BANARSI DASS CHADHA & BROS. v. LT. GOVERNOR, DELHI ADMN. & ORS.
Citation: [1979] 1 S.C.R. 271; 1978 INSC 140
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: V.R. KRISHNA IYER , D.A. DESAI, O. CHINNAPPA REDDY
Judgment date:
Case summary
1978 INSC 140. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1978-08-21. BANARSI DASS CHADHA & BROS. v. LT. GOVERNOR, DELHI ADMN. & ORS. Read the judgment and case...
Judgment text
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS Z71 BANARSI DASS CHADHA & BROS. • v. LT. GOVERNOR, DELHI ADMN. & ORS. August 21, 1978 ll [V. R. KIUSHNA IYER, D. A. DESAI AND 0. CllINNAPPA REDDY, JJ. J Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, S. 3(e)- Brick-earth. whether a minor mineral, within the meaninR of that expression 'Minor Mineral', as defined ins. 3(e). S. 3(e) of the Mines and Mineral (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 defiues "'Minor Mineral' as meaning building stones, gravel, ordinary . , clay, ordinary sand other than sand used for prescribed purposes, and any other mineral which the Central Government may, by Notification in the offi· cial Gazette declare to be a minor mineral". In exercise of the power conferred by s. 3 (e) of the Act the Central Government declared inter-alia brick· earth as a 'minor mineral'. Dismissing the appeal by special leave the Court ( HEID : (! ) The word 'mineral' has no fixed but a contextual connotation.
If 'mineral' is not a term of art it is a word of common parlance, capable of multiplicity of meanings depending upon the context. The word is occaaionally used in a very wide sense to denote any substance that is neither animal nor vegetable. Sometimes it is used in a narrow sense to mean no more than precious metals like gold and silver. Again the word 'minerals' is often used to indicate substances obtained from underneath the surface of the earth by digging or quarrying, though it is not always so. [273 A-C, 274 Fl In the context of the 'Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, the 1rord Mineral is of sufficient amplitude to include brick-earth. If the expression 'minor mineral' as defined in the Act, includes 'ordinary clay' and 'ordinary sand', there is no earthly rea. son why brick-earth sbOuld not be held to be 'any other mineral' which may be declared as a 'minor mineral'. [275 B-C] Rhagwu11 Dais v. State of U. P. , [1976] 3 SCR 869, applied. Laddu ·Mal v.
State of Bihar, AIR 1965 Pat. 491; Amar Modilaf Siugh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1972 Punjab ~n under-ground mines and open workings was expressly repudiated in Midland R. C. v. Haunchwood Brick & Tile Co. IL. R. 10 Ch. Div. 552) and in Hext v. Gill (L. R. 7 Ch. 699)". • The Supreme Court of United States also referred to several Englilih cases where stone for road making or paving was held to be 'minerals' as also granite, sandstone, flint stone, gravel. marble, fire clay, brick-clay, a"nd the like. It is clear that the word 'mineral' has no fixed but a contextual connotation. r (1) [1976] 3 S. C. R. 869. (2) 47 L. Ed. 575. The learned Counsel for the appellant invited our attention to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Todd Birleston and Co. v. The North Eastern Railway Co. (') and to Stoud's Judicial Dictionary to urge that clay, brick-earth and the like have sometimes been bold not to he minerals by English Courts.
As we said earlier the word mineral is an elastic word whose meaning depends upon the setting in which it is used. For instance, in the case cited, the question was whether clay forming the surface or subsoil, and constituting the "land" compulsorily taken for the purposes of a railway, was not a mineral within the meaning of Sections 77, 78 or 79 o1 the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act. The answer was that 'clay' was not a mineral for· the purposes of the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act. Any other conclusion, in the context of the Act, would have led to the absurd (1) [1903] I K. B. 60~. · IB. D. CHADHA v. LT. GOVERNOR DELIIl (Chinnappa Reddy, !. ) 275 result that the original owner whose land had been taken would be ·entitled to dig and take away the clay from the land on which the Railway was constructed, thus defe_ating the very object of the compul-sory taking.
On the other hand, as noticed by the Supreme Court of the United States, in several English cases clay, gravel, sand, stone etc. had been held to be minerals. That is why we say the word mineral , has no definite meaning but has a variety of meanings, depending on the context of its use. In the context of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act, we have no' doubt that the word 'mineral' is of sufficient amplitude to include 'brick-earth'. As already ·observed by us, if the expression 'minor mineral' as defined in the Act include' 'ordinary clay' and 'ordinary sand'. there is no earthly reason why 'brick-earth' should not be held to be 'any other mineral' which may he declared as 'minor mineral.. We do not think it necessary to pursue the matter further except to sa~ that this was lhe view taken in Laddu Mal v. State of Bihar,(I) Amar Singh Modilal v. State of 2 8 Haryana( ) and Sharma & Co. v. State of U. P. ( ).
We do not agree with the view of the Calcutta High Court in State of West Bengal v. ! agadamba Prasad(') that because speaks of 'ordinary e~h' as a mineral it is not a minor mineral as defined in the Mines and Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act. The appeal is accordingly dis-missed with costs. 'S. R. Appeal disn11:1sed. {I) A. l. R. 1965 Patna 491. {2) A. l. R. 1972 Punj. & Har. >56. (3) A. LR. 1975 All. 86. {4) A. l. R. 1969 Cal. 281.
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