BEGULLA BAPI RAJU ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH ETC. ETC

Citation: [1983] 3 S.C.R. 701

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: A.P. SEN, E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, R.B. MISRA

Case summary

Soon after, its constitutional validity was challenged before the Andhra Pradesh High Court on various grounds but a Full Bench of the High Court negatived the chatlenge and held the ,Act to be constitutionally valid on 11th of April, 1973....

Judgment text

BEGULLA BAPI RAJU ETC. ETC. •• STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH ETC. ETC. August 23, 1983 [A. P. SEN, E. S. VENKATARAMIAH AND R. B. MISRA JJ. J Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, Section 3(/), definition of family unit-Whether the term ''mi~or sons" would include a "separated minor son" long before the coming into force ofthe Act and whether the lands transferred by ·such separated minor sons to third parties by separate sale deeds would also for"! part. of a holding for the purposes ofSections 3(/), 3(o), 4, 5(3), 5(4), 7, Explanations I and II to Section 8 and /~Whether to answer in the affirmative and holding so would be· in violation of Articles 14 aiid 21 ofthe Constitution-Whether a new plea not taken before the High Court would be allowed to be taken for the first time in the Supreme Court and a petitioner be given liberty to produce a document in future.

The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) ACt, 1973 was enacted on January 1, 1973. Soon after, its constitutional validity was challenged before the Andhra Pradesh High Court on various grounds but a Full Bench of the said High Court negatived the same on 11th of April 1973. Therefcire, the Act was prought into force on January l, 1975 by virtue of a notification issued by the State Government. The three petitioners in SLP 6794/1978 filed separate declarations in accordance with Section 8 of the Act on the footing that the minor sons separated long before the enactment or enforcement of the Act did not constitute a "family unit" and their holdings cannot be tagged with the holding of the father and that land transferred to oμtsiders long before the enactment either under agreement to sale or under gift deed should not be included in the holding of the petitioners. The Land Reform.

s Tribunal, Kovvur rejected the said pleas and on September 27, 1976 declared that the 'family unit' was in possession of excess land over the ceiling limit. The appeal Preferred before the -Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal was allowed in part. The revision petition filed before the High Court was dismissed on . the 7th of July 1978 and hence the Special Leave petitions to appeal. , During the pendency of the revision petition in the High Court the Andhra Pradesh ~Hing on Agric;ultural Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1977 was enacted with retrospective effect from 1st January, 1975 which introduced Section 4A among other provisions. The constitution3. I validity of the Amendment) Act was challenged on the grounds, namely, the State Act is void and inoperative by reason of enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) A. ~t!

1976 \Central Act) and ~h;i~ the od go together and, therefore, deprivation E, of the minors of thi land is hit by Article 21 of the Constitution which contemplates not only a mere existence but living with dignity. Dismissing the petitions, the Court HELD : l. There is no infirmity in any of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land reforms (Ceiling on ·Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. All the·Contendons raised are rio longef res integra, since they are covered by earlier decisions of this Court. [718 F] / 2:1. From a reading of sections 3(£), 3(o), 4, 5(3), 5(4), 8 and 10, it will be clear that the ceiling area in case of an individual who is not a member of the family unit is equivalent to one standard holding. and so also in the case of a family unit with not more than five members the ceiling area is the same.

But if the family unit consistcc\ of more than' five members the ceiling area · would stand increased by one-fifth of one standard holding for every additional member of the family unit, subject, however, to the maximum limit of two standard holdings. In view of the explanation added to S. 4 the land held by all the members of the family unit shall be aggregated for the purpose of ~omputin$ the holding of the family unit Obviously, therefore, where a family B,B. RAJU V. ANDHRA PRADESH 703 unit consisted bf father, mother, and minor sons or daughters the land held by ~· 811 these persons would have· to be clubbed tOgether and then ceiling area limit applied to the aggregate holding. No distinction has been made in the definition of family unit between a divided millor son and an undivided minor son. Both stand on the same footing. and a divided minor son is as much a member of the family unit as an undivided minor son. Family unit is not to be confusod with )oint family. [710 A-D] 2:2.

