BALCO EMPLOYEES UNION (REGD.) v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS

Citation: [2001] SUPP. 5 S.C.R. 511

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: B.N. KIRPAL, SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, P. VENKATARAMA REDDI

Judgment text

BALCO EMPLOYEES UNION (REGO. ) v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. DECEMBER 10, 2001 [B. N. KIRPAL, SHIVARAJ V. PATIL AND P. VENKATARAMA REDD! , JJ. ] Disinvestnzent: Disinvestment of51% equity qfBalco, a Public Sector Undertaking, by Central Govemnient to aStrategic Partnerandtransfero,fnranagementthereof- Amenability to Judicial Review-Held, it is cm ec~nomic policy decision qfthe Govenunent and hence not tunenable to judicial review-Constitution o,fIndia, 1950 -Articles 32 & 226. Protection of workers' rights and interests-Availability of under the Constitution-Held, not available-Hoivever, on . facts, st~{ficient sqfeguards anl/ protection are built in various agree111ents entered into with the Strategic Partner besides availability ofprotection under existing laws-Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 12, 14 and 16. Non-consultation with State Govemment by Union of India regan/ing disenvestment-0.

(fer by the State Government to purchase 51% equity at a higher price-Held, on facts, State Government was not oblivious of the disinvestment of BALC0-0. [fer not valid since the disinvestment is over. Disinvestn1ent Co1nn1ission reconunendations to Union of India-Binding nature-Held, not binding. Valuation o,f a:-;sets to arrive at a reserve price-Correctness thereof- Held, valuation is a question of fact and hence, not an1enable to Judicial review-On facts, proper procedure has been . followed in valuation. Disinvestment decision of BALCO-Transparency of-Held, there is complete transparency-On. fai:ts,fairand equitable procedure was followed in carrying out disinvestn1ent-Clain1 by the State Government uncharitable and baseless. Trans.

fer of land, which was originally a tribal land and given on lease · 5ll to BALCO, to a non-tribal o;; disinvestment-Validity of-Held, change qf management or shareholding does not involve tran~fer of land-Allegation baseless since original tran~fer of land to BALCO WllS not questioned-M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959-Mining Concession Rules. Ad111inistrtitive Unv: Principles o,f Natural Justice-Right o. f hearing and consultation with employees b~fore taking economic policy decisions-Availability of-Held, not • available. Public Interest Litigation : Petition Oil Disinevstment decisions-Admissibility of-Grant of Expparte reli~f-Held, not admissible as it is not meant to challenge financial or economic decisions ofthe Government-Ex-parte reli4should be granted after \ taking undertaking from the Petitioner to indemnify any loss or damage ifPIL is dismissed since any delay will be contrary to public interest. Mis.

Bharat Aluminium Comapny Limited (BALCO) was incorporated in 1965 under the Companies Act, 1956 as a Public Sector Undertaking (PSU). The State Government provided land partly by transfer of its own land and partly through land acquisition to the undertaking for its establishment. Since 1990-91, successive Central Governments had been planning to disinvest some of the PSUs and in 1996, the Union of India constituted a Disinvestment Commission as an independent non-statutory advisory body and set out broad terms of reference. In 1997, the Commission recommended the Union of India to privatise BALCO and suggested disinvestment of 40% of equity holding to a Strategic Partner and dilution of remaining 60% holding through public offer over a period of time. Subsequently, on the basis of the revised recommendations of the Commission, Chairman suggested the Union of India to offer 51% or more to the Strategic Partner along with transfer of management.

The Union of India approved the sale of 51% equity and appointed a Global Advisor through competitive bidding process to carry out the process cf disinvestment. This decision was challenged in 1999 by the BALCO Employees ~ Union by filing a Writ Petition in the High Court of Delhi. The High Court disposed of the Writ Petition on the basis of a mutual consent that advance intimation will be given to the employees before taking a final decision on BALCO EMPLOYEES UNION (REGD. ) v. U. O. l. 513 disinvestment. In June 2000, the Global Advisor issued global advertisements in leading journals and newspapers calling for 'Expression of Interest' for acquiring 51% equity in BALCO. Eight companies expressed their interest. The Global Advisor, in consultation with the Union of India, shortlisted three companies and requested them to submit their financial bids. Meanwhile, asset valuation of BALCO was do11e to fix reserve price of 51 % equity through a Valuer independently.

the reserve price was fixed at Rs. 514. 40 crores. The highest bid of Rs. 551. 50 crores was aceepted by the Union of India. After passing a resolution in the Lok Sabha, a Shareholders Agreement and a Share-Purchase Agreement between Union of India and the highest bidder were signed as per the procedure for disinvestment. A Writ Petition by the Employees' Union was filed in the High Court of Delhi challenging the disinvestment of BALCO by the Union of India. A Public Interest Litigation (PIL) was also filed in the same High Court. Another Writ Petition was filed by an employee in the High Court of Chattisgarh. In the meantime, BALCO received notices from the State Government authorities for alleged breach of various provisions of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 and the Mining Concession Rules. BALCO filed a Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India before this Court.

The Writ Petitions filed before the High Courts were transferred to this Court and all the cases were heard together. Petitioner-Employees Union contended that BALCO is a State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and hence by disinvestment of BALCO, the employees lost their rights and protection under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution; and that the employees have a right to be heard before and during the process of disinvestment.

The State Government, besides supporting the contention of the Employees Union contended that the implementation of the disinvestment policy has failed to evoke a comprehensive package of socio-economic and political reform towards implementation of the policy of disinvestment; that it was not consulted by the Union of India in the process of disinvestment and that it was prepared to offer a higher value than the one accepted; that the Union of India had deviated from the recommendation of the Commission by disinvesting 51 % of the holding on the basis of a suggestion of the Chairman of the Commission; that the method of valuation of the assets of the company was faulty as some assets were not taken into considera. tion for valuation and that the accepted offer viz. , Rs. 551.

50 crores did not represent the correct value of 51% equity along with controlling interest; that the whole process of disinvestment lacked transparency; that the 'f disinvestment decision defeats the provisions of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 and goes against the fundamental basis on which the land was acquired for the purpose of the company; that the land could not be transferred to a non-tribal. Public interest litigant, challenging the disinvestment, contended that he had been closely connected with PSUs and therefore had the locus standi to file the Writ Petition. Respondent-Union of India contended that tllte wisdom and advisability of economic policies of a Government are not amenable to judicial review; and that the challenge to the decision to disinvest on the ground that it impairs public interest or that it was without any need to disinvest or that it was inconsistent with the decision of the Commission is untenable.

