BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI v. HIRALAL SOMABHAI CONTRACTOR (DECEASED) REP. BY LRS. & ORS

Citation: 2023 INSC 805, [2023] 11 S.C.R. 1064

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: J. B. PARDIWALA AND MANOJ MISRA, JJ.

Judgment text

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI v. HIRALAL SOMABHAI CONTRACTOR (DECEASED) REP. BY Civil Appeal No. 4955 of 2022 [2023] 11 S. C. R. 1064 : 2023 INSC 805 CASE DETAILS BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI v. HIRALAL SOMABHAI CONTRACTOR (DECEASED) REP. BY LRS. & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 4955 of 2022) SEPTEMBER 06, 2023 [J. B. PARDIWALA AND MANOJ MISRA, JJ. ] HEADNOTES Issues for consideration: Whether the wilful breach of an assurance in the form of an undertaking given by a counsel/ advocate on behalf of his client to the court would amount to "civil contempt" as defi ned u/s.

2(b) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971; whether the said undertaking could be said to have been given to the court; whether the contempt court has the power to declare any contemptuous transaction non est or void; whether the benefi ciaries of a contemptuous transaction have a right to be heard in the contempt proceedings on the ground that they are necessary or proper parties as they are bona fi de purchasers of the suit property for value without notice; and whether the apology tendered by the contemnors deserves to be accepted. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - s.

19 - Statutory appeals under - Statement made by the counsel appearing for the contemnors before the High Court in the form of an undertaking upon instructions of the clients that the property would not be sold till the disposal of the main petition - However, despite the undertaking, the appellants proceeded to execute sale deeds in favour of diff erent parties and thereby, wilfully disobeyed the order passed by the High Court - Contemnors held guilty of contempt by the High Court and the sale transactions held to be void - Correctness: Held: High Court did not commit any error in passing the impugned judgment and order - Undertaking was given to the High Court and the breach or disobedience would attract the provisions of the 1971 Act. [Paras 116 and 117] 1064 BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI v. HIRALAL 1065 SOMABHAI CONTRACTOR (DECEASED) REP. BY LRS. & ORS. Contempt of Court Act, 1971 - s.

2(b) - Expression 'wilful disobedience' - Meaning of - Wilful breach of an assurance in the form of an undertaking given by a counsel/advocate on behalf of his client to the court, if would amount to 'civil contempt' as defi ned u/s. 2(b): Held: Expression "wilful" means act or omission which is done voluntarily or intentionally and with the specifi c intent to do something which the law forbids or with the specifi c intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done, with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law - It signifi es a deliberate action done with evil intent or with a bad motive or purpose - Assurance in the form of an undertaking given by a counsel/advocate on behalf of his client to the court, the wilful breach or disobedience of the same would amount to 'civil contempt' as defi ned u/s. 2(b) of the 1971 Act . [Paras 56 and 116(i)] Contempt of Court Act, 1971 - s.

2(b) - Term Undertaking - Meaning of - Undertaking by the counsel, if undertaking given to the court: Held: Every undertaking given by a party to a litigation may not be an undertaking to the court - There exists a distinction between an undertaking given to a party to the lis and the undertaking given to a court - Undertaking given to a court attracts the provisions of the 1971 Act whereas an undertaking given to a party to the lis by way of an agreement of settlement or otherwise would not attract the provisions of the 1971 Act - Breach of an undertaking given to the other party may not constitute the contempt of court - However, whether a particular undertaking is an undertaking to the court or to the opposite party depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and the language used - On facts, the undertaking could be said to have been given to the court - Wilful breach of an assurance in the form of an undertaking given by a counsel/advocate on behalf of his client to the court would amount to "civil contempt" as defi ned u/s.

2(b) .

[Paras 72, 73, 76-77 and 116(ii)] Contempt of Court Act, 1971 - Contempt of court - Transfer of suit property in contempt proceedings - Power of the contempt court to declare any contemptuous transactions non est or void: Held: Though the transfer of the suit property pendente lite may not be termed as void ab initio yet when the court is looking into such transfers in contempt proceedings the court can defi nitely declare such transactions to be void in order to maintain the majesty of law - Apart from punishing the contemnor, the majesty of law may demand that appropriate directions be issued by the court either for reversal of the transactions by declaring the said transactions to be void or proceed to pass appropriate directions to the concerned authorities to ensure that the contumacious conduct on the part of the contemnor does not continue to enure to the advantage of the contemnor or anyone claiming under him - On facts, the High Court justifi ed in declaring all the sale deeds executed by the contemnors in favour of the purchasers as non est; and that the sale deeds stand cancelled and set aside - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - s.

52. [Paras 88, 89 and 116(iii)] Contempt of Court Act, 1971 - Contempt of court - Contempt proceedings - Impleadment of benefi ciaries of any contumacious transaction as necessary parties: Held: Benefi ciaries of any contumacious transaction have no right or locus to be heard in the contempt proceedings on the ground that they are bona fi de purchasers of the property for value without notice and thus, are necessary parties - Contempt is between the court and the contemnor and no third party can involve itself into the same - It was not necessary for the High Court to implead the purchasers in the contempt proceedings - Purchasers were quietly watching the proceedings - It is not as if they were not aware of what was happening however, when things went wrong, they now cry foul of not being impleaded as parties and heard by the High Court - Necessary parties. [Paras 97 and 116(iv)] Contempt of Court Act, 1971 - s.

12 - Punishment for contempt of court - Apology tendered by the contemnors - Acceptance of: Held: Apology tendered should not be accepted as a matter of course and the court is not bound to accept the same - Apology may be unconditional, unqualifi ed and bona fi de, still if the conduct is serious, which has caused damage to the dignity of the institution, the same should not be accepted - There ought not to be a tendency by courts, to show compassion when disobedience of an undertaking or an order is with impunity and with total consciousness - All throughout the proceedings before the High BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI v. HIRALAL 1067 SOMABHAI CONTRACTOR (DECEASED) REP. BY LRS. & ORS.

Court, the stance of the appellants was that they committed a big mistake by executing the sale deeds despite having given a clear-cut undertaking to the court that they would not do so - In such circumstances, the appellants pleaded before the High Court that their apology may be accepted and they may be discharged from the proceedings - Though the apology was tendered before the High Court in the fi rst instance, yet such apology does not deserve to be accepted and was rightly not accepted by the High Court.

[Paras 100, 113 and 116(v)] Judicial notice - Matters pertaining to contempt of court: Held: It is noticed that the courts have shown undue leniency and magnanimity towards the contemnors - Lenient attitude shown by the courts actually emboldens unscrupulous litigants to disobey or commit breach of the order passed by any court or any undertaking given to the court with impunity - Litigants, proceeded for contempt of court have realised that they have a very potent weapon in their hands in the form of apology - There ought not to be a tendency by courts to show compassion when disobedience of an undertaking or an order is with impunity and with total consciousness. [Paras 101 and 102] Contempt of Court Act, 1971 - s. 12 - Punishment for contempt of court - Apology u/s. 12 - Concept of - Explained. [Paras 99, 111, 112] Contempt of Court - Contempt Jurisdiction - Exercise of - Governing principles- Stated.

[Paras 40-45] Contempt of Court - Civil contempt - Commission of - Conditions to be satisfi ed - Stated. [Para 43] LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES Mohd. Aslam v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 442 : [1994] 5 Suppl. SCR 104; Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang and Another (2006) 11 SCC 114 : [2006] 3 SCR 1068; Anil K. Surana and Another v. State Bank of Hyderabad (2007) 10 SCC 257; Bharat Steel Tubes Limited v. IFCI Limited (2010) 14 SCC 77 : [2010] 15 SCR 993; Abhishek Kumar Singh v. G. Pattanaik and Others (2021) 7 SCC 613; Murray & Co. v. Ashok Kr. Newatia & Another, (2000) 2 SCC 367 : [2000] 1 SCR 367; T. Ravi and Another v. B. Chinna 1068 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S. C. R. Narasimha and Others (2017) 7 SCC 342: [2017] 3 SCR 1; Sevakram Prabhudas v. H. S. Patel and Others, 2000 (1) vol. 41 GLR 715; Mrityunjoy Das and Another v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman and Others, (2001) 3 SCC 739 : [2001] 2 SCR 471; Supreme Court Bar Association v.