The definition of family unit a:tongwith the eXplanatiOn does n. ot leave the slightest doubt that a separated minor son is as much a member Of the family unit as a joint son With his father. [713 BJ Kanuru Venkatakrishna Rao v. The Authorised Officer, Land Reforff1S~ Bandar & Ors, [1978] Andhra Law Journal Vol. U, p. 114, approved. Stateof Maharashtra v. Vyasendra, C. A. No. 4264/83 decided by S:C· on 3-5-1983, followed. _. 3:1. rn Order to attract the provisions or clause (iv) of section s of'.. the Act, the petitioners have to esta~lish that the Government by notification has declared a particular area to be a drought prone area. Here, the petitioners should have raised a contention to that effect before the High Court and should have produced the neceSsary notification but they did not do so. Even before this Court they have not been able to produce the specific notification issued by the Governrnent. Under the circumstances they cannot be allowed to urge this.

new point for want of necessary foundation. [713 F-H] 3:2: This Court cannot· give a blank cheque to the petitioners to prQduce the required notification as and when they like according to their sweet will. r 713 G] 4. The definition of family unit under sectiOn 3(f) ·or the Act, as interpreted by the High Court is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Further it is saved by the protective umbrella under Article 31A and 31B of the Constitution. [714 B·C] Seth Nand wl & Ors. v. State of Haryana & 'Ors. , (1980] 3 SCR 1181, followed. • 5. After taking into consideration the various relevant prov1s1ons of the Act, the Court in State ofAndhra Pradesh v. Mohd. Ashrafuddin AIR 1982 S. C. 913 correctly came to the conclusio~ that the same land can be the land of the tranferor as well as the transferee in view of the definition of the term 'holding' in section 3(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Act and the said view does not require reconsideration.. (717 A-B] 6. The.

contention that life includes livelihood within the meaning Or Article 21 of the Constitution was repelle-0 in In re : Sant Ram, [1960] 3 SCR 499 and A. V. Nachane v. Union ofIndia, [1982j I SCC. 206 and since Maneka SUPREME COURT. REPORTS [1983) 3 s. c. R. J, • • • Gandhi v. Union ofl1! dia did not take into consideration Sant Ram's case, these ~~~ thei:ef~r~, ~till-~~Id; i~e field. · ·B~sides, t. he petitioners hilve Qeen d"epriVed of.. ~h~ir h~J~,ing ip. th~ ~«? rm of surplus I. and but it was only for the purPose of giving. relief t. o th~ downtrodden and the pOor agricllltural labourers. ' -ThC surplus land would: v~st in the State ~nd the State'in itS tUrn would give it to the poor and the downtrodden and thus suCh a deprivat_ion will be protected undei- Articte 39 of the Directive Principles. [718 C-EJ · · · · · Maneka Gandhi. v. Union ofIndia, [1978] 2 SCR 621, disti_o~ished. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.

1671, 2631, 3322-23, 3904, 4418, 9796, 9127 of 1979, 6639-40, 6794, 5121-22 of 1978, 10403 of 1979, 3797 of 1980. • • - - , I ' ' From the Judgments and Orders dated the 6-7-77, 19. 12. 77, 20. 12. 71; 20-4'. -78, 28~2-78, ~7-79, 8-6-78, 1~1:18, 12-7-78, '9-8-79, 18-1-78 and 13-10-77 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision Petition Nos. 1991/76 & 403/77, 1612/77, 1268 & 1275/77, 4436}77, 2571/77, 7175/78, 7174/78, 70 & 1907/78, 564178, 1036 & ll261(s; 1686/79, 1. 387/77 and 2677 of 1977 •· - l - WITH "-, Writ Peti. tion No. 4789 of 1982 J ·e. AND Writ Petition No. 4703 of 1978 (Under article 32 of the Constitution of India) f FOR THE APPEARING PARTIES ' M. N. Phad"e, q. f. S,qs{')! an. d P. Rama Reddy. A. Subba Rao, B. Partha Sarathi, T. V. S. N. Chari, B. Kanta Rao, K. R.. CfJowdhari, A. V. v. Nair, Mrs.. Y. D, Kh_anna·and V. M.. Phadke. § The Judgment of the Court was delivered by . ·- ... ;· ~-· ' - ~ ' . ' ·~. MISRA J. This batch of special leave petitions and wr.

it petitions arising outof proceedings under the Ancihra Pradesh Land. Reforms ~ (Ceiling O! l Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to -. / as the' 'Andhra Prades~ Ad) js 'directed 'against the"judgments of ~··~ ·- - ' . the Hi~h Court of An . AJtl v. ANOHRA Pa'AOESH ~Misra, J. ) 709 (iii) in the case of an individual who is a di'Jofoed husband and who has no't. remarded, such inaivi- . dual and his minor sons and. unmarried minor . ,.. daughters, whether in his custody 'or not; an'd (iv) where an individual and his or her ·spouse are . both d~ad, their minor sons 'and unmarried minor daughters. Explanation :- Where a minor son is m~r"ried, · hjs wife and their off-spring, if any, shall al. so be deemed. to be memb'ers of the family unit of which the minor son is ' a ~ember. " c '· Section 3 (o) defines 'person' as. induding il! ler blia. an individual and a family unit.

