BASELIUS MAR THOMA MATHEWS & ORS. v. PAULOSE MAR ATHANASIUS &. ORS (2)

Citation: [1980] 1 S.C.R. 250

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: V.R. KRISHNA IYER, P.N. SHINGAL

Case summary

We do not for a moment countenance the suggestion that the district judge is not equal to the legal instricacies or factual challenges of these or other cases, the procedural law having vested him with unlimited jurisdiction and the High Court having committed: these cases to...

Judgment text

BASELIUS MAR THOMA MATHEWS & ORS. v. PAULOSE MAR ATHANASIUS &. ORS. August 9, 1979 (V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND P. N. SHINGHAL, JJ. J Code of Civil Procedure-S. 24(1)(b)-High Court when can withdraw suits from a lon'er court and itself try them. A large number of suits filed by a religious community in the State were pending over the years in several courts. Considering the prolongation and plurality of cases and the deleterious social consequences resulting from such litigation the High Court and the State Government selected eight of the most significant suits and constituted an Additional District Court to try them. After the court had recorded evidence of numerous witnesses and before the commencement of arguments a petition under s. 24(1)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure was presented to the High Court for withdrawal of the suits ~o the file of the High Court. This was dismissed by the High Court.

On the qtiestion whether at this stage and in these circumstances the suibl should be called up to the High Court and disposed of Allowing the appeal, HELD: Advancement of public justice will be promoted by the High Court itself at this stage, proceeding to hear the suits. All the suits should be trans~ fcrred to the High Court and, tried from the present stage, since expeditious tern1ination is the driving force behind this order for transfer. [253H] \Vhat is more important in a case of this kind is shortening the longevity of these quasi-public litigations, reducing the enormous expenditure involved for both si The learned Judge considered the various grounds urged before him for withdrawal of the suits to the High Court and was unimpressed by them.

Merely because 'a considerable section of the public was tensely interested in these litigations the court was not prepared to withdraw them to the High Court, nor was the circumstace that important and intricate questions of law were involved sufficient for snch transfer in its view. A massive volume of oral evidence had been recorded by the specially appointed Judge and so the High Court felt that it would be "proper for the court that recorded the evidence to hear the arguments also". We are not inclined to fault the learned Judge in the view he has adopted. But there are many buts to any general proposition. Shri Tarkunde appearing for the respondents, stressed before us, as an additional consideration that if the cas~s were withdrawn to the High Court and tried, as was likely by a Division Bench of that court his clients might lose a statutory right of appeal and would have to depend upon the chancy jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.

A single appeal, as of right, would be taken away, was his apprehension. Shri N:u:-iman, appearing for the petitooners, having prudently though belatedly withdrawn the Special Leave Petition which made reference to bia8, focussed on the advantage both sides would derive · by an early determination of the litigation at the High Court level. He also submittcd that there was hardly any doubt that questions of law of considerable public importance were involved and an appeal to the Snpreme Court, as of right, both under Article 133 and Sec- +. tion 110 C. P. C. , was a certainty. He further emphasised that Sec- '"' tion 24(1) (b) would become 'ai dead letter if Shri Tarkunde's objection that an automatic right of appeal to the Supreme Court would • be imperilled in the event of the High Court withdrawing suits, were to be accepted. We agree with the learned Judge of the High Court that some ,of the grounds put forward for withdraw! of the suits to the High (Kr;shna Iyer, !.

) Court were without merit an~ were rightly rejected. But we are not inclined to exaggerate the improtance of the demeanour of witnesses observed by the trial judge, especially when years have lapsed, heaps of evidence have been recorded and judicial memory with hyper psychic sensitivity is more in the books than in the wear and tear o! life. What weighs with us is the importance of shortening the longevity of these quasi-public litigations, reducing the enormous expenditures involved for both sides and entrusting even the first determination, now that all evidence has been recorded, to the highest deck of Justice in the State. It is indubitable that after the decision by the District Court appeals will inevitably be carried to the High Court.

It is predictably reasonable to expect, from all that has been presented to us and all that we have been able to gather from the records, that the case involves questions of public moment and are likely to spiral up to the Snpreme Court on final appeal. In this jurisdiction, the approach has to be pragmatic, not theoretic, without whittling down the basics of Jaw bearing on transfer of cases. We do not for a moment countenance the suggestion that the district judge is not equal to the legal instricacies or factual challenges of these or other cases, the procedural law having vested him with unlimited jurisdiction and the High Court having committed: these cases to his seisin. Hints of bias are also out of bounds, as we have indicated. If these suits at this stage of early arguments which have yet to begun effectively, are transferred to the High Court a spell of few years in the stre,ssful life of the litigation will be saved.

Taking copies of a bunch of decrees by the District Court, followed by preliminaries and filing of appeals, service of notices and other ripening processes, may co11~3ume considerable time and money. And then the High Court would begin de novo the entire arguments and appreciation of the whole range of facts and law as in first appeal it is bound to do in a ca. se of this type. Where lakhs of peopl'e arc excitedly affected by the ultimate decision and the fate of a few hundred suits and a thousand churches is to be settled by a single adjudication, the elimination of some years and duplication of hearings and full arguments at the commanding height of the High Court is a wise measure, all things considered. The social • savings of abbreviation of laws' delays are important to social justice.

j We do not tarry to dilate on the many dimensions to this transfer petition except to state that we feel the advancement of public justice will be promoted by the High Court itself at this stage, pro- ceeding to hear the suits. We, therefore, direct that all the suits covered by the transfer petition be transferred to the High Court and tried from the present stage post-haste, since expeditious termination is the driving force behind this order for transfer. A last thought before we piirt with this case. When sacerdotal institutiorul are litigious fights double disaster threatens society because of the souls of the votaries not only suffer spiritual neglect but are maddened by the passions unleashed by forensic disputation.

We leave this lis with the deep wish that the High Court will give the suits high priority in its agenda of postings and finish this unhappy chapter, if persuasively possible, by both sides burying the hatchet, · abjuring litigative pugilistics and restoring a modus vivendi which will heal old wounds, bring new harmony and please the Spirit of Christ. That is the highest justice the several lakhs of good Christians, now Jocked in Jong years of suits and appeals, sincerely hunger for. We allow the appeal as indicated above. P. B. R. Appeal allowed.