BALCO submitted that the entire rationale and process of disinvestment before taking a final decision was explained to the employ· ees; and that the various representations made by the Employees Union had been considered before finalising the disinvestment. Dismissing the petitions, the Court HELD : I. 1. Process of disinvestment is a policy decision involving complex economic factors. Courts have consistently refrained from interfering with economic decisions as it has been recognised that economic expediencies lack adjudicative disposition and u"'less the economic decision, based on economic expediencies, is demonstr:ated to be so violative of constitutional or legal limits on power or so abhorrent to reason, that Courts would decline to interfere. In matters relating to economic issues, the Government has, while taking a decision, right to "trial and error" as long as both trial and error are bona . fide and within limits of authority.

There is no case made out by the petitioner that the decision to disinvest in BALCO is in any way capricious, arbitrary, illegal or uninformed. [547-G-H; 548-A] 1. 2. The policies of the Government ought Mt to remain static. With BALCO EMPLOYEES UNION (REGO. ) v. U. 0. l. 515 the change in economic climate, the wisdom and the manner for the Government to run commercial ventures may require reconsideration. What may have been in the public interest at a point of time may no longer be so. While it was a policy decision to start BALCO as a company owned by the Government, it is as a change of policy that disinvestment has now taken place. If the initial decision could not be validly challenged on the same parity of reasoning, the decision to disinvest also cannot be impugned without showing that it is against any law or ma/a fide. [551·B·CJ 1. 3. In a democracy, it is the prerogative of each elected Government to follow its own policy.

Often a change in Government may result in the shift in focus or change in economic policies. Any such change may result in adversely affecting some vested interests. Unless any illegality is committed in the execution of the policy or the same is contrary to law or ma/a fide, a decision bringing about change cannot per se be interfered with by the Court. [572-F] 1. 4. Wisdom and advisability of economic policies are ordinarily not amenable to judicial review unless it can be demonstrated that the policy is contrary to any statutory provision or the Constitution. In other words, it is not for the Court to consider relative merits of different economic policies and consider whether a wiser or better one can be evolved. For testing the correctness of a policy, the appropriate forum is the Parliament and not the Court. Here the policy was tested and the Motion defeated in the Lok Sabha on 1st March, 2001. [572-G-H] 1. 5.

In the case of a policy decision on economic matters, Courts should be very circumspect in conducting any enquiry or investigation and must be most reluctant to impugn the judgment of the experts who may have arrived at a conclusion unless the Court is satisfied that there is illegality in the decision itself. [572-G·HJ Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, [1970] 1 SCC 248 CB, reWoo. Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd. ), Sindri and Ors. v. Union ofIndia and Ors. , [1981] 1 SCC 568; State o. fM. P. and Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors. , (1986] 4 SCC 566; G. B. Mahajan and Ors. v. Ja/gaon Municipal Couμcil and Ors. , [1991) 3 SCC 91; Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. Reserve Bank of India, [1992] 2 SCC 343; Premium Granites and Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. , [1994] 2 SCC 691; Delhi Science Forum and Ors. v. Union ofIndia and Anr. , [! 996] 2 SCC 405; R. K. Garg v. Union ofIndia and Ors. , [1981] 4 SCC 675; M. P. Oil Extraction and Anr. v.

State ~fM. P. and Ors. , [1997] 7 SCC 592; State ~f Pun;ab and Ors. v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga and Ors. , [1998] 4 SCC 117; Bhavesh D. Parish and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. , [2000] 5 SCC 471 and Nannada Bachao Ando/an v. Union ~(India and Ors. , [2000] 10 SCC 664, referred to. 2. 1. The workers may have interest in the manner in which the company is conducting its business as the policy decision may have an impact on the workers' rights, nevertheless it is an incidence of service for an employee to accept a decision of the employer which has been honestly taken and which is not contrary to law. Even a govemment servant, having the protection of not only Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution but also of Article 311, has no absolute right to remain in service.

Hence, non-govern· ment employees working in a company which by reason of judicial pro· nouncement may be regarded as a State for the purpose of Part III of the Constitution, cannot claim a superior or a better right than a government servant and impugn its change of status. [548·B·D] Ajay Hasia and Ors. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Ors. , [1981] 1 SCC 722; Central Inland Willer Transport Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. Brajo Nath Ganguly and Anr.. [1986] 3 SCC 156; Bharat Petroleum (Erstwhile Burmah Shell) Management Stq[fPensioners v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Ors. , [1998] 3 SCC 32, referred to. 2. 2. The policy of disinvestment cannot be faulted if as a result thereof the employees lose their rights or protection under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In other words, the existence of rights of protection under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution cannot possibly have the effect of vetoing the Government's right to disinvest.

The employees can· not claim a right of continuous consultation at different stages of the disinvestment process. If the disinvestment process is gone through with· out contravening any law, the normal consequences as a result of disinvestment must follow. [548-G-H; 549-A] State ofHaryana v. Shri Des Raj San! (ar and Anr. , [1976] 2 SCC 844, , relied on. BALCO EMPLOYEES UNION (REGD. ) "· U. 0. 1. 517 Southern Structural Staff Union v. Managemenl ofSouthern Structural Ltd. & Anr. , (1994) 81 Comp. Cases 389, approved. 2. 3. The Government could have run the industry departmentally or in any other form. When it chooses to run an industry by forming a company and it becomes its shareholder then under the provisions of the Companies Act as a shareholder, it would have a right to transfer its shares.

When persons seek and get employment with such a company registered under the Companies Act, it must be presumed that they accept the right of the directors and the shareholders to conduct the affairs of the company in accordance with law and at the same time they can exercise the right to sell their shares. As a result of disinvestment of 51% of the shares of the company, the management and control, no doubt, has gone into private hands. Nevertheless, it cannot, in law, be said that the em· ployer of the workmen has changed. The employees continue to be under the company and change of management does not in law amount to a change in employment. [549-B·C] 2. 4. The minutes of the meeting held between the Union of India and . , BALCO with the petitioner disclose that, in principle, the petitioner was not against disinvestment but were concerned with their interest being suffi· cientiy safeguarded. In.

the Shareholders Agreement between the Union of India and the Strategic Partner, it is provided that there would be no re· trenchment of any worker in the first year after the closing date and there· after restructuring of the labour force, if any, would be implemented in a manner recommended by the Board of Directors of the company. It further mandates that in the event of reduction in the strength of its employees is required, then it is to be ensured that the company offers its employees an option to voluntarily retire on terms that are not in any manner less favour· able than the Voluntary Retirement Scheme offered by the company on the date ofthe arrangement.