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Surjit Singh Arora, (1996) 6 SCC 14 : [1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 56; Govind Kaur v. Hardev 1982 (1) RCR 323 (13); State Bank of India and Others v. Dr. Vijay Mallya, 2022 SCC Online SC 826; Satyabrata Biswas and Others v. Kalyan Kumar Kisku and Others (1994) 2 SCC 266 : [1994] 1 SCR 413; Thomson Press (India) Limited v. Nanak Builders and Investors Private Limited and Others, (2013) 5 SCC 397 : [2013] 2 SCR 74; Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. and Another, (1996) 4 SCC 622 : [1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 295; Vidur Impex and Traders Private Limited and Others v. Tosh Apartments Private Limited and Others, (2012) 8 SCC 384 : [2012] 10 SCR 307; Jehal Tanti and Others v. Nageshwar Singh (Dead) THR. LRS. , AIR 2013 SC 2235; In Re: Mafatlal Industries Ltd. O. J. Appeal No. 16 of 1994 in Company Petition No. 22 of 1994 decided on 12. 07. 1996; Surjit Singh and Others etc. etc. v. Harbans Singh and others, AIR 1996 SC 135 : [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 354; Sarvinder Singh v.

Dalip Singh and Others, (1996) 5 SCC 539 : [1996] 4 Suppl. SCR 271; Bibi Zubaida Khatoon v. Nabi Hassan Saheb and Another, (2004) 1 SCC 191 : [2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 290; Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University and Others, (2001) 6 SCC 534 : [2001] 3 BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI v. HIRALAL 1069 SOMABHAI CONTRACTOR (DECEASED) REP. BY LRS. & ORS. SCR 1129; D. N. Taneja v. Bhajan Lal, (1988) 3 SCC 26 : [1988] 3 SCR 888; Tapan Kumar Mukherjee v. Heromoni Mondal and Another, (1991) 1 SCC 397 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 55; Sub-Judge, First Class, Hoshangabad v. Jawahar Lal Ramchand Parwar AIR 1940 Nagpur 407; Priya Gupta and Another v. Additional Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and Others, (2013) 11 SCC 404 : [2012] 12 SCR 818; M. Y. Shareef and another v. Hon'ble Judges of the Nagpur High Court and others, AIR 1955 SC 19 : [1955] SCR 757 - referred to. M. v. Home Offi ce and Another (1992) Q. B. 270 : (1992) 2 WLR 73 : (1992) 4 All ER 97; Clarke and others v.

Chadburn and others (1985) 1 All ER 211 - referred to. Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, pg 1599; Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition - referred to. OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED ORDER AND APPEARANCES CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4955 of 2022. From the Judgment and Order dated 13. 07. 2022 of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Misc. Civil Application No. 121 of 2018 in Special Civil Application No. 16266 of 2013. With Civil Appeal Nos. 5041 of 2022 and 4869 of 2023. Appearances: Shyam Divan, Kapil Sibal, Mihir Joshi, Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Advs. , Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Gaurav Singh, Soumik Ghosal, Shamik Shirishbhai Sanjanwala, Siddharth Srivastava, Vanshdeep Dalmia, Ms. Devanshi Singh, Shivam Pundhir, Advs. for the Appellant. Arijit Prasad, Sr. Adv. , Nachiket A. Dave, Pradhuman Gohil, Mrs. Taruna Singh Gohil, Ms. Ranu Purohit, Alapati Sahithya Krishna, Ms. Nidhi Mittal, Rushabh N. Kapadia, Vijayanand Tripathi, Advs. for the Respondents.

1070 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S. C. R. JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT J. B. PARDIWALA, J. : "When we speak of the 'rule of law' as a characteristic of our country, (we mean) not only that with us no man is above the law, but (what is a diff erent thing) that here every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals. Respect for law and its institutions is the only assurance that can hold a pluralist nation together. Any attempt to achieve solutions to controversies, however, ideologically and emotionally surcharged, not on the basis of law and through judicial institutions, but on the strength of numbers will subvert the fundamental values of our chosen political organisation. It will demolish public faith in the accepted constitutional institutions and weaken people's resolve to solve issues by peaceful means.

It will destroy respect for the Rule of Law and the authority of courts and seek to place individual authority and strength of numbers above the wisdom of law. " Mohd. Aslam v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 442. 1. Since the issues raised in all the captioned appeals are the same; the parties are also same and the challenge is also to the self-same judgment passed by the High Court of Gujarat those were taken up for hearing analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 2. There are in all three appeals before us. 3. The Civil Appeal No. 4955 of 2022 and Civil Appeal No. 5041 of 2022 are statutory appeals under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short, 'the Act 1971') fi led by the contemnors who stood punished by the High Court whereas the Civil Appeal No. 4869 of 2023 is an appeal fi led at the instance of the benefi ciaries of contemptuous transactions with the permission of this Court. In other words, the appellants of Civil Appeal No.

4869 of 2023 are the purchasers of the suit properties from the contemnors. The benefi ciaries of the contemptuous transactions are also BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI v. HIRALAL 1071 SOMABHAI CONTRACTOR (DECEASED) REP. BY LRS. & ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J. ] before this Court as the High Court while holding the appellants of the two statutory appeals referred to above guilty of contempt for their deliberate and wilful disobedience of the undertaking given to the court also declared the sale transactions to be void. STATUTORY APPEALS UNDER SECTION 19 OF THE CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971 4. The appellants of the two statutory appeals have been held guilty of contempt by the High Court of Gujarat for their deliberate and wilful disobedience of the undertaking given to the concerned Court, which came to be recorded vide order dated 14. 10. 2015 passed in the Special Civil Application No. 16266 of 2013.

The impugned order passed by the High Court holding the appellants guilty of contempt dated 13. 07. 2022 came to be passed in the Misc. Civil Application No. 121 of 2018 fi led by the respondents herein in the Special Civil Application No. 16266 of 2013. 5. The operative part of the impugned order passed by the High Court reads thus: "ORDER (i) We hold that accused Nos. 3. 1 to 3. 4 and accused No. 4 guilty of Contempt for their deliberate and wilful disobedience of the undertaking given to this Court which came to be recorded by order dated 14. 10. 2015 passed in Special Civil Application No. 16266 of 2013. (ii) We impose cost of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) on accused Nos. 3. 1 and 3. 2 in lieu of sentencing them to imprisonment and in addition direct them to pay fi ne of Rs.

2,000/- (Rupees Two Thousand only) each and the amount of fi ne shall be paid within a period of three weeks from today and in default thereof they shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two (2) months. (iii) We sentence accused Nos. 3. 3, 3. 4 and accused No. 4 to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two months and pay fi ne of Rs. 2,000/- (Rupees Two Thousand only) each and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two (2) months. (iv) It is declared that following sale deeds executed by accused Nos. 3. 1 to 3. 4 through accused no. 4 as power of attorney holder in favour of purchaser as non est and it is hereby ordered to be cancelled, quashed and set aside and respondents are directed to restore the position which was prevailing prior to the execution of the aforesaid sale deeds which was prevailing at the time of the order dated 14. 10. 2015 passed in Special Civil Application No. 16266 of 2013.

The said sale deeds are as follows: - LIST OF SALE DEEDS Sr. Sale Deed Plot Plot Consideration Name of the No. Date Area No. purchaser 1 9-11-15 118. 48 79 103115/- Jagdish Chug 2 9-11-15 118. 48 80 103115/- Rama Rani 3 19-2-16 118. 48 119A 8500/- Prakash Kundu 4 19-2-16 118. 48 199B 8500/- Prakash Kundu 5 19-2-16 118. 48 200 8500/- Prakash Kundu 6 15-3-16 118. 48 122B 8500/- Mafatlal Kalidas (56) HUF 7 15-3-16 118. 48 122C 8500/- Mafatlal Kalidas (55) HUF 8 17-5-17 152 27 8500/- Sudesh Dingra 9 17-5-17 152 27A 8500/- Shilpi Ravi 10 17-5-17 152 28 8500/- Roshan Lal 11 25-7-17 118. 48 176 8500/- Sami Kumar 2,82,730/- 3 Sale deeds done /added afterwards 12 30-10-18 19. 26 Shop 49000/- Trilokram Mali No. 7 13. 25-7-17 118. 48 175 8500/- Yogesh kumar Patel Total 3,40,230/- BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI v. HIRALAL 1073 SOMABHAI CONTRACTOR (DECEASED) REP. BY LRS. & ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J. ] The Jurisdictional Sub-Registrar/s be informed to make necessary entries in the records accordingly.

