BHAVNAGAR UNIVERSITY v. PALITANA SUGAR MILL PVT, LTD. AND ORS

Citation: [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 517

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: G.B. PATTANAIK, K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, S.B. SINHA

Judgment text

SHAVNAGAR UNIVERSITY v. PALITANA SUGAR MILL PVT, LTD. AND ORS. DECEMBER 3, 2002 [G. B. PATTANAIK, CJ. , K. G, BALAKRISHNAN AND S. B. SINHA, JJ. ] land laws: Gztjarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976-Sections 20(/) and (2) and 21(/)-Reservation ofland under the Act/or r:cquisition- Failure to acquire for more than I0 years despite service of notice uls 20(2)-/ssuance of draft revised pla1>-Whether the land stood de-reserved/ de-designated or whether the term ofI 0 years stood extended in view ofdraft revised pla1>-Held, the land stands de-reserved/de-designated upon expiry of specified period-Duration of reservation/designation which has lapsed, would not get extended by reason of revised plan-land Acquisition Act, 1894. Interpretation of Statute-Recourse to construction of statute-Need for-Held, is required only in case of ambiguity, obscurity or inconsistency in the statute and not otherwise-True meaning of a provision has.

to he determined from its clear language with due regard to the scheme of law- Scope of legislation or intention of legislature cannot be enlarged when language of provision is unambiguous-A beneficent provision must be liberally construed law of Precedence-Decision is an authority for which it is decided and not what can logically be deduced-A /iule difference in facts and additional facts may make difference in Precedential value of decision. Practice & Procedure: Plea before Supreme Court that contentions raised before High Court not taken into consideration-Held, cannot be gone into-Appropriate remedy lies before High Court in its review jurisdiction. State reserved certain land u/s 20 of Gujarat Tm'Jn Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976. The development plan, on expiry of 10 years from the dale of its publication lapsed. Respondents, the owners of the lands issued notices in terms of Section 20(2) of the Act asking the State to acquire the properties.

Draft of revised development plan was issued. The question for consideration in the cases was whether by reason of inaction on the part of the State to acquire the lands for more than 10 years under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 despite service of notice, the same stood de-reserved/de-designated; or in view ofissuance ofdraft revised plan the term of 10 years stood extended. High Court had held that issuance of draft revised plan by itself does not put an embargo on the application of Section 20(2) of the Act. Hence the present appeals. Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. 1. Sections 20 and 21 of Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 are required to be read conjunctively with Sections 12 and 17 of the Act.

Whereas in terms of Sections-12 and 17, the reservation and designation have been provided, Section 20(1) only enables the authorities to acquire the land designated or reserved for the purpose specifically mentioned in Section 12(2) (b) and (n) as also other clauses specified therefor either by acquisition or agreement or in terms of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 20(1) is merely an enabling provision in terms whereof the State become entitled to acquire the land either by agreement or taking recourse to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. If by reason of revised plan, any other area is sought to be b~ought within the purview of the development, evidently in relation thereto the State will be entitled to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 20(1) but it will bear repetition to state that th. e same would not confer any other or further power upon the State to get the duratio. n of designation of land, which has been lapsed, extended.

What is contemplated under Section 21 is to meet the changed situation and contingencies which might not have been contemplated while preparing the first final development plan. The power ofthe State enumerated under Section 20(1) does not become ipsofacto applicable in the event ofissuance ofa revised . plan as the said provision has been specifically mentioned therein so that the state may use the same power in a changed situation. 1530-D, F, G; 533-H; 534-A-Cj 1. 2. Section 20(2), however, carves out an exception to the exercise of BHAVNAGARUNIVERSITYv. PALITANA SUGAR MILL PVT. LTO. 519 powers by the State as regards acquisition of the land for the purpose" of carrying out the development ofthe area in the manner provided for therein.