Beside, BALCO undertook before this Court, that it will not retrench any worker who is in the employment on the date of takeover of the management by the Strategic Partner, other than any dis· missal or termination of the worker(s) of the company from their employment in accordance with the applicable staff regulations and standing or· ders of the company or other applicable laws. [552-E-H; 553-A] 2. 5. 'f! te workers' interest are adequately protected in the process of disinvestment. The existing laws adequately protect workers' interest and no decision affecting a huge body of workers can be taken without the prior • consent of the State Government. Further more, the service conditions are governed by the certified order of the company and any change in the conditions thereto can only be made in accordance with law. It is clear from the facts that safeguarding the interest of the workers was one of the concerns of the Government.

Representations had been received from the Trade Union leadersandeffort wasmacje to try and ensure that the process ofdisinvestment did not adversely affect the workers. [553-B; 556-B] 2. 6. It will not be open to a Court to consider whether there has been a gross failure to evolve comprehensive package towards implementation of the policy on disinvestment. In the process of disinvestment, it is evident that the Union of India was aware of the interest of the workers and employees as a class. It was precisely for this reason that safeguards were inserted in the Shareholders Agreement. These terms were incorporated in the agreement after the demands of BALCO employees were considered by the Union of India. (558-A; B] 3. 1. In taking policy decision in economic matters at length, principles of natural justice have no role to play.

While it is expected of a responsible employer to take all aspects into consideration including welfare of the labour before taking any policy decision that, by itself, will not entitle the employees to demand a right of hearing or consultation prior to the taking of the decision. [548-D-E] 3. 2. Merely because the workmen may have protection of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, °by regarding BALCO as a State, it does not mean that the erstwhile sole. shareholder viz. , Government had to give the workers prior notice of hearing before deciding to disinvest. There is no principle of natural justice which requires prior notice and hearing to persons who are generally affected as a class by an economic policy decision of the Government. However, it is the case of the Union of India that the workers had been fully informed about the process of disinvestment through an ongoing dialogue. [548-F] 3. 3.

Employees of the company may have an interest in seeing as to how the company is managed, bnt it is unacceptable that in the process of disinvestment, the principles of natural justice would be applicable and that the workers, or for that matter any other party having an interest therein, would have a right of being heard. For good goveranance and BALCO EMPLOYEES UNION (REGD. ) v. U. 0. 1. 519 administration whenever such policy decisions are taken, it is desirable that there shonld be wide range of consnltations including considering any representations which may have been filed, but there is no provision in law which would require a hearing to be granted before taking a policy decision. In exercise of executive powers, policy decisions have to be taken from time to time. It will be impossible and impracticable to give a formal hearing to those who may be affected whenever a policy decision is taken.

One of the objects of giving a hearing in application of the principles of natural justice is to see that illegal action or decision does not take place. Auy wrong order may adversely affect a person and it is esssentially for this reason that a reasonable opportunity may have to be granted before passing of an administrative order. In case of the policy decision, however, it is impracticable, and at times against the public interest, to do so, but this does not mea. n that a policy decision which is contrary to law cannot be challenged. Not giving the workmen an opportunity of being heard cannot per se be a ground of vitiating the decision. If the decision is otherwise illegal as being contrary to law or anyConstitutional provision, the persons affected like the workmen, can impugn the same, bot not giving a pre decisional hearing cannot be a ground for quashing the decision. [556-C-F] 3. 4.

In judicial proceedings where rights are likely to be affected, principles of natural justice would require the Court to give a hearing to the party against whom an adverse or unfavourable order may be passed. No judicial or quasi-judicial functions are exercised by the Government when it decides, as a matter of policy, to disinvest shares in a Public Section Undertaking. While it may be fair and sensible to consult the workers in a situation of change of management, there is, however, in law no such obligation to consult in the process of sale of majority shares in company. (557-B-D] National Textile Workers' Union and Ors. v. P. R. Ramakrishnan, (1983] I 1 sec 228, distinguished. Pm. f. Babu Mathew and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. , (1997] 90 Company Cases 455, approved. 4.

The grievance of alleged non-consultation of the State Government in the process of disinvestment of BALCO is a matter between the State Government and the Union of India and such grievance cannot be raised by the State against the Union of India in the proceedings initiated by the workmen before the Court. However, it is unbelievable that during the entire process of disinvestment of BALCO, the State Government was oblivious of what was happening. · Wide publicity was given at various stages in connection with the disinvestment. It was after doe pnblicity a Global Adviser was appointed and thereafter advertisement was issued in an effort to select the Strategic Partner. The whole process of disinvestment of BALCO took place over a period of about two years. The issue was even debated by members in the Lok Sabha.

There wa~ nothing to prevent the State Government at any stage prior to the selection of the Strategic Partner, either to forward its views or a representation or even to make an offer of buying the 51% of the shares which were being sold. Once Sharesholders' Agreement has been signed, the offer of the State Government to buy 51% equity shares in the company for a higher value of Rs. 551. 41 crores would be of no ronsequence. This offer did not see the light of the day till the start of the litigation. [558-D-GJ 5. The Chairman of the Commission requested the Government to consider strategic sale of 51 % or more of the equity instead of the recommendation of the Commission for sale of only 40 % of the equity. From the facts, it is not possible to accept the contention that the Union of India deviated from the advise given by the Disinvestment Commission. The advice of the Commission was not binding on the Union of India.

Further, the terms of reference and the provisions contained in the Resoloution which required the disinvestment under the supervision of the Commission and the Commission advising the Government on matters like consideration of the interests of the stake-holders, workers, consumers etc. , were deleted by the subsequent Resolution. The Commission became only an advisory or recommendatory body. The acceptance of the advice by the Government and corning to the conclusion that sale of 51% or more of the equity of BALCO along with transfer of management would secure a better price than the sale of only 40% cannot be regarded as unwarranted, illegal or arbitrary. [559-G-H; 560-A-C] 6. 1. It is not for this Court to consider whether the reserve price fixed by the Valuer at Rs. 514. 5 crores was correct or not.