(v) It would be open for the purchasers to recover the amount of sale consideration from the accused Nos. 3. 1 to 3. 4 and accused no. 4. (vi) The present Misc. Civil Application stands allowed with costs quantifi ed at Rs. 1,00,000/- payable jointly and severally by accused nos. 3. 1 to 3. 4 and accused no. 4 to the applicants towards the cost of the present proceedings. 64. After pronouncement of the above order, Mr. Mihir Joshi, learned Senior Advocate seeks for stay of operation of this judgment for a period of four weeks. Having regard to the facts of above case, we are of the considered view that it would be just and necessary to stay this order for a period of four weeks from today. Accordingly, we grant stay of this judgment for a period of four weeks from today subject to accused Nos. 3. 1 to 3. 4 and accused No. 4 depositing of fi ne amount and costs as ordered hereinabove before this Court within two weeks from today. " 6..

It all started with an order passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court dated 14. 10. 2015 in the Civil Appeal No. 11412 of 2015 in the Special Civil Application No. 16266 of 2013 referred to above. The order dated 14. 10. 2015 referred to above reads thus: "It is stated at the Bar by Mr. Sanjanwala learned senior advocate, on instructions from his clients, that the property qua the subject matter of this entry and the petition, shall not be sold out till the main petition is heard and decided, which satisfi es the conscious of Mr. Mihir Thakor learned senior advocate appearing with Mr. Prabhav Mehta learned advocate and he states that he may not press the Letters Patent Appeal, on instructions. Hence, this Civil Application stands disposed of accordingly. It goes without saying that the order was passed adinvitum/by consent of the learned advocates. " (Emphasis supplied) 1074 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S. C. R. 7.

Thus, it appears that a statement was made by the learned counsel appearing for the contemnors before the High Court in the form of an undertaking and that too upon instructions of the clients that the subject matter i. e. , the property would not be sold till the main petition i. e. , the Special Civil Application No. 16266 of 2013 is fi nally disposed of. 8. On the strength of the aforesaid order one Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) fi led by the respondents herein against an interim order also came to be disposed of vide order dated 21. 10. 2015, which reads thus: "Mr. Prabhav Mehta learned advocate for the applicants states that in view of the order dated 14 October, 2015 passed by learned single Judge in Civil Application No. 11412 of 2015 in SCA No. 16266 of 2013, wherein the statement is recorded that the property in question qua the subject matter of this entry shall not be sold until the main petition is heard and decided, he seeks permission to withdraw the proceedings.

Permission is granted. Accordingly, the Civil Application No. 10627 of 2015 and LPA(Stamp) No. 1195 of 2015 in SCA No. 16266 of 2013 with the Civil Application (Stamp) No. 10539 of 2015 shall stand disposed of as withdrawn. " (Emphasis supplied) 9. It appears that despite having undertaken that the property qua the subject matter of the disputed entry would not be disposed of till the fi nal disposal of the main matter; the appellants herein proceeded to execute as many as 13 sale deeds in favour of diff erent parties and thereby, wilfully disobeyed the order dated 14. 10. 2015 passed by the High Court referred to above. 10. In such circumstances referred to above, the respondents herein preferred the Misc. Civil Application (Contempt) No. 121 of 2018 and initiated contempt proceedings against the appellants herein. The High Court framed the following points for its consideration: "(i) Whether respondent Nos. 3. 1 to 3.

4 and 4th respondent have willfully and deliberately disobeyed the order dated 14. 10. 2015 passed in Civil Application (for direction) No. 11412 of 2015 in Special Civil Application No. 16266 of 2013? BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI v. HIRALAL 1075 SOMABHAI CONTRACTOR (DECEASED) REP. BY LRS. & ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J. ] (ii) Whether the contempt proceedings are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay as contended by the respondents or the contempt application is liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971? (iii) What order? " ADJUDICATION BY HIGH COURT: 11. We shall give a fair idea as to how the High Court dealt with the contempt proceedings. The High Court fi rst took notice of the various sale deeds that came to be executed by the appellants herein between 09. 11. 2015 and 30. 10. 2018, which were in wilful disobedience of the undertaking given to the High Court. The details are as under: No.

Index Name of the Party Plot Plot Consid Conside Sale Page No. area eration ration Deed No. date as per Index Value 1 157 Jagdish 79 118. 48 103115/- 568704/- 9-11-15 Chug 2 158 Rama Rani 80 118. 48 103115/- 568704/- 9-11-15 3 159 Prakash 199A 118. 48 8500/- 568704/- 19-2-16 Kundu 4 160 Prakash 199B 118. 48 8500/- 568704/- 19-2-16 Kundu 5 161 Prakash 200 118. 48 8500/- 568704/- 19-2-16 Kundu 6 162 Mafatlal 122B 118. 48 8500/- 568704/- 15-3-16 Kalidas HUF (56) 7 163 Mafatlal 122C 118. 48 8500/- 568704/- 15-3-16 Kalidas HUF (55) 8 164 Sudesh Dingra 27 152 8500/- 729600/ 17-5-17 9 165 Shilpi Ravi 27A 152 8500/- 729600/ 17-5-17 10 166 Roshan Lal 28 152 8500/- 729600/ 17-5-17 11 167 Sami Kumar 176 118. 48 8500/- 568704/- 25-7-17 282730/- 6738432/- 1076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S. C. R. 2 Sale deeds done / added afterwards 12 518 Trilokram Mali Shop 19. 26 49000/- 298530/- 30-10-18 No. 7 13 555 Yogesh Kumar 175 118. 48 8500/- 568704/- 25-7-17 Patel 340230/- 7605666/- 12.

The High Court, thereafter, in para 27 of its impugned judgment took notice of the affi davit dated 23. 01. 2019 fi led by one of the contemnors. Para 27 reads thus: "27. In fact the 4th respondent in his affi davit dated 28. 08. 2005 fi led in the present proceeding also admits this fact in paragraph 6 which is already extracted herein supra. In fact in the affi davit dated 23. 01. 2019 fi led in the present contempt proceeding, 4th respondent has categorically deposed to the following eff ect: "I state that I am the power of attorney holder of other respondents in Misc. Civil Application for contempt. I declare that I had authorised Senior Advocate Shri S. H. Sanjanwala to state before the Hon'ble Court that I will not transfer, sell Survey No. 63 and 65 situated at Majura till fi nal disposal of the Special Civil Application No. 16266 of 2013. " (Emphasis supplied) 13. In para 28, the High Court observed thus: "28.

As to what would be the evidentiary value of the statement made by the learned Senior Advocate pressed into service at earlier point of time in this proceedings has also received the attention of this Court. It came to be observed by this Court on 29. 01. 2019 to the following eff ect: "In the present proceedings, affi davits have been fi led by the private respondents wherein unconditional apology is tendered and a categorical statement is made that there is no scope for justifi cation of the action of execution of Sale Deeds after such consent was recorded; namely to maintain status-quo on the subject land. In another affi davit, it is revealed that the respondents have instructed the counsel to make statement on BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI v. HIRALAL 1077 SOMABHAI CONTRACTOR (DECEASED) REP. BY LRS. & ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J. ] their behalf.

Thus, there is no escapement from the action which reveals willful, deliberate breach of undertaking and statement made before the Court in the writ proceedings. "" (Emphasis supplied) 14. In para 31, the High Court proceeded to observe thus: "31. In the instant case it can be noticed that at the behest of 4th respondent, learned Senior Counsel representing the respondent Nos. 3. 1 to 3. 4 and 4th respondent had made a statement in Special Civil Application No. 16266 of 2013 while the learned Single Judge was adjudicating Civil Application (for direction) No. 11412 of 2015 fi led therein and an undertaking came to be given that the property qua the subject matter of entry which was undisputedly relating to Survey Nos. 63 and 65 would not be sold and yet the same has been sold by respondent Nos. 3. 1 to 3. 4 through their power of attorney holder 4th respondent. Had this undertaking not been given obviously respondents in Special Civil Application No.