Section JO is a key section which imposes ceiling on the holding of land by providing that if the extent of iJ:fo holding of a person is in excess of the ceiling area, the person ,shiill be liable to surrender the land held in excess. If, therefor¢, an individual or family unit holds land in excess of the ceiling area, the excess land would have to be surrendered to the State ·Gove'rnihent. The extent of the ceiling area has been provided by s. 4 (I) of the Andhra "Pradesh Act, which reads : lil "4(1) The ceiling area in the case of a family unit consisting of not more than five members shall be an extent of land equal to one standard holding. (2) the ceiling area in the case of a . family nnit consisting of more than five members shall be an ·extent'of F land equal to one standard holding plus an additional · extent of one-fifth of one standard holding for every siicn member in excess of. five, so however; that . the ceiling area shall not exceed two standard holdings.

(3) The ceiling area in the case of every individtia1 who is not a member of a family unit, and in the case of any other person shall be an extent of land equal to one standard holding. · . Explanation :- In the case of a family unit, the ceiling area. shall be applied to the aggregate of tlie lands held by all ihe members of the family unit. " It will· thus be clear that the ceiling area in case of an individual who is not a member of the family unit is· equivalent to one standard holding and so·also in the case· of a family unit with not more than five members the ceiling area is the same. But if the family unit consisted of more than five members the ceiling area , would stand increased by one-fifth of one standard holding for every additional member of the family unit, subject, however, to the 8 maximum limit of,two standard holdings; In view of the explanation added to s.

4 the land held by all the members of the family unit shall be aggregated for the purpose of computing the h~lding of the family unit. Obviously, therefore, where a family unit consisted of father, mo. ther, and minior sons or daughters the land held by all these persons would have to be' clubbed together aud then ceiling area limit applied to the aggreate holding. No distinction has been · made in the definition of a family unit between a divided minor son an undivided minor son. Both stand on the same footing and a divided minor son is as much a meml)er of the family unit as an undivided minor Son. Family unit· is not to be confused with joint family.. The contention of Shri Phadke is that the definition of various terms as given in s. 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Act opens with the words . "In this Act, unle~s the context otherwise requires. " According to the learned counsel the context 'otherwise requires' that the word 'minor' in s.

3 (f) cimnot include a divided minor son, Section 4 (2), argued the learned counsel, deals with the . ceiling area of a . family unit and s. 4 (3) deal~ with the ceiling·area of an individual who is not a member of a family unit. A divided minor son, submits the counsel,'is ail individual and is no longer a member of the family unit in as much a~ a partition has not only the effect of division ofthe property but a complete severance from membership of the joint family. Thus a minor who is separated under a partition deed cannot be a member of the family unit but becomes an individual. G- The counsel supported his argument by reference to els. (3) and (4) of s. 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Act. Clause (3) deals with the . ·"'\ holding of an individual who is not a member of a family unit b. nt is a member of joint family, and reads : · · "(3) In computing the holding of an individual who is not a member of a family Ullit, but. is a member of a ii. B. ! Wu v. ANo! iRl' PRADESH (Misra, J. ) ?

11 joint family, the share of such an individual in the lands held by the joint family shall be taken into account and aggregated with the lands, if any, held by him separately and for this purpose, such share shall be deemed to be the extent of land which would be allotted to such individual had there been a partition of the lands held by thejoint family. " Clause (4) deals with the member of· a family unit who is also a member. of a joint family, and reads : "(4) In computing the holding of the member of a family unit . who is also a member of a joint family, the share of such member in the lands held by the joint family . ·. shall be taken into account and aggregated with the lands, . if any, held by him separately and for this purpose, such share shall be deemed to be the. extent of land which would be allotted to such member, had there been a partition of the land held by the joint family.