What has to be seen in exercise of judicial review of administrative action is to examine whether proper procedure has been followed and whether the reserve price which was fixed is arbitrarily low and on the face of it, unacceptable. [560-F] BALCO EMPLOYEES UNION (REGD. ) v. U. 0. 1. 521 6. 2. Assets including shares can be sold in a number of ways, i. e. , by public auction, tenders orsealed offers or by negotiations. The exercise which was undertaken to appoint a Valuer and to get a value of this controlling interest of51 % of the shares was presumably to arrive at the reserve price. What the assets will fetch, is ultimately reflected in the offer which is received. The bidders at the time offurnishing their bids did not know what will be the reserve price which had to be fixed. It is only after the receipt of the bids that the reserve price was made known.

The perception in the market, therefore, clearly was that 51 % shares of BALCO along with its management wasnot worth more than Rs. 550. 5 crores. Underthe circumstances, when the Union of India had decided to disinvest in BALCO by acepting a bid far in excess of the reserve price which was fixed by the Valuer, the said decision cannot, under any circumstances, be faulted. Whether the reserve price should have been 514. 4 crores or more appears to be immaterial when the best price which has been offered for the sale of 51% stake in BALCO after global advertisement was only Rs. 551. 5 crores. There is no suggestion that there was any other company or Institution which had or could offer more than the said sum. When proper procedure has been followed and an offer Is made ofa price more than the reserve price then there is no basis for this Court to conclude that the decision of the Government to accept the highest offer is in any way vitiated. [560-G-H; 561-A-E] 6. 3.

The offer of the highest bidder was more than the reserve price which was arrived at by a method which is well recognised. Further, valuation is a question of fact and Court will not interfere in matters uf valuation unless the methodology adopted is arbitrary. [573-C] Duncans lndusrtries Ltd. v. State of U. P. and Ors. , [2000] I SCC 633, relied on. 7. 1. Transparency does not mean the conducting of Government business while sitting on the cross roads in public. Transparency would require that the manner in which decision is taken is made known. Persons who are to decide are not arbitrarily selected or appointed:The selection of the Global Adviser and the Strategic Partner was through the process ofissuance of global advertisement. It is the Global Adviser who selected the Valuer who was already on the list ofvaluers maintained by the Government.

Whatever material was received was examined by a High Power Committee and the ultimate d~cision was taken by the Cabinet Committee on Disinvestment. To \ say that there has been lack of transparency, under these circumstances, is uncharitable and without any basis. [561-G-H; 562-A] 7. 2. The facts show that fair, just and equitable procedure has been followed in carrying out this disinvestment. The allegations of lack of transparency or that the decision was taken in a hurry or there has been an arbitrary exercise of power are without any basis. It is a matter of regret that the State Government has been making such allegations against the Union of India without any basis. This Court strongly deprecates snch unfounded averments made by an officer of the State. [573-A-B] 8. The giving of land to BALCO on lease was clearly permissible under the provisions of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 as it stood then.

It is too late after 25 years when the last permission was granted to hold that becaues of the disinvestment, it must be presumed that there is a transfer of land to the non-tribal in the year 2001 even though the land continues to reamin with BALCO to whom it was originally transferred. The change of management or in the shareholding does ot imply that there is transfer of land from one company to another. If the original grant of lease of land and permission to transfer in favour of BALCO between the years 1968 and 1972 was valid, then, it cannot now be contended that there has been another transfer of land with the Government having reduced its stake to 49%. Even if BALCO had been a non-public sector undertaking, the transfer of land to it was not in violation of the Land Revenue Code. The land was validly given to BALCO a number of years ago and today it is not open to tM State Government to take a summersault and challenge the correctness of its own action.

Furthermore even with the change in management the land remaius with BALCO to whom it had been validly given on lease. [564-E-H] Samatha v. State ()fA. P. and Ors. , [1997] 8 SCC 191, distinguished. 9. 1. Public Interest Litigation (PIL) is not a pill or a panacea for all wrongs. It was essentially meant to protect basic human rights of the weak and the disadvantaged and was a procedure which was innovated where a public spirited person files a petition in effect 011 behalf of such persons who on account of poverty, helplessness or economic and social disabilities could not approach the Court for relief. There have been, in recent times, increasing instances of abuse of PIL. [566-F] BALCO EMPLOYEES UNION (REGD. ) v. U. 0. 1. 523 9. 2. PIL was not meant to be a weapon to challenge the financial or economic decisions which are taken by the Government in exercise of their administrative power.

A person personally aggrieved hy any such decisii;n, which he regards as illegal, can impugn the same in a Court of law, but, a PIL at the behest of a stranger ought not to be entertained. Such a litiga· tion cannot persebe on behalf of the poor and the downtrodden, unless the Court is satisfied that there has been violation of Article 21 and the persons adversely affected are unable to approach the Court. The decision to disinvest and the implementation thereof is purely an administrative decision relating to the economic policy of the State and challenge to the same at the instance of a busy-body cannot fall within the parameters of PIL. [571-G-H; 572-A] 9. 3. Judicial interference by way ofPILis availableifthere is injury to public because of dereliction of Constitutional or statutory obligations on the part of the government. Here it is not so and in the sphere of economic policy or reform the Court is not the appropriate forum.

Every matter in public interest or curiosity cannot be the subject matter of PIL. 'Courts are not intended to and nor should they conduct the administration of the country. Courts will interfere only if there is a clear violation of Constitutional or statutory provisions or non-compliance by the State with its Constitutional or statutory duties which is not so in the present case. [573-E-G] 9. 4. No ex-parte relief by way of injunction or stay especially with respect to public projects and schemes or economic policies or schemes should be granted. It is only when the Conrt is satisfied for good and valid reasons, that there will be irreparable and irretrievable damage an injunction should be issued after hearing all the parties. Even then the Petitioner should be put on appropriate terms such as providing an indemnity or an adequate undertaking to make good the loss or damage in the event the PIL filed is dismissed.