16266 of 2013 who were the appellants in Letters Patent Appeal (Stamp) No. 1196 of 2015 would not have withdrawn the appeal as not pressed. It is this undertaking given to this Court on 14. 10. 2015 which prevented the applicants herein to withdraw the said appeal and it is this solemn assurance given to the Court which per-forced them to withdraw the appeal by recording the statement made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 3. 1 to 3. 4 and 4th respondent. " (Emphasis supplied) 15. In para 33, the High Court took notice of the fact that the contemnors Nos. 3. 1 to 3. 4 had not disputed the execution of the power of attorney in favour of the 4th contemnor; they had not denied the execution of the sale deeds; they had not even denied having received the benefi t under the sale deeds; and they had also not denied that the power of attorney was not cancelled.

The High Court also took notice of the fact that the explanation off ered by the contemnors that the sale deeds had to be executed as the sale transactions had already been completed, was an afterthought and lacking bona fi de. 1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S. C. R. 16. In para 35 of the impugned judgment, the High Court observed that the contemnors had not only violated the undertaking given to the court but had also taken undue advantage unto themselves, namely, the sale consideration having fl own from the purchasers to the contemnors. The High Court in this regard observed the following in para 35: "35. In the instant case the contemnors have not only violated the undertaking given to the Court but have also taken undue advantage unto themselves namely the sale consideration has fl own from the purchasers to the vendors i. e. the contemnors. Even according to the recitals found in the Sale Deeds referred to in the tabular column hereinabove, it is depicted as Rs.

2,82,730/- (in respect of 11 Sale Deeds); in respect of 2 Sale Deeds executed in the year 2017-18, the consideration has been depicted as Rs. 3,40,230/-. As per the index value, the consideration amount or proper market value in respect of 11 Sale Deeds would be Rs. 67,38,432/-; whereas in respect of 2 Sale Deeds the consideration or proper market value as per index value would be Rs. 76,05,666/-. In the reply affi davits fi led by contemnors Nos. 3. 1 to 3. 4, there is not even a whisper with regard to consideration amount. They neither contend nor plead that the consideration that has fl own under the said Sale Deeds have not been received by them. On the contrary, the affi davit-in-rejoinder fi led on behalf of the petitioners against the reply fi led by respondent Nos. 3. 1 to 3.

4, it has been specifi cally contended by the complainants that contemners in order to hoodwink and overreach the process of law, an imaginary plea has been projected by way of defense that "cash" transaction of Rs. 8,500/- took place for such sale in the year 2012 wherein no date is mentioned. In fact, the defence put-forth by contemnor No. 3. 1 to the eff ect that she is a housewife, has been denied in the rejoinder affi davit fi led by applicants by raising a specifi c plea that in Special Civil Suit No. 130 of 1995 fi led before the 2nd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Surat, respondent No. 4 in the cross-examination has deposed that respondent No. 3. 1 is engaged in the textile business and she is a Director of M/s. Surat Fabric Cap Company Limited and in the same breath he has deposed that all the members of the family were aware of the order dated 14. 10. 2015 BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI v. HIRALAL 1079 SOMABHAI CONTRACTOR (DECEASED) REP. BY LRS. & ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.

] passed by this Court. Insofar as rejoinder affi davit to the reply affi davit fi led by respondent No. 3. 2, complainants have specifi cally contended that respondent No. 3. 2 was very well aware of the order dated 14. 10. 2015 and same is the statement made in the rejoinder affi davit fi led against the reply fi led by respondent No. 3. 3 and 3. 4. It is also contended that sale consideration depicted in the Sale Deeds are farce and to overreach the order of the Court less consideration has been refl ected as against the real value. To highlight this aspect in paragraph 6(c) the complainants have contended at the relevant point of time the Jantri value of the subject land was Rs. 4,800/- per sq. mtr. and the consideration depicted in the Sale Deed is at Rs. 8,500/-. It is also stated that consideration for the sale transaction for 118. 80 sq. mtrs. of land and for the land sold to the extent of 152. 00 sq. mtrs. are similar and hence the complainants contend that respondent No.

4 maliciously sold the subject property at under value rate and has caused huge loss to the public exchequer. To highlight the fact that alleged possession certifi cate which has been relied upon to contend that sale transaction had already been completed way back in the year 2012 when compared to the Sale Deed dated 09. 02. 2016, it would clearly indicate that survey numbers depicted in both these documents are distinct and diff erent. Hence, contending that the possession receipts executed in favour of Prakash Kundu as well as cash receipts produced on record are forged, bogus and concocted and contrary to the facts, the complainants have sought for the said documents being excluded from the purview of consideration of this Court. ". (Emphasis supplied) 17.

In para 36, the High Court took notice of the fact that the contemnors in categorical terms had admitted in their affi davit fi led in the proceedings, that they had sold the subject property though fully conversant and aware of the undertaking given by them before the Court that they would not sell the property till the disposal of the main petition. 18. In para 37, the High Court looked into the affi davit fi led by the accused No. 4 (power of attorney holder) dated 28. 08. 2018. Para 37 reads thus: 1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S. C. R. "37. Whereas, the accused no. 4 categorically admits of execution of sale deed, however, he tries to feign ignorance by deposing in his affi davit dated 28. 08. 2018 to the following eff ect:- "I say that the main allegation made against us is, that contrary to the orders of this Hon'ble Court dated 14. 10. 2015, we have sold the property to the persons who are mentioned in the indexed documents annexed with the contempt application.

I say that I, bona fi de believed that, the transactions mentioned in the indexed documents on page-157 onwards alleging contempt against us, without trying to over justify the case, it is my duty to point out the correct facts which led me to bona fi de believe that sale was completed. I say that on page-158 copy of the index register is produced regarding the sale in favour of Prashantbhai Haradhanbhai Kondu, which is registered on 09. 02. 2016. I am producing herewith a copy of the sale deed because, the index produced by the applicant does not refl ect the correct position. Hereto and marked as Annexure R1 is copy of the sale deed dated 09. 02. 2016. It is very clear that the sale was completed on 21. 08. 2012, but it was only not registered. As per the defi nition of sale, the transaction is complete since we have received the consideration money and we had handed over the possession. The said fact is also mentioned in the sale deed. "" (Emphasis supplied) 19.

In para 40, the High Court took notice of the fact that even after notice was issued to the contemnors in the contempt proceedings, they continued to commit further acts contempt. Para 40 reads thus: "40. The accused have continued to commit further contempt. We say so for the reason that additional affi davit dated 06. 04. 2019 fi led by complainant No. 1. 1 enclosing the sale deed dated 30. 10. 2018 would clearly disclose that accused no. 4 on behalf of himself and also on behalf of accused no. 3. 1 to 3. 4 had sold shop bearing No. 7 admeasuring 19. 2 sq. mtrs. in the land bearing Survey No. 63 which land was also agreed not to be sold by way of undertaking given to this Court on 14. 10. 2015. Additional affi davit dated 18. 07. 2019 has been fi led by complainant No. 1. 1 which discloses another portion of BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI v. HIRALAL 1081 SOMABHAI CONTRACTOR (DECEASED) REP. BY LRS. & ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J. ] land admeasuring 118. 48 in Survey No.

63 has been disposed of vide sale deed dated 25. 07. 2017. Respondent No. 4 who had been examined as a witness in Special Civil Suit No. 130 of 1995 in his deposition (Annexure B-2) has admitted that he was aware of the interim order in which breach is alleged. In fact he has also deposed that all the family members are well aware of the order dated 14. 10. 2015. His admission reads thus: "It is true that my Advocate. Mr. Shirishbhai Sanjanwala, under my instructions, gave oral undertaking that for Survey No. 63 and 65 of Majura will not be sold till the fi nal outcome of CMA. I do not remember it orally but it might be mentioned in the Honourable High Court of Gujarat Application No. 16266/13 in reference to the undertaking given by me to my Advocate Mr. Shirishbhai Sanjanwala, after reading over the order dated 14. 10. 2015 that what was the reason that he gave the assurance on my behalf. I did not have the occasion of meeting advocate Mr. Shirish Sanjanwala after 14. 10.