In the event the land referred to under Section 20(1) thereof is not acquired or proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act are not commenced and further in the event an owner or a person interested in the land serves a notice in the manner specified therein, certain consequences ensue, namely, the designation of the land shall be deemed to have lapsed. A. legal fiction, therefore, has been created in the said provision. (530-G, H; 531-A] 1. 3. The relevant provisions ofthe Act are absolutely clear, unambiguous and implicit. A plain meaning of the said provisions, would lead to only one conclusion, namely, that in the event a notice is issued by the owner of the land or other person interested therein asking the authority to acquire the land upon expiry ofthe period specified therein viz. ten years from the date of issuance of final development plan and in the event pursuant to or in furtherance thereof no action for acquisition thereof is taken, the designation shall lapse.

(531-F, G] 1. 4. It is true that Section 21 of the Act imposes a statutory obligation on the part of the State and the appropriate auth()rlties to revise the development plan and for the said purpose Sections 9 to 20 'so far as may be' would be applicable thereto, but thereby the rights ofthe owners in terms of Section 20(2) are not taken away. Only because the provision of Section 20 has been referred to therein, it would not mean that thereby the Legislature contemplated that the time often years specified by the Legislature for the purpose ofacquisition ofthe land would get automatically extended. Following the principle of interpretation that all words must be given its full effect, the words "so far as may be" applied to such revision must be given full effect to. (533-B-D) p 1. 5.

The words "so far as may be" indicated the intention of the Legislature to the effect that by providing revision offinal development plan from time to time and at least once in ten years, only the procedure or preparation thereof as provided therein, is required to be followed. Such procedural requirements must be followed so far as it is reasonably possible. Section 21 of the Act, does not and cannot mean that the substantial right conferred upon the owner of the land or the person interested therein shall be taken away. It is not and cannot be the intention of the Legislature that what is given by one hand should be taken away by the other. )533-D-F] 1. 6. Section 21 does not envisage that despite the fact that in terms of Section 20(2), the designation of land shall lapse, the same, only because a draft revised plan is m~de, would automatically give rise to revival thereof.

Section 20 does not manifest a Legislative intent to curtail or take away the right acquired by a landowner under Section 22 vfgetting the land defreezed. (533-G) 1. 7. The statutory interdict of use and enjoyment of the property must be strictly construed. When a statutory authority is required to do a thing in a particular manner, the same must be done in that manner or not at all. The State and other authorities while acting under the said Act are only creature of statui. e. They must act within the four-corners thereof. By reason of the provision of the Act, a reasonable restriction, has been imposed upon the owner on the user ofhis property. An owner ofa property, subject to reasonable restrictions which may be imposed by the Legislature, is entitled to enjoy the l>roperty in any manner he likes. A right to use a property in a particular manner or in other words a restriction imposed on user thereof except in the mode and manner laid down under statute would not be presumed.

(534-D; 529-G; 529-C] 1. 8. However, despite statutory lapse ofdesignation ofthe land, the State is not denuded of its power ofeminent domain under the general law, namely, Land Acquisition Act in the event an exigency arises therefor. (534-E) KL. Gupta and Ors. v. The Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors. , (1968) 1 SCR 274; Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority v. Manila/ Gordhandas and Ors. , (1996) ll SCC 482 and Murari and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. , [1997) 1SCC15, distin. guished. Municipal Corporation ofGrerater Bombay v. Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants' Association and Ors. , (1988) Supp. SCC 55, referred to. 2. 1. It is the basic principle of construction of statute that the same should be read as a whole chapter by chapter, section by section and words by words. Recourse to construction or interpretation of statute is necessary when there is ambiguity, obscurity, or-inconsistency therein and not otherwise.

An effort must be made to give effect to all parts ofstatute and unless absolutely necessary, no part thereof shall be rendered surplusage or redundant. True meaning of a provision of law has to be determined on the basis of what it provides by its clear language, with due regard to the scheme oflaw. (528-F-G) 2. 2. Scope of the legislation on the intention of the legislature cannot BHAVNAGAR UNIVERSITY v. PALITANA SUGAR MILL PVT. LTD 521 be enlarged when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. In other words statutory enactments must ordinarily be construed according to its plain meaning and no words shall be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconciliable with the rest of the statute. 1528-H; 529-AI 2. 3. A beneficient provision of legislation must be liberally construed so as to fulfill the statutory purpose and not to frustrate it.