It is in public interest that there should be early disposal of cases. PIL should, therefore, be disposed of at the earliest as any delay will be contrary to public interest and thus become counterproductive. [574-A-C] S. P. Gupta v. Union qfIndia andAnr. , [1981] Supp. SCC 87; Sachidanand Pandey and Anr. v. State ofWest Bengal and Ors. , [1987] 2 SCC 295; Subhash Kumar v. State qf Bihar and Ors. , [1991] 1 SCC 598; Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary and Ors. , [1992] 4 SCC 305; Raunaq International Ltd. v. I. V. R. ' Construction Ltd. and Ors. , [1999] l SCC 492 and Narmada Bachao Ando/an v. Union ofIndia and Ors. , [2000] 10 SCC 664, referred to. 10. With regard to the .

writ petition filed nnder Article 32 of the Constitntion by BALCO challenging various show canse notices issned by the State Government anthorities for alleged breach of varions provisious of Land Revenne Code and Mining Concession Rules, the company has adequate alternative remedy under the enactments under which the notices had b~en issued and, in appropriate case, can approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. [572-D] CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Transferred Case (C) No. 8 of 2001. WITH T. C. (C) Nos. 9 and IO of 2001 and W. P. (C) No. 194 of 2001. Soli J. Sorabjee, Attorney General, Harish N. Salve, Solicitor General, Dipankar P. Gupta, G. L. Sanghi, C. A. Sunc'! farn, P. Chidambararn, Anoop G. Chaudhary, Ranjit Kumar, Dr. A. M. Singhvi, Jaideep Gupta, Sanjay Sen, Rana S. Biswas, Ms. Sheetal Sharma, Sitesh Mukherjee, Ms. Indra Sawhney, S. S. Ray, Ms. Rakhi Ray, Ms. P. S. Shroff, Ms. Ritu Bhalla, Sidharth Datta, Manish Singhvi, Ankur Talwar, Maninder Singh, Ms.

Pratibha M. Singh, Ms. Kavita Wadia, Siddharth Goswami, Siddharth Chowdhury, B. V. Bairam Das, Rajiv K. Garg, Annam D. N. Rao, Ravindra Shrivastava, Advs. General for Chhattisgarh, Prakash Shrivastava, Piyush Dharmadhikari, Ms. Suparna Shrivastava, Harsh Verma, R. M. Sharma, Sanjay Parikh, R. R. Chandrachud, Arun Beriwal, Sudhir Walia, Mahinder Singh Dahiya, Jaideep Gupta, Shahid Rizvi and Ms. Sarla Chandra for the appearing parties. In-person for the Petitioner in T. C. (C) No. 9/2001. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KIRPAL, J. The validity of the decision of the Union of India to disinvest and transfer 51 % shares of M/s Bharat Aluminium Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as 'BALCO') is the primary issue in these cases. BALCO was incorporated in 1965 as a Government of India Undertaking under the Companies Act, 1956. Prior to its disinvestment it had a paid- , BALCO EMPLOYEES UNION (REGO. ) v. U. 0. 1. [KIRPAL, J. ] 525 up share capital of Rs. 488.

85 crores which was owned and controlled by the Government of India. The company is engaged in the manufacture of aluminium and had plants at Korba in the State of Chhattisgarh and Bidhanbag in the State of West Bengal. The Company has integrated aluminium manufacturing plant for the manufacture and sale of aluminium metal including wire rods and semi-fabricated products. The Government of Madhya Pradesh vide its letter dated 18th March, 1968 wrote to BALCO stating that it proposed that land be granted to it on a 99 years lease subject to the terms and conditions contained therein. The letter envisaged giving on lease Government land on payment of premium of Rs. 200 per acre and, in addifon thereto also to provide tenure land which was to be acquired and transferred on lease to BALCO on payment by it the actual cost of acquisition plus annual lease rent.

Vide its letter dated 13th June, 1968 BALCO gave its assent to the proposal contained in the aforesaid letter of 18th March, 1968 for transfer of land to it. BALCO intimated by this letter that the total requirement of land would be about 1616 acres. Thereafter, in addition to the Government land which was transferred, the Government of Madhya Pradesh acquired land for BALCO under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on payment of compensation. The District Collector, Bilaspur also granted permission under Section 165(6) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 for acquiring/transferring private land in favour of BALCO. As a result of the aforesaid, BALCO set up it's establishment on it's acquiring land from and with the help of the State Government. Since 1990-91 successive Central Governments had been planning to disinvest some of the Public Sector Undertakings.

In pursuance to the policy of disinvestment by a Resolution dated 23rd August, 1996 the Ministry of Industry (Department of Public Enterprises) Government of India constituted a Public Sector Dis-investment Commission initially for a period of three years. The Resolution stated that this Commission was established in pursuance of the Common Minimum Programme of the United Front Government at the Centre. The Commission was an independent, non-statutory advisory body and was headed by Shri G. V. Ramakrishna who was to be its Full-time Chairman. The Commission had four p]llt-time Members. Paras 3, 4 and 5 of the said Reso- Jution are as follows:- "3. The broad terms of reference of the Commission are as follows:- I. To draw a comprehensive overall long term disinvestment programme within 5-10 years for the PSUs referred to it by the Core Group. II. To determine the extent of disinvestment (total/partial indicating percentage) in each of the PSU. III.

To prioritise the PSUs referred to it by the Core Group in terms of the overall disinvestment programme. IV. To recommend the preferred mode(s) ofdisinvestment (domestic capital markets/international capital markets/auction/private sale to identified investors/any other) for each of the identified PSUs. Also to suggest an appropriate mix of the various alternatives taking into account the market conditions. v. To recommend a mix between primary and secondary disinvestments taking into account Government's objective, the relevant PSUs funding requirement and the market conditions. VI. To supervise the overall sale process and take decisions on instrument, pricing, timing, etc. as appropriate. VIL To select the financial advisers for the specified PSUs to facilitate the disinvestment process. VIII.

To ensure that appropriate measures are taken during the disinvestment process to protect the interests of the affected employees including encouraging employees' participation in the sale process. IX. To monitor the progress of disinvestment process and take necessary measures and report periodically to the Government on such progress. X. To assist the Government to create public awareness of the Government's disinvestment policies and programmes with a vi~w to developing a commitment by the people. XL To give wjde publicity to the disinvestment proposals so as to ensure larger public participation in the shareholding of the enterprises; and XII. To advise the Government on possible capital restructuring of enterprises by marginal investments, if required, so as to ensure enhanced realisation through disinvestment. 4. The Disinvestment Commission will be advisory· body and the Government will take afinal decision on the companies to bedisinveste elected or appointed.