2015 or having discussion with him. ". (Emphasis supplied) 20. The High Court thereafter, considered whether the unconditional apology tendered by the contemnors deserved to be accepted and whether they should be exonerated from the contempt proceedings or not. In this regard, the High Court observed in paras 52 and 55 respectively as under: "52. The accused no. 3. 1 to 3. 4 not having taken any steps as expected of a reasonable prudent person to cancel the power of attorney given to 4th respondent at the fi rst available opportunity but on the other hand having sold the property even after notice of contempt being served upon them, we are of the considered view that remorse expressed or unconditional apology tendered by them cannot be accepted as genuine and/or bona fi de. On the other hand, the conduct of accused and particularly accused no. 3. 1 to 3.

4 not even cancelling sale deeds would be suffi cient to arrive at a conclusion that contrition or remorse expressed by them is not bona fi de and has been made to stave off the contempt proceedings by making a show of apology having been tendered and trying to take umbrage by contending that accused no. 1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S. C. R. 3. 1 and 3. 2 are housewives cannot be allowed to take umbrage or use the protective umbrella, and extending them of such benevolence would result in pure stream of administration of justice being polluted by such persons by feigning ignorance and as such we are of the considered view that they should be dealt with iron hands. ××× ××× ××× 55. Applying the aforestated principle to the facts on hand as noticed by us earlier in hereinabove, that accused No. 3. 1 to 3.

4 are attempting to improve their case step by step and stage by stage and tendering apology without any real contrition and same not being from the heart but off ered as a lip sympathy to stave off the consequences that would fl ow from their contemptuous act, the affi davit of apology has been fi led. Had there been real remorse, they would have on notice of contempt being served, forthwith cancelled the power of attorney executed in favour of accused no. 4. However, they have not chosen to do so. On the other hand, they have allowed him to continue to perform duties as their agent and derived benefi ts out of it, which discloses there is no real contrition expressed by them which would satisfy the Courts' conscious.. (Emphasis supplied) 21. The High Court thereafter, proceeded to consider whether the contempt proceedings were time barred.

The High Court looked into Section 20 of the Act 1971 and took the view that the cause of action was recurring in nature and the wrong had continued. The proceedings initiated were not barred under Section 20 of the Act 1971. 22. In the last, the High Court recorded what had happened on the date when the contemnors remained present in the court to answer the charge framed against them. The High Court observed in para 61 as under: "As such, this Court by order dated 18. 12. 2018 directed the contemnors to be present personally and to answer as to why charge should not be framed against them. In reply to the same, an affi davit has been fi led by the contemnors on 24. 12. 2018 admitting thereunder the disobedience and breach of the undertaking given to the Court. In the words of fourth respondent, the admission reads to the following eff ect: BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI v. HIRALAL 1083 SOMABHAI CONTRACTOR (DECEASED) REP. BY LRS. & ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J. ] "2.

I sincerely regret that the execution of the sale deeds was in breach of the statement made by learned counsel on my behalf. I hereby sincerely tender unconditional apology with clear understanding that there is breach of the statement. I submit that there is no scope for justifi cation of the action of execution of sale deeds which I undertook under the pressure built up by the agreement-holders. I request Your Lordships to accept my apology if deem fi t and proper. ". (Emphasis supplied) 23. The High Court ultimately held the appellants guilty of contempt for their deliberate and wilful disobedience of the undertaking and punished them accordingly. 24. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellants are herein before this Court with the present appeals. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5041 OF 2022 25. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, the learned Senior Counsel appeared for the appellants of Civil Appeal No. 5041 of 2022. Mr.

Rohatgi submitted the following: (a) The appellant Nos. 1 and 2 respectively had no idea or proper knowledge as to what was transpiring in the proceedings before the Revenue Authorities or the High Court for the reason that the appellants had appointed Balwantbhai Somabhai Bhandari (appellant of the connected appeal) as their power of attorney holder. The power of attorney holder looked after the litigation relating to the subject land and the appellants were not involved in any manner in the day to day activities. The sale deeds were not signed by the appellants as they were executed by the power of attorney holder. (b) The High Court materially erred in holding that the appellants had admitted in their affi davits that they were fully conversant and aware of the undertaking given before the High Court. This is a glaring factual error in as much as the perusal of all the three affi davits dated 07. 10. 2018, 28. 10. 2018 and 24. 12. 2018 1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S. C. R.

respectively fi led by the appellants state to the contrary that they were not aware of the order dated 14. 10. 2015. (c) The High Court should have accepted the unconditional and bona fi de apology made at the fi rst instance. The High Court went wrong in saying that the apology was tendered at a belated stage. (d) Section 12 of the Act 1971 stipulates the punishment for contempt of Court. The proviso to the said section states that 'accused may be discharged or punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the court'. Furthermore, the Explanation to the said proviso states that "an apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualifi ed or conditional if the accused makes it bona fi de. " (e) The High Court committed a serious error in not accepting the explanation off ered by the appellants that the sale deeds had already been completed prior to the order dated 14. 10. 2015 and only formal registration of the sale deeds was left.

(f) The High Court committed error in recording that the properties were sold even after the notice of contempt was issued to the appellants. 26. In support of aforesaid submissions, the learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the following case law: (i) Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang and Another, (2006) 11 SCC 114; (ii) Anil K. Surana and Another v. State Bank of Hyderabad, (2007) 10 SCC 257; (iii) Bharat Steel Tubes Limited v. IFCI Limited, (2010) 14 SCC 77; and (iv) Abhishek Kumar Singh v. G. Pattanaik and Others, (2021) 7 SCC 613. 27. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned Senior Counsel prayed that there being merit in his appeal, the same be allowed and the impugned judgment and order of the High Court be set aside. BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI v. HIRALAL 1085 SOMABHAI CONTRACTOR (DECEASED) REP. BY LRS. & ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J. ] 28. Mr. Mihir Joshi, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in the Civil Appeal No.

5041 of 2022 made the following submissions: (a) The High Court has erred in not accepting the apology tendered by the appellants on the ground that it was not tendered at the fi rst instance. Notice in Form-I was issued on 23. 04. 2018. After issuance of notice, the very fi rst affi davit of the appellant dated 24. 08. 2018 contains an unconditional apology. A further affi davit dated 24. 12. 2018 also off ers unconditional apology. The apology being genuine as is evident from the facts of the case and tendered at the fi rst instance ought to have been accepted by the Court. The High Court rendered a factually incorrect fi nding in para 49 (iv) that there was no unconditional apology tendered at the fi rst instance so as to construe the acts of the accused as not being deliberate or wilful. The High Court erred in holding in para 38 of its impugned order that the fi rst affi davit dated 28. 08. 2018 did not contain an unconditional apology, which is factually incorrect.

The said affi davit dated 28. 08. 2018 tendered an unconditional apology. (b) In fact, the contempt proceedings were not maintainable at all since the statement recorded on behalf of the appellant in the order dated 14. 10. 2015 is neither an order of the Court nor an undertaking given to the Court and therefore, there could be no breach thereof, amounting to civil contempt as contemplated under section 2(b) of the Act 1971. It is self-evident that the statement is an assurance to the other party and not an undertaking to the court. Breach of such statement may invite an action for restitution by the opposite party which would have to be adjudicated in duly constituted proceedings, but it would not invite proceedings for contempt since it is neither an order of the court nor an undertaking to the court.

This distinction is well known and accepted by Courts and the contempt application ought to have been dismissed as not maintainable only on this ground 1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S. C. R. (c) The High Court clearly erred in holding that breach of the statement recorded in the order dated 14. 10. 2015 (assuming the same is considered as an undertaking contemplated under Section 2(b) of the Act 1971) was a wilful and deliberate breach, overlooking the following facts: (i) The Court has erred in disbelieving the explanation tendered by the Appellants regarding the necessity of the sales since the subject transfers had been concluded with full payment of consideration and handing over of possession vide the possession receipts much prior to 14. 10. 2015 and therefore, the transfers were not covered by the statement recorded on 14. 10. 2015.