1529-BI legislation and Interpretation by Jagdish Swarup, page 479 referred to. 3. The purpose and object of creating a legal fiction in the statute is well-known. When a legal fiction is created, it must be given its full effect. 1531-B] M Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Machilipatnam, A. P. and Anr. , (1994] 2 SCC 323; Indian Oil Corporation limited v. Chief Inspector ofFactories and Ors. etc. , (19981 5 SCC 738; Valtas Limited Bombay v. Union ofIndia and Ors. , (1995) Supp. 2 SCC 498; Harish Tandon v. Addi. District Magistrate, Allahabad, U. P. and Ors. , (1995] l SCC 537 and G. Viswanathan etc. v. Hon'bleSpeaker, Tamil Nadu legislative Assembly, Madras and Anr. , [1996) 2 sec 353, referred to. East End Dwelling Co. ltd v. Finsbury Borough Council, (1951) 2 All ER 587, referred to. 4.

When a public functionary is required to do a certain thing within a specified time, the same is ordinarily directory but when consequence for inaction on the part of the Statutory authorities within such specified time is expressly provided, it must be held to be imperative. (534-F] Datta/rays v. State ofBombay, AIR (1952) SC 181, referred to. Sutherland, Statutory Construction 3rd edition, Vo/. 3 p. 102; Crawford on Statutory Construction, Article 269 p. 535; Craies on Statute law VIJI Edn. page 262 and Interpretation and Application of Statutes by Reed Dickerson page 7, referred to. 5. A decision is an authority for which it is decided and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. A little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision. [540-F] Smt. Ram Rakhi v. Union ofIndia and Ors. AIR (2002) Delhi 458; Delhi Administration (NCT ofDelhi) ·v. Manoharlal, AIR (2002) SC 3088; Haryana Financial Corporation andAnr. v.

Mis. Jagdamba Oil Mills and Anr. , JT 2002 1SC482 and Dr. Nalini Mahajan etc. v. Director ofIncome Tax (Investigation) and Ors. , (2002) 257 ITR 123, referred to. 6. The contention that various other points had been raised before High Court which were not taken into consideration, cannot be gone into in as much as assuming the same to be correct, the remedy of the appellants would lie in filing appropriate application for review before the High Court. [541-A] State ofMaharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and Anr. , AIR (1982) SC 1249, relied on. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8003 of2002. From the Judgment and Order dated 24. 11. 2000 of the High Court of Gujarat in SCA 1032 of 1996. WITH Civil Appeal Nos. 1539, 1540, 1541 of2001 and Civil Appeal Nos. 8004-. 8012 of2002. Kirit N. Rawal, SG, Gopal Subramanium, Bhaskar Tanna, T. R. Andhyarujina, Ashok H. Desai, P. N. Mishra, Yatin Oza, H. N. Salve, S. H. • Sanjanwala, S.

Muralidhar, Rashmin Chaya, Umesh Trivedi, Shreys Jayasimha, Anip Sachthey, Ms. H. Wahi, Janak Shah, V. D. Khanna, Jatin Zeveri, P. H. Parekh, Rohit Alex, Huzefa Ahmadi, Amit Dhingra, Arun Francis, Ms. Sweety Manchanda, Ms. J. S. Wad, Ashish Wad and Ms. Niharika Bahl, for Mis. J. S. Wad & Co. , Ms. Alka Agarwal, for M/s. l. M. Nanavati Associates, B. V. Desai, Ms. Vanita Mehta, P. K. Manohar, Ms. Anu Mohla and M. N. Shroff for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S. B. SINHA, J. Leave granted in special leave petitions. This batch ofappeals arising out ofcommon Judgment and Order ofthe Gujarat High Court at Ahmedal>! td'fo SCA Nos. 10108/94, 4427/92, 4733/92, 4847/92, 3537/95, 8882/99, 8~88/99, 6461196 EJtd 6519/98 involving the. question .. t' BHAVNAGAR UNIVERSITY 1·. PALITANA SUGAR MILL PVT. LTD. [M. B. SHAH, J. J 523 as regard to interpretation of Sections 20 and 21 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 (for brevity.

