BHARATHIDASAN UNIVERSITY AND ANR. v. ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND ORS

Citation: [2001] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 253

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: S. RAJENDRA BABU, DORAISWAMY RAJU

Judgment text

BHARATHIDASAN UNIVERSITY AND ANR. v. ""' ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND ORS. SEPTEMBER 24, 2001 - [S. RAJENDRA BABU AND DORAISWAMY RAJU, JJ. ] All India Council For Technical Education Act, 1987: Sec. 2(i), 2(h), 10(1)(k)-Technical Institutions-Meaning of-No approval by All India Council for the Technical Education before commencing a course or programme in Technical Education or New Department-AICTE . filed writ petition to forebear the appellant University from running any new course in Technology-Single Judge ofHigh Court allowing the writ petitionorders for cancellation ofadmission-Division Bench affirmed it-On,appeal held, when legislative intent found spec(fic mention and expression in the '4---,,. proviso of the Act, the same cannot be rendered nugatory in view of object Dj underlying the Act-Approval under section JO(k) for starting a new technical institution/New Course does not cover University. All India Council. for Technical Education (Grant ofapproval.

for Strarting new Technical Institutions, Introduction of Courses ·or Programmes and approval ofintake capacity ofseatsfor the courses orProgrammes) Regulations, 1954; Regulatior 4 and 12-Scope of-Held, Regulation which compels University to seek approval before starting a course/New Deptt. directly opposed to and inconsistent with the provisions of Sec. JO(i)(k)-Hence void and unenforceable. The appellant University, a fulfledged University recognised by the University Grants Commission commenced courses in technology without seeking approval of All India Council For Technical Education. AICTE filed a writ petition to forebear the University authoritil~s from running/ conducting the courses as prior approval before commencing of the courses was not sought for by the University as. envisaged under AICTE Act and statutory regulations made thereunder, particularly Regulation 4.

The stand of appellant University was that it was not a technical institution as per section 2(h) of the Act and consequently Regulations made for seeking approval of the AICTE before commencing a course of technical ed~cation was in excess of regulation making powerof the AICTE and consequently null and void. H. ; ::: ASAN UNIVERSITY v. ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECHNICAL EDUCATION [RAJU, J. ] 265 and have an accepted and well-merited role of Primacy to play in shaping as well as stepping up a co-ordinated development and improvement in the standards of education and research in the sphere of education. When it is only Institutions other than universities which are to seek affiliation, it was not correct to state in the decisions under challenge that an University, which cannot grant affiliation to a technical institution, cannot grant the same to itself.

Consequently, the conclusions rendered based on the principles for classifying enactments into 'general law' and 'special law' to keep them within their respective limits or area of operation are not warranted and wholly uncalled for and do not merit our approval or acceptance. _ The AICTE cannot, in our view, make any regulation in exercise of its powers under Section 23 of the Act, notwithstanding sub-section ( l), which though no doubt enables such re~ulations being made generally to carry out the purposes of the Act, when such power is circumscribed by the specific limitation engrafted therein to ensure them to be "not inconsistent with the r provisions of the Act and the rules.... " So far as the question of granting approval, leave alone prior or post, Section lO(l)(k) specifically confines the limits of such power of AICTE only to be exercised vis-a-vis technical institutions, as defined in the Act and not generally.

When the language is specific, unambiguous and positive, the same cannot be over-looked to give an expansive meaning under the pretext of a purposive construction to perpetuate an ideological object and aim, which also, having regard to the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the AICTE Act,. are not warranted or justified. Therefore, the regulation insofar as it compels the universities to seek for and obtain prior approval and not to start any new department or course or programme in technical education (Regulation 4) and empower itself to withdraw such approval, in a given case of contravention of the regulations (Regulation 12) are directly opposed to and inconsistent with the provisions of Section lO(l)(k) of the Act and consequently void and unenforceable. The fact that the regulations may have the force of law or when made have to be laid down before the legislature concerned do not confer any more sanctity or immunity as though they are statutory provisions themselves.