Here we have the selection of the global adviser and the strategic partner through the process of issuance of global advertisement. It is the global Adviser who selected the valuer who was already on the list of valuers maintained by the Government. Whatever material was received was examined by high Power Committee known as the ! MG and the ultimate·decision was taken by the Cabinet Committee on Disinvestment. To say that there has been lack of transparency, under these circumstances, is uncharitable and without any basis. It was contended on behalf of the State of Chattisgarh that the land on which industry has been set up was originally tribal land. The said land could have been acquired and used by public sector undertaking but the tribal land could not be transferred to a non-tribal. Once majority shares in BALCO were transferred to a non-tribal company, the prohibition contained against the , , transfer of tribal land came into operation.

Relying on the majority decision of this Court in Samatha v. State ~f A. P. and Ors.. (1997] 8 SCC 191, it was contended that the transfer of land even by lease in favour of BALCO must be regarded as being invalid. In Samatha scase, . this Court had to consider the validity of the grant of mining lease of Government land' in a scheduled area to the 'Non-Tribals'. The Court had to consider the effect and applicability of Section 3(1) of the A. P. Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation, 1959 which reads as follows:- "3. Tran. ~fer ofimmovable property by a member o. fa Scheduled Tribe-( l)(a) Notwithstanding anything in any enactment, rule or law in . force in the Agency tracts any trans. fer of immovable property situated in the Agency tracts by a person, whether or not such person is a member ~fa Scheduled Tribe, shall be absolutely null and void, unless such trans. fer is rnade in .

favour of a person, who is a nzen1ber ~fa Scheduled Tribe or a society registered or deemed to be registered under the Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1964 (Act 7 ~f 1964) which is composed solely ~{members ~fthe Scheduled Tribes". While interpreting the said Regulation framed by the Governor in exercise of powers under Article 244 read with para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution, this Court held that the words "transfer of immovable property ....... by a person" in. that clause included the transfer by way of grant of mining lease by the State Government. Section 3(1) was interpreted as prohibiting any such transfer in favour of a non-scheduled tribe and it was further declared that such transfer shall be absolutely null and void. While we have strong reservations with regard to the correctness of the majority decision in Samatha s case, which has not only interpreted the pro- BALCO EMPLOYEES Ul' · case. Transferred Case No. 9 of 2001. Shri B. L.

Wadhera has, in recent years, become a persistent Public Interest Litigant who has to his credit fairly large number of Writ Petitions filed in the Delhi High Court. Not to miss an opportunity, soon after the bid of Sterlite was accepted on 21st February, 2001, promptly Wadhera filed Writ Petition in the Delhi High Court within two days i. e. on 23rd February, 2001 which is Transferred Case No. 9 of2001 challenging the said decision. Wadhera is not an employee of the company, nor was he a prospective bidder. He contended that he had been closely connected with public sector undertakings and therefore, had the locus standi to file the Writ Petition challenging the said disinvestment by filing what he terms as a Public Interest Litigation. Public Interest Litigation, or PIL as it is more commonly known, entered the Indian judicial process in 1970. It will not be incorrect to say that it is primarily the judges who have innovated this type of litigation as there was dire need for it.

At that stage, it was intended to vindicate public interest where fundamental and other rights of the people who were poor, ignorant or in socially or economically disadvantageous position and were unable to seek legal redress were required to be espoused. PIL was not meant to be adversarial in nature and was to be a cooperative and collaborative effort of the parties and the Court so as to secure justice for the poor and the weaker sections of the community who were not in a position to protect their own interests. Public Interest Litigation was intended to mean nothing more than what words themselves said viz. , 'litigation in the interest of the public'. While PIL initially was invoked mostly in cases connected with the relief to the people and the weaker sections of the society and in areas where there was violation of human rights under Article 21, but with the passage of time, petitions have been entertained in other spheres. Prof. S. B.

Sathe has summarised the extent of the jurisdiction which has now been exercised in following words :- "PIL may, therefore, be described as satisfying one or more of the following parameters. These are not exclusive but merely descriptive: Where the concerns underlying a petition are not individualist • but are shared widely by a large number of people (bonded Jabour, undertrial prisoners, prison inmates). Where the affected persons belong to the disadvantaged sections • of society(women, children, bonded Jabour, unorganised labour etc. ). • Where judicial Jaw making is necessary to avoid exploitation(intercountry adoption, the education of the children of the prostitutes). • Where judicial intervention is necessary for the protection of the sanctity ofdemocratic institutions(independence of the judiciary, existence of grievances redressal forums).

Where administrative decisions related to development are harmful • to the environment and jeopardize people's to natural resources such as air or water". There is, in recent years, a feeling which is not without any foundation that Public Interest Litigation is now tending to become publicity interest litigation or private interest litigation and has a tendency to be counter-productive. PIL is not a pill or a panacea for all wrongs. It was essentially meant to protect basic human rights of the weak and the disadvantaged and was a procedure which was innovated where a public spirited person files a petition in effect on behalf of such persons who on account of poverty, helplessness or economic and social disabilities could not approach the Court for relief. There have been, in recent times, increasingly instances of abuse of PIL. Therefore, there is a need to re-emphasize the parameters within which PIL can be resorted to by a Petitioner and entertained by the Court.

This aspect has come up for consideration before this Court and all we need to do is to recapitulate and reemphasize the same. What Public Interest Litigation is meant to be has been explained at length in S. P. Gupta v. Union ofIndia and Anr. , [1981] Supp. SCC 87. Public Interest Litigation in that case was filed relating to the appointment and transfer BALCO EMPLOYEES UNION (REGO. ) v. U. 0. 1. [KIRPAL, J. ] 567 of judges and it is in this connection that the question arose with regard to the locus standi of the Petitioner to file the Writ Petition. While deciding this aspect, this Court examined as to what is the nature of the Public Interest Litigation and who can initiate the same. At page 215, Bhagwati J. observed as follows :- "...