hereinafter referred to as the 'Said Act'), \Vere taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this com1non judg1nent. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. The State of Gujarat in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Section 20 of the said Act reserved certain areas of which the respondents herein amongst others are the owners. On or about 3. 3. 1986 a development plan was finally published in terms of the provisions of the said Act, and the period of I0 years therefrom lapsed on 2. 3. 1996. A revised Development plan however came into being on 20th February, 1996. It is not in dispute that respondents who claim ownership of the lands in question issued notices in terms of sub-section 2 of Section 20 of the said Act, asking the State Government to acquire the properties in terms thereof.

The short question which arises for consideration in these matters is as • to whether by reason of inaction on the part of the State and its authorities under t~e Town Planning Act to acquire the lands for a period of more than 10 years, in terms of the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 despite service of notice, the same stood de-reserved/de-designated or in view of issuance of draft revised plan under Section 21 thereof, the term of 10 years stood extended? The contention of the respondents before the High Court was that on a plain reading of the provisions of Section 20 ofthe said Act, it would appear that the appellants were under a statutory obligation to take steps for acquisition of land on receipt of the requisite notice in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act and on their failure to do so the reservation/ designation in respect of land in question would lapse.

Per contra the contention of the Appellant was that the provisions of Section 20(2) of the Act although enables service of notice by land owners for acquisition within six moths from the expiry of I0 years from the date of final development plan but the same would not come into operation when the final development plan is in the process of revision under Section 21 of the said Act read with sub~section 1 of section 20 thereof. The High Court upon taking into consideration the provisions of the said Act and upon consideration of the rival contentions raised therein came to the conclusion that issuance of a draft revised plan by itself does not put an embargo on the application of sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the said Act. The appellants were represented by Mr. Kirit N. Rawal. Solicitor General and Mr. T. R. Andhyarujina, learned senior counsel appearing for the Gujarat University and Mr. Tanna for the South Gujarat University.

The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that having regard to the scope and purport of the said Act, the High Court must be held to have erred in so f~r as it failed to take into consideration that the objects of an integrated, incorporated and interdependent development plan, cannot be fully achieved within a period of 10 years and in that view of the matter when steps are taken for revision of the final development plan, the period specified in sub-section (2) of Section 20 w. ould get automatically extended. Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on K. L. Gupta and Ors. v. The Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors. , [1968] l SCR 274, Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority v. Manila/ Gordhandas and Ors. , [1996] 11 SCC 482 and Murari and Ors. v. Union ofIndia and Ors. , [1997] I SCC 15. On the other hand, the submissions of learned counsel for the respondents led by Mr.

Ashok Desai the learned senior counsel is that in the event the interpretation of the provisions of Sections 20 and 21 as suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted, the same· would render sub-section 2 of Section 20 otiose and redundant. According to learned counsel the right of an owner of the land cannot be kept under suspension for a long time and the period of I0 years specified by the legislature must • be held to be a reasonable one, and thus by n . PALITANA SUGAR MILL PVT. LTD. [M. B. SHAH, J. ] 535 a limitation of the power of the Officer. " At p. I07 it is pointed out that a statutory direction to private individuals should generally be considered as mandatory and that the rule is just the opposite to that which obtains with respect to public officers. Again, at p.

I09, it is pointed out that often the question as to whether a mandatory or directory construction should be given to a statutory provision may be determined by an expression in the statute itself of the result that shall follow non-compliance with the provision. At p. 111 it is stated as follows : "As a corollary of the rule outlined above, the fact that no consequences of non-compliance are stated in the statute, has been considered as a factor tending towards a directory construction. But this is only an element to be considered, and is by no means conclusive. " [See also Crawford on Statutory Construction , Article 269 at p. 535)• In Dattatrays v. State of Bombay [AIR 1952 SC 181), it was held as under :- "Generally speaking the provisions of a statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring private rights are imperative.