The High Court should have looked into the documents such as possession receipts, payment receipts and extracts of bank ledger statements, in respect of the subject sales produced before the High Court. The High Court erred in holding that no material had been placed to establish or demonstrate that the property had in fact been sold in the year 2012 itself. The High Court erred in holding in para 35that an imaginary plea had been made by way of a defence that cash transaction took place for sale in the year 2012 wherein no date is mentioned. (ii) The High Court erred in holding that the documents as above were purportedly concocted and that only the income tax returns could be the best evidence. (iii) The High Court overlooked the fact that the impugned sale transactions were only of 1521 sq. mtrs. of survey no. 63 admeasuring 33,790 sq. mtrs. and that the survey no. 65 admeasuring 31,095 sq. mtrs.

was unsold and vacant which clearly refl ected adherence to the statement as understood by the Appellants and supported the explanation of the Appellants that the subject sales of small plots of 118 sq. mtrs. each had to be formally concluded since the actual transfers had taken place many years prior to 14. 10. 2015 and the allottees were being seriously prejudiced in development of the plots and such transfers were never BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI v. HIRALAL 1087 SOMABHAI CONTRACTOR (DECEASED) REP. BY LRS. & ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J. ] intended to be covered under the statement of 14. 10. 2015 which would operate only for future transfers. (iv) The High Court erred in overlooking that the standard of proof required in a contempt proceeding, being a quasi- criminal proceeding, is that of a criminal proceeding and the breach has to be established beyond reasonable doubt.

The facts of the present case do not establish beyond reasonable doubt that there was a wilful breach or disobedience of an order of the court, or statement or undertaking given to the court. The power of contempt should be exercised cautiously and only after the required standard of proof is met. (v) The High Court erred in proceeding on the basis that the Appellants continued to commit contempt and in that regard relying on the transactions stated at Serial Nos. 12 and 13 respectively of the table at para 26 of the impugned judgement. The said transaction at Serial No. 12 purportedly of 30. 10. 2018, of a shop, is not a part of the subject lands S. No. 63 and 65 with regard to which order dated 14. 10. 2015 was passed; and the transaction at Serial No. 13 is of 25. 7. 2017, hence it is not of a date after the fi ling of the contempt petition (fi led on 12. 01. 2018).

(d) The High Court has erred in overlooking the context and background facts in which the statement was made and what was meant and covered in the statement in light of the same. (e) The Court has overlooked the requirement of section 13 of the Act 1971 since the conduct of the Appellant has not obstructed the cause of justice in any manner whatsoever. As held by this Court in Murray & Co. v. Ashok Kr. Newatia & Another, (2000) 2 SCC367 (paras 19 to 22), the language of Section 13 makes it clear that it is not enough there should be some technical contempt of court, but it must be shown that the act of contempt would otherwise substantially interfere with the due course of justice which has been equated with "due administration of justice". 1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S. C. R.

(f) The High Court erred in imposing a sentence of imprisonment for civil contempt without assigning any reasons as to why such an exception had to be made more particularly overlooking the following: (i) A close scrutiny of Section 12(3) indicates that the legislature intended that in case of civil contempt a sentence of fi ne alone should be imposed except where the Court considers that the ends of justice make it necessary to pass a sentence of imprisonment also. Before passing an extreme sentence, the Court ought to assign special reasons after proper application of mind. There is absolutely no justifi cation or reason set out in the judgment supporting a bare conclusion that imprisonment is justifi ed in the case. (ii) The High Court erred in overlooking the bona fi des of the Appellants which would have established that there was no wilful breach of the statement recorded in the order dated 14. 10. 2015 and in any case, would certainly not justify imprisonment.

In particular, the Court has overlooked that the appellant tendered his unconditional apology at the fi rst instance on 24. 08. 2018; explained the transaction with necessary documents immediately thereafter on 07. 10. 2018 without detracting from the apology; proposed remedial measures of keeping an equivalent area of land open and vacant till the fi ling of the petition by way of affi davit dated 04. 01. 2019; that additional land was off ered over and above the one proposed in the earlier affi davit vide affi davit dated 09. 01. 2019 and that the Appellants had personally remained present before the court at all hearings of the contempt application without seeking any exemption despite one of the contemnors being diagnosed and treated for advanced stage of cancer. (iii) The conduct of the Appellants subsequent to the impugned judgment also shows their due deference to the orders of the court. Each accused has deposited costs and fi ne with BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI v.

HIRALAL 1089 SOMABHAI CONTRACTOR (DECEASED) REP. BY LRS. & ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J. ] the registry of the High Court. In compliance with the direction nos. (ii) and (iii) contained in para 63 directing the accused to restore the position prevailing prior to the statement recorded in the order dated 14. 10. 2015, the appellants have also returned the consideration amount and requested the purchasers for compliance with the judgment. (g) The High Court ought to have considered the fact that the Appellants had off ered to purge the alleged contempt, by off ering alternative land. In the affi davit dated 04. 01. 2009, the Appellants had off ered to deposit the sale consideration and also that since the sale is only of 1430. 81 sq. meters of Survey No. 63, the Appellant is willing to keep aside other lands in his possession, for the benefi t of the Complainants. A further affi davit was fi led on 09. 01.

2019, wherein the Appellants had off ered valuable lands, at Khatodara, with an assurance not to transfer or alienate such lands till the writ petition is decided. It is well settled that a sale pendente lite or even in alleged breach of an injunction order is not per se void, and the Court has a liberty to balance the equities in a case. The order of the High Court is harsh. The plot owners are bona fi de purchasers of the plots for consideration without notice. The sale in favour of the plot owners have been set aside without any notice to them or hearing them. The High Court could have balanced the equities rather than setting aside the sale deeds already executed bona fi de by the Appellant. This Court in T. Ravi and Another v. B.

Chinna Narasimha and Others reported in (2017) 7 SCC 342, has held that the transfer of the suit property pendente lite is not void ab initio and the purchaser of any such property take the bargain, subject to the rights of the Plaintiff in the pending suit. The Court further held that the same principle would apply to a case involving a breach of an injunction issued by a competent court, and such breach would not render the transfer by way of an absolute sale void or ineff ective. 1090 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S. C. R. 29. In support of the aforesaid submissions, the learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the following case law: (i) Sevakram Prabhudas v. H. S. Patel and Others, 2000 (1) vol. 41 GLR 715; (ii) Mrityunjoy Das and Another v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman and Others, (2001) 3 SCC 739; and (iii) Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India and Another, (1998) 4 SCC 409. 30.

In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed that there being merit in his appeal, the same be allowed and the impugned judgment and order be set aside. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 31. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents herein vehemently submitted that no error not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the High Court in passing the impugned judgment and order.. 32. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents made the following submissions: (a) The assurance given by the learned senior advocate to the court as recorded in order dated 14. 10. 2015 by the High Court is a clear undertaking as per Sections 12 and 13 respectively of the Act 1971. It should be seen as a clear-cut undertaking given to the court and it is supposed to be binding to the parties concerned. Had this undertaking not been given the respondents herein who were the appellants in LPA (Stamp) No.

1196 of 2015 would not have withdrawn the appeal as not pressed. Also, the appellants of LPA/respondents herein did not invite any further order in SCA No. 16266 of 2013 due to the said undertaking. (b) The undertaking given by Sr. Adv. "That the property qua the subject matter of this entry and the petition shall not be sold out till the main petition is heard and decided" clearly falls within section 2(b) of Act 1971. The undertaking given by learned counsel is completely binding on the appellants. BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI v. HIRALAL 1091 SOMABHAI CONTRACTOR (DECEASED) REP. BY LRS. & ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J. ] (c) Despite such clear undertaking, the appellants sold the plots between 2015 and 2018. If the appellants wanted to sell the plots under certain compelling circumstances, they could have approached the High Court for modifi cation or variation of the order which they did not deem fi t to do.

Further, as a clear continuing act of contempt, even after the execution of the sale deeds the appellants failed to bring the said aspect to the notice of the High court. (d) The appellants continued to commit contempt even during the pendency of contempt proceedings. They sold the shop bearing no. 7 on 30. 10. 2018 i. e. , 9 months after the notice of contempt was issued. They also sold the land bearing Survey No. 65 on 09. 09. 2021 with the consideration amount of Rs. 51,93,00,000/- which is also on record of the contempt proceedings of the High Court. (e) The appellants have not produced any authenticated documents in support of their case of having put the buyers in possession in the year of 2012 (income tax return, bank statement etc. ). The cash receipt which they have produced is issued by S. K. Industries Service Society and not by the present appellants and also all of those documents are unauthenticated, forged and fabricated.