" On the strength ef these clauses ·it is sought to be argued for the petitioners that joint family is recognisecj as a legal entity in the computation of holding. Reference was also made to s. 3 (f), cl. (iv) · which provides that where an individual and his or her spouse are both dead, their minor sons and unmarried daughters will be a constituent of 'family unit'. The contention of Shri Phadke is that in view of cl. (iv) of s. 3 (f) an orphan constitutes a family unit and is a· member thereof, and in the light of these provisions 1f one looks at s. 8, Explanation I regarding declaraiion of holding it will be clear that it speaks of "where the land is held or is deemed to be held by a minor not being a member of a family unit, the declaration shall be furnished by his· guardian". Explanation II deals with the land held by the family unit and the declaration on b,ehalf of the family unit is to be made by a person in the management of the property of such family ·unit.

Such a minor not being a member of the family unit, says the counsel, can only be a separated member of the joint family. Shri Ram Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent State relied on Kanuru V•nkatakrishna Rao v. The Authorised Officer, Land Reforms, Bandar & Ors. (') in support of his contention that a scpa- (I) [1978] A. L. J. Vol. II, p. 114. 112 sllPREME 'collRT iEJioRTS ! 1~8313 s. c. R. rated minor son is as much a member of the family unit . as a nonseparated minor son. The precise argument of the learned counsel in that case was that since no provision is made in the:Act to ·indicate the holding of a 'family unit', the other provisions of the Act cannot· have any application with regard to a family unit. The High Court held: "According to the definition of the term 'person' a family unit is also a person. All the provisions of the Act are intended by the Legislature to apply to the family unit , like the other categories of the term 'person' as per its definition.

Therefore, the legislature intended the family ' unit also to have a holding. for the purpose of applying provisions of the Act relating to determination of the ceiling limit and excess land, ·if any, ove. r it. It is. true the provision is not specific that such and such land consti· tutes the holding of a fa'mi! y unit. But from what was said in the explanation to section 4, it is clear what is meant by the Legislature to be the holding of a family unit. The implication is very clear that the holding of a family unit is the aggregate of all the lands lield by all the members of the family unit ..... By means of the Explanation itself the Legislature intended to make that provision. ,, . A similar question arose in a recent case before this Court in Civil Appeal No. 4264 of 1983: State of Maharashtra v.

Vyasendra decided on 3rd May, 1983 by a Division Bench on Section· 4 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 ' dealt with 'family unit' and the land held by it. Dealing with the question Hon'ble the Chief Justice speaking for the Court observed : "The circumstance that the land held by a constituent member of the family unit is separate property or stridhail property is·a matter of no consequence whatsoever for the purpose of determining the ceiling area which the family unit can retain. The respondent, his wife and their minor sons and ininor unmarried daughters, if any, are all constit~ent members of the family unit and all the lands held by them have to be pooled together for the purpose of determining the ·ceiling area which is permissible to the family unit. The nature or character of their interest in li. B. RAill v. ANf>HRA PRADESH'(Mlsra, J. ) 713 the land held by them is irrelevant for computing the ceiling area which the family unit may retain.

. In our opinion, therefore, the definition of family unit along with. the . explanation does not leave the slightest doubt that a separated mmor son i~ as much a me'mber of the family unit as a joint son with his father. 8 This leads us to the second group relating to drought-prone area. It may be pointed out at the very oqtset that no such plea had been taken before 'the High Court. The petitioners seek to get an advantage of 121 per cent 'on account of the land. lying in dr<iughtprone area in view of s. 5 (iv) of the Andhra Pradesh Act. Section 5 (iv) provides : "5 (iv) In the case of any dry land situated in any area declared by the Government by notification to be a drought prone area, the extent of standard holding shall · be increased,- (a) by twelve and a half per centum, in the· case of any dry land falling under Class G or Class H of the Table below ; (b) by twenty per centum, in the case of any dry land falling under Class I, Class J or Class K of the said Table.