When the provisions of statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the Legislature, it has been the practice of the courts to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them not affecting the validity of the acts done. " In Craies on Statute Law VIII Edn.

at page 262, it is stated thus :- "It is the duty of courts ofjustice to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed that is each case you must look to the subject-matter, consider the importance ofthe provision and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act, and upon a review of the case in that aspect decide whether the enactment is what is called imperative or only directory. " In the aforementioned backdrop, we may usefully refer to the decision of this Court in The land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore's case (st! pra) wherein it has been stated :- "There was some argument on the meaning of the words "so far as they are applicable", used in Section 27 of the Bangalore Act. These words cannot be changed into "in so far as they are specifically mentioned" with regard to the procedure in the Acquisition Act.

On the other hand, the obvious intention, in using these words, was to exclude only those provisions of the Acquisition Act which become inapplicable because of any special procedure prescribed by the Bangalore Act (e. g. Section 16) corresponding with that found in the Acquisition Act (e. g. Section 4(1)). These words bring in or make applicable, so far as this is reasonably possible, general provisions such as Section 23(1) ofthe Acquisition Act. They cannot be reasonably construed to exclude the application of any general provisions of the Acquisition Act. They amount to laying down the principle that what is not either expressly, or, by a necessary implication, excluded must be applied. It is surprising to find misconstruction of what did not appear to us to be reasonably open to more than one interpretation. " We may at this juncture usefully quote the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes : "It is sometimes more important to emphasize the obvious than to elucidate the obscure".

(See the Interpretation and Application of Statutes by Reed Dickerson at page 7). The decision of this Court in KL. Gupta's case (supra), whereupon the learned coun. sel for the Appellant strongly relied upon, may in the aforementioned backdrop, be considered. In that case, the vires of the provisions of Sections 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 ofthe Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 were in question. Although the constitutionality of Section 17 of the Act was also questioned before this Court, at the hearing the same was given up. The Court specifically noticed so stating :- "Towards the end of the hearing counsel for the petitioners submitted that s. 17 of the Act might be left out of consideration for the purpose of these petitions and learned counsel for the respondents were agreeable to this course. We, therefore, do not express our views about the validity or otherwise of this section. " In that case the rights of the owners accrued to them having regard to BHAVNAGAR UNIVERSITY 1·.

PALITANA SUGAR MILL PVT. LTD. [M. B_ SHAH, J. ] 537 the inaction on the part of the State and other authorities despite rights to the owners of land as envisaged under sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act were not in question. Section 17 of the Act was in pari 111ateria with Section 21 of the said Act. The scheme of the provisions of the Bombay Act as regards designation or reservation of land for ten years and further right of revision after every ten years was considered having regard to the challenges made therein that thereby the State was conferred with· a power which was unreasonable and thus violative of Articles 14 and 19(1) of the Constitution of India. The observations made by this Court should be understood in that context. In that case the rival contention as regards interpretation of the statute was not the subject-matter of the consideration of the Constitution Bench.

The scheme of the Act was noticed thus :- "The idea behind this sub-section is that if any land is to be set apart for public purposes such as parks etc. mentioned in cl. (b) of s. 7 or any other public purpose which might be approved by a local authority or directed by the State Government in terms of cl. (e) of s. 7, the State Government must examine whether it would be possible for the local authority to be able to acquire such land by private agreement or compul. sory purchase within a period of ten years. This acts as a check on the local authority making too ambitious proposals for designating lands for public purposes which they may never have the means to fulfil. It is obvious that the local authority must be given a reasonable time for the purpose and the legislature thought that a period of ten years was a sufficient one. S. 11(I) empowers the local authority to acquire any land designated in the development plan for a purpose specified in els. (b), (c), (d) or (e) of s.

7 either by agreement or under the Land Acquisition Act. Under sub-s. (2) of s. 11 the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 as amended by the Schedule to the Act are to apply to all such acquisitions. The Schedule to the Act shows that s. 23 of the Land Acquisition Act is to stand amended for the acquisition under this Act with regard to the compensation to be awarded. In fact it is for the benefit of the person whose land is acquired, as he can get the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the declaration under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in place of s. 4. Sub-s. (3) provides that ifthe designated land is not acquired by agreement within ten years from the date specified under sub-s. (3) of s. I0 or ifproceedings under the Land Acquisition Act are not commenced within such period, the owner or any person interested in the land may serve r.

cticc to the local authority and if within six months from the date of such notice the land is not acquired or no steps as aforesaid are commenced for its acquisition, the designation shall be deemed to have lapsed. This provision again is for the benefit ofthe owner ofthe land for unless the land is acquired or steps taken in that behalf within the fLXed limits of time, he ceases to be bound by the designation ofhis land as given in the development plan. " (Emphasis Supplied) What was emphasised in that case is unreasonableness of Section 17 of the Act which, as indicated hereinbefore, was not pressed at a later stage. This Court had no occasion to consider the conflicting rights of the parties under sub-section (3) of Section 10 vis. _a- vis Section 17 of the Bombay Act. What was considered and upheld by the Court was the contention that by taking the recourse to Section 17 more than once acquisition might be held up indefinitely from generation to generation.

As the facts of the present case stand absolutely on a different footing and this Court in KL. Gupta's case (supra) was not called upon to answer the same, the same cannot be said to be an authority for the proposition that by reason of Section 21 of the Act, the designation of the land although lapsed in terms of Section 20, the same would get automatically extended or revised once a revised plan is made. This Court in K. L. Gupta's case merely held that the land which is reserved for ten years can be subjected to further reservation for any period till it is actually required for its town planning activities leading to revision of development plans from time to time. Therein, this Court did not negate the right ofowners. Such a right of the land-owners, ... as noticed hereinbefore, has been specifically acknowledged.

Nowhere it was stated that valuable right conferred on a land-owner of getting his land reserved by serv_ing notice would be defeated or taken away merely because a revised development plan was in the offing. The question raised in the said case, thus, was absolutely different. It is interesting to note that the law of the land was considered therein, as it then stood by observing :- "No one can be heard to say that the local authority after making up BHAVNAGAR UNIVERSITY 1·. PALITANA SUGAR MILL PVT. LTD. [M. B. SHAH. J. ] 539 its mind to acquire land for a public purpose must do so within as short a period of time as possible. It would not be reasonable to place such a restriction on the po\ver of the local authority \Vh ich is out to create better living conditions for 1nillions of people in a vast area. " However. we may notice that the Parliament amended the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 in terms whereof, inter alia, Section 11 A was inserted.

In the Objects and Reasons of the said Act, it was stated :- "With the enormous expansion of the State's role in promoting public welfare and economic development since independence, acquisition of land for public purposes, industrialization, building of institutions, etc. , has become far more numerous than ever before. While this is inevitable, promotion of public purpose has to be balanced with the rights of the individual. whose land is acquired, thereby often depriving him of his means of livelihood. Again, acquisition of land for private enterprises ought not to be placed on the same footing as acquisition for the State or for an enterprise under it. The individual and institutions who are unavoidably to be deprived of their property rights in land need to be adequately compensated for the loss keeping in view the sacrifice they have to make for the larger interests of the community.

The pendency of acquisition proceedings for long period often causes hardship to the affected parties and renders unrealistic the scale of compensation offered to them. " The decision in Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority's case (supra), in our opinion, has again no application to the fact of the present case. The fact of the matter therein was completely different. The Gujarat Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976, which is now in operation in the State of Gujarat, came into force from 30th November, 1978, prior to which the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 was applicable to the State of Gujarat. Prior to coming into force ofthe Gujarat Act, the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation submitted the development plan on 15th January, 1976 which came to be sanctioned by the State Government on 12th August, 1983.

It was held by this Court that the draft development plan submitted by the Corporation on 15th January, 1976, could not have been sanctioned under the provisions of the Gujarat Act on 12th August, 1983 ignoring the fact that meanwhile a comprehensive draft development plan had been prepared and submitted by the Corporation on 23rd July, 1981 which also came to be sanctioned en 2nd November, 1986 and which included the areas covered by the earlier illegally sanctioned plan on 12th August, 1983. In the aforementioned peculiar facts, the question arose as to from which date the period of ten years had to be reckoned for application of Section 20(2) of the Act.