Consequently, when the power to make regulations are confined to certain limits and made to flow in a well defined canal within stipulated banks, those actually made or shown and found to be not made within its confines. but outside them, the courts are bound to ignore them when the question of their enforcement aris~ and the mere fact that there was no specific relief sought for to strike down or declare them ultra vires, particularly when the party in sufferance is a respondent to the lis or proceedings cannot confer any further sanctity or authority and validity which it is shown and found to obviously and patently lack. It would, therefore, be a myth to state that regulations made· under Section 23 of the Act have "Constit~tional" and legal status, even unmindful of the fact that anyone or more of them are found to be not consistent with· specific provisions of the Act itself. Thus, the regulations in question, which the AICTE could not have.

made so as to bind universities/ UGC within the confines of the powers conferred upon it, cannot be enforced cagainst or bind an University in the matter of any necessity to seek'prior approval to commence a new department or course and programrile in technical education in any university or any of its departments and constituent . ·• instituiions. To put it in a nutshell, a reading of Section 10 of AICTE Act will make it clear that whenever the Act omits to cqver a 'University', the same has been specifically provided in the provisions of the Act. For example, while under clause (k) of Section 10 only 'technical institutions' are referred to, clause (o) of Section 10 provides for the guidelines for admission of students to 'technical institutions' and 'Universities' imparting technical educati'on. If we look at the definition of a 'technical institution' under Section 2(h) of the Act; it is clear that a 'technical institution' cannot include a 'University'.

The clear intention of the Legislature is not that all institutions· whether University or otherwise ought to be treated as 'technical institutions' covered by the Act. If that . was the intention, there was no difficulty for the Legislature to have merely provided a definition of 'technical institution' by not excluding· 'University' from the definition thereof and thereby avoided the necessity to use alon<Tofilde both the words 'technical institutions' and University in several provisions in the Act. The definition of 'technical institution' excludes from its purview a 'University'. When by definition a 'University' is excluded from a 'technical institution•: to interpret that such a clause or such an expression wherever the expression 'technical institution' occurs will include a 'University' will be reading into the Act what is not provided therein.

The power to grant approval for starting new technical institutions and for introduction of new courses or programmes in consultation with the agencies concerned is covered by Section lO(k) which would not cover a 'University but only a 'technical institution'. If Section lO(k) does not cover a 'University' but only a 'technical institution', a regulation cannot be framed in such a manner so as to apply the regulation framed in respect of 'technical institution' to apply for Universities when the Act maintains a complete dichotomy between a 'University' and a 'technical institution'. Thus, we have to focus our attention mainly to the Act in question on the language adopted in that enactment.

In that view of the matter, it is, therefore, not even necessary to examine the scope of other enactments or whether the Act prevails over the University Act or effect of competing entries falling under Entries 63 to 65 of List-I vis-a~ vis Entry 25 of List-III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The fact that initially the syndicate of the appellant-university passed a resolution to seek for approval from AICTE and did not pursue the matter on those lines thereafter or that the other similar entities were adopting such a course of obtaining the same and that the Andhra Pradesh High Court in M. Sambasiva Rao's case (supra) taken a particular view of the matter are not reasons which can be countenanced in law to non-suit the appellant. Nor such . reasons could be relevant or justifying factors to draw any adverse finding against and deny relief by rejecting the claims of the appellant-university.

We also place on record the statement of the learned senior counsei for the appellant, which, in our view, even otherwise is the correct position of law, that the challenge of the appellant with reference to the Regulation in question and claim of the AICTE that the appellant-university should seek and obtain prior approval of the AICTE to start a department or commence a new course or programme in technical education does not mean that they have no obligation or duty to conform to the standards and norms laid down by the AICTE for the purpose of ensuring co-ordinated and integrated development of technical education and maintenance of standards. For all the r~asons stated above, we allow the appeal and consequently set aside the judgment under c:hallenge by dismissing the writ petition filed in the High Court. Having regard to the position of law declared by us, the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in M.

Sambasiva Rao s case (supra) cannot also be considered to lay down the correct position of law. No costs. S. K. S. Appeal allowed.