It is for this reason that in public interest litigation - litigation undertaken for the purpose of redressing public injury, enforcing public duty, protecting social, collective, 'diffused' rights and interests or vindicating public interest, any citizen who is acting bona fide and who has sufficient interest has to be accorded standing... " The limitation within which the Court must act, and the caution against the abuse of the same is referred to by Bhagwati J. at page 219 as follows :- "24. But we must be careful to see that the member of the public, who approaches the court in cases of this kind, is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private profit or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The Court must not allow its process to be abused by politicians and others to delay legitimate administrative action or to gain a political o~iective.

Andre Rabie has warned that "political pressure groups who could not achieve their aims through the administrative process" and we might add, through the political process, "may try to use the courts to further their aims". These are some of the dangers in public interest litigation which the court has to be careful to avoid. It is also necessary for the court to bear in mind ;hat there is a vital distinction between locus standi andjusticiability and it is not eve1y d~fault on the part ofthe State or a public authority .. that is justiciable. The court must take care to see that it does not overstep the limits ~fits judicial. function and trespass into areas which are reserved to the Executive and the Legislature by the Constitution. It is a fascinating exercise for the court to deal with public interest litigation because it is a new jurisprudence which the court is evolving ajurisprudence which demands judicial statesmanship and high creative ability.

The frontiers of public law are expanding far and wide and new concepts and doctrines which will change the complexion of the law and which were so far as embedded in the womb of the future, are beginning to be born. 25. Before we part with this general discussion in regard to locus standi, there is one point we would like to emphasise and it is, that cases may arise where there is undoubtedly public injury by the act or omission of the State or a public authority but such act or omission alsocauses a specific legal injury to an individual or to a specific class or group of individuals.

In such cases, a member of the public having sufficient interest can certainly maintain an action challenging the legality of such act or omission, but if the person or specific class or group of persons who are primarily injured as a result of such act or omission, do not wish to claim any relief and accept such act or omission willingly and without protest, the member of the public who complains of a secondary public injury cannot maintain the action, for the effect of entertaining the action at the instance of such member of the public would be to foist a relief on the person or specific class or group of persons primarily injured, which they do not want. " Emphasis added In Sachidanand Pandey and Am: v. State of West Bengal and Ors. , [1987] 2 SCC 295, V. Khalid, J. observed as follows :- "61.

It is only when courts are apprised of gross violation of fundamental rights by a group or a class action or when basic human rights are invaded or when there are complaints of such acts as shock the judicial conscience that the courts, especially this Court, should leave aside procedural shackles and hear such petitions and extend its jurisdiction under all available provisions for remedying the hardships and miseries of the needy, the underdog and the neglected. I will be second to none in extending help when such help is required. But this does not mean. that the doors of this Court are always open for anyone to walk .. in. It is necessary to have some self-imposed restraint on public interest litigants''. After referring to the decision in Subhash Kumar v. State ~f Bihar and Ors. , [1991] 1 SCC 598 and other cases on the point, in Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhm)• and Ors. , [1992] 4 SCC 305, it was observed at page 348 as follows :- "109.

It is thus clear that only a person acting bona. fide and having BALCO EMPLOYEES UNION (REGD. ) v. U. 0. 1. [KIRPAL, l. ] . 569 sufficient interest in the proceeding of PIL will alone have a locus standi and can approach the court to wipe out the tears of the poor and needy, suffering from violation of their fundamental rights, but not a person for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. Similarly, a vexatious petition under the colour of PIL brought before the court for vindicating any personal grievances, deserves rejection at the threshold". Referring to the litigants standing in queues waiting for the cases to be listed in Courts at page 349, Pandian, J. had observed as follows:- "...

the busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no public interest except for personal gain or private profit either for themselves or as proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity break the queue muffling their faces by wearing the mask of public interest litigation, and get into the courts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitions and thus criminally waste the valuable time of the courts and as a result of which the queue standing outside the doors of the Court never moves which piquant situation creates a frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants and resultantly they lose faith in the administration of our judicial system. " While dealing with a case where PIL had been filed in relation to an award of contract, the factors which the Courts have to consider have been dealt with in the following observations in Raunaq International Ltd. v. /. V. R. Construction Lid. and Ors.

, (1999] 1 SCC 492 at page 502. "17. Normally before such a project is undertaken, a detailed consideration of the need, viability, financing and cost-effectiveness of the - proposed project and offers received takes place at various levels in the Government. If there is a good reason why the project should not be undertaken, then the time to object is at the time when the same is under consideration and before a final decision is taken to undertake the project. If breach of law in the execution of the project is apprehended, then it is at the stage when the viability of the project is being consiciered that the objection before the appropriate authorities including the court must be raised. We would expect that if such objection or material is placed before the Government, the same would be considered before a final decision is taken.

It is common experience that considerable time is spent by the authorities concerned before a final decision is taken regarding the execution ofa public project. This is the appropriate time when all aspects and all objections should be considered. It is only when valid objections are not taken into account or ignored that the court may intervene. Even so, the court should be moved at the earliest possible opportunity. Belated petitions should not be entertained. 18. The same considerations must weigh with the court when interim orders are passed in such petitions. The party at whose instance interim orders are obtained has to be made accountable for the consequences of the interim order. The interim order could delay the project, jettison finely worked financial arrangements and escalate costs.

Hence the petitioner asking for interim orders in appropriate cases should be asked to provide security for any increase in cost as a result of such delay or any damages suffered by the opposite party in consequence of an interim order. Otherwise public detriment may outweigh public benefit in granti,1g such interim orders. Stay order or injunction order, if issued, must be moulded to provide for restitution. " Lastly, we need only to refer to the following observations in the majority decision in Narmada Bachao Ando/an case (supra) at page 763. "232. While protecting the rights of the people from being violated in any manner utmost care has to be taken that the court does not transgress its jurisdiction. There is, in our constitutional framework a fairly clear demarcation of powers. The court has come down heavily whenever the executive has sought to impinge upon the court's jurisdiction. 233.

At the same time, in exercise of its enormous power the court should not be called upon to or undertake governmental duties or functions. The courts cannot run the Government nor can the administration indulge in abuse or non~use of power and get away with it. The essence ofjudicial review is a constitutional fundamental. The role of the higher judiciary under the Constitution casts on it a great obligation as the sentinel to defend the values of the Constitution and the rights of Indians. The courts must, therefore, act within their BALCO EMPLOYEES UNION (REGD. ) v. U. 0. 1. [KIRPAL, l. ] 571 judicially permissible limitations to uphold the rule of law and harness their power in public interest. It is precisely for this reason that it has been consistently held by this Court that in matters of policy the court will not interfere.