The High Court has duly taken notice of this fact in its impugned order (para 35 at page 38). As per law, the sale is deemed to have been completed on the date when the sale deed is registered, which in the instant case are admittedly after the undertaking given by Sr. Advocate in the SCA No. 16266 of 2013 as recorded in the order dated 14. 10. 2015 of the High Court. (f) The apology given by the appellants is a farce. Apology from the appellants did not come at the fi rst instance. If they were really sorry, they should have cancelled the sale deeds executed during the pendency of the contempt proceedings, which they have not done. It is only in the present proceedings that they have tried to show that they attempted to cancel the sale deeds by way of sending letters to the plot holders. Thus, they have tried to show that they made an eff ort to comply with the order of the High 1092 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S. C. R.

court, but no proof has been produced as to when and in what manner the notices were sent or executed i. e. , by way of post or email or courier etc. Such dubious conduct of the appellants goes to show that despite committing contempt and having shown no remorse, they are still trying to misguide this Court by producing such documents which from their very bare reading appear to be false, unreliable and fabricated. (g) In the course of the hearing of the appeals, Mr. Joshi, the learned senior counsel had suggested an alternate remedy of keeping aside the land of Survey No. 65, but in reality, the appellants have sold that very land also during the pendency of contempt proceedings in the year 2021. Thus, the contemnors have tried to misguide this court by making such false statements. 33. In support of his aforesaid submissions, the learned Senior Counsel relied on the decision of this Court in the case of T. Ravi (supra). 34.

In such circumstances referred to above, it was prayed on behalf of the respondents that there being no merit in both the statutory appeals those may be dismissed. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4869 OF 2023 35. The appellants are the purchasers of the plots from the contemnors. Mr. Shyam Divan, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the purchasers submitted that the High Court committed a serious error in declaring the sale deeds executed by the contemnors in favour of his clients as non est or void. According to Mr. Divan, assuming for the moment that the transfer was in wilful disobedience of the undertaking given by the contemnors, such transfers are not void transfers. In other words, the transfer of suit property pendente lite is not void ab initio. He would argue that his clients are bona fi de purchasers of the property for value without notice.

In such circumstances, the High Court ought to have balanced the equities more particularly when the contemnors had off ered other alternative lands to protect the interests of the complainants. 36. It was argued that the High Court should have insisted for the presence of the purchasers in the contempt proceedings. Without giving any BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI v. HIRALAL 1093 SOMABHAI CONTRACTOR (DECEASED) REP. BY LRS. & ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J. ] opportunity of hearing to the purchasers, the High Court ought not to have declared the sale transactions as void. It was also argued that the appellants have further transferred the properties and that would make them vulnerable to further civil and criminal proceedings by such subsequent purchasers. 37. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Divan, the learned Senior Counsel prayed that this Court may tilt the equities and protect the bona fi de purchasers of the property for value without notice. 38.

The aforesaid submission canvassed by Mr. Shyam Divan, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents suggests that the appellants (purchasers) have further transferred the properties and as on date they have no further interest in the subject properties. ANALYSIS 39. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed any error in passing the impugned judgment and order? PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE EXERCISE OF CONTEMPT JURISDICTION 40. The object of the discipline enforced by the court in case of contempt of court is not to vindicate the dignity of the court or the person of the Judge, but to prevent undue interference with the administration of justice. 41. Any interference with the course of justice is an aff ront to the majesty of law and the conduct of interference is punishable as contempt of court.

Public interest demands that there should be no interference with the judicial process, and the eff ect of the judicial decision should not be pre-empted or circumvented. (Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Proprietors of Indian Express Newspapers Bombay Pvt. Ltd. and Others reported in(1988) 4 SCC 592). 42. If a party, who is fully in the know of the judgment/order of the Court, is conscious and aware of the consequences and implications of the order of the Court, acts in violation thereof, it must be held that disobedience is wilful. To establish contempt of court, it is suffi cient to prove that the 1094 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S. C. R. conduct was wilful, and that the contemnor knew of all the facts which made it a breach of the undertaking. 43.

The following conditions must be satisfi ed before a person can be held to have committed civil contempt: (i) there must be a judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court; (ii) there must be disobedience to such judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court; and (iii) such disobedience of the judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court must be wilful. [Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai and Another v. Patel Chandrakant Dhulabhai and Others, reported in (2008) 14 SCC 561] 44. It behoves the court to act with as great circumspection as possible, making all allowances for errors of judgment. It is only when a clear case of contumacious conduct, not explainable otherwise, arises that the contemnor must be punished. Punishment under the law of contempt is called for when the lapse is deliberate and in disregard of one's duty and in defi ance of authority.

Contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, and the standard of proof is the same as in other criminal cases. The alleged contemnor is entitled to the protection of all safeguards/rights, including benefi t of doubt. [Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi reported in (2012) 4 SCC 307]. 45. The sanctity to judicial proceedings is paramount to a society governed by law. Otherwise, the very edifi ce of democracy breaks and anarchy reigns. The Act 1971 is intended to correct a person deviating from the norm and trying to breach the law/assuming law on to himself. It intends to secure confi dence of the people in the administration of justice by disciplining those erring in disobeying the orders of the Court/undertaking given to court. 46. This Court in a plethora of cases has explained the true purport of exercise of powers under the 1971 Act. In Mrityunjoy Das (supra), it held that: "13.

Before however, proceeding with the matter any further, be it noted that exercise of powers under the Contempt of Courts Act shall have to be rather cautious and use of it rather sparingly after addressing itself to the true eff ect of the contemptuous conduct. The court must otherwise BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI v. HIRALAL 1095 SOMABHAI CONTRACTOR (DECEASED) REP. BY LRS. & ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J. ] come to a conclusion that the conduct complained of tantamounts to obstruction of justice which if allowed, would even permeate in our society (vide Murray & Co. v. Ashok Kr. Newatia [(2000) 2 SCC 367 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 473] ). This is a special jurisdiction conferred on to the law courts to punish an off ender for his contemptuous conduct or obstruction to the majesty of law. It is in this context that the observations of this Court in Murray case [(2000) 2 SCC 367 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 473] in which one of us (Banerjee, J. ) was party needs to be noticed: (SCC p.

373, para 9) "The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts of law since the image of such a majesty in the minds of the people cannot be led to be distorted. The respect and authority commanded by courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the entire democratic fabric of the society will crumble down if the respect for the judiciary is undermined. It is true that the judiciary will be judged by the people for what the judiciary does, but in the event of any indulgence which can even remotely be termed to aff ect the majesty of law, the society is bound to lose confi dence and faith in the judiciary and the law courts thus would forfeit the trust and confi dence of the people in general. "" 47. The Constitutional Bench of this Court in the case of Supreme Court Bar Association (supra), while discussing the ambit of powers under the Act 1971 and the principles to be followed while punishing a party held as under: "28.

An analysis of the above provision shows that sub-section (1) of Section 12 provides that in a case of established contempt, the contemner may be punished: (a) with simple imprisonment by detention in a civil prison; or (b) with fi ne; or (c) with both. A careful reading of sub-section (2) of Section 12 reveals that the Act places an embargo on the court not to impose a sentence in excess 1096 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S. C. R. of the sentence prescribed under sub-section (1). A close scrutiny of sub-section (3) of Section 12 demonstrates that the legislature intended that in the case of civil contempt a sentence of fi ne alone should be imposed except where the court considers that the ends of justice make it necessary to pass a sentence of imprisonment also. Dealing with imposition of punishment under Section 12(3) of the Act, in the case of Pushpaben v. Narandas V. Badiani [(1979) 2 SCC 394 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 511] this Court opined: (SCC p. 396, para 6) "6.

A close and careful interpretation of the extracted section leaves no room for doubt that the legislature intended that a sentence of fi ne alone should be imposed in normal circumstances. The statute, however, confers special power on the Court to pass a sentence of imprisonment if it thinks that ends of justice so require. Thus before a Court passes the extreme sentence of imprisonment, it must give special reasons after a proper application of its mind that a sentence of imprisonment alone is called for in a particular situation. Thus, the sentence of imprisonment is an exception while sentence of fi ne is the rule. " ××× ××× ××× 34. The object of punishment being both curative and corrective, these coercions are meant to assist an individual complainant to enforce his remedy and there is also an element of public policy for punishing civil contempt, since the administration of justice would be undermined if the order of any court of law is to be disregarded with impunity.

