannot always and in every case be inferred merely from the failure of the party to take the objection.

Waiver can be inferred only if and after it is shown that the party knew about the relevant facts and was aware of his right to take the objection. As Sir Johan Romilly M. R. has observed in Vyvyan v. Vyvyan [(1861) 30 Beav. 65, 74; 54 E. R. 813, 817] "waiver '"'r acquiescence, like election, presupposes that the person to be bound is fully cognizant of his rights, and, that being so, he neglects to enforce them, or chooses one benefit instead of another, either, but not both, of which he might claim". In The Director of Inspection of Income Tax 8 (Investigation}, New Delhi and Another v. Pooran Mal & Sons and Another[(1975) 4 sec 568] the issue was regarding waiver of benefits under a statute of limitation. It was stated: "13. We may in this connection refer to the decision in Wilson v. Mcintosh.

In that case an applicant to bring lands under the Real Property Act filed his case in court under Section 21, more than three months after a caveat had been lodged, and thereafter obtained an order that the caveator should file her case, which she accordingly did. It was held that he had thereby waived his right to 0 have the caveat set aside as lapsed under Section 23. The Privy Council held that the limitation of time contained in Section 23 was introduced for the benefit of the applicant, to enable him to obtain a speedy determination of his right to have the land brought under the provisions of the Act and that it was competent for the applicant to waive the limit of the three months, and that he did waive it by stating a case and applying for and obtaining an order upon the appellant to state her case both, which steps assumed and proceeded on the assumption of the continued existence of the caveat. They referred with • approval to the decision in Phillips v.

Martin where the Chief Justice said: "Here there is abundant evidence of waiver, and it is quite clear that a man may by his conduct waive a provision of an Act of Parliament intended for his benefit. The caveator was not brought into Court in any way until the caveat had lapsed. And now the applicant, after all these proceedings have been taken by him, after doubtless much expense has been incurred on the part of the caveator, and after lying by and hoping to get a judgment of the Court in his favour, asks the Court to do that which but for some reasons known to himself he might have asked the Court to do before any other step in the proceedings had been taken. I think he is altogether too late.

It is to my mind a clear principle of equity, and I have no doubt there are abundant authorities on the point, that equity will interfere to prevent the machinery of an Act of Parliament being used by a person to defeat equities which he has himself raised, and to get rid of a waiver created by his own acts. " The legal principle emerging from these decisions is also stated in Craies on Statute Law (6th Edn. ) at page 369 as follows: "As a general rule, the conditions imposed by statutes which authorise legal proceedings are treated as being indispensable to giving the court jurisdiction. But if it appears that the statutory conditions were inserted by ~ " the legislature simply for the security or benefit of the parties to the action themselves, and that no public interests are involved, such conditions will not be considered as indispensable, and either party may waive them without affecting the jurisdiction of the court.

" [emphasis supplied] Applying the above principles to the present case, it must be held that the benefit of notice provided under the Act and Rules being for the benefit of the Appellant in which no public .. \ interests are involved, he has waived the same. 34. Significantly, a similar conclusion was reached in the case of Krishna Bahadur v. Purna Theatre [(2004) 8 SCC 229], though the principle was stated far more precisely, in the following terms: t "9. The principle of waiver although is akin to the principle Iof estoppel; the difference between the two, however, is that whereas estoppel is not a cause of action; it is a rule CORPORATION & ORS. [S. S. SINHA, J. ] of evidence; waiver is contractual and may constitute a cause of action; it is an agreement between the parties and a party fully knowing of its rights has agreed not to assert a right for a consideration. 10.

A right can be waived by the party for whose benefit certain requirements or conditions had been provided :r for by a statute subject to the condition that no public interest is involved therein. Whenever waiver is pleaded it is for the party pleading the same to show that an agreement waiving the right in consideration of some compromise came into being. Statutory right, however, may also be waived by his conduct. " [Emphasis supplied] [See also Bank of India v. O. P Swarnakar (2003) 2 SCC 721] \. ) _.... _ 35. In Ramdev Food Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel and Ors. [2006 (8) SCALE 631], this Court observed: "The matter may be considered from another angle. If the first respondent has expressly waived his right on the trade mark registered in the name of the appellant-Company, ' ) could he claim the said right indirectly? The answer to the said question must be rendered in the negative. It is wellsettled that what cannot be done directly cannot be done ~ indirectly.

The term 'Waiver' has been described in the }.. following words: "Waiver is the abandonment of a right in such a way that the other party is entitled to plead the abandonment by way of confession and avoidance if the right is thereafter asserted, and is either express or implied from conduct. A person who is entitled to rely on stipulation, existing for his benefit alone, in a contract or f ,.... of a statutory provision may waive it, and allow the contract or transaction to proceed as though the stipulation or provision did not exist.

Waiver of this kind depends upon consent, and the fact that the other party has acted upon it is sufficient consideration It seems that, in general, where one party has, by his words or conduct, made to the other a promise or assurance which was intended to affect the legal relations between them and to be acted on accordingly, then, once the other party has taken him at his word and acted on it, so as to alter his position, the party who gave the promise or assurance cannot afterwards be allowed to revert to the previous legal relationship as if no such promise or assurance had been made by him, but he must accept their legal relations subject to the qualification which he has himself so in. troduced, even though it is not supported in point of law by any consideration. [See 16 Halsbury's Laws (4th edn) para 1471]" In this view of the matter, it may safely be stated that the appellant, through his conduct, has waived his right to an ~ / equitable remedy in the instant case.

Such conduct precludes 't and operates as estoppel against him with respect to asserting a right over a portion of the acquired land in a situation where the scheme in question has attained finality following as a result of the appellant's inaction. 36. Mr. Lalit submits that his client is ready and willing to pay some reasonable amount to the respondent No. 3 in whose favour plot No. 165 has been finally allotted. Issuance of any such direction, in our opinion, is legally impermissible. ~! 37. We, therefore, are of the opinion that in this case, no relief can be granted to the appellant. He may, however, take recourse to such remedy which is available with him in law including one by filing a suit or making a representation before the State. 38. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal is dismissed. No costs. R. P. Appeal dismissed.