When there is a valid law requiring the Government to act in a particular manner the court ought not to, without striking down the law, give any direction which is not in accordance with law. In other words, the court itself is not above the law. 234. In respect of public projects and policies which are initiated by the Government the courts should not become an approval authority. Normally such decisions are taken by the Government after due care and consideration. In a democracy welfare of the people at large, and not merely of a small section of the society, has to be the concern of a responsible Government. If a considered policy decision has been taken, which is not in conflict with any law or is not ma/a. fide, it will not be in public interest to require the court to go into and investigate those areas which are the function of the executive.

For any project which is approved after due deliberation the court should refrain from being asked to review the decision just because a petitioner in filing a PIL alleges that such a decision should not have been taken because an opposite view against the undertaking of the project, which view may have been considered by the Government, is possible. When two or more options or views are possible and after considering them the Government takes a policy decision it is then not the function of the court to go into the matter afresh and, in a way, sit in appeal over such a policy decision". It will be seen that whenever the Court has interfered and given directions while entertaining PIL it has mainly been where there has been an element of violation of Article 21 or of human rights or where the litigation has been initiated for the benefit of the poor and the underprivileged who are unable to come to Court due to some disadvantage.

In those cases also it is the legal rights which are secured by the Courts. We may, however, add that Public Interest Litigation was not meant to be a weapon to challenge the financial or economic decisions which are taken by the Government in exercise of their administrative power. No doubt a person personally aggrieved by any such decision, which he regards as illegal, can impugn the same in a Court of law, but, a Public Interest Litigation at the behest of a stranger ought not to be entertained. Such a litigation cannot per se be on behalf of the poor and the downtrodden, unless the Court is satisfied that there has been violation of Article 21 and the persons adversely affected are unable to approach the Court. The decision to disinvest and the implementation thereof is purely an administrative decision relating to the economic policy of the State and challenge to the same at the instance of a busy-body cannot fall within the parameters of Public Interest Litigation.

On this ground alone, we decline to entertain the writ petition filed by Shri B. L. Wadhera. Writ Petition (Civil) No. 194 ~f 2001 This writ petition has been filed under Article 32 of the Constitution by BALCO challenging various show cause notices issued to them by authorities in the State of Chhattisgarh. In our opinion, it will not be appropriate for this Court to entertain the challenge to the said show cause notices in this petition. The petitioners have adequate remedy open to it under the Acts under which the notices had been issued and, in appropriate case, can approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. This writ petition is thus not entertained as alternative remedy is available to the petitioner. Conclusion: In a democracy, it is the prerogative of each elected Government to follow it's own policy. Often a change in Government may result in the shift in focus or change in economic policies.

Any such change may result in adversely affecting some vested interests. Unless any illegality is committed in the execution of the policy or the same is contrary to law or mala fide, a decision bringing about change cannot per se be interfered with by the Court. Wisdom and advisability of economic policies are ordinarily not amenable to judicial review unless it can be demonstrated that the policy is contrary to any statutory provision or the Constitution. In other words, it is not for the Courts to consider relative merits of different economic policies and consider whether a wiser or better one can be evolved. For testing the correctness of a policy, the appropriate forum is the Parliament and not the Courts. Here the policy was tested and the Motion defeated in the Lok Sabha on ! st March, 2001.

Thus, apart from the fact that the policy of disinvestment cannot be questioned as such, the facts herein show that fair, just and equitable procedure has been followed in carrying out this disinvestment. The allegations of lack of transparency or that the decision was taken in a hurry or there has been an arbitrary exercise of power are without any basis. It is a matter of regret that on behalf of State of Chattisgarh such allegations against the Union of India have been made without any basis. We strongly deprecate such unfounded averments which have been made by an officer of the said State. The offer of the highest bidder has been accepted. This was more than the reserve price which was arrived at by a method which is well recognised and, therefore, we have not examined the details in the matter of arriving at the valuation figure.

Moreover, valuation is a question of fact and the Court will not interfere in matters of valuation unless the methodology adopted is arbitrary [see Duncans Industries Ltd. v. State of U. P. and Ors.. [2000] I SCC 633]. The ratio of the decision in Samatha's case (supra) is inapplicable here as the legal provisions here are different. The land was validly given to BALCO a number of years ago and today it is not open to the State of Chattisgarh to take a summersault and challenge the correctness of it's own action. Furthermore even with the change in management the la~d remains with BALCO to whom it had been validly given on lease. Judicial interference by way of PIL is available if there is injury to public because of dereliction of Constitutional or statutory obligations on the part of the government. Here it is not so and in the sphere of economic policy or reform the Court is not the appropriate forum. Every matter of public interest or curiosity cannot be the subject matter of PIL.

Courts are not intended to and nor should they conduct the administration of the country. Courts will interfere · only if there is a clear violation of Constitutional or statutory provisions or noncompliance by the State with it's Constitutional or statutory duties. None of these contingenci~s arise in this present case. In the case of a policy decision on economic matters, the Courts should be very circumspect in conducting any enquiry or investigation and must be most reluctant to impugn the judgement of the experts who may have arrived at a conclusion unless the Court is satisfied that there is illegality in the decision ~ Lastly, no ex-parte relief by way of injunction or stay especially with respect to public projects and schemes or economic policies or schemes should be granted. It is only when the Court is satisfied for good and valid reasons, that there will be irreparable and irretrievable damage can an injunction be issued after hearing all the parties.

Even then the Petitioner should be put on appropriate terms such as providing an indemnity or an adequate undertaking to make good the loss or damage in the event the PIL filed is dismissed. It is in public interest that there should be early disposal of cases. Public Interest Litigation should, therefore, be disposed of at the earliest as any delay will be contrary to public interest and thus become counter-productive. For the aforesaid reasons stated in this judgment, we hold that the disinvestment by the Government in BALCO was not invalid. Transferred Case (Civil) Nos. 8, 9 and 10 of 200 I are dismissed. The parties will, however, bear their own costs. B. S. T. C. and Petition dismissed.