" In order to attract the provisions of cl. (iv) of s. 5 the petitioners have to establish that the Government by notification has declared a particular area to be a drought prone-area. The petitioners. were given an opportunity to produce the notification which they have failed to do and now the p~titioners seek that they should be given . an opportunity to produce the specific notification as and when they are able to procure the same. We are not inclined to give such a blank cheque to the petitioners to produce the required notification as and when they like. Indeed they should have 'raised a contention to that effect before the High _(Court and should have produced the ·necessary notification but that they did not do. Even before this Court they have not been able to produce the specific notification issued by the Government. Under the circumstances they cannot be allowed to urge this point for want to necessary foundation for the 714 SUI'REMB COURT REPORTS iI983) 3s. c. a.

argument. We also decline to accede to their request that they may be allowed to produce the required Government notification according to their sweet will and as and when they are able to produce the same. We pow take up the third ground that the definition of family unit under s. 3 (f), as interpreted by the High Court is violative of 8 Art. 14 of the Constitution. This point is also covered by a decision 1 of this Court in Seth Nand Lal & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors. ( ) and the Court repelled the argument firstly on the ground that it was saved by the protective limbrella under Art. 31A and Art 3! B of the .

Constitution and also on other considerations as will be evident from the following observation : "It has been pointed out that adopting 'family' as a unit as against 'an individual' was considered necessary as that would reduce the scope for evasion of law by effecting mala fide- partitions and transfers since such transactions are usμally made in favour of family members that normally in rural agricultura! ' set up in our country the family is the operative unit and all the lands of a family constitute a single operational holding and that 'therefore ceiling should . be ·related to the capacity of a family to 'Cultivate the lands personally. It has been pointed out that keeping all these aspects in view the concept of family was artificially defined and double standard for fixing. ceiling, one for the primary unit and other for the adult son living with the family was adopted In fact, a provision like s. 4(3) which makes for the augmentation. .

of the permissible area for a family when the adult sons do' not own or hold lands of their own but are living with the family has one virtue, that it ensures such augmentation in the case of every family irrespective of by what ·personal law it is governed and no discrimination is made between major sons governed by different systems of personal laws. So far as an adult son living separately from the family is concerned, he is rightly regarded as a separate unit who will have to file a separate <jeclaration in respect of his holding under ·•. 9 of the Act and since he is living separately and would not be contributing ·9is capacity to the family to cultivate the. famiiy lands (1) (1980] 3 S. C. R, 1181. B. B. RAJU v. ANDHRA PRADESH (Misra, J. ) 715 personally, there is no justification for increasing the permissible area of the primary unit of the family..

The case of an unmarried daughter or daughters living with the family, counsel pointed out, was probably considered to be a rare case and it was presumed, that daughters would in normal course get married and would become members of their husbands' units and that iS why no sepa· rate provision was made for giving additional land for every unmarried ma]or daughter living with the family. On the ·materials placed and the initial presumption of constitutionality, we find considerable force in this sub· mission. It is, therefore, not possible to strike down an enactment particularly the enactment dealing with agra· rian reform which bas been put on the Statutes Book with th. e avowed purpose of bringing about equality or rather· reducing the inequality between the haves and the have nots, as being violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution simply because it has failed to. make a provision for what was regarded as an exceptional case or a rare . contingency.

In our view, the material furnished on behalf of the State Government by way of justification for adopting an artificial definition of family and a double standard for fixing ' ceiling is sufficiel)t to rebel the attack on these provisions under Art. 14. " ... We fully concur with the view of the Court. We now take up the fourth ground. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the land transferred by the petitioners in favour of outsiders under various deeds could not be included in their holdings, especially when those transfers were not hit by s. 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Act in as much as the transfers were made much before 24th of fanuary, 1971. This point is again covered by a decision of this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh- v. Mohd. 1 Ashrafuddin( ; to which one of us was a party. In that case the Court had to construe the expression 'held' as defined in s. 3 (i) of the Andhra Pradesh Act.

It reads : · "3(i) · 'holding' means the entire land held by a person,-· (i) as an owner ; · (3l A,. I. ~. 19sz s. ~. 91'\, 716 SUPR,BME COURT REPOKT$ [1983j 3s. c. tt (ii) as a limited owner ; (iii) as a usufructuary mortgage ; (iv) as a tenant ; (v) who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by condi· tional sale or through part performance of a contract for the sale of land or otherwise, or in one or more of such capacities ; and the expression 'to hold. land' shall be cos. trued accordingly. Exalanation :-Where the same land· is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in. any ·other capacity, such land shall be included . in the holding of both such persons. " D;aling with the expressions 'hek! ' the Court observed : I ''The word 'held' is not defined in the Act. We have, therefore, to go by the dictionary meaning of the term. According to Oxford Dictionary 'held' means : to possess to be the owner or holder or tena. nt of; keep possession of; occupy.