This Court answered the aforementioned question in the folluwing ttr111s :- "As in the present case the only question which is to be answered is as to with effect from which date I0 years period shall be counted, it has to be decided as to which date shall be deemed to be the date of coming into force of the final development plan, so far the area within the Corporation is concerned. The notification dated 2. 11. 1987, had been issued by the State Government covering the area notified on 12. 8. 1983, several years before, the issuance of notices by the writ petitioners. The notification dated 2. 11. 1987, was neither questioned by the writ petitioners-respondents nor could have been questioned, according to us.

When power has been vested in the appellant to prepare a d_raft development plan and there being no bar to include in the said draft development plan even area, for which an earlier draft development plan had already been sanctioned, then the draft development plan which was sanctioned and notified on 2. 11. 1987, shall be deemed to be the final development plan within the meaning of Section 20 of the Gujarat Town Planning Act. As such the period of IO years has to be calculated and counted with reference to 3. 12. 1987, the date when such final development was to come into force. " Yet again the decision of this Court in Murari's case (supra) has no application to the fact ofthis matter. The question which arose for consideration therein was as to whether in terms of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act any actual "physical possession is required to be obtained or merely taking the possession specified therein would serve the purpose.

Having regard to the provision of the said Act, we are of the opinion that the decisions cited by the learned Solicitor General have no application in the instant case. A decision, as is well-known, is an authority for which it is decided and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. It is also well-settled that a little difference in facts or addition!! -1 facts . may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision. [See Smt. Ram Rakhi v. Union ofIndia and Ors. , AIR (2002) Delhi 458, Delhi Administration (NCT ofDelhi) v. Manoharlal, AIR (2002) SC 3088, Haryana Financial Corporation and Anr. v. Mis. Jagdamba Oil Mills and Anr. , JT (2002) l SC 482 and Dr. Nalini Mahajan etc. v. Director ofIncome Tax (Investigation) and Ors. , [2002] 257 ITR 123. ' BHAVNAGAR UNIVERSITY 1·. PALITANA S. UGAR MILL PVT LTD_ [M. 8. SHAH. J] 541 For the aforementioned reasons, \Ve are in agree1nent with the findings of the High Court. Before parting with the case.

\Ve 1nay notice that Mr. Tanna appearing on behalfofthe South Gujarat University in C. A. No. 1540 of2002 submitted that various other contentions had also been raised before the High Court. We are not prepared to go into the said contentions inasmuch assuming the same to be correct, the remedy of the appellants would lie in filing appropriate application for review before the High Court. Incidentally, we may notice that even in the special leave petition no substantial question of law in this behalf has been raised nor any affidavit has been affirmed by the learned advocate who had appeared before the High Court or by any officer of the appellant who was present in court that certain other submissions \Vere made before the High Court which were not taken into consideration.. In State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and Anr.

, AIR (1982) SC 1249, this Court observed :- "When we drew the attention of the learned Attorney General to the concession made before the High Court, Shri A. K. Sen, who appeared for the State of Maharashtra before the High Court and led the . · arguments for the respondents there and who appeared for Shri Antulay before us intervened and protested that he never made any such concession and invited us to peruse the written submission made by him in the High Court. We are afraid that we cannot launch into an inquiry as to what transpired in the High Court. It is simply not done. Public Policy bars us. Judicial decorum restrains us. Matters of judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena. "Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation". (Per Lord Atkinson in Somasundaran v. Subramanian, AIR (1926) PC 136).

We are bound to accept the statement of the Judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired in court. We cannot allow the statement of the Judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well-settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence.

If a party thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the attention of the very Judges, who have made the record to the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a statement that had been made in error (Per lord Buckmaster in Madhusudan v. Chandrabati, AIR ( 1917) PC 30. That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. Of course a party may resile and an Appellate Court may permit him in rare and appropriate cases to resile from a concession on the ground that the concession was made on a wrong appreciation of the law and had led to gross injustice; but, he may not call in question the very fact of making the concession as recorded in the judgment. " For the aforementioned reasons, there is no merit in these appeals which are dismissed.

However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. K. K. T.. Appeals dismissed. .. _