Under some circumstances, compliance of the order may be secured without resort to coercion, through the contempt power. For example, disobedience of an order to pay a sum of money may be eff ectively countered by attaching the earnings of the contemner. In the same manner, committing the person of the defaulter to prison for failure to comply with an order of specifi c performance of conveyance of property, may be met also by the court directing that the conveyance be completed by an appointed person. Disobedience of an undertaking may in the like manner be enforced through process other than committal to prison as for example where the breach of undertaking is to deliver possession of property in a landlord-tenant dispute. Apart BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI v. HIRALAL 1097 SOMABHAI CONTRACTOR (DECEASED) REP. BY LRS. & ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.

] from punishing the contemner, the court to maintain the majesty of law may direct the police force to be utilised for recovery of possession and burden the contemner with costs, exemplary or otherwise. ××× ××× ××× 36. In deciding whether a contempt is serious enough to merit imprisonment, the court will take into account the likelihood of interference with the administration of justice and the culpability of the off ender. The intention with which the act complained of is done is a material factor in determining what punishment, in a given case, would be appropriate. ××× ××× ××× 42. The contempt of court is a special jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly and with caution whenever an act adversely aff ects the administration of justice or which tends to impede its course or tends to shake public confi dence in the judicial institutions. This jurisdiction may also be exercised when the act complained of adversely aff ects the majesty of law or dignity of the courts.

The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts of law. It is an unusual type of jurisdiction combining "the jury, the judge and the hangman" and it is so because the court is not adjudicating upon any claim between litigating parties. This jurisdiction is not exercised to protect the dignity of an individual judge but to protect the administration of justice from being maligned. In the general interest of the community it is imperative that the authority of courts should not be imperilled and there should be no unjustifi able interference in the administration of justice. It is a matter between the court and the contemner and third parties cannot intervene. It is exercised in a summary manner in aid of the administration of justice, the majesty of law and the dignity of the courts. No such act can be permitted which may have the tendency to shake the public confi dence in the fairness and impartiality of the administration of justice..

(Emphasis supplied) 48. To hold a person guilty of civil contempt, "wilful disobedience" is an indispensable requirement. Whether the conduct of contemnor is 1098 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S. C. R. deliberate and wilful can be considered by assessing the material on record and attendant circumstances. PIVOTAL ISSUES 49. We would like to address ourselves broadly on four questions: (i) Whether the wilful breach of an assurance in the form of an undertaking given by a counsel/ advocate on behalf of his client to the court would amount to "civil contempt" as defi ned under Section 2(b) of the Act 1971? (ii) There exists a distinction between an undertaking given to a party to the lis and the undertaking given to a court. The undertaking given to a court attracts the provisions of the Act 1971 whereas an undertaking given to a party to the lis by way of an agreement of settlement or otherwise would not attract the provisions of the said Act.

Whether in the present case an undertaking could be said to have been given to the court? (iii) Whether the contempt court has the power to declare any contemptuous transaction non est or void? In other words, although the transfer of the suit property pendente lite is not void ab initio yet when the court is looking into such transfers in contempt proceedings, whether the court can declare such transactions to be void in order to maintain the majesty of law? (iv) Whether the benefi ciaries of a contemptuous transaction have a right to be heard in the contempt proceedings on the ground that they are necessary or proper parties as they are bona fi de purchasers of the suit property for value without notice? (v) Whether the apology tendered by the contemnors deserves to be accepted or is it a legal trick to wriggle out of responsibility? WHAT IS WILFUL DISOBEDIENCE? 50.

In order to decide whether the appellants are guilty of civil contempt, we would like to refer to Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which reads as under:-- BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI v. HIRALAL 1099 SOMABHAI CONTRACTOR (DECEASED) REP. BY LRS. & ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J. ] "2. Defi nitions. --In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-- ××× ××× ××× (b) "civil contempt" means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court;" 51. The Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, at page 1599, defi nes "willful" as hereunder: "Proceeding from a conscious motion of the will; voluntary; knowingly; deliberate. Intending the result which actually comes to pass; designed; intentional; purposeful; not accidental or involuntary.

Premeditated; malicious; done with evil intent, or with a bad motive or purpose, or with indiff erence to the natural consequences; unlawful; without legal justifi cation. An act or omission is "willfully" done, if done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specifi c intent to do something the law forbids, or with the specifi c intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law. It is a word of many meanings, with its construction often infl uenced by its context. In civil actions, the word (willfully) often denotes an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. But when used in a criminal context it generally means an act done with a bad purpose; without justifi able excuse; stubbornly, obstinately, perversely. " 52. This Court in Niaz Mohammad and Othersv.

State of Haryana and Others reported in (1994) 6 SCC 332, explaining the expression "wilful disobedience" had held:-- "9. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') defi nes "civil contempt" to mean "wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court ... ". Where the contempt consists in failure to comply with or carry out an order of a court made in favour of a party, it is a civil contempt. The person or persons in whose favour such order or direction has S. C. R. for contempt against the alleged contemner, with a view to enforce the right fl owing from the order or direction in question. But such a proceeding is not like an execution proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure. The party in whose favour an order has been passed, is entitled to the benefi t of such order.

The court while considering the issue as to whether the alleged contemner should be punished for not having complied with and carried out the direction of the court, has to take into consideration all facts and circumstances of a particular case. That is why the framers of the Act while defi ning civil contempt, have said that it must be wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court. Before a contemner is punished for non-compliance of the direction of a court, the court must not only be satisfi ed about the disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction or writ but should also be satisfi ed that such disobedience was wilful and intentional. The civil court while executing a decree against the judgment-debtor is not concerned and bothered whether the disobedience to any judgment, or decree, was wilful. Once a decree has been passed it is the duty of the court to execute the decree whatever may be consequence thereof.

But while examining the grievance of the person who has invoked the jurisdiction of the court to initiate the proceeding for contempt for disobedience of its order, before any such contemner is held guilty and punished, the court has to record a fi nding that such disobedience was wilful and intentional. If from the circumstances of a particular case, brought to the notice of the court, the court is satisfi ed that although there has been a disobedience but such disobedience is the result of some compelling circumstances under which it was not possible for the contemner to comply with the order, the court may not punish the alleged contemner. ". (Emphasis supplied) 53. In Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v.

Dharam Godha and Others reported in (2003) 11 SCC 1, the expression 'wilful disobedience' in the context of Section 2(b) of the Act was read to mean an act or omission done voluntarily and intentionally with the specifi c intent to do something, which the law forbids or with the specifi c intention to fail to do something which the law requires to be done. Wilfulness signifi es deliberate action BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI v. HIRALAL 1101 SOMABHAI CONTRACTOR (DECEASED) REP. BY LRS. & ORS. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J. ] done with evil intent and bad motive and purpose. It should not be an act, which requires and is dependent upon, either wholly or partly, any act or omission by a third party for compliance. 54. In Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj and Others reported in (2014) 16 SCC 204, it was observed as under:-- "12. Thus, in order to punish a contemnor, it has to be established that disobedience of the order is "wilful".

The word "wilful" introduces a mental element and hence, requires looking into the mind of a person/contemnor by gauging his actions, which is an indication of one's state of mind. "Wilful" means knowingly intentional, conscious, calculated and deliberate with full knowledge of consequences fl owing therefrom. It excludes casual, accidental, bona fi de or unintentional acts or genuine inability. Wilful act does not encompass involuntarily or negligent actions. The act has to be done with a "bad purpose or without justifi able excuse or stubbornly, obstinately or perversely". Wilful act is to be distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It does not include any act done negligently or involuntarily. The deliberate conduct of a person means that he knows what he is doing and intends to do the same. Therefore, there has to be a calculated action with evil motive on his part.

Even if there is a disobedience of an order, but such disobedience is the result of some compelling circumstances under which it was not possible for the contemnor to comply with the order, the contemnor cannot be punished. "Committal or sequestration will not be ordered unless contempt involves a degree of default or misconduct. " (Vide S. Sundaram Pillai v. V. R. Pattabiraman [S. Sundaram Pillai v. V. R. Pattabiraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591], Rakapalli Raja Ram Gopala Rao v. Naragani Govinda Sehararao [Rakapalli Raja Ram Gopala Rao v. Naragani Govinda Sehararao, (1989) 4 SCC 255 : AIR 1989 SC 2185], Niaz Mohamm