Thus, 'held' connotes both ownership as well as possession. And in the context of the definition it is · not possible to interpret the term 'held' only in the sense of possession. For example, if a land is held by an owner and also by a tenant or by a person in possession . ' ~ ... - I ' . pursuant to a contract for sale, the holding will be taken to be the holding of all such· persons. It obviously means that an owner who is not an actual poss. ession will also be tl\~e)l. to b~ a holder of the land. If there 'Yas any doubt in this. behalf, the same has been dispelled by the explanation attach~d to the definition of the term. 'holding'. The explan. ation clearly contemplates that. the same land . ca-,; be th~·holding of two diff~rent persons holding the land in two different capacities. The respondent in view of the definition 9erta\nly is holding as an owner, although he is not in possession. " Shri Phadke, however, contends that s. ~(il.

of the Andhra Pradesh Act being unreasonable is ultra vires because the same land , il. B. RAJU v. ARDHRA PRADE_SH (Misra, J. ) 717 cannot be the land of the transferor as well as of the transferee and that Mohd. Ashrafuddin's case (supra) requires reconsideration. That case has taken into consideration the various relevant provisions of the Act. and the Court came to the conclusion the same land can be the land of the transferor as well as the transferee in view of the definition of the term 'holding' i_n s. 3(i) of the Andhra Pradesh Act and in our opinion the view taken in that case is fully warranted by . ,. the provisions of the Act. We are not persuaded to accept the ' contention that the case requires re-consideration.

This leads us to the last point but not the least in importance, in that the petitioners have been deprived of a substantial portion of their holding in the form of surplus-land and thereby they have been deprived of their livelihood affecting their right to live, which is )'. violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution. In support of this i:ontentio11 ·strong relia nee was placed on the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union ofIndia(') which has given a new dimension to Art. 21 of the Constitution. It was held in that case that right to live is not merely confined to physical existence, but it includes within its ambit the right to live with basic human dignity and the State cannot deprive anyone of this valuable right. It was further submitted that · 1 s. 3(f) of the Andhra Pradesh Act with the explanation added to it is destructive of Art. 21 and, therefore, violative of the basic structure of the Constitution. This point is also covered by two decisions of this Court.

In re Sar:t Ram(') dealing with Art. 21 of the Consti·· tution a Bench of Five Judges of this Court held : "The argument that the word "life" in Art. 21 of the . Constitution includes "livelihood" Iias only ·to be stated to be rejected. " ' "The same view was reiterated by a Bench of three Judges in A. V. Nac! ,ane v. Union of India('). In that case the validity of the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 (I of 1981) and the Life Insurance Corporation of India . Class III and Class IV Employees (Bonus and. Dearness Allowance) Rules, 1981, were challenged I on several grounds including Art. 21 of the Constitution and the - Court dealing with this aspect of the matter quoted with approval the case of Sant Ram (supra) in the following words : (1) [1978] 2 S. C. R. 621. (2) [1960] 3 S. C. R. 499. (3) [198211 s,c. c 206.

"As rega_rds Article 21, the first premise of the argu· ment that the word 'life' in that Article includes livelihood was considered and rejected in In re Sant Ram,'' Shri Phadke, however, brushed these cases aside on the simple ground that they are not relevant for the decision of the question whether the right to live includes the right to Jive with human dignity, and the decision on Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) must be deemed to be the correct exposition of the Jaw on the subject. The contention that life includes livelihood within the meaning of. Art. 21 of the Constitution was repelled in these two cases and Maneka Gandhi's case did not take into consideration the case of Sant Ram (supra). These cases, therefore, still hold the field. Besid~s, the petitioners have been deprived of their holding in the form of surplus land but it ·was only for the purpose of giving relief to ~he downtrodden and the roor agricultural labourers.

The surplus land would vest in the State and the State in its turn would give it to the poor and the downtrodden and thus such a deprivation will be protected under Art. 39 of Directive Principles. The case of Maneka Gandhi (supra), in our opinion, is not relevant for the decision of the point under consideration. The counsel for the petitioners in other cases adopted the same argument of Shri Phadke. Having given our best consideration to the questions involved in the cases we find no· infirmity in any of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act. ' For the foregoing discussion all the special leave petitions and the writ petitions must fail. They are accordingly dissmissed. S. R. Petitions